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Abstract
Detection and prevention of collusive behavior are primary concerns of regulatory and
antitrust authorities. This includes the exposure of explicit collusion, i.e., cartels, as well
as the avoidance of tacit collusion in order to create competitive markets. In an effort to
acquaint regulators with market structures and firm behavior that facilitate implicit co-
ordination among competing firms, this thesis investigates principle characteristics of
oligopolistic markets with respect to their propensity to collude tacitly. These main fea-
tures are (i) strategic interactions of few competitors, (ii) multimarket contact between
those firms, and (iii) vertically related upstream and downstream markets.
The market characteristics are investigated theoretically and empirically with a focus
on economic laboratory experiments. Considering the lack of field data on tacit col-
lusion due to the difficulties in detecting collusive behavior, experimental economics
constitute a complementary research method which bridges the gap between theory
and field evidence. In particular, economic laboratory experiments are well suited to
systematically study the factors that may lead to tacit collusion in spite of the restrictive
assumptions of theory or the deficiency of internal validity in real-world data.
As groundwork for the investigation of oligopoly characteristics, part one of the thesis
reports on analyses of the experimental methodology itself. Its potential with respect
to regulatory policy advice in general is assessed in a literature review that results in
guidelines for corresponding experimental designs. In particular, the survey spans the
spectrum of experiments by classifying them into those aiming for external validity by
implementing regularities of a specific industry and those targeting internal validity by
considering the most simplistic laboratory environment. A key design element of any
experiment is the mode of timing. The vast majority of experiments consider discrete
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time although continuous time may be argued to be a more realistic alternative. There-
fore, both modes of timing are evaluated in an oligopoly competition experiment in
which tacit collusion is found to be higher under discrete time than under continuous
time. This finding emphasizes the implications of an experimenter’s choice of timing.
Part two of the thesis is dedicated to theoretical and empirical analyses of the interac-
tions of market structures and tacit collusion. First, the effect of the number of firms on
tacit collusion is investigated by a meta-analysis of extant oligopoly experiments and
by two experiments with symmetric and asymmetric firms. By systematic variation of
the number of firms as well as the mode of competition, all analyses show that contrary
to prominent belief the competitiveness of an industry does not strictly increase with
the number of competitors. In fact, triopolies and quadropolies are found to be equally
competitive, which bears important ramifications for merger control and ex ante reg-
ulation of oligopolies. Second, a theory of conglomerate firms’ price setting behavior
is developed that explains under which circumstances multimarket contact facilitates
tacit collusion compared to single market contact. The theory builds on firms’ abil-
ity to communicate collusive intentions solely through their price setting behavior and
on the conjecture that such price signaling can be conducted more efficiently under
multimarket contact. The findings suggest that limiting conglomerate firms’ possibil-
ity to engage in price discrimination across geographically segmented markets may
effectively reduce tacit collusion. Third, tacit collusion is also investigated in an en-
vironment of vertically related markets. In an industry in which wholesale access for
a non-integrated reseller is provided by two vertically integrated firms, a laboratory
experiment reveals that wholesale competition may facilitate tacit collusion, yielding
wholesale and retail prices even above the monopoly level. Whereas regulation pre-
venting a margin squeeze fails to decrease prices, a simple price commitment rule at
the wholesale level is found to substantially reduce tacit collusion. These results in-
dicate that consumers may be worse off under a wholesale duopoly with unregulated
competitive wholesale provision relative to the case of a wholesale monopoly. Alto-
gether, these findings highlight the vital importance of research on competition policy
and of regulation itself in safeguarding competition.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“If we want our regulators to do better, we have to embrace a simple idea: regulation isn’t an
obstacle to thriving free markets; it’s a vital part of them.”
James Surowiecki (2010)
DETECTION and prevention of anti-competitive behavior are among the pri-mary concerns of regulatory and antitrust authorities. This precept is based on
the rationale of welfare economics that effective competition results in a market out-
come which maximizes total surplus and that is hence considered to be efficient. The
most prominent mode of anti-competitive behavior by more than a single firm is collu-
sion. In general, this term refers to “an agreement among firms to divide the market,
set prices, or limit production” (O’Sullivan and Sheffrin, 2003, p. 171). More specific,
two forms of collusion are differentiated in antitrust policy with respect to the process
of how such an agreement is concluded: explicit collusion and tacit collusion. While the
former is at the core of what constitutes a cartel, the latter refers to conduct that results
in implicit coordination among firms without the need of explicit communication. Al-
though procedurally different they may lead to similar distortions of competition and
1
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thus both the exposure of explicit collusion as well as the prevention of tacit collusion
are integral components of competition authorities’ remit. Whereas the formation of
a cartel is illegal conduct in most countries, e.g., according to the United States (US)
Sherman Act or Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(EU), tacit collusion is by definition informal and therefore lacks the ground for pros-
ecution of an identifiable illegal action. Therefore, ex ante regulation and likewise ex
post competition policy warrant expertise on how to safeguard competition and hinder
tacit collusion. Consequently, a substantial amount of economic research is devoted
to characterize market conditions that facilitate tacit collusion among competing firms,
which can in turn aid authorities in identifying anti-competitive market structures and
deciding on appropriate regulatory remedies. This body of research may broadly be
categorized into theoretical, empirical, and experimental approaches.
First, with respect to game-theoretic analyses of non-cooperative games—apart from
few exceptions—predictions of collusion are attained only in infinitely repeated games,
i.e., an environment in which the same game is repeated endlessly. For instance, a
common assumption in the theoretical literature on collusion is that a firm behaves ac-
cording to a grim trigger strategy which provides that the firm (i) plays the collusive
action until one of its competitors deviates from this action and (ii) in case of a deviation
punishes the deviating rival from that point on by infinite play of the competitive ac-
tion. If all competing firms follow the grim trigger strategy stable collusive play occurs
on condition that all firms sufficiently value future profits compared to present profits.
In other words, competitors engage in joint profit maximization (JPM) if and only if
they discount future profits at least as much as according to the critical discount factor.
Therefore, standard economic theory predicts collusion only if the rationale of back-
ward induction and likewise profitable deviation does not apply due to a time horizon
that is not finite but infinite. Ivaldi et al. (2003) provide a comprehensive summary of
the theoretical evidence on tacit collusion.
Second, with regard to empirical research, it is notoriously hard to obtain robust evi-
dence for the existence of tacit collusion as it lacks a formal agreement that is observ-
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able in the field. More general, a benchmark for competition, which is required to
assess whether a market outcome is collusive or not, is difficult to attain in empirical
data. However, even if such a benchmark can be defined, it still remains to be judged
whether supra-competitive prices should be attributed to a cartel and hence, explicit
collusion, or to idiosyncrasies of the market structure and thus, tacit collusion. Con-
sequently, the insights that can be retrieved from empirical analyses on causal effects
in this context are limited. The few extant field studies on the identification of tacit
collusion are reviewed by Feuerstein (2005).
Third and lastly, with respect to experimentation in economics, laboratory environ-
ments are well suited to systematically analyze the factors that facilitate tacit collusion.
In contrast to empirical analyses of field data, a benchmark for competition is readily
given by the game implemented in the experiment and hence tacit collusion can be
measured and compared across varying market structures. The result is a high level of
internal validity due to controlled variation as well as randomization of uncontrollable
input variables, which is, however, accompanied by a potential lack of external validity.
In this vein, regarding the economics of tacit collusion, laboratory experiments may be
used as a testbed for the competitiveness of alternative market structures and thereby
constitute a complementary research methodology that bridges the gap between the-
ory and the field. Recent experimental studies on tacit collusion are surveyed by Pot-
ters and Suetens (2013). Engel (2007, 2015) further contributes to a formalization of the
experimental evidence on tacit collusion by means of meta-analyses.
In a nutshell, the combined research indicates that (i) a low number of firms and (ii)
multimarket contact are two of the main drivers of tacit collusion. Both of these mar-
ket properties are distinctive of oligopolies. An oligopoly is by definition character-
ized by a fewness of competitors. Worldwide examples are the airliner market, which
is effectively a duopoly with Airbus and Boeing, and the video game console market
that is shared among Microsoft, Nintendo, and Sony. Moreover, it can be observed that
oligopolies frequently arise in industries of natural monopolies, i.e., in industries with
subadditive cost functions so that “multi-firm production is more costly than produc-
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tion by a monopoly” (Baumol, 1977, p. 810). In order to allow for competition in these
industries, they are often regulated. Obvious examples for natural monopolies are net-
work industries, which are characterized by both high sunk infrastructure investments
and strict regulation. More specific, energy and telecommunications markets in many
countries are dominated by a low number of firms. Furthermore, these industries also
exhibit multimarket contact between conglomerate oligopolistic competitors. For in-
stance, the end consumer market for fuel is concentrated in many countries with few
firms controlling most of the gas stations. At the same time, consumers cannot move
their demand for fuel arbitrarily. Obviously, demand for fuel is geographically tied and
therefore multimarket contact occurs. An even more distinct example for a regulated
oligopoly are mobile and fixed telecommunications markets in Europe.
As detailed in Section 1.1, the consolidation in and fragmentation of European telecom-
munications markets reduces the number of network operators and increases multi-
market contact—whilst at the same time the European Commission (EC) targets a single
market for telecommunications and digital industries across the EU. After this motivat-
ing example, Section 1.2 derives the research questions in the context of tacit collusion
in oligopolies and regulated industries that underlie this thesis. Section 1.3 introduces
the structure of the remainder of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
In 2010, the EC formulated the Digital Agenda for Europe as one of the seven pillars
of its Europe 2020 Strategy. The agenda’s main objective is to develop a digital single
market (DSM), which is also among the ten priorities set out by the current Juncker
Commission and assumed to boost the European gross domestic product by up to
EUR 415 billion (European Commission, 2015c). The strategy towards the implementa-
tion of a DSM builds on three pillars, one of which is to create “the right conditions
for digital networks and services to flourish” (European Commission, 2015c, p. 3).
In particular, this pillar is primarily aimed at reviewing the telecommunications reg-
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ulation to “ensure that markets operate more competitively and bring lower prices
and better quality of service to consumers and businesses, while ensuring the right
regulatory conditions for innovation, investment, fair competition and a level playing
field” (European Commission, 2015b, p. 3). Scholars, authorities, and industry profes-
sionals (Pelkmans and Renda, 2011; Parcu and Silvestri, 2014; European Commission,
2013b; European Policy Center, 2010; van Gorp et al., 2011) agree that the EU is still
fragmented into 28 national telecommunications markets based on indicators that are
believed to reflect the state of cross-border merging. In essence, a connected DSM is
pictured as an EU-wide market in which (i) consumers purchase telecommunications
services across member states at sufficiently homogeneous prices, (ii) online trade of
goods and provision of services is ubiquitous also across national borders, (iii) levels of
broadband coverage and subscriptions are high and converged, and (iv) firms operate
in a continent-spanning digital economy. However, a host of barriers to the DSM is
discerned in the literature which can be summarized into four categories: (i) economic
differences between member states, (ii) cultural differences between populations, (iii)
consumers’ concerns with respect to data privacy and protection, and (iv) heterogeneity
in regulatory approaches—the latter of which is unanimously viewed as the key imped-
iment of the evolution of a DSM. This notion is summarized trenchantly by Alexander
Italianer (2015), then Director-General of the EC’s Directorate General for Competition:
“We have an open telecom market, but we don’t have a European telecom market.”
Therefore, the goal that is pursued with the above-mentioned pillar of EC’s DSM strat-
egy is a convergence of telecommunications regulation and eventually of telecommu-
nications markets across the EU. However, this process is likely to facilitate two de-
velopments which can already be discerned in national European telecommunications
markets today and which are related to anti-competitive effects: (i) a consolidation of
telecommunications network operators and (ii) an increase in multimarket contact be-
tween telecommunications service providers. With respect to the mobile telecommuni-
cations industry, the ongoing consolidation is highlighted by an increasing concentra-
tion of (national) markets. In particular, as a consequence of horizontal mergers the
number of mobile network operators recently decreased from four to three in Austria,
5
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Ireland, and Germany (Walle and Wambach, 2014). Yet the industry is also concentrated
on the European level. Across member states, the four biggest mobile network oper-
ators combine approximately 60% of all subscribers in the EU; again the two biggest
of these companies, Vodafone and Deutsche Telekom, operate directly or through sub-
sidiaries in twelve and eleven EU member states, respectively (Vestager, 2015). Seven
of these countries overlap so that both firms meet each other in these national markets.
Other mobile network operators or mobile virtual network operators are present in
more than a single country as well. These examples demonstrate that several telecoms
are conglomerate firms that meet the same competitors in multiple national markets.
In other words, multimarket contact is pervasive in the European mobile telecommu-
nications industry.
Although in a different vein, this also applies to the fixed telecommunications industry.
In many European countries, the fixed broadband infrastructure is almost exclusively
owned by a single firm, i.e., the incumbent, which originates from the fact that most
of the fixed telephone networks were built by state-owned enterprises, which were
later privatized—in conjunction with the network infrastructure. Therefore, to allow
for competition nevertheless, access to these infrastructures is regulated in most coun-
tries. However, the increasing transmission of content via the Internet Protocol, which
is independent of the underlying infrastructure, makes cable networks more popular
as their operators offer telecommunications services that are equal (or even superior) in
quality to those of traditional fixed telecommunications operators. In fact, whereas al-
most 94% of EU households have a digital subscriber line (DSL) connection at their dis-
posal, more than 44% are connected to a cable infrastructure so that at least a third of all
households can choose between these two network types when subscribing for broad-
band (European Commission, 2015a). Due to consolidation movements among cable
operators by conglomerate mergers over distinct geographic areas, several regions of
the EU are not only governed by infrastructure competition between traditional tele-
coms and cable operators, but also exhibit increasing multimarket competition within
national borders. Since demand for telecommunications services over fixed infrastruc-
ture is arguably only to a very limited extent geographically transferable, it may be
6
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argued that the market for fixed broadband is geographically segmented at the sub-
national level.
In conclusion, although the European telecommunications industry features increasing
multimarket contact of conglomerate firms due to ongoing consolidation within na-
tional markets, no single network operator is present in at least half of all EU member
states—a fact that nourishes doubts that the connected DSM will be completed in the
near future. Yet, further convergence of European telecommunications markets will
only reinforce the developments detailed above. Albeit in consequence of different
market dynamics, a set of similar issues arises in fixed and mobile telecommunica-
tions markets with respect to regulation and competition. First, whereas the number of
firms in many mobile telecommunications markets decreases from four to three, fixed
telecommunications markets exhibit infrastructure duplication and thus the transition
from a monopoly to a duopoly. Therefore, in both types of markets combined reg-
ulatory and competition authorities are faced with the question of what constitutes a
sufficient number of firms to ensure effective competition even in the absence of regula-
tion. Second, increasing multimarket contact—either supra-national or sub-national—
requires scrutiny regarding its potential anti-competitive effects. Third, a characteristic
of infrastructure-based industries such as the telecommunications sector is that access
to the infrastructure and provision of a service over the infrastructure constitute two
different markets within the same value chain. Therefore, attention is also warranted
with respect to whether the regularities of competition in a single (or multiple horizon-
tally connected) market(s) carry over to vertically related markets in which the required
input on the upper part of a value chain, i.e., access to a fixed or mobile telecommuni-
cations network, is controlled by few or even only a single firm.
1.2 Research questions
The three issues with respect to effective competition derived for the telecommunica-
tions industry apply likewise for other oligopolies in general and network industries in
7
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particular. Therefore, they constitute the starting point for this thesis. These issues are
directly connected to research questions that are derived and listed in the following.
Regarding the relation of the number of competitors in a market to the market’s com-
petitiveness, a prominent notion in the economic literature is that the competitiveness
of a market increases monotonically with the number of competitors. Apart from the
fact that this notion itself may be challenged, competition authorities reviewing merger
cases and regulatory bodies examining the justifications for existing regulation have to
judge what is the minimum number of firms in a market to prevent tacit collusion and
ensure effective competition so that they thus arrive at a decision to clear or refuse a
merger and regulate or deregulate a specific market, respectively.1 As highlighted by
the example of telecommunications markets, yet carrying over to oligopolies in general,
the critical number of firms is assumed to lie between two and four. With this in mind,
the following research question tackles the relationship between the fewness of firms
and anti-competitive behavior.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1. How many competitors are enough to ensure effective competition
in a market that is governed by an oligopoly?
The issue of multimarket contact and its potential anti-competitive effects are exam-
ined in the economic literature ever since Edwards’s (1955) conjecture that two firms
meeting in more than a single market will refrain from undercutting each other in any
market because they fear to be punished by their rival in all markets. The expected
consequence is stronger tacit collusion among the conglomerate firms than if the firms
would meet only in a single market. Explanations that corroborate this conjecture hinge
on specific assumptions about firm characteristics or the market structure. However, a
collusive effect of multimarket contact cannot be explained by existing theory in a situa-
tion of profit-maximizing symmetric firms and markets. More importantly, the process
according to which tacit collusion emerges in single markets and how this translates to
1Obviously, beforehand authorities have to decide on what constitutes effective competition in an
oligopolistic market.
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multiple markets is widely understudied. The next research question therefore directly
addresses this.
RESEARCH QUESTION 2. Does multimarket contact between conglomerate firms facilitate
tacit collusion more than single market contact? If yes, according to which price setting process
does tacit collusion emerge?
Whereas the previous issues deal with generic factors that are pervasive in oligopolies,
the next issue is more specific for those oligopolies that are infrastructure-based indus-
tries. Apart from the telecommunications industry this applies to all network industries
as well as several other industries that feature an essential facility at a higher level of
their value chain. More specific, if an input good at an upstream market is required for
the production of a downstream good, control over the former may be related to strong
market power. This is assumed to be most severe in the case of a monopolistic up-
stream market. Therefore, in many network industries regulators oblige the incumbent
of a bottleneck infrastructure to provide access to its downstream rivals in order to al-
low for competition at the downstream market. If, however, the upstream market is not
composed of a monopolistic access provider but instead of two firms providing access,
the rationale for regulated access should be reviewed. The following research question
is therefore concerned with the interplay of competition at the upstream market and
the regulation of access to the upstream good.
RESEARCH QUESTION 3. Is a duplication of essential infrastructure at an upstream market
beneficial for firms at the downstream market and for consumers? How can regulation at the
upstream market safeguard competition?
As already pointed out, laboratory economic experiments are a promising research
methodology when investigating tacit collusion and when evaluating regulatory in-
stitutions. However, the potential of the experimental methodology in economics with
respect to examining regulatory issues is still widely unknown due to a lack of reviews
of the extant literature. Especially with respect to how experiments can serve as a com-
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plementary research methodology in advising regulators, design and procedural guide-
lines are missing. Therefore, the promotion of the experimental methodology towards
regulators requires to formulate a set of guidelines to be followed by researchers when
conducting an experiment for regulatory policy advice. The next research question is
aimed at fulfilling this task.
RESEARCH QUESTION 4. How and to what extent can economic laboratory experiments pro-
vide a testbed for regulatory institutions to advise regulatory policy?
One feature of experimental design that gains recent attention is the mode of timing that
is implemented to resemble the nature of an experiment’s underlying repeated game.
So far, most experiments employ the concept of discrete time, i.e., a one-shot game is
repeated in separate periods in which each subject in an experiment makes a single de-
cision as specified by the theoretical model underlying the experiment. An alternative
that is considered to be closer to decision making in the real world is continuous time.
This refers to an experiment that runs in (almost) real time so that subjects can make
and adapt decisions at any point in time. The consequences of such a mode of timing
are largely unknown and both theoretical and experimental analysis in this regard is
scarce. Therefore, the implications of continuous time for competition in oligopolies
are also unknown. The following research question targets this research gap.
RESEARCH QUESTION 5. Does continuous time in experiments on oligopoly competition fa-
cilitate tacit collusion more than discrete time?
1.3 Structure of this thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized in two parts. Part I deals with the method-
ology of experimental economics in regard to regulatory and competition policy and
thereby constitutes the basis for the applications of the experimental methodology in
Part II. In particular, Part I comprises Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 addresses Research
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Question 4 and provides a review of the extant experimental literature on issues of
regulatory policy and derives guidelines for the design and procedures of experiments
aimed at advising regulators from a qualitative analysis. Thereby, laboratory experi-
ments are differentiated into those aiming for a maximum of external validity of their
findings with respect to a specific industry and those targeted at internal validity of
the test of a generic regulatory institution that is not limited to a specific industry con-
text. Chapter 3 accompanies the qualitative analysis in the previous chapter. It reports
on an investigation of the mode of timing as one specific experimental design element
and thereby deals with Research Question 5.2 In an experimental oligopoly environ-
ment, discrete time and continuous time are investigated in regard to their propensities
towards tacit collusion next to market structure controls in an effort to obtain robust
empirical evidence. Together these two chapters constitute the first part of the thesis
and lay the methodological ground for the subsequent experimental investigations of
certain features of market structures and their effect on tacit collusion.
Part II encompasses three chapters that all focus on a (rather) generic market character-
istic and its effect on tacit collusion by means of both theoretical analysis and experi-
mental investigation. Chapter 4, which relates to Research Question 1, is an extensive
experimental analysis of number effects in oligopolies and composed of three distinct
studies.3 Starting with a meta-analysis of existing oligopoly experiments that system-
atically vary the number of competitors in a market, two comprehensive laboratory
experiments are reported that investigate the effects of a varying number of firms un-
der several market structures and thereby cover a wide range of oligopoly scenarios.
Chapter 5 deals with price discrimination across geographic markets as one of the key
features of multimarket contact in a laboratory experiment and thereby constitutes the
groundwork for an investigation of Research Question 2.4 Building on the findings
from this experimental analysis, in Chapter 6 a behavioral theory is derived that targets
to answer Research Question 2 by suggesting a process according to which tacit collu-
2Chapter 3 is based on joint work with Jan Krämer and Daniel Schnurr (Horstmann et al., 2015b).
3Chapter 4 is based on joint work with Jan Krämer and Daniel Schnurr (Horstmann et al., 2015a).
4Chapter 5 is based on joint work with Jan Krämer (Horstmann and Krämer, 2013).
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sion can be reached in single and multiple markets.5 More specific, the theory is able
to determine the conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion
more than single market contact, and vice versa. The predictions of the theory are val-
idated by an economic laboratory experiment. Chapter 7 takes a focus on vertically
related markets and tests a theory of upstream competition and regulation in the lab-
oratory.6 More specific, the scenario comprises two firms that are vertically integrated
over an upstream market and a downstream market as well as a firm that operates
solely in the downstream market but requires the upstream good as an input to supply
its good to consumers. Within this context, Research Question 3 is addressed by sys-
tematic variation of the level of competition and regulation in the upstream market.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this thesis with a summary of findings with respect to the
research questions formulated above. Thereby, the policy and managerial implications
of the obtained results are discussed as well as the limitations connected to them. Fur-
thermore, propositions for future work are derived from the limitations of this thesis
and likewise from further open questions that arise from the reported findings.
5Chapter 6 is based on joint work with Jan Krämer (Horstmann and Krämer, 2016).
6Chapter 7 is based on joint work with Jan Krämer and Daniel Schnurr (Horstmann et al., 2016).
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Part I
Regulation in the Lab

Chapter 2
Experimental Economics for Regulatory
Policy Advice
THE governments of the United Kingdom (UK), the US, and Germany all seekcounsel by behavioral scientists to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
policy programs and decisions. In 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron announced
the Behavioural Insights Team as the first government institution dedicated to the appli-
cation of behavioral research (McSmith, 2010). President Barack Obama followed in
2014 when he launched the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team to help “government pro-
grams better serve the nation while saving taxpayer dollars” (Shankar, 2015). A few
months later, with a comparable intention, Chancellor Angela Merkel decided to estab-
lish a group of advisors for behavioral research (Plickert and Beck, 2014). Recently, also
the Austrian government chimed in and announced that it will incorporate insights
from behavioral economics into their policy (Weißensteiner, 2015). These examples em-
phasize the increasing influence of behavioral research on policy and society. Yet, the
launchings of all the aforementioned government institutions were predominantly mo-
tivated by nudging, i.e., a concept of policy making based on “any aspect of the choice
architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any
options or significantly changing their economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008,
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p. 6).1 Or, as the Behavioural Insights Team (2015, p. 6) phrases it more bluntly as one
of their objectives: To enable “people to make ‘better choices for themselves’ ”.2
This chapter takes a different angle on the role of experimental economics for policy
advice. Instead of analyzing how behavioral science may help governments in nudg-
ing the population to make better decisions, the aim is to investigate how experimental
economics can advise decision-making in economic regulatory policy.3 Remarkably,
the potential of the experimental methodology for policy making in economic regula-
tion of markets is far less emphasized and exploited. However, already several decades
ago experiments have been used to address the potential consequences of political de-
cisions on the economy. Therefore, this chapter builds upon previous related literature
overviews (e.g., Davis and Wilson, 2002; Normann, 2008; Ricciuti, 2008; Normann and
Ricciuti, 2009) and has two main contributions. First, an extensive review of economic
experimental studies with specific implications for economic policy making in regu-
lated industries is compiled. Second, key experimental design elements are derived
from the reviewed literature in an effort to provide scholars with a documentation of
the consensus (and dissent) among experimentalists regarding the design of laboratory
experiments for regulatory policy advice. In particular, the focus is on experimental
industrial organization (IO) research in the laboratory with implications for industry
regulation. After Section 2.1 states the research objectives of this literature review and
sets its scope, the key variables are introduced in Section 2.2. The actual review of the
extant literature is conducted in Section 2.3. Subsequently, Section 2.4 summarizes ob-
servations from the previous review and thereby derives a conceptual framework of
how to design an economic laboratory experiment for regulatory policy advice. Finally,
in Section 2.5, the potential of the experimental methodology is discussed.
1A yet broader definition not limited to economic incentives is proposed by Hausman and Welch (2010,
p. 126): “Nudges are ways of influencing choice without limiting the choice set or making alternatives
appreciably more costly in terms of time, trouble, social sanctions, and so forth. They are called for
because of flaws in individual decision-making, and they work by making use of those flaws.”
2Lunn (2014) discusses the influence of behavioral economics on policy and summarizes related experi-
mental work.
3Also outside the scope of this chapter are the implications of behavioral economics on potential biases
in the decision-making process of regulatory authorities. See Cooper and Kovacic (2012) for a formal
model of a regulator serving as an agent to a political supervisor.
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2.1 Objectives
One may argue that it is among the main goals of economists to support policy mak-
ers in making better informed decisions which will be beneficial for the society as a
whole. In this vein, many scholars draw policy conclusions of their research. However,
comparably few economic studies have been explicitly motivated by a policy prob-
lem, analyzed its components, and subsequently proposed a solution. Diverse areas of
economic research may provide valuable insights to policy makers. The scope of the
present literature review is limited to economic laboratory experiments that provide
insights for regulatory policy. In the following, this scope is motivated both in terms of
content and method.
Questions on the economic regulation of firms, markets, and economic processes are
closely connected to IO. Although Tirole (1988, p. 3) “would actually like to avoid giv-
ing a precise definition of the field, as its frontiers are fuzzy”, he nevertheless suggests
that there are two different perspectives on the field. The first takes an insider’s point
of view and is thus concerned with the internal organization and market behavior of
a firm, which constitute its business strategy. The second takes an outsider’s point of
view and encompasses assessments of market efficiency. In welfare economics, market
efficiency refers to a Pareto optimal allocation of resources, i.e., a situation in which it
is impossible to make any individual better off without making at least one individual
worse off. Pareto efficiency is a necessary condition for a market outcome that maxi-
mizes total welfare—however, the concept does not consider whether an allocation is
socially desirable or not. The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics states
that any competitive (Walrasian) equilibrium at which goods are sold at marginal cost
results in a Pareto efficient resource allocation (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al., 1995). Yet,
most real markets, e.g., oligopolies, are imperfectly competitive and will thus also de-
viate from the maximum of social welfare. Thus, following Tirole’s outsider’s perspec-
tive, IO may be defined as “the theory and empirical evidence of imperfectly compet-
itive markets” (Tremblay and Tremblay, 2012, p. 3). Moreover, IO analyzes whether
and how government intervention may help to improve market outcomes in imper-
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fectly competitive markets. Joskow and Noll (1994, p. 367) differentiate two types of
regulation:
“Economic” regulation controls profits, sets prices, and determines who can
participate in a market or use a particular resource. “Social” regulation con-
trols polluting by-products of production, sets health and safety standards
for products and workplaces, restricts the content of information provided
by sellers through advertising and other means of describing products to
consumers, and establishes requirements to protect buyers from fraudulent,
discriminatory, or incompetent behavior by sellers.
In this vein, the contextual scope of this literature review are executive and legislative
forms of economic regulation and thus encompass interventions and rules determining
firms’ behavior on and the functioning of regulated markets. Issues of social regulation
go beyond the constraints of this review.
The methodological scope encompasses economic laboratory experimentation.
Whereas (laboratory) experiments have been an established research methodology in
the natural sciences for hundreds of years, its application to economics, i.e., a social
science, is a comparably new idea. Chamberlin (1948) is considered to have conducted
the very first market experiments. In his classroom experiments, Chamberlin studied
whether theoretical predictions of posted offer markets prevail in the laboratory envi-
ronment with his students representing buyers and sellers. He found that the experi-
mental markets were imperfectly competitive, which prompted him to conclude: The
advantage of experimentation is “to study in isolation and under known conditions”,
whereas “the data of real life are necessarily the product of many influences other than
those which it is desired to isolate” (Chamberlin, 1948, p. 95). These findings have
stimulated the emergence of a new economic methodology. It is situated between the
stringent propositions of theory—which are yet based on abstracting assumptions—on
the one hand and the externally valid evidence of empirical research—which yet lacks
explanatory underpinning—on the other hand.
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Between these poles the application of economic laboratory experiments for regulatory
policy may be fruitful for three reasons. First, experiments can test a specific theory.
Within the controlled environment of the laboratory, the assumptions of a theory, e.g.,
non-cooperative behavior, may be induced by design so that theoretical predictions are
tested by comparison to the behavior of real human subjects making real decisions un-
der real (e.g., monetary) incentives. By systematic variation, this allows not only to
test the validity of theorems, but also to test the robustness of underlying assumptions.
In this vein, experiments may provide support for or against a theory’s assumptions
and predictions and thus “evaluate the internal workings of a theory” (Holt, 1995, p.
353). For instance, in Chapter 7 the theoretical prediction of cost-based pricing in a
model of upstream competition in vertically related markets is examined in an exper-
imental environment subject to different regulatory regimes. Second, experiments can
test specifics of the real world. In case an experiment is not motivated by theory, but
rather empirical observation, the laboratory environment may be designed to closely
resemble the regularities of the real-world counterpart. In particular, an experiment’s
environment and institution (Smith, 1982) may be formally constructed according to the
economic agents, commodities, messages, allocation rules, cost functions, and process
rules inherent in the real-world example. By systematic variation of the environment’s
or institution’s characteristics, findings from the laboratory may help to reveal under-
lying systematics in the real world. For instance, in Chapter 4 the number of providers
needed in the mobile telecommunications industry to ensure effective competition is
determined in a laboratory experiment by controlled variation of the number of firms,
everything else being equal. Third, experiments may test the potential effects of regula-
tory policy legislation. By definition, empirical data on the effectiveness and potential
side-effects of new, unimplemented regulatory measures is not available. Even if it is,
e.g., from other countries or related markets, appropriate counterfactuals of a regula-
tory intervention are notoriously hard to find. Furthermore, findings from field data
lack internal validity so that their application to a different context ignores potential
interaction effects. However, regulatory intervention, and likewise non-intervention,
can have tremendous effects on the economy, including business strategies, prices, and
innovation. Due to these (opportunity) cost of regulation, policy makers depend on
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evidence that sheds light on the potential effects of a regulatory institution in order
to make informed decisions. In this regard, laboratory experiments can serve, above
and beyond theoretical predictions, as an inexpensive ex ante test bed for alternative
regulatory institutions before incurring the costs of full-scale field trials. More specific,
experiments may point to flaws in an intended regulatory policy, detect unforeseen
problems, and discover design-objective tradeoffs that have not previously been con-
sidered. For instance, in Chapter 5 the effects of a uniform price regulation on conglom-
erate firms meeting the same rivals in several distinct geographic markets are analyzed
in comparison to the unregulated case allowing for price discrimination. Because the
high internal validity of findings from laboratory experiments is accompanied with a
potential lack in external validity, e.g., through real-world factors (deliberately or unin-
tentionally) neglected in the experimental design, results from experiments cannot be
directly transferred to the field. However, if a regulatory measure fails in the controlled
laboratory environment, there is little reason to believe that it will perform in the field
(Plott, 1987). Taken together, experimentation allows to test regulation in the lab.
Naturally, experimentation in economics has limitations and is a complementary re-
search methodology that may compensate for shortcomings of other methodologies, as
vice versa. The criticism on experiments—which is predominantly directed towards the
external validity of experimental evidence—has been extensively discussed by several
scholars (see, e.g., Plott, 1989; Siakantaris, 2000; Smith, 2002; Falk and Heckman, 2009).
Among the most common objections are the use of student subject pools, learning be-
havior, framing from instructions, too small payoffs, social preferences, and simplistic
designs. Falk and Heckman (2009) discuss and reject these objections against experi-
mentation in the social sciences altogether.
Following the motivation outlined above, the subsequent literature review focuses on
experiments with distinct implications for regulatory policy. Although the boundaries
of different streams of experimental economics tend to vanish, in the classification lan-
guage of Davis and Holt (1993, p. 5–9) this review is centered around market exper-
iments instead of game or individual-choice experiments. As a further limitation in
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scope, only experiments conducted in the laboratory are reviewed. Not only does a
majority of new experimental evidence still stem from the laboratory, but regulatory
measures of competition among firms can hardly be tested in the field at all. However,
some remarkable exceptions (e.g., Lunander and Nilsson, 2004) exist. See Harrison
and List (2004) as well as Carpenter et al. (2005) for a thorough introduction to and
conceptualization of field experiments in economics, i.e., experiments conducted in a
real-world context exposed to treatment conditions. Dolan and Galizzi (2014) provide a
recent review of policy-relevant field experiments. In the same vein and with respect to
the aim of this review, also macroeconomic laboratory experiments are not considered
(see Ricciuti, 2008, for a comprehensive overview).
In a nutshell, the review encompasses economic laboratory experiments in which sub-
jects represent firms making strategic decisions on a market and treatment variables
resemble direct instruments or indirect consequences of economic regulation. The first
research question addresses the evidence stemming from this body of literature. As pre-
vious overviews on (market) experiments for policy making (Davis and Wilson, 2002;
Normann, 2008; Normann and Ricciuti, 2009) provide an excellent source of informa-
tion on early experiments, this review is limited to works from the new millennium.
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.1. What has been learned from economic laboratory experiments of
the current millennium for regulatory policy?
Based on the essence of the reviewed experimental evidence, qualitative and quan-
titative observations are derived to provide guidelines for researchers in conducting
laboratory experiments for advice of policy makers in economic regulation of firms
and markets. Thereby, key elements of the experimental design and procedures (see
Section 2.2 for a listing) are addressed as indicated by the second research question.
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.2. What are key design and procedural elements of an economic
laboratory experiment testing a regulatory institution?
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After reviewing and analyzing previous relevant works, this chapter concludes with an
assessment of the research potential of economic laboratory experiments and its contri-
bution to regulatory policy making as captured by the third research question.
RESEARCH QUESTION 2.3. Which regulatory policy problems are suited to be tested in the
laboratory?
The treatment of these research questions by means of a qualitative literature review
is intended to provide researchers, politicians, and practitioners with a summary of
experimental evidence on regulatory policy and additionally with guidelines on the
design of experimental investigations in this regard.
2.2 Key variables
In accordance with the research questions, the literature review is conducted along four
key variables: (i) The regulatory policy problem motivating the research, (ii) the key
aspects of the experimental design to test the regulatory institution(s), (iii) the empir-
ical results of the experiment, and (iv) the specific policy implications of these find-
ings. Each reviewed article is investigated according to these variables and is thus
analyzed on two different levels of abstraction. Whereas the first and last variable are
only concerned with the real-world application and therefore independent of the re-
search methodology, the remaining two variables cover the purely experimental part
of each study and bridge between methodology and application. Thereby, a systematic
overview not only of implications for regulatory policy making, but also of experimen-
tal design features of testing regulatory institutions is provided. Moreover, each of the
four variables may be analyzed across the body of literature not only in connection but
also independently.
The first variable on the regulatory policy problem underlying an experimental analysis
is one of the two dimensions used to group the literature. Regulatory institutions are
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initiated by different government institutions (e.g., the parliament, departments, and
other regulatory or competition authorities) and applied to a certain set of firms and/or
markets. Accordingly, the policy problems discussed in the experimental literature are
organized according to specific industries or regulatory policy domains.
The second variable encompasses central experimental design elements that are essen-
tial for the regulatory problem at hand and also used to arrange the literature. In terms
of Smith’s (1982) theory of experimentation in microeconomics, this includes the eco-
nomic agents and commodities of the environment as well as the institution’s mes-
sages, allocation rules, cost functions, and process rules. For the purpose of manageable
length, the focus is on distinguishing design features of an experiment that separate it
from other studies. Thereby, most experimental designs fall in between two extremes.
First, the experiment may be designed to maximize internal validity as it tests a the-
oretical prediction, i.e., a hypothesis on the functioning of a regulatory institution. In
this regard, the underlying model’s assumptions on actions, markets, and timing are
directly transferred to the laboratory. Second, the design may aim at maximum exter-
nal validity as it replicates most aspects of a real-world scenario. The literature review
points to characteristic features of each experimental design and tries to locate it within
the above mentioned extremes.
The first two variables together are used to organize the literature. Thereby, a hierar-
chical approach is applied. First, in the vein of Schram (2005), experimental studies
are categorized according to whether their design is mostly concerned with external
validity, i.e., empirical regularities, or internal validity, i.e., theory testing. Second, ex-
periments are classified into subcategories of industry or regulatory policy domains.
The third variable provides a sketch of an experiment’s results. This is merely a sum-
mary of the empirical findings, while their implications for regulatory policy are rele-
gated to the fourth key variable. This separation allows to assess how authors trans-
form empirical evidence from laboratory to field. If the authors of an article suggest
specific policy implications and the study is therefore considered as policy-relevant,
its implications are replicated with utmost precision. If an experimental study touches
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on a topic of regulatory policy and is therefore also considered as policy-relevant, but
lacks to provide concrete implications, they are drawn from the empirical results in the
context of the corresponding regulatory policy.
2.3 Literature review
To compile the relevant literature basis for this review, a structured approach was fol-
lowed (cf. Webster and Watson, 2002). First, leading economic journals publishing re-
search on IO and laboratory experiments have been thoroughly searched. The key-
word prefixes “experiment” and “market” were used (separately and in conjunction)
to identify relevant articles in these journals. Second, the literature cited in previous
overviews on experimental markets that are (at least remotely) related to policy mak-
ing (Plott, 1982, 1989; Holt, 1995; Davis and Wilson, 2002; Wilson, 2007; Normann, 2008;
Götte and Schmutzler, 2009; Normann and Ricciuti, 2009; Wilson, 2011; Potters and
Suetens, 2013; Friesen and Gangadharan, 2013; Müller and Normann, 2014) has been
included.
With the body of literature accruing from the first two steps, further relevant articles
were thirdly identified by backward and forward citation browsing. While the for-
mer is a means to find prior important work in references, the latter allows to identify
more recent relevant studies by searching through articles citing one of the previous
relevant articles. Forward searching was conducted using Google Scholar.4 As a fourth
and last step, keyword searches in Google Scholar were conducted to find relevant arti-
cles in other journals that have not previously been considered as well as in conference
proceedings. In the following, therof all articles published since the beginning of the
millennium in a peer-reviewed outlet (journal or conference proceeding) are considered
and analyzed according to the key variables.
4Since its release in 2004, Google Scholar has repeatedly been compared to similar services such as Thomson
Reuters’ Web of Science or Elsevier’s Scopus. In a comparative analysis, Meho and Yang (2007) find that
Google Scholar reports more citations than its competitors as it also considers conference publications,
dissertations, theses, and books. Kousha and Thelwall (2007, p. 1055) reach comparable results and
conclude that Google Scholar is “more comprehensive for social sciences”.
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2.3.1 Laboratory experiments maximizing external validity
The first major category encompasses all economic laboratory experiments specifically
designed to resemble a real-world market scenario as closely as possible. These studies
were motivated by empirical regularities and suggest potential real-world implications
of different regulatory institutions in specific markets. The authors of these works thus
aim at maximizing the external validity of their experimental results. Naturally, this
comes at the cost of reduced generalizability of the effects of a regulatory institution
due to the uniqueness and specificity of experimental markets’ designs. The list of
industries covered by this category of experiments ranges from network industries such
as energy markets, telecommunications markets, and railway markets via health care
issues to mechanisms of environmental protection such as emission trading markets
and water allocation.
Energy
Studies addressing regulatory policy with respect to the energy industry range across
different energy sources, infrastructures for the transport of energy, and energy mar-
kets. In fact, some of the very first market experiments designed in reference to a spe-
cific industry cover regulatory issues of (then recently) liberalized energy markets. For
example, in a series of experiments partly sponsored by the US Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission, McCabe et al. (1989, 1990, 1991) and Rassenti et al. (1994) address
the coordination problem of separate contracts for purchase and transportation of nat-
ural gas and suggest that centrally controlled uniform price sealed-bid double auctions
may result in a more efficient, i.e., welfare-enhancing, allocation of resources. An early
version of the mechanism was in fact adopted by a pipeline owner. Even earlier than
that, Grether and Plott (1984) studied and found evidence for anti-competitive effects of
price announcements and best price guarantees in the industry for lead antiknock gaso-
line additives after the US Federal Trade Commission had filed a case against the four
major antiknock compound manufacturers. These and other early works are compre-
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hensively reviewed by Rassenti and Smith (1998), Kiesling (2005), Staropoli and Jullien
(2006), and Normann and Ricciuti (2009).
Surprisingly, more recent experimental work from the current millennium on the reg-
ulation of energy markets, as summarized in Table A.1, is exclusively located in the
electricity industry.5 Many of those studies are directly evoked or indirectly motivated
by the debate on reforming the electricity market in England and Wales between 1997
and 2001 or by the 2000/2001 electricity crisis in California and subsequent regulatory
interventions. In this vein, many of these experimental works are funded by regula-
tory authorities and their perennial regulatory policy issues are the anti-competitive
effects of market power and other detrimental effects evoking allocative inefficiencies
in oligopolistic wholesale electricity markets. In particular, experiments are used to as-
sess the potential of various auction mechanisms, seller concentration, price caps, and
demand-side management in mitigating the market power of electricity producers and
thus increasing efficiency.
All experimental designs are motivated by empirical phenomena of electricity markets
and capture intricacies of their real-world counterparts. Some of the designs resemble
the real world in great detail. Considered electricity market regularities include the dif-
ferentiation between baseload, midload, and peakload, cost asymmetries of power gen-
eration, supply outages and generator failures, power flows in a specified grid of nodes,
transmission losses and constraints, demand uncertainty and shocks, and minimum
capacity requirements. Consequently, the list of simplifying assumptions apart from
those common to laboratory economic experiments in general is comparably short.
Most researchers assume that all buyers in their experimental markets are electricity
service providers and that all sellers are electricity producers which do not sell to other
producers. Some scholars assume that there are no transmission constraints or that de-
mand is certain. Each of the experiments employs an auction mechanism to allocate
supply and demand. As multiple units of electricity are auctioned, most of the mech-
anisms are based on multiunit auctions. The discriminatory price variant extends the
5All tables referred to in this chapter are relegated to Appendix A.
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first price single-unit auction and winners are paid the prices of their offers. Instead,
in the uniform price variant, which is analogue to the second price single-unit auction,
all winners are paid the same price regardless of their actual offers. Sellers of electric-
ity are controlled by human participants in all experiments. However, designs differ
in whether the demand-side is computerized (one-sided auction) or controlled by hu-
man subjects as well (double auction). With respect to the complexity and high level
of detail incorporated in these experimental designs, it is not surprising that a group
of researchers at Cornell University developed PowerWeb, an experimental software
designated to conduct electricity markets in an environment closely resembling real-
world characteristics (Zimmerman et al., 1999; Zimmerman and Thomas, 2004). An
interesting deviation from standard experimental procedures, which follows from the
complexity of the mechanisms studied and emphasizes their policy relevance, is that
several studies rely on previously-experienced students or even industry professionals
to portray sellers and/or (wholesale) buyers of electricity.
The key results of the experiments indicate clear implications for regulatory policy.
First, a uniform price sealed-bid auction is suggested to be most effective in mitigat-
ing market power in oligopolistic wholesale electricity markets as it is connected with
higher efficiency than a uniform price continuous auction (Denton et al., 2001b,a), a dis-
criminatory price auction (Abbink et al., 2003; Rassenti et al., 2003b), or hybrid forms
of uniform and discriminatory price auctions (Thomas et al., 2002; Mount et al., 2002;
Vossler et al., 2009).6 Second, demand-side bidding is found to dampen the exertion
of market power better than one-sided auctioning (Weiss, 2002; Rassenti et al., 2003a);
a result that also applies to retail markets and auction participation by consumers, i.e.,
demand-side management (Adilov et al., 2005). Double auctions have proven to be
very robust in the sense that they lead to competitive outcomes in a number of circum-
stances. Third, forward contracting of capacity (Mount and Maneevitjit, 2008; Brandts
6Results from agent-based simulation models support these findings. Bower and Bunn (2001) simulate
the England and Wales electricity market of 1999 with seller agents adopting a strategy based on re-
inforcement learning. The discriminatory price auction is found to result in higher market prices than
the uniform price auction because bid and market prices are not publicly available so that agents with
a large market share gain a significant informational advantage. Yet, Nicolaisen et al. (2001) find high
levels of market efficiency in a discriminatory price double auction with reinforcement learning agents,
but do not compare their results to a uniform price auction.
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et al., 2008; van Koten and Ortmann, 2013) or financial transmission rights (Kench, 2004)
intensify competition and may further reduce allocation inefficiencies. However, this
finding does not carry over to dynamic efficiency with respect to investments in mo-
nopolistic network capacity (Henze et al., 2012). Fourth, price caps implemented by the
regulator, either based on reference offers (Kiesling and Wilson, 2007; Shawhan et al.,
2011) or fixed exogenously (Le Coq and Orzen, 2012; Henze et al., 2012), may also effec-
tively mitigate market power. Fifth and lastly, the implications of seller concentration
are controversial. Whereas some studies suggest that electricity markets with three or
four firms may already lead to effective competition (Denton et al., 2001a; Weiss, 2002;
Bernard et al., 2005), other experiments indicate that under some circumstances six sell-
ers may be required (Denton et al., 2001b) or that prices may even be supra-competitive
in a market with as many as 24 firms (Chapman et al., 2004).
Telecommunication
Laboratory experiments resembling empirical regularities of the telecommunications
industry and drawing specific regulatory policy implications are exclusively found in
the design of auction mechanism for licensing of radio spectrum.7 As all rules of spec-
trum auctions are controlled by national regulatory authorities, spectrum auctions are
conducted in a highly controlled environment specifically designed for its purpose.
Therefore, spectrum auctions in the real world conform to the laboratory conditions
of experimentation and thus, laboratory experiments are particularly suited to assess,
evaluate, and conduct wind tunnel tests of alternative designs and rules of spectrum
auctions. Only few other real-world processes allow for such an accurate replication
in the laboratory, which ensures exceptionally high external validity of experimental
findings. Consequently, experimental studies have been particularly influential in the
design of spectrum auctions in many countries, in particular for the British 3G/UMTS
7Other laboratory investigations specifically designed to study real-world issues in telecommunications
markets do not address regulatory policy. See, e.g., Friedman and Huberman (2005) for software agent
and human real-time behavior in congested broadband networks and Kaskiris et al. (2006, 2007) for
applications of combinatorial auctions to allocate (excess) broadband capacity as a commodity good.
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auction in 2000 (Abbink et al., 2005) and for the US 4G/LTE auction in 2008 (Goeree
and Holt, 2010).
Table A.2 lists all studies in the telecommunications category and allows to identify two
broad streams of experimental literature in spectrum auction design since the beginning
of the current millennium. Early works until 2005 study predominantly the efficiency
of simultaneous multiround auctions, largely used in 2G and 3G spectrum auctions.
More recent studies, published since 2010, try to engineer more efficient, less error-
prone alternatives and seek these in combinatorial multiround auctions mostly applied
in recent 4G spectrum auctions.
Spectrum auctions are multiunit auctions. Their purpose is to allocate multiple licenses
for the (exclusive) use of a block of radio spectrum in a given geographical region (e.g.,
national or sub-national) for a limited period of time. Auction formats used in early
spectrum auctions are generalizations of the single-unit ascending (also known as En-
glish) auction, in which each bid has to be greater than the bid that preceded it. The
auction’s duration is endogenous as it ends only if no higher bid follows. The most
common multiunit extension of this procedure for spectrum auctions is the simultane-
ous multiround ascending auction, according to which bidders may place single-item
bids on any license block in a subset of all offered licenses. The auction runs in multiple
discrete rounds and, analogously, ends if no bidder places a higher bid on any of the of-
fered licenses. However, this auction format entails an exposure problem, which refers
to the risk for a bidder to make a loss in case of winning only a fraction of the desired li-
cense bundle. Although bids may be placed on multiple licenses, each single bid entails
only a single license and may not be placed on a bundle of licenses. In case a bundle of
licenses is valued more than the sum of individual licenses, the bidder may place bids
on single licenses exceeding the valuation for the single license. Therefore, winning not
the whole bundle may result in losses, e.g., due to overbidding for single licenses. Such
value synergies for a bundle of licenses, also referred to as value complementarities or
supperadditivity, may arise from geographic adjacency, e.g., as a mobile network op-
erator is already operating in a neighboring area, or the number of licenses, e.g., due
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to consumers valuing larger networks or due to shared fixed costs that have to be in-
curred prior to extracting value from any acquired license in a bundle. Combinatorial
auctions avoid this exposure problem by allowing for bids on indivisible bundles—but
at the cost of complexity. Bidders in combinatorial auctions may place bids on any bun-
dle of items in the auction. While this package bidding allows auction participants to
bid precisely according to their own valuations for single items and various bundles of
items, the number of potential bids is substantially higher than in a simultaneous mul-
tiround auction and exponentially increasing in the number of items in the auction. In
particular, a bidder who is targeting two licenses but also values each license individ-
ually would have to place a total of three bids, i.e., two bids on the single licenses and
one on the bundle of both licenses. Numerous variants of the combinatorial auction
were suggested by researchers, practitioners, or regulators and have been investigated
in the literature. First, prices of single licenses or license bundles may either increase
by submitted bids as, e.g., in the combinatorial multiround ascending auction or auto-
matically by a clock as in a combinatorial clock auction. With both auction formats, the
auction usually ends if no higher bid is placed on any item or bundle. Second, com-
plexity for bidders may be reduced by restricting the variety of bundles they can bid
on. Third, bidders may be allowed to have only one provisionally winning bid in any
given round as they can bid on any self-specified bundle. This is referred to as a XOR
(read: exclusive or) bidding rule to distinguish it from an OR bidding rule, according
to which multiple winning bids are allowed at any time. In all multiunit formats for
spectrum auctions studied in the laboratory, eligibility rules, activity obligations, and
increment requirements may be imposed to spur bidding on the one hand and avoid
jump bidding on the other hand. Some experimental designs mirror the rules used in
previous spectrum auctions or considered for prospective ones by national regulatory
authorities even more closely and thereby derive a precise understanding of properties
of these auction rules. In a nutshell, spectrum auction experiments may be viewed as
a means of “applied mechanism design” (Banks et al., 2003, p. 314). A software suite
specifically designed for the purpose of auction experiments is jAuctions, developed by
Jacob Goeree.8
8See http://people.hss.caltech.edu/~jkg/jAuctions.html. Accessed January 29, 2016.
30
2.3 Literature review
In 1994, the US Federal Communications Commission conducted its first spectrum auc-
tion and utilized the simultaneous multiunit ascending auction format. Banks et al.
(2003) find that strong eligibility rules restricting bidding behavior may hinder the as-
signment efficiency of licenses in this auction format and conclude that an alternative
application of a combinatorial multiround ascending auction may increase efficiency,
but also auction length. Motivated by the 3G spectrum auctions in the UK and Ger-
many, Abbink et al. (2005) and Seifert and Ehrhart (2005) compared the performance of
previously considered auction formats.9 They find that the simultaneous multiround
ascending auction leads to high efficiency and is not outperformed by hybrid auction
mechanisms that add an additional single round sealed-bid auction or that split the auc-
tioning of licenses in two phases. In the vein of mechanism design, newer experimental
studies try to increase the efficiency of allocation methods recently used for spectrum
auction. Their key findings can be summarized in two major policy implications. First,
the assumed nature and magnitude of license value synergies matters greatly for the
performance comparison between combinatorial and simultaneous auction formats. If
license value synergies are high or distributed such that they are easy to exploit, com-
binatorial multiround ascending auctions are more efficient than simultaneous multi-
round ascending auctions, irrespective of whether prices increase by submitted bids or
automatically by a clock driven by excess demand (Brunner et al., 2010; Kagel et al.,
2010, 2014). In case the opposite holds and license value synergies are low or complex,
this result may be reversed (see also Bichler et al., 2013). Second, bidders’ preselection
of a small number of packages appears to be the main source of allocative inefficiencies
in combinatorial spectrum auctions. Reducing the number of possible bundles through
predetermination of license packages by the regulator (Goeree and Holt, 2010; Scheffel
et al., 2012) or simplifying the bid language and the payment rule (Bichler et al., 2014)
increases efficiency in combinatorial multiround auctions significantly. In summary,
9The 3G spectrum auctions in the UK and Germany are considered the highest-grossing auc-
tions ever raising almost EUR 39 billion and EUR 51 billion, respectively (Binmore and Klem-
perer, 2002). Results from the 2000 UK 3G spectrum auction are reported at http://www.
ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/spectrumauctions/auction/auction_index.htm.
Final prices from the 3G spectrum auction in Germany during the same year may be found
at http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2000/
000818UMTS-Versteigerung.html. Both sources accessed January 29, 2016.
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regulators appear to face a trade-off between the exposure problem of the simultane-
ous multiround auctions and the complexity of combinatorial multiround auctions as
both negatively impact allocation efficiency.
Transportation
The third and last category of network industries in this review encompasses the regu-
lation of mechanisms to allocate limited capacity in transportation systems. Allocation
problems arising in transportation industries are characterized by uncertainty and indi-
visibility of demand as well as an inelastic supply due to fixed capacities (Banks et al.,
1989). Pre-millenium experimental investigations on transportation systems include
bulk commodity transportation on inland waterways (Hong and Plott, 1982), take-off
and landing slots on airports (Grether et al., 1981; Rassenti et al., 1982), space shuttle
payload resources (Ledyard et al., 1994; Plott and Porter, 1996; Ledyard et al., 2000),
and railway track capacity (Brewer and Plott, 1996; Nilsson, 1999). Again, these early
works are thoroughly reviewed in previous literature overviews.
Newer experimental work on the regulation of transportation systems from the current
millennium, as summarized in Table A.3, has exclusively added to the literature on
deregulated and vertically separated railway industries. There are also more recent
laboratory experiments on transportation systems (e.g., Holguín-Veras et al., 2011) that,
however, deal rather with the interaction between shippers and carriers of freight rather
than the regulation of a (state-owned) transportation network infrastructure. Deck and
Smith (2013) provide a recent review of these works.
Due to its network properties, experimental designs of regulated railway industries
share several characteristics of electricity markets in the laboratory. This applies, first
and foremost, to capacity constraints of each edge in the network. These are aggra-
vated by the fact that a single track may only be used in one direction at the same
time. Therefore, positive and negative externalities from potential conflicts between
diverging preferences of train operators arise. In contrast to other network industries,
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the allocation of track capacity not only requires the assignment of usage rights, but
also a scheduling of trains that accounts for the time a train needs to travel between
two stations and the path dependencies arising from this. In other words, a train that
has traveled from A to B may obviously not subsequently travel from A to C before it
has previously returned to A. The experiments discussed here have carefully captured
these regularities. In particular, they consider a state-owned railway network with two
or more interconnected nodes and study the effects of different auction mechanisms to
allocate rights of use on the network between private train operators providing passen-
ger rail service.
Railway privatization started in the US, Japan, and Sweden in the 1980s and continued
in several European and American countries in the 1990s. Irrespective of the subsidiza-
tion of passenger railway services in many countries, two broad streams of privatiza-
tion strategies may be differentiated. The first stream encompasses full privatizations
of vertically integrated railway companies as in the US or Canada with duopolistic rail-
way infrastructure competition. The second stream refers to access regulation or verti-
cal separation introducing competition among train operators on a monopoly railway
infrastructure as in several European countries.10 The experimental studies reviewed
here consider this latter stream. In a study commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of
Transport, Cox et al. (2002) show that the allocation of regional monopoly usage rights
of routes with regulated minimum schedules leads to higher consumer and total sur-
plus than auctioning each time-slot on every route individually. Isacsson and Nilsson
(2003) put a stronger focus on designing an efficient auction mechanism for individ-
ual train connections and find that multiround ascending auctions and a second-price
sealed-bid auction are similarly efficient. Recent working papers (de Jong, 2012; Dixit
et al., 2015) provide a more comprehensive review of experimental evidence in trans-
portation industries and are not limited to issues of regulatory policy.
10Qualitative and empirical ex post assessments of railway privatizations attest mixed success of both
streams of privatization strategies (see, e.g., Pittman, 2005; Alexandersson, 2009; Boardman et al., 2013).
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Emissions
Cason (2010), Friesen and Gangadharan (2013) as well as Noussair and van Soest (2014)
provide recent overviews of experimental evidence on environmental markets, includ-
ing emission permit trading institutions (this subsection), conservation auctions (next
subsection), and water markets (next but one subsection). Most of the experimental
endeavors they summarize address (economic) regulatory issues and many do so by
means of an experimental design that resembles specific regularities of a real-world
market. The existence of these recent overview articles on experimental environmental
markets highlights that issues of environmental protection are a vivid area of experi-
mental economics. In fact, none of the afore-stated industries has evoked as many ex-
perimental publications on regulatory policy as environmental markets in recent years.
For this reason, with respect to the existing literature overviews, the review in this and
the following two subsections deviates from the scope set out in the introduction and
is limited to the most recent experimental works published during this decade.
To cut the ongoing pollution is one of the greatest challenges of this century. In order
to avert global warming, several countries or multinational political unions have im-
posed regulatory measures aimed at cutting back emissions. Often, a cornerstone of
these measures is emission permit trading, a market-based mechanism that relies on fi-
nancial incentives to abate emissions. Its rationale is to prohibit a firm to emit a certain
greenhouse gas unless it holds a corresponding number of allowances, i.e., emission
permits. First, a regulator sets a total cap on the amount of emissions or the permit
price and distributes or auctions a specified number of permits. Then, firms that do not
have enough permits at their disposal may either acquire permits from other firms on
a regulated market or invest in technology to abate their own emissions. Thereby, this
cap and trade mechanism is intended to evoke an efficient allocation of emission per-
mits and abatement investments. In 2005, the EU Emission Trading Scheme was launched
as the first large-scale emissions trading program (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007).11 The
11To date, it covers 45% of all greenhouse gas emissions in the EU and is the world’s largest emission
permit trading market. See the EC’s fact sheet on the EU Emission Trading Scheme provided at
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laboratory experiments reviewed in Table A.4 investigate design features of this and
other emission trading institutions with regard to static allocative efficiency, dynamic
investment efficiency, permit prices, and compliance with the regulation.
Two principles may be differentiated in the initial allocation of emission permits, i.e.,
firms either acquire them in an auction held by the regulator or receive a free per-
mit allotment corresponding to their current emission levels, a process referred to as
grandfathering. Experimental designs capture both not only in the pure form but also
in hybrids. Auction formats utilized for the initial allocation are exclusively multiu-
nit (sealed-bid or multiround ascending clock) auctions with a uniform pricing rule,
which highlights a recent popularity of uniform price auctions compared to the earlier
experimental investigations discussed in previous subsections that also covered dis-
criminatory pricing rules. Following the initial allocations firms trade permits among
each other in a double auction that either dictates price developments by a multiround
ascending clock or runs continuously. Across auction formats price controls such as
ceilings and floors or mechanisms fixing the total quantity of permits may be enacted.
Similar to regulated industries discussed earlier, experimental emission permit auc-
tions feature strong asymmetry and uncertainty in parameters over firms and time,
e.g., in grandfathered permit endowments, investment costs in abatement technology,
marginal abatement costs, and thus permit valuations. Such asymmetries are espe-
cially inherent in double auctions. For example, ceteris paribus, a firm with high (low)
marginal abatement cost and low (high) initial permit endowment is assumed to bid for
(offer) emission permits. Further regularities of real-word emission trading programs
are transferred to the lab, including banking of emission permits for future use, emis-
sion reports and compliance audits, and penalties for excess emissions. With up to 20
auction participants interacting simultaneously, experimental emission permit auctions
are among the biggest laboratory experiments in terms of cohort size.12 Student sub-
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/factsheet_ets_en.pdf. Accessed Jan-
uary 29, 2016.
12In the context of experimental economics, a cohort is referred to as a group of subjects which interact
with each other but do not encounter any other subjects outside their cohort. Therefore, a cohort
effectively constitutes the data aggregation level of independent observations.
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jects depict either emitters subject to emission compliance regulation, non-compliance
speculators, or intermediaries.
Experimental findings point to systematic market outcome effects of design features in
emission permit trading programs.13 First, with regard to initial permit allocations, the
uniform price sealed-bid auction is superior to other allocation mechanisms. It is more
efficient than grandfathering (Grimm and Ilieva, 2013) and also more effective in ag-
gravating cheap-talk collusion between bidders than the related multiround ascending
clock auction (Mougeot et al., 2011), which is not advantageous over grandfathering
(Camacho-Cuena et al., 2012). Evidence on whether emission permits should be allo-
cated all at once or rather reserves should be available to provide additional supply af-
ter previous emission trading is ambiguous (Grimm and Ilieva, 2013; Shobe et al., 2014;
Perkis et al., 2015). Second, continuous trading among firms after initial permit allot-
ments improves allocative efficiency more than clocked trading over multiple rounds
(Camacho-Cuena et al., 2012), although it may even decrease efficiency compared to
an initial grandfathering allocation (Grimm and Ilieva, 2013). Third, depending on the
political goal, regulators can make use of specific permit trade rules such as price con-
trols and banking or rely on emission report audits. Whereas permit banking and a
price cap at which an unlimited amount of permits may be acquired from the regulator
limit price volatility and thus the risk for emitters connected to permit trading at the
cost of higher emission volatility, a supply cap limits the total amount of emissions but
raises permit prices (Stranlund et al., 2014; Perkis et al., 2015). Analogously, high audit
probabilities cut emissions and emission report violations at the cost of higher permit
prices (Stranlund et al., 2011). Fourth, investments in greener technologies are effec-
tively incentivized through emission trading (Camacho-Cuena et al., 2012), however,
permit prices do not necessarily decrease as predicted by associated emission reduc-
13All experiments listed in Table A.4 consider the productions of emitting firms only in a highly abstracted
manner. One remarkable exception is Dormady (2014) who utilizes a very rich experimental design to
simulate an emission trading program in parallel to an electricity market. Allowing for numerous real-
world regularities he considers a scenario with asymmetric types of electricity producers giving rise
to market power and allowing for explicit collusion between dominant firms via a chat to a symmetric
no-communication control treatment. Results indicate that dominant firms rather engage in strategic
capacity withholding in the energy market to reduce demand in the emissions market than the other
way around. As the article does not address regulation as a treatment, it is not included in the main
text of the review.
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tions (Taschini et al., 2014). Fifth, allowing banks, speculators, or eco-friendly firms
that are not subject to environmental regulation to participate in permit auctions inten-
sifies competition and adds liquidity which reduces excess emissions by compliance
firms (Mougeot et al., 2011; Taschini et al., 2014). Sixth and lastly, Cason and Gan-
gadharan (2011) glance at the future of global emission reduction goals and conclude
that an internationalization of emission trading programs allowing for cross-country
trading would be welfare-enhancing as efforts of emission reduction could be allocated
between high and low abatement cost regions.
Conservation
Conservation programs are adopted by regulators to introduce land to environmental
friendly use or to establish a habitat for endangered species, ultimately serving ecolog-
ical policy goals. If the land is in private hands, the public sector may buy the land
directly from landowners, which is, however, connected to high cost for the land as
such and for personnel to negotiate bilateral agreements. Alternatively, a regulator
may specify a fixed compensation payment for voluntary land conservation, oblige
landowners to conserve a share of their land for a fixed reimbursement, or, yet more
flexible, set up a conservation program based on an inverse auction mechanism that fi-
nancially incentivizes landowners to offer their land for ecosystem service provision.
A conservation auction may be viewed as a specific form of a call for tenders in which
the traditional roles of sellers and buyers in an auction are reversed. A government
agency acts as the buyer and seeks to procure conservation land use projects from pri-
vate individuals. Landowners make offers for this environmental service and compete
with each other for a compensation for foregone profits from agricultural use of their
land. At the close of the auction the regulator will choose a combination of offers ac-
cording to its preferences which generally depend on the estimated environmental ben-
efits and the price. Recent laboratory experiments, as summarized in Table A.5, study
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compensation schemes in conservation programs that are either based on an inverse
auction mechanism or a fixed payment and voluntary or mandatory participation.14
The decisive and differentiating feature of experimental conservation markets com-
pared to other laboratory-based mechanism designs is the careful attention of geo-
graphic positioning of land that allows to control for adjacency and proximity of land
parcels. Landowners are arranged either along a circle or in a rectangular area. This
arrangement of landowners to one another is crucial as contiguous conservation areas
are beneficial for environmental goals, e.g., for the creation of a habitat for endangered
species. For this reason, regulators may provide an agglomeration bonus for conser-
vation areas that stretch over several land parcels, which again rewards landowners if
they select adjacent land parcels for conservation or even coordinate with each other
to form an even bigger coherent area. This additional level of complexity, which is in-
cluded in all recent experimental investigations of conservation programs, reinforces
the interdependence of landowners’ decisions as the value of a conservation offer or
choice depends on offers or choices from adjacent landowners. The idiosyncrasies
of the real world are extensively captured in the laboratory. Conservation cost, en-
vironmental benefits from conservation, and agricultural value vary between up to 12
landowners, but also across land parcels from the same landowner. The environmental
service of conservation itself is either auctioned or imposed on landowners. In the latter
case conservation requirements may subsequently be traded and re-allocated among
landowners.
The majority of recent conservation program experiments considers an obligation to
conserve (Banerjee et al., 2012, 2014; Parkhurst et al., 2015) instead of competitive auc-
tioning of conservation activities (Banerjee et al., 2015). With respect to conservation
14There are two related strands of experimental literature on regularities of environmental markets, which,
however, are more directed towards individual human behavior. The first strand is a subset of labora-
tory experiments on conservation auctions that study the trustworthiness of landowners in committing
to sold conservation activities (e.g. Vogt et al., 2013; Vogt, 2015). The second strand sheds light on how
the regulation or self-governance, e.g., in the absence of a regulator, of natural resources (e.g. Janssen
et al., 2010; Janssen, 2015) or compliance with international environmental treaties (e.g. Cherry and
McEvoy, 2013; McEvoy et al., 2015) may account for the role of human behavior and interaction in
commons dilemmas. See Janssen et al. (2014) for a discussion of experimental software suites with
regard to behavioral research in social-ecological systems.
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requirements, a subsidized agglomeration bonus for adjacent conserved land parcels
leads to better spatial coordination between landowners so that more coherent conser-
vation areas emerge, resulting in a more efficient land use (Parkhurst et al., 2015). Co-
ordination may be further facilitated by dissemination of information on program par-
ticipation of other landowners (Banerjee et al., 2014). Similarly, allowing firms to trade
initially allotted conservation requirements in a continuous double auction increases
allocative efficiency due to more coherent conservation areas (Parkhurst et al., 2015).
However, the number of participating landowners is crucial, with more landowners
hampering regional coordination, and thus regulators can increase the likelihood of
desired coordination by deliberate determination of the territory for a conservation pro-
gram (Banerjee et al., 2012). If environmental services are not imposed but rather auc-
tioned by the regulator in the first place, landowners cannot only coordinate spatially
but also on prices so that an agglomeration bonus may not necessarily be beneficial.
Instead, a regulator who discloses its preferences for agglomeration allows landown-
ers to collude tacitly on higher prices whilst allocative efficiency remains unaffected
compared to a situation of unknown regulator preferences (Banerjee et al., 2015).
Water
In 2010, the United Nations recognized the human right to water.15 In most countries
water is supplied by public or private utilities or directly extracted from sources such
wells, springs, or rivers for individual use. Some arid regions, however, such as Aus-
tralia and the west of the US, rely on water trading schemes to allocate scarce water.
In these areas, water is distributed according to water rights entitling their holders—
often farmers—to a certain amount or share of water. By leasing or selling these rights
in an auction water may be allocated to the highest bidder. The ongoing growth in
world-wide water consumption, which is paralleled by an increasing number of peo-
15General Assembly resolution 64/292, The human right to water and sanitation, A/RES/64/292 (3 Au-
gust 2010), available at http://undocs.org/A/RES/64/292.
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ple affected by water scarcity highlights the relevance of research on the regulation of
water supply.16
Recent experimental studies contribute to the design of market mechanisms that allo-
cate water from one or more sources to agricultural and private consumers. In par-
ticular, prioritization of water rights, water options, alternative auction formats, and
other allocation mechanisms are considered and tested on their potential to increase
efficiency in water trading schemes. See Table A.6 for a summary.17
Water markets capture features from both environmental markets as well as network
industries. They allocate usage rights of a scarce resource and additionally account for
physical constraints of water flow such as its unidirectional flow in canals. Designs uti-
lized in recent water markets experiments consider the roles of water suppliers, water
demanders, and, if applicable, water rights holders depending on whether the labo-
ratory resembles a market with water provided by monopolistic or oligopolistic firms
or a trading mechanism with water allocated by water rights. In the latter case, up
to ten farmers holding water rights are considered to allow for comparison to catch-
ment areas in reality. Asymmetry in water extraction cost and water rights allocations
as well as uncertainty in water supply, water demand, and crop values, e.g., due to
weather risk, are implemented for better relation to reality or even parametrized with
real-world biophysical data. With regard to water rights allocation, alternative trad-
ing institutions such as auctions, bilateral bargaining, and regulated fees are compared.
The experimental software suite VeconLab provides a program especially designed to
test externalities arising along a water canal.18
16Statistics and estimates on water scarcity are provided by the United Nations at http://www.un.org/
waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml. Accessed January 29, 2016.
17Other related experiments exhibit great parallelism with real-world water markets but do not formally
benchmark and test alternative regulatory institutions. Zetland (2013) suggests a new auction format
for the redistribution of initial water allocations but the experiment does not allow for a systematic
comparison to other regulated auction formats. Broadbent et al. (2014) simulate the water leasing
market in the Middle Rio Grande basin in New Mexico, US, in great detail and find that capital crop
farmers benefit most from trading. Furthermore, Cook and Rabotyagov (2014) conduct discrete-choice
experiments, i.e., conjoint analysis, on water leasing markets with real water rights holders. Lastly,
preliminary results from a laboratory experiment on coordination among municipalities under an en-
vironmental subsidy policy for water quality are reported by Šauer et al. (2015).
18See http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/. Accessed January 29, 2016.
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In line with findings from other industries, trading among farmers in a uniform price
sealed-bid double auction leads to highly efficient allocations of water rights that are
not inferior to a continuous double auction (Tisdell, 2011). This superiority holds also
over bilateral bargaining and cheap-talk agreements in a scenario of priority usage
rights on water that arise from different locations of farmers along a canal of unidi-
rectional water flow (Holt et al., 2012). The efficiency of allocations from continuous
double auctions may, nonetheless, be improved by trade of priority-differentiated water
rights. Thereby, the risk of exclusion from water provision is implicitly allocated as high
security water rights provide priority water access over their low security counterparts
in case of water scarcity. However, the efficiency gain from this additional layer of com-
plexity can only be realized with low transaction cost (Lefebvre et al., 2012). Compara-
bly, more efficient allocations result from continuous double auctions if, additionally to
water rights, options for water rights are auctioned, allowing their holders to purchase
water at a fixed price when it is needed (Hansen et al., 2014). Moreover, water options
help to equalize gains from trade across water sellers in a water market monopsony
with a single buyer of water, e.g., a big city. In case of strong market concentration on
the supply side it may be assumed that water prices are announced by the supplier(s)
rather than determined by a double auction. In line with common knowledge, if water
is supplied by a privately owned monopolist households and farmers pay higher prices
than in a duopoly—provided explicit collusion can be prevented—but consumers are
best off in terms of both price and water quality with a monopolistic public utility acting
as a social planner (García-Gallego et al., 2012a,b). However, this benefit for consumers
comes at the cost of overexploitation of limited water resources.
Miscellaneous
Robust empirical evidence and success of laboratory experiments on specific industries
and markets has stimulated the methodology to spread into other specialized markets
as well. Deck and Wilson (2008) investigate anti-competitive firm behavior and corre-
sponding regulation in a gasoline market. The experimental design captures four refin-
41
Chapter 2 Experimental Economics for Regulatory Policy Advice
ers and four retailers, all of which are controlled by humans, as well as computerized
customers preferring one of the four gasoline brands with equal probability. Retailers
and customers are organized on a 7×7 grid with retailers operating at two locations:
the center and one of the four edges of the network. Regulation either permits geo-
graphic wholesale price discrimination by refiners between center and corner retailer
locations (so called zone pricing) or not, which is reminiscent of a uniform price con-
straint. Uniform pricing in the wholesale market is found to increase retail transaction
prices in the clustered center area but not the isolated edge areas as well as retailers’
but not refiners’ profits. Furthermore, retail transaction prices are lower throughout
if each retailer is vertically integrated with a refiner. These findings lead the authors
to suggest against a uniform wholesale price constraint as well as obligations against
refiner-owned gasoline stations.19
Tisdell and Iftekhar (2013) and Iftekhar and Tisdell (2015) assess the efficiency of simul-
taneous and combinatorial single round auction formats to allocate geographical indi-
vidual fishing quotas. These experiments share several design aspects of spectrum auc-
tions and demonstrate comparably that the combinatorial variant is superior in terms
of efficiency and auctioneer revenue. However, bidder valuations across regions of
fishing quotas greatly impact allocative efficiency of both auction formats as there dis-
tribution may impact the exertion of market power. Regulators should thus scrutinize
the distribution of potential value synergies.20 The same authors (Iftekhar and Tisdell,
2014) also test auctioneer’s project selection criteria and bidders’ bidding flexibility in
an auction for a wildlife corridor between two regions—a mechanism related to the
inverse auctions of land conservation programs. Whether the regulator selects offers
according to net benefits or the benefit to cost ratio does not impact the outcome. In-
stead, limiting bidders flexibility by allowing only a single bid per bidder reduces the
total installation cost of the wildlife corridor.
19In a recent working paper, Haucap and Müller (2013) use a similar experimental setup as Deck and
Wilson (2008) but neglect the wholesale market and instead investigate alternative measures of price
volatility regulation implemented in real-world retail gasoline markets.
20As quota management alone may not be sufficient to resolve assignment problems in fisheries, Emery
et al. (2015a,b) investigate the potential of alternative business models such as fishery closures and
cooperatives to mitigate economic rent dissipation caused by allocation inefficiencies. See also Tanaka
et al. (2014) for an experimental investigation of fishermen’s decision on vessel size.
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2.3.2 Laboratory experiments maximizing internal validity
Laboratory experiments in IO often study the effect of exogenous features of a market
structure—determined by nature or chosen to match idiosyncrasies of an industry—on
prices, quantities, investments, and product quality. These works contribute to our un-
derstanding of the underlying systematics of (imperfectly competitive) markets, help
to identify anti-competitive firm behavior, demonstrate when markets require regula-
tory intervention, and are thus highly relevant to regulatory policy makers. However,
these experiments rather test predictions from a theory across particular market struc-
tures than the functioning of a regulatory instrument itself. A smaller share of labo-
ratory market experiments explicitly addresses the impact of a regulatory institution
or (in)direct regulatory intervention. Experimental efforts on identifying determinants
of anti-competitive firm behavior and intricate details of the market structure under
which authorities should permit, intervene, or prohibit are condensed in recent re-
views: By Engel (2007) with an emphasis on tacit and explicit collusion; with a broader
view on static and dynamic efficiency by Potters and Suetens (2013); and, more recently,
in a working paper by Engel (2015) with the explicit goal of assessing factors that are
deemed anti-competitive according to merger guidelines in the EU and the US.
This second major category of the review of laboratory experiments for regulatory pol-
icy advice takes a very different view. It does not tackle the question on when to in-
tervene, but how to do so. Thereby, it covers predominantly oligopoly and antitrust
experiments and contributes to the problem of selecting an appropriate instrument to
resolve the regulatory policy problem at hand. The experiments surveyed here differ
in several aspects from those reviewed in the previous subsection. Foremost, the ex-
perimental design abstracts from a specific industry and is instead chosen to create a
universal market setting such that it is likely not to have a significant effect on the find-
ings. Consequential, the underlying theoretical models are, in general, less complex
and have less parameters to be calibrated. Parameters are not chosen to resemble a
real-world market but to create a market environment that allows for a consistent test
of a regulatory institution. At the extreme, the experimental design is stripped of all ele-
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ments that are not influenced by the regulatory intervention. In a nutshell, the purpose
of these experiments is an assessment of the effects of a regulatory instrument prior to
its implementation and/or to study it in an environment in which its pure effect may
be clearly differentiated from confounding variables.
Price controls
The direct assessment of prices is undoubtedly one of the strongest instruments at hand
of regulators. Prominent examples of such exogenous price determination are termina-
tion fees for interconnection in mobile telecommunications networks or transmission
charges in electricity grids. The welfare effects connected to such regulatory conduct
however are a matter of field studies as it leaves no room for business decision-making
and thus no occasion for experimental investigation. Instead, experimentalists have
tackled the impact of weaker price control mechanisms such as price floors, price ceil-
ings, price volatility restrictions, and uniform pricing constraints. All these regulatory
instruments have in common that they are aimed at safeguarding competition in mar-
kets with imperfectly competitive structures.
Table A.7 summarizes experiments on price controls. The majority of experimental de-
signs aims at simplicity in an effort to reduce the risk of interactions between the market
structure and the regulatory instrument under investigation. The prevalent competi-
tion model is one of price competition in homogeneous goods in which the lowest-
pricing firm receives all demand, thus yielding a unique equilibrium of marginal cost
pricing that is referred to as the Bertrand (1883) paradox. Alternatively, with price
competition in differentiated goods equilibrium prices may be above marginal cost.
For simplicity, both forms of price competition are referred to as Bertrand competition.
Related to these modes of competition is a posted offer institution, which aims at a
more realistic representation of retail markets and was already used in the (allegedly)
first-ever market experiment by Chamberlin (1948). The most notable differences to
homogeneous Bertrand competition are that the quantity that may be sold by each firm
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is constrained and that consumers have heterogeneous valuations so that they may
also be embodied by human subjects in the laboratory. The experimental designs re-
ported here, however, all computerize the demand side. Price controls are tested by
implementing and abstaining from the regulation according to a between-subject or
within-subject design.
The experimental findings are predominantly in favor of price controls due to their
beneficial effect in fostering competition and may be summarized as follows. First,
price floors above production cost ensuring firms a positive profit even at the minimum
possible price increase competition rather than weaken it (Dufwenberg et al., 2007).21
Second, price ceilings below the monopoly price likewise intensify or at least do not
relax competition in contrast to the alternative hypothesis that they might constitute a
focal point for tacit collusion (Engelmann and Normann, 2009; Engelmann and Müller,
2011). Third, restricting price choices by conglomerate firms to uniform prices across
geographic markets exacerbates tacit collusion compared to a situation of price discrim-
ination (Horstmann and Krämer, 2013). Fourth and notwithstanding, a restriction of the
time of price increases effectively reduces the volatility but at the same time increases
the level of prices by facilitating collusive behavior (Berninghaus et al., 2012).
Leniency programs
One of the most important yet toughest tasks of competition authorities is to detect
cartels based on explicit coordination between firms which is deemed anti-competitive
behavior detrimental to consumer and social welfare. According to antitrust law, e.g.,
the Sherman Act in the US or Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU,
price-fixing agreements in a competitive environment are illegal. If a cartel is detected
by a competition authority, its members are fined with regard to the damage done to
21Notably, Maart-Noelck et al. (2013) make a somewhat related finding in a very different setting. In their
experiment, subjects do not strategically interact but choose individually when to make an investment
whose net present value is increasingly uncertain over time. With a minimum value ensured as a
subsidy, which the authors refer to as a price floor, investment decisions are not different than without
the subsidy or price floor.
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consumers and other firms. Since the beginning of this millennium, every year the EU
revealed four to 10 cartels and imposed a yearly total of up to EUR 1.9 billion of fines on
them.22 A competition authority can learn about a cartel in three different ways: First
through own investigation, second by a report from a third party, and third through
self-reporting cartel members. The experimental studies reviewed here disregard the
first two possibilities. Detecting cartels through own investigation without specific sus-
picion is notoriously hard. Therefore, the primary purposes of antitrust policy are not
only to facilitate the exposure of cartels but also to prevent the formation of cartels in
the first place.
Nowadays, many countries have included corporate leniency programs into their an-
titrust legislation to increase the likelihood of cartel detection by creating an incentive
for cartel members to report the illegal price-fixing and thereby to deter firms from
forming cartels altogether. There are three major forms of leniency for self-reporting
cartel members: First a reduction in the fine that will be imposed on the cartel mem-
bers, second amnesty from prosecution—which is essentially a reduction of the fine
to zero—or third a financial reward or bonus from the fines payed by the other cartel
members. The specific jurisdiction for a reduction or reward may be sensitive to the
cartel’s duration or on how cooperative self-reporting firms are. One may conjecture
that these three forms of leniency are sorted by reporting incentive in ascending order
and thus that the reporting of cartels and the deterrence of their formation follow ac-
cordingly. However, experimental investigations as summarized in Table A.8 suggest a
more nuanced evaluation.23
The experimental markets are modeled either by a single round or multiround auction,
by Bertrand competition in homogeneous or differentiated goods, or by a prisoner’s
dilemma. In case cartel formation is endogenous, all two to three firms in the market
have to uniformly choose to communicate explicitly for a cartel to be established. Only
then firms may communicate either via a chat or a more structured messaging protocol
22See the continuously updated cartel statistics of the EC at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf. Accessed January 29, 2016.
23Due to access restrictions the study by Hesch (2012) is not included.
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to form a non-binding price-fixing agreement. Depending on the implemented antitrust
policy, firms can report a cartel to the authorities before and/or after prices are chosen.
Finally, resembling investigation efforts by competition authorities some experiments
implement a 10% to 15% probability for established cartels to be detected by the au-
thority in case they have not yet been reported. Three benchmark cases for leniency
programs are conceivable. First, traditional antitrust policy that relies solely on cartel
detection by authority investigations without a leniency program. Second, an environ-
ment in which cartels are permitted and there is no antitrust policy in effect, i.e., the
laissez-faire approach. Third, a situation in which cartels cannot be formed as explicit
communication between firms is impossible and therefore price coordination may only
occur tacitly.24 The latter two cases may alternatively be thought of a situation with-
out a leniency program and a cartel detection probability of 0% and 100%, respectively.
Note that all the experimental designs allow only for market-wide cartel formation and
thus the effect of price-fixing agreements on competitors are not investigated.
All experiments unisono support the notion that antitrust policy with a leniency pro-
gram is more effective in reducing prices, deterring cartel formation, and facilitating
cartel dissolution than the laissez-faire approach to cartel formation. On the level of dif-
ferent forms of leniency and their comparison to traditional antitrust policy, however,
findings are more nuanced. First, an antitrust policy that is purely based on fines may
even result in higher prices than laissez-faire (Bigoni et al., 2012). Second, allowing car-
tel members to report their activities and apply for leniency often improves but never
worsens the deterrence effect on cartel formation compared to traditional antitrust pol-
icy without leniency (Apesteguia et al., 2007; Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008; Bigoni
et al., 2012; Hinloopen and Onderstal, 2014; Bigoni et al., 2015b). Third, with respect
to the effect of leniency alternatives on prices, cartel formation, and cartel dissolution,
experimental findings are ambiguous. Amnesty and fine reduction may be superior to
a reporting reward (Apesteguia et al., 2007), it may be exactly the other way around
24Cheap-talk communication between firms and its collusion effect is a separate issue in experimen-
tal economics with multiple aspects, among them whether communication is costly (Andersson and
Wengström, 2007), structured or free-form (Waichman et al., 2014), exogenously controlled (Fonseca
and Normann, 2012), or endogenously formed (Fonseca and Normann, 2014).
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(Hamaguchi et al., 2009), or there may be no significant difference (Bigoni et al., 2012).
Fourth, granting leniency only to the first reporting firm and not also to firms that re-
port on a cartel later but before an investigation is made public is, if any, beneficial to
the goals of antitrust policy (Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008; Hamaguchi et al., 2009).
Fifth, leniency programs have less pronounced effects if applied to auctions (Hinloopen
and Onderstal, 2014).
Mergers
Mergers and acquisitions involving large firms are subject to an inspection by com-
petition authorities.25 The purpose of this procedure is to assess the potential anti-
competitive effects of such an undertaking. In other words, a competition authority
opening a merger case aims at estimating the market power of the post-merger con-
glomerate and the corresponding impact on competition. The controversial practical
issue of market definition and the delineation in terms of product and geography is
not regarded in the experimental literature (see, e.g., Kaplow, 2010; Coate and Simons,
2012). Instead, the controlled environment of the lab allows to control for a clear market
definition and investigate the isolated welfare effects of mergers. At least three types of
mergers may be differentiated (Moeller and Brady, 2014). First, in a horizontal merger
two firms are combined that are competitors and produce substitutes (e.g., the merger
between Telefónica and E-Plus in Germany). Second, in a vertical merger two firms are
combined that operate in the same value chain but on different stages of production
and may be in a buyer/seller relationship (e.g., the merger between Time Warner and
AOL in the US). Third, in a conglomerate merger two firms are combined that oper-
ate in different markets and have no business relationship (e.g., the merger between
General Foods and Philip Morris in the US). Experimental investigations of horizontal
mergers are comprehensively reviewed in Chapter 4.26 The little attention conglomer-
25Although mergers in the narrow sense, i.e., between equally sized entities to form an entirely new
company, are rare compared to a take over of smaller firms by larger firms, for simplicity and in line
with the economic literature any consolidation of two or more firms is referred to as a merger.
26These experiments analyze the number effects in oligopolies, i.e., the effect of an exogenously differing
number of firms on competition. Other experiments that consider merger formation as an event over
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ate mergers receive in economic experiments predominantly focus on multimarket con-
tact, which is the subject of Chapter 6. Therefore, only experiments on vertical mergers
are reviewed here.
Table A.9 summarizes the extant experimental studies on the regulation of vertical
mergers. They specifically address a merger between two firms that operate on differ-
ent levels of the same value chain and scrutinize the effect on competitors. Thereby, the
laboratory environment is utilized to control for a market structure with and without
the merger. The effect on consumer welfare is not in focus. There are related experi-
ments on anti-competitive firm behavior under vertical integration (e.g., Elliott et al.,
2003) that do not perform a formal test of regulatory intervention and are thus not in-
cluded here.
The experiments employ the most simplistic design of a vertical merger with just two
levels of a supply chain constituting an upstream and a downstream market. The up-
stream market is either controlled by a monopolist making price-quantity offers or fol-
lows the logic of homogeneous Bertrand competition with the underlying assumption
that downstream firms value upstream input goods equally. The downstream market
is either computerized or characterized by firms competing in homogeneous Cournot
(1838) competition according to which firms choose the quantity of their good instead
of its price. In contrast to the Bertrand paradox, competition à la Cournot does not yield
a market price at marginal cost in equilibrium even with homogeneous goods.
Vertical integration resulting from a merger between a downstream and an upstream
firm raises prices (Normann, 2011) and reduces output (Martin et al., 2001) at the up-
stream level, both of which are indicators of a tendency to foreclose downstream com-
petitors. However, in case the upstream market is monopolistic, public instead of se-
cret offers to downstream firms are similarly foreclosing as vertical integration (Martin
et al., 2001). Also in a duopolistic upstream market, foreclosure is facilitated as vertical
time (Lindqvist and Stennek, 2005; Huck et al., 2007; Fonseca and Normann, 2008) do not benchmark
to a non-merger scenario so that these studies may not easily be adduced to compare the effects of
stopping a horizontal merger or not. Furthermore, Davis (2002) and Davis and Wilson (2005, 2006)
investigate a tool that is used by authorities to identify anti-competitive merger cases.
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integration of one firm may serve as a collusion device for both upstream firms, which
then raises prices in the downstream market, what is harmful for consumers (Normann,
2011).
Bundling
Bundling is referred to as the conduct to sell two (or more) products together at a sin-
gle price. Everyday examples of its pure form are shoes and gloves: consumers cannot
buy a single but only a pair of them. The individual products of bundles like these can
be considered as perfect complements, i.e., a left shoe has (almost) no value without
the corresponding right shoe. However, if bundled products are not perfect comple-
ments but independent, bundling is a strategic decision which may be detrimental to
consumers and competitors. Thereby, a crucial factor is whether a firm sells the bundle
as an additional offer to the single products or sells the bundle exclusively, thereby re-
fusing to sell one product unless a buyer also takes another product. Whinston (1990)
shows that the latter case, referred to as tying, enables a firm to leverage market power
from the market of the tying product to the market of the tied product, which gives
rise to foreclosure and exclusion of competitors and eventually relaxes competition to
the detriment of consumers.27 In case a competition authority investigates a bundling
case and concludes that the behavior constitutes anti-competitive tying, it may impose
a fine on the tying firm. As a recent example, Edelman (2015) briefly summarizes tying
cases in the US and the EU before reviewing Google’s product bundling and concluding
that it constitutes tying under antitrust law.
There are two distinct experiments that explicitly address the decision faced by compe-
tition authorities to intervene in situations of bundling (see Table A.10). By systematic
variation of firms’ possibility to engage in bundling, the welfare effects of bundling can
directly be inferred. Thereby, the product markets are considered to be separate and
27Another strand of experimental literature (Landeo and Spier, 2009, 2012; Smith, 2011; Boone et al., 2014)
examines the related concept of exclusivity contracts between sellers and buyers but does not consider
regulatory intervention into this conduct.
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independent of one another, such that without bundling demand in one market does
not impact demand in the other market. Aloysius et al. (2012) conduct a related exper-
iment without regulation and instead compare bundling to sequential pricing of two
products. Their results indicate that the latter is more harmful to consumers although
it is not preferred by sellers.
The experimental designs consider the most simple case of bundling of two products.
Only one firm is in a dominant position as it produces both products and there may be
one or more competitors. The firms compete either in a posted offer institution with
limited capacity, in a homogeneous Cournot market setting, or à la von Stackelberg
(1934), whose model is a modification of Cournot competition with sequential instead
of simultaneous quantity decisions which results in a first-mover advantage for the
so called Stackelberg leader—in this case the dominant multi-product firm that may
engage in bundling.
Findings based on the two different experimental designs similarly indicate that the
anti-competitive effects of bundling are nuanced.28 On the one hand, if bundling deci-
sions are endogenous, there are no adverse welfare effects overall as bundling occurs
rarely (Caliskan et al., 2007; Muris and Smith, 2008; Hinloopen et al., 2014). On the other
hand, instances of product bundling that do occur endogenously or are imposed exoge-
nously diminish total welfare and competitors’ profits (Hinloopen et al., 2014) and deter
market entry into the tied market, irrespective of the existence of a competitive fringe
that reduces prices in the tying market (Caliskan et al., 2007). In conclusion, there seems
to be no clear ground to prohibit bundling per se, but competition authorities should
scrutinize instances of product bundling on a case by case basis.
28See Greenlee et al. (2011) for a critical review of the experimental findings of Caliskan et al. (2007)
reported in Muris and Smith (2008) with respect to the eligibility of the experimental design to test
existing product bundling theory. See Muris et al. (2011) for a rebuttal.
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Transparency and information
Companies and consumers seek to make informed business or purchase decisions, re-
spectively. The real degree and value of information at hand of buyers and sellers in a
market is hard to estimate. Although regulators acknowledge that information has an
impact on the functioning of markets per se, the evaluation of additional information
and information exchanges among firms with respect to competition is controversial
(Kühn and Vives, 1995). Experimental economics can provide competition authorities
with advice to whether and how they should control for the information flow in mar-
kets by assessing the competition and welfare effects of different (regulated) sets of
information.
Table A.11 lists experimental studies that investigate the several instruments at hand
of authorities to regulate the availability and exchange of information in markets, auc-
tions, and industries. Information regulation instruments can be divided into three
categories: Publication of aggregate industry or firm-specific data, announcement of
winning and/or losing bids in state-run auctions, and an obligation of transparency
about product quality. While the former two tackle the exchange of information among
competitors, the latter considers information provided by firms to their consumers.
The experimental designs aim at simplicity. Market models include homogeneous as
well as differentiated variants of Bertrand and Cournot competition. Two experiments
are framed as an (inverse) first-price sealed-bid auction, which effectively is homoge-
neous price competition. One experimental design on transparency regulation is more
comprehensive and endogenizes product quality. With a focus on the transparency of
product quality to consumers it is, remarkably, the only study reviewed in this subsec-
tion on internal validity focused experiments that does not (fully) rely on computer-
ized consumers. Alternative information regulations are implemented by a disclosure
or concealment of prices, quantities, profits, winning bids, losing bids, and product
quality of competitors in the same market or firms in other related but not compet-
ing markets. A notable difference to the market experiments reviewed above is that a
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majority of the information experiments employ a random matching of subjects over
periods instead of a fixed matching. The usual motivation for this design choice is to
avoid learning effects as much as possible.
The sum of findings suggests that there is no monotonic relationship between the
amount of information and competitive intensity. First, concerning the distribution of
information on firms’ behavior within a single market, price and quantity competition
lead to different results. With Cournot competition, providing firms with their competi-
tors’ individual output choices and profits intensifies competition compared to a situa-
tion when firms are only informed about the average or total output choice (Huck et al.,
1999, 2000). However, an information status in between with firms knowing about firm-
specific output choices but not profits may relax the competitive intensity and facilitate
tacit collusion (Offerman et al., 2002). With Bertrand competition, the effect of different
degrees of information exchange in a market may be much smaller (Huck et al., 2000).
In a nutshell, instead of monotonicity, experimental evidence suggests a U shaped rela-
tionship between competition and information with competition being strongest with
very little information or full transparency on competitors’ actions and outcomes. Sec-
ond, information on outcomes of similar but independent, separate markets can have
a positive effect on coordination and is thus conjectured to work as a signaling device.
With Cournot competition, informing firms about the average profit across other par-
allel markets drives down outputs and is thus detrimental to competition compared
to both a situation with detailed knowledge about competitors in the same market or
no information on other firms at all (Altavilla et al., 2006). Likewise with Bertrand
competition, competition is more fierce if no information from other related but inde-
pendent markets is provided (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2002; Bruttel, 2009). However,
this finding may depend on either homogeneity of goods or a random matching of
firms, as other experimental work indicates that with a differentiated Bertrand and
fixed matching firms make highest profit if they have no information on competitors at
all (Altavilla et al., 2006). Third, in contrast to information exchange among firms, trans-
parency towards consumers about product quality has clear cut positive effects (Henze
et al., 2015). In particular, product quality of an experience good—and thus, welfare—is
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monotonically increasing if consumers have less uncertainty about the quality of prod-
ucts offered to them.
Miscellaneous
Beyond the articles reviewed above there are further scattered experiments which in-
vestigate a particular economic regulatory instrument.29 Offerman and Potters (2006)
collect laboratory data on restricted market entry institutions. Their experimental in-
dustry has four firms that want to enter a market. Either the regulator distributes the
two market entry licenses randomly—in which case the selected firms may have to in-
cur a fixed cost—or they are allocated in a first-price sealed-bid auction. Upon market
entry, five periods of duopolistic price competition in horizontally differentiated goods
follow. The findings indicate that fees from restricted market entry lead to higher prices
and facilitate collusion in the market per se, irrespective of whether these entry cost
stem from an auction mechanism or are fixed by the regulator. In case there is only a
single entry license, the post-entry monopolistic firm charges the monopoly price with
entry fees as well as without.
Also related to cost but more reminiscent of a price control measure is yardstick com-
petition, a mechanism suggested by Shleifer (1985) in which the price a firm is allowed
to charge in a regulated industry is determined not only by its own cost but also by the
cost of similar firms. Potters et al. (2004) compare two regulatory variants of yardstick
competition between two local monopolists: Either the regulated price of each monop-
olist depends on the average cost of both firms or only on the other firm’s cost. Thereby,
firms are assumed to choose, i.e., report, their cost. Their profits are an initially increas-
ing but concave function of these reported cost. In both cases of price determination
cost are found to be above socially optimal levels. Yet, perfect tacit collusion is even
29The vast majority of the remaining experimental IO literature, however, is rather concerned with the
anti-competitive effects of a specific oligopolistic market structure. As an exaggerated example, see the
explorative (and unsuccessful) search by Gomez et al. (2008) for market characteristics that may evoke
the allegedly anti-competitive conduct of predatory pricing.
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more frequent and consequently prices are higher if a monopolist’s price depends only
on the other firm’s cost.
2.4 Observations
Drawing on existing principles for economic laboratory experiments from seminal text-
books on the methodology (Davis and Holt, 1993; Kagel and Roth, 1995), this section
treats the chapter’s second research question and derives additional guidelines for the
design of laboratory experiments that specifically examine issues of the economic regu-
lation of markets from the exhaustive literature analysis in the previous section. Atten-
tion is attributed to all intrinsic and common design elements of a market experiment,
including the allocation rules, demand and supply specifications of the microeconomic
system, the economic agents and their action space, the parametrization of market vari-
ables, the treatment scheme, the mode of repetition and matching rules, the type of
participants, and the framing of instructions. As these elements vary greatly in detail
across experiments, the following conceptual framework, which is organized by ob-
servations, focuses at design and procedural issues on which the recent experimental
literature as clustered in the review reveals a consensus. Matters in difference, espe-
cially between the two categories of experiments identified in the review, are clearly
indicated. They highlight the ramifications of an experimenters decision to tackle an is-
sue of regulatory policy either in a specific industry context or in a stylized but generic
environment. The issue of whether a research question is suited for experimental ex-
amination is relegated to Section 2.5. Hence, for the scope of this section it is assumed
that the regulatory policy problem subject to investigation is already specified. Before
concentrating on the experimental design itself, the necessity of a clear identification of
performance measures for the assessment of the regulatory policy is discussed.
OBSERVATION 2.1. Quantifiable performance measures should be defined in accordance with
the policy goals connected to a regulatory institution as an intermediate step between the iden-
tification of the regulatory policy problem and its experimental investigation.
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A consistent experimental evaluation of a regulatory institution requires the identifica-
tion of and commitment to performance measures for a quantitative assessment. For an
unbiased investigation, it is vital that performance measures are reasoned and chosen
prior to designing—let alone carrying out and statistically analyzing—the experiment.
The underlying general principle of ex ante hypothesis formulation, which applies to
(non-exploratory) research in general, is especially relevant in the social sciences and
even more so if research findings are supposed to advise policy makers. For the same
reason, experimenters should point out how the choice of economic measures for the
performance of a regulatory institution relates to a single or multiple policy goals such
as, e.g., welfare maximization, consumer protection, or effective competition.30 Non-
transparent handling of policy goals and research objectives may give rise to doubts
about the scientific nature of an experiment. Therefore, good experimental work on
regulatory policy should start with (i) a clear identification of policy goals connected
to the regulation at hand and (ii) precise definitions of the performance measures for
a laboratory assessment of the regulation. The qualitative review reveals that all stud-
ies state the objectives of their experiment, however, only few particularly discuss how
policy goals of the investigated regulation relate to these research objectives. Further-
more, experiments aimed at external validity appear to be less specific in naming and
itemizing performance measures for the laboratory assessment of the regulation than
experiments aimed at internal validity. As a consequence, hypotheses in studies from
the former category—if specifically formulated at all—are often undirected.
In particular, the majority of experiments aimed at internal validity focus on a single
performance measure. They exhibit a clear tendency towards individual or aggregated
behavior with price and quantity choices being the predominant proxies. Experiments
aimed at external validity are less homogeneous in this regard. Performance measure
choices vary greatly across experiments, yet mostly across industries. In general, these
30The relevance of a transparent formulation of policy goals, research objectives, and hypotheses is further
highlighted by Myrdal (1953, p. vii) who argues that it is impossible to avoid value judgments in
economics and other social sciences alike: “There is an inescapable a priori element in all scientific
work. Questions must be asked before answers can be given. The questions are an expression of our
interest in the world, they are at bottom valuations. Valuations are thus necessarily involved already
at the stage when we observe facts and carry on theoretical analysis, and not only at the stage when
we draw political inferences from facts and valuations.”
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studies consider multiple performance measures which are not only related to firm
choices but also to how these affect market outcomes.31 Two types of studies may be
broadly differentiated among experiments aimed at external validity: Those that focus
on efficiency, i.e., total surplus, provided that its maximization is perceived to be the
priority of regulation, and those which are rather concerned with the distribution of
total surplus, in particular consumer surplus, firm profits, or public revenue (e.g., in
a state-run auction). Apart from few exceptions, the performance indicators across all
experiments on regulatory policy measure some form of static efficiency as dynamic
efficiency inevitably has to deal with path dependencies in choice sequences which are
notoriously hard to adequately control for in experiments with human subjects.
OBSERVATION 2.2. Parallelism to the real world (salience and generalizability) is the pivotal
principle of designing an economic laboratory experiment on a regulatory policy problem which
is aimed at external (internal) validity of its findings.
Naturally, the design of an experiment on an issue that is idiosyncratic to a regulated
industry captures several regularities of this industry, which eventually results in an
experimental environment that is more reminiscent of reality than the design of an ex-
periment that addresses a generic regulatory instrument which is not restricted to a
certain industry. In turn, an experiment of the latter type is guided by salience yielding
a design as simple as possible to minimize the risk of interaction with the regulation
and to obtain generalizable findings. Internal validity of laboratory data is negatively
correlated with the complexity of the experimental design, whereas the opposite holds
with respect to external validity of experimental findings provided that the additional
complexity is a consequence of increasing parallelism to reality. Naturally, the two
types of experiments outlined here are endpoints of a continuum. Yet, a comparison
of experimental designs between the two broader categories reveals major differences.
Generally, the commitment to internal or external validity is to a lesser extent conscious
31By evaluating this difference between experiments focused on internal and external validity, one has to
take into account that in simple IO models, which are pervasive in the former, market outcomes are
linear in aggregate choices. For instance, with homogeneous Bertrand competition consumer and pro-
ducer surplus can be directly inferred from the market price, rendering an additional surplus analysis
uninformative.
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than implicit in the regulatory problem at hand, i.e., whether the research question is
predominantly focused on a specific regulated industry or the functioning of a generic
regulatory instrument.
OBSERVATION 2.3. The microeconomic system of experiments aimed at external (internal) va-
lidity is predominantly composed of extensively regulated market mechanisms such as auctions
(basic IO competition models à la Bertrand or Cournot) for which theoretical predictions may be
ambiguous (are well established).
A vast majority of 90% of articles aimed at external validity utilize auctions in their ex-
perimental designs—a finding that is likely to be caused by the controlled environment
of auctions also in the real-world. Only 15% in the category of internal validity-centered
experiments do so. More specifically, experiments in the former category frequently
encompass more than a single allocation mechanism and thereby closely resemble the
structure of a strongly regulated real-world market. Occasionally, this comes at the
cost of ambiguous theoretical predictions or even the absence of analytical theoretical
predictability. Instead, experimental designs in the latter category are almost exclu-
sively limited to a single allocation mechanism—although the competition model it-
self is often considered a treatment variable, whereby the most common mechanisms
are Bertrand competition (45%), Cournot competition (25%), and posted offer institu-
tions (15%). This observation indicates that extensive regulation in a real-world market
yields a detailed experimental environment with complex procedures. In other words,
the more comprehensive a real-world market’s regulation the lesser the experimenter’s
uncertainty in deciding on details of the microeconomic system. Also, however, it is
reasonable to hypothesize strategic choices and market outcomes to be more volatile
the more complex the experimental design. This provides in turn a rationale for sim-
plistic designs of experiments which test generic regulatory theory: Any market feature
requires parametrization for which, however, there is no source in lack of a specific tar-
get market. In this vein, Holt (1995, p. 361) provides a more general guideline to market
experiment design: “One key to good experimental work on IO issues is to introduce
the right simplifying conditions, without losing the essential features of the market en-
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vironment.” Clearly, Holt’s principle is directed towards experimenters who aim for
internal validity of their results. Acknowledging the classification of experiments ac-
cruing from the previous review, this highlights that an experimental assessment of
regulatory policy requires an active consideration of the trade-off between a highly de-
tailed or very stylized experimental design.
OBSERVATION 2.4. Economic agents are predominantly firms embodied by human partici-
pants. In experiments aimed at external (internal) validity, the number of strategic decision-
makers is chosen to resemble the corresponding real-world market (to be as low as possible).
Instead, the demand side of a market is almost exclusively computerized.
By definition with respect to the scope of this review, economic agents in each ex-
periment are firms deciding on, e.g., the selling price or quantity to produce of their
product, bids in an auction, or the quality of a product. As these firms are strategic
decision makers, they are embodied by human participants in the experimental labo-
ratory. In few exceptions, some but never all of the firms are controlled by software
agents. The number of firms in market experiments on regulatory policy varies con-
siderably depending on whether the laboratory environment is designed to resemble a
specific real-world industry or not. Among experiments focusing on internal validity
the distribution of the number of firms across the studies in this review has the 25th,
50th, and 75th percentiles, i.e., quartiles, {P25, P50, P75} = {2,2,4}. Hence, in line with
a stylized microeconomic system, the predominant (theoretically) competitive market
structure of these experiments is a duopoly. The corresponding quartiles for experi-
ments aimed at external validity are {P25, P50, P75} = {4,6,8}, which clearly indicates a
larger market size in terms of the number of firms. However, the medians of the num-
ber of firms across experiments in a specific regulated industry vary considerably and
range between 2 and 12. In conclusion, depending on whether the experimenter aims
for internal or external validity the number of economic agents in a market experiment
on regulation should be chosen as low as possible or to resemble the number of com-
petitors in the corresponding real-world market, respectively. Across both categories,
the other sides of the markets under experimental investigation, i.e., the consumers in
59
Chapter 2 Experimental Economics for Regulatory Policy Advice
retail markets or the public authorities in state-run auctions, are almost entirely com-
puterized. A prominent exception with a strategic demand side in experiments are
wholesale markets, in which firms embodied by participants purchase a good as an
input for the production of a good in another market. Yet, with regard to business-to-
consumer markets all but one experiments computerize the demand side.
OBSERVATION 2.5. The parametrization of market structure variables should always be de-
duced from field data. Experiments aimed at external (internal) validity utilize data which is
narrow (broad) in scope but deep (shallow) in detail and consequently predominantly asymmet-
ric (symmetric) across firms and often uncertain as well as volatile (certain and time-invariant).
The parametrization strategies for experiments aimed at internal validity and those
focused on external validity are widely different. Whereas a parametrization in the
former category is stylized from the real world, it is based on regularities of a specific
industry in the latter category; some of these studies indicate great efforts in capturing
and processing field data to utilize it for experiment parametrization. This basic distinc-
tion has several implications for details of the parametrization. First, in 85% of exper-
iments aimed at external validity firm-specific parameters such as endowments, cost
or valuations are asymmetric across competing firms, whereas the same share of ex-
periments focused on internal validity exhibit symmetric parameters and hence, firms.
Second, firm-specific as well as market parameters that manipulate demand and sup-
ply vary over repetitions in some experiments centered at external validity, but are
time-invariant in all experiments from the internal validity category. Third, the uncer-
tainty in real-world industries about market parameters is captured in corresponding
experiments, whereas complete information is always ensured in more stylized, i.e.,
internal validity-centered experiments. Fourth, as a consequence of the previous re-
marks, the choice of conducting an experiment which is aimed at maximizing either
its internal or its external validity directly impacts whether the effect of parameter dif-
ferences can only be evaluated in a relative manner or also—to some extent—at an
absolute level. Taken together, as the purpose of any economic laboratory experiment
is to make statements about real-world markets, parameter choices should always be
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based on related field data. The key distinction is which data and how this data is
utilized for parametrization of an experiment, i.e., whether the data is taken from a
specific industry and reflected in the experimental design in detail or whether the data
is an aggregate over different industries sharing a certain feature and applied in the
most simplistic way.
OBSERVATION 2.6. The treatment design ideal is a full-factorial between-subject application
of experimental conditions with atomic differences. For experiments aimed at external validity,
design alterations across treatments can be greater to capture alternative regulations considered
in reality.
The ideal treatment design captures each combination of treatment variables (i.e., full-
factorial) and applies them to separate groups of randomly selected subjects (i.e.,
between-subject). The rationale behind this gold standard of treatment design is that a
simultaneous variation of multiple treatment variables does not allow to infer a causal
effect of regulation as observed statistical differences in a market outcome may be
evoked by a single treatment variable, i.e., monocausal, or caused by a combination
of treatment variables, i.e., an interaction. A comparison of treatment schemes reveals
that all experiments aimed at internal validity cover at least two treatments between
which the only difference is the implementation of a single regulatory institution that
is not an aggregate of multiple regulatory measures. The difference in the experimen-
tal design between these two treatments is thus not further separable, i.e., atomic. In
contrast and in analogy to the complexity of the experimental design itself, differences
between treatment conditions are less likely to be incremental in experiments focused
on external validity than those aiming for internal validity. A regulatory policy prob-
lem in a specific industry may elicit alternative proposals that, by their nature, vary
considerably. Due to budget and other constraints, an experiment designed to assess
these alternative regulations consequently cannot exclusively rely on treatments with
incremental differences but rather captures the extremes—a design strategy which is
more generally utilized in case of continuous treatment variables, since the smaller an
economic effect the stronger it has to be to show statistical significance.
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OBSERVATION 2.7. The standard mode of repetition is a fixed number of discretely separated
periods that is common knowledge for all participants. Half of all experiments are composed of
no more than 20 periods.
The median regulation in the lab experiment runs for 20 periods and participants are
informed about this length of the experiment. A period is an independent and re-
peatable part of an experiment which is interchangeable with other instances of it-
self. The number of periods in an experiment is a proxy of its length. Depending
on how an experiment’s ending is determined, the number of periods may be com-
pared across experiments as a design element. More specific, this is only possible if
the end of an experiment is imposed exogenously and publicly known. This includes
both fixed and random ending rules provided that participants are informed about the
fixed or minimum number of periods, respectively. If instead the end of an experi-
ment is determined endogenously, the number of periods is not independent from the
other features of the experiment and thus cannot be compared across different exper-
imental designs. Within both categories of experiments, about 80% of all studies use
a fixed ending rule. The remaining experiments in the category of internal or exter-
nal validity-centered studies end after a random exogenous number of periods or an
endogenous amount of time, respectively.32 Regarding all experiments with an exoge-
nous termination rule, the number of periods is similar across experiment categories
with quartiles {P25, P50, P75} = {12,20,30} for studies aimed at external validity and
{P25, P50, P75}= {10,20,40} for articles focused at internal validity. As only studies from
the latter category apply exogenous random ending rules and as the minimum number
of periods is used to compare the lengths of experiments, the actual number of periods
may be higher in these experiments. Within each period, decisions are made simul-
taneously except for cases in which a specific sequence of decision-making is a direct
consequence of a feature in the real-world market.
32All experiments with an endogenous ending investigate the regulation of spectrum auctions which run
until an ending criterion depending on the bidding activity is met.
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OBSERVATION 2.8. Fixed matching with a permanent assignment of participants to cohorts
over the entire time horizon is the most common matching procedure.
Across periods, firms are matched into fixed groups in the majority of experiments, i.e.,
participants are initially assigned to a cohort and stay within that same cohort through-
out a session. The advantage of such a matching procedure is the independence of
different cohorts which facilitates subsequent statistical analysis. Depending on the re-
search question, an associated downside may be strong learning effects due to repeated
interaction with the same subjects. To carve out learning effects under a fixed matching,
experimenters often cut off parts at the beginning and end of time series data. Alterna-
tive sample matching procedures are random matching, i.e., subjects are randomly re-
matched every period, and perfect stranger matching, i.e., each subject encounters any
other subject at most once. The main purpose of these matching schemes is to reduce
learning effects as participants cannot expect to meet the same fellow participants in
subsequent periods or even know with certainty that they will encounter different par-
ticipants every period. Consequently, the downside is that observations from different
cohorts are not independent from each other. To sum up, fixed and random matching
are counterparts as one turns a disadvantage of the other into an advantage and vice
versa. Experiments aimed at external validity rely exclusively on fixed matching, which
is arguably more reminiscent of real-world industries in which the same competitors in
a market interact repeatedly (leaving out market entry and exit). Among experiments
focused on internal validity, fixed matching is also prevalent with 55% of the studies
utilizing such a scheme. A minority of 30% applies a random matching, which is also
known as stranger matching. None of the experiments uses a perfect stranger match-
ing. Instead, the remaining 15% treat the matching procedure as a treatment variable
and apply both fixed and random matching in a between-subject manner.
OBSERVATION 2.9. The standard and preferred subject pool with respect to the internal va-
lidity of experimental findings are students who are neither intentionally primed nor trained.
The external validity of implications regarding regulatory policy can be ascertained by engaging
industry professionals to participate in the lab.
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Implications of an experiment are drawn from decisions made by human participants.
Demographic and other characteristics may influence the behavior of participants.
Consequently, the process according to which an experiment’s participants are selected
is crucial to its success. The literature on economic laboratory experiments differen-
tiates broadly between students, experts, and the general public as common subject
pools. Common designations for experts in IO experiments are managers, practition-
ers, or industry professionals, indicating the decision makers who make the real-world
decisions depicted in the laboratory. Experimental assessments the behavior of differ-
ent subject pools have not eventuated in a complete set of systematic similarities and
differences but call for a case by case evaluation. A majority of experimental IO studies
that compared managers’ and students’ (e.g., Waichman et al., 2014) or industry profes-
sionals’ and students’ (see Chapter 7) behavior find similar behavior in the laboratory
environment. Yet, concerning experiments on regulatory policy and with respect to
the external validity of experimental findings, a subject pool of industry professionals
appears to be most preferable as a random sample would be representative of the pop-
ulation of decision makers in firms. However, industry professionals can be primed,
e.g., if they contemplate on the experiment’s purpose and adapt their behavior to elicit
a market outcome which they assume to result in more favorable regulation. Moreover,
recruiting industry professionals for participation in an experiment may proof difficult
in case the purpose of the experiment has to remain unknown. Regarding the internal
validity of laboratory experiments, the appropriate subject pool is yet less clearly iden-
tifiable since industry professionals and students alike may be framed when making
decisions in the lab. Just like students could be influenced by their field of study, pro-
fessionals’ behavior is likely to be affected by the industry they work in. Reviewed ex-
periments aimed at internal validity rely exclusively on students, which is in line with
the purpose of generic results as students who are inexperienced with the mechanisms
of the experimental market are less likely to be primed than industry professionals.
Subject pools in 75% of studies focused on external validity are also constituted of in-
experienced students. In 10% of the articles industry professionals are engaged, which
is motivated by a conjectured positive effect on the external validity. The remaining
15% of the experiments report to use experienced students, i.e., student subjects who
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have been extensively trained in the mechanics of the experiment—often for multiple
hours. This last subject pool alternative is commonly reasoned by high complexity of
the experimental design that makes training necessary. However, it is likely that de-
liberately induced experience of student participants affects their behavior during the
experiment itself due to potential path dependencies from training sessions. There-
fore, a subject pool of experienced students may combine the disadvantageous of both
engaging inexperienced students or industry professionals without making use of the
respective advantageous.
OBSERVATION 2.10. There is no general rule on framing in IO experiments on regulatory
policy. Yet, a majority of experiments aimed at external (internal) validity is framed in the
corresponding industry context (in industry-unspecific economic terms).
Framing refers to the context that is provided to the participants. Its purpose is to con-
tribute to an environment in which participants can relate to the real-world significance
of their decisions in the lab. So far, no clear standard has evolved in experimental eco-
nomics regarding the framing of laboratory environments. This holds likewise for the
subset of experiments on regulatory policy. Authors refer to different kinds of fram-
ing in their studies, the most common being context framing, economic framing, and
neutral framing. The first usually refers to experiments in which participants are con-
fronted with special vocabulary to induce a certain real-world context, e.g., a specific
regulated industry. The second broadly covers experiments relying on economic terms
such as ‘market’, ‘firm’, and ‘price’ without mentioning a specific industry. The third
and last type of framing is predominantly stated by experimenters to describe that they
abstained from economic terms in their experimental instructions altogether. Naturally,
context framing, i.e., a framing within a specific industry, applies to a majority of ex-
periments aimed at external validity, whereas experiments focused on internal validity
fall rather into the categories of economic or neutral framing. However, these terms of
framing types are used inconsistently so that the categories are too fuzzy to allow for
a serious quantitative assessment of different kinds of framing above and beyond the
qualitative evaluation. This observation is in line with a claim by Loewenstein (1999, p.
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30) regarding neutral, i.e., abstract and context-free, framing: “The context-free exper-
iment is, of course, an elusive goal. An egg-shaped cage provides the same amount of
context, albeit somewhat more alien, as any other environment.” In other words, there
is no absence of framing, but merely different framing. For instance, instead of provid-
ing participants with the information that they are forming a cartel which is subject to
a cartel detection probability, Hamaguchi et al. (2009, p. 150) tell their participants that
they participate in a “payoff reduction lottery”. Clearly, this term constitutes framing
as well—although a very different one than cartel detection. The impossibility to avoid
framing in designs and instructions of laboratory experiments on regulatory policy calls
for extensive research on the effect of different types of framing.
2.5 Discussion
Experimental economics contributes substantially to issues of economic regulation. The
extensive review conducted in this chapter provides an overview of regulatory policy
problems that can be investigated in the laboratory. Moreover, treating the experimen-
tal design as a separate key variable in the review allows for a specific analysis of com-
monalities and differences in design features across studies. This resulted in the 10
observations listed in the previous section and represents the state of the art of regu-
lation in the lab. This section concludes the chapter with a discussion on the potential
of experimentation in economics to examine regulatory policy problems and to advise
policy makers according to implications deduced from experimental findings.
An analysis of policy problems addressed by the reviewed experiments points to two
broad categories: allocation problems and issues of antitrust—with experiments aimed
at external validity falling into both categories, whereas the strand of articles focused
on internal validity is largely covered by the second category. Moreover, a majority of
external validity-centered experiments employs auctions, which are used in strongly
regulated environments and simulate upper parts of the value chain, i.e., they rarely
consider retail markets with consumers as buyers. These are in turn common for inter-
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nal validity-centered experiments. In sum, experimental examination is not limited to
certain parts of the value chain and is especially useful for issues of economic regulation
that address the allocation of a scarce resource or the mitigation of market power and
anti-competitive behavior. It is virtually impossible to assess the true implications of ex-
perimental work on regulatory policy, however, there is anecdotal evidence regarding
the experiments resembling intricacies of a specific real-world market: Several of these
experiments are funded by government institutions and many of them are conducted
in countries or by authors from countries in which the regulation of the respective in-
dustry was undergoing drastic change by the time of the experiment.
Over and beyond the scope of this review, laboratory experimentation is utilized not
only to examine issues of economic but also of social regulation. The range of policy
problems addressed by the experiments reviewed in this chapter indicate six generic
application possibilities which apply likewise to all fields of regulatory policy. First,
laboratory experimentation is a test bed for regulatory policy and thus provides further
insight into whether a policy will work as predicted in the real world or not. Second,
experiments can provide complementary evidence with respect to existing economic
theory on a regulatory measure. Third, two competing theories can be compared ceteris
paribus in a controlled laboratory environment. Fourth, an already implemented regu-
latory institution can be reassessed in the laboratory in case its impact is hard to assess
in empirical data. Fifth, experiments can support the design of completely new, regu-
lated markets (e.g., emission permit auctions). Sixth, owing to its necessary simplicity,
experiments may even be a tool to communicate and canvass for new regulation.
However, laboratory experiments are merely a complementary methodology in re-
search on regulatory policy—not only compared to theoretical models but also with
respect to empirical methodologies. In comparison to other empirical methodologies
in economics, Griliches (1986, p. 1466) states: “If the data were perfect, collected from
well-designed randomized experiments, there would hardly be room for a separate
field of econometrics.” This remark implicitly points out the impossibility of controlled
experimentation in the real world. Instead, high internal validity of an empirical re-
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search methodology is generally paralleled by a low external validity, and vice versa.
In particular, laboratory experiments may be ranked top on a scale of internal validity
of empirical research methodologies, but at the same time at the bottom with respect
to external validity. Following this logic, empirical alternatives to laboratory experi-
mentation are—in order of increasing external and decreasing internal validity—field
(also real or natural) experiments based on controlled variation in the field, quasi-
experiments inferring causal relations by e.g., instrumental variables, and computa-
tional experiments using simulations calibrated with field data. Angrist and Pischke
(2010, p.23) criticize this view on external validity and argue that “empirical evidence
on any given causal effect is always local, derived from a particular time, place, and
research design.”
In conclusion, laboratory experiments have already examined issues from all major
policy fields. A juxtaposition of common governmental departments and experimental
literature shows that selective issues in all departments have already been studied in
the lab. Over and beyond a review on and description of the state of the art of regulation
in the lab, this calls for further investigation into the potential of public policy in the lab.
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Chapter 3
Sequences of Decision Making in
Experiments and Tacit Collusion
DECISION making is, by its nature, a continuous process. Individuals but alsoorganizations monitor their environment continuously and may act or react ac-
cording to their observations at any time. Especially in electronic markets, e.g., online
retail or financial markets, sellers and buyers may react promptly to decisions by other
market participants. However, the reaction time by decision makers can also be cho-
sen strategically (e.g., strategically delayed), or actions may be taken only for a very
short period (e.g., to send a signal to a competitor or to retaliate a rival’s action). In
continuous time, the reaction time or duration of an action is chosen endogenously by
the decision makers and thus offers a richer set of strategies than if actions can only be
taken at fixed points in time.
However, most economic laboratory experiments—including the studies on regula-
tory policy reviewed in the previous chapter—employ a discrete time framework and
thus rely on the assumption that players move simultaneously or sequentially in a pre-
defined and ordered sequence. Consequently, subjects in the experiment have a given
(limited or infinite) amount of time to decide on their actions. By this means, these
experiments abstract from the decision makers’ choice with regard to the timing of an
action and thus implicitly restrict the space of potential strategies.
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Therefore, this chapter scrutinizes the different assumptions of discrete and continuous
time in economic laboratory experiments. Section 3.1 outlines the research question and
implications of this study, before the extant literature on experiments in non-discrete
time is reviewed and a framework of timing in experiments is suggested in Section 3.2.
Section 3.3 introduces an experiment designated for a laboratory assessment of discrete
and continuous time and describes its design and procedures. Empirical results of the
experiment are derived in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes and discusses the
results’ methodological and policy implications.
3.1 Motivation
An increasing number of experimental studies on repeated games deviates from the
classical mode of discrete time and instead employs a real-time setting that runs con-
tinuously and in which participants, per definitionem, hold onto their actions until
they change them explicitly. Such continuous time frameworks have been used, e.g., in
prisoner’s dilemma games (Bigoni et al., 2015a; Friedman and Oprea, 2012) as well as
in Hotelling (1929) location model (Kephart and Friedman, 2015a). Also experiments
on continuous auction design naturally allow for bids and offers in continuous time—
however, not as a means to repeat a one-shot game over independent periods. Instead,
each transaction inherently depends on the transactions preceding it and thus continu-
ous auction experiments are not considered in this chapter.
To the best of the author’s knowledge no systematic investigation on the effect of con-
tinuous versus discrete time on price and quantity competition in oligopoly experi-
ments exists to date. It is thus unknown whether discrete and continuous time compe-
tition affect price and quantity setting behavior on imperfectly competitive experimen-
tal markets, i.e., whether one of the two time frameworks facilitates cooperation and
the ability to tacitly collude more than the other. To answer this research question is
precisely the aim of this chapter.
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The contribution to the literature is twofold. First, this study provides an examination
of non-cooperative game settings in continuous time, a time framework which arguably
captures more properties of time in reality than discrete time but for which theoretical
analysis is scarce and ambiguous. Second, the experiment constitutes a formal test
for differences in tacit collusion between discrete time and continuous time. Thereby,
it provides first evidence for a reassessment of the real-world implications of discrete
time oligopoly experiments in regard to the real-world context of continuous time.
For this study, the two time frameworks of discrete (synchronous-move) and contin-
uous (real time, i.e., asynchronous-move) time are applied to a laboratory experiment
of oligopoly competition. In particular, both price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot)
competition in duopolies and triopolies, respectively, are considered. Taken to the lab,
continuous time implies that the length of a period in a repeated game is so small that
subjects cannot observe distinct periods, i.e., the reaction time of the experimental soft-
ware is lower than the human reaction time. This study is not the first to employ a
non-discrete time framework. Also, comparisons of discrete and continuous time in
lab experiments exist for specific contexts (see the following section for an overview).
However, this experimental study is the first concerned with the emergence of tacit col-
lusion under oligopolistic competition in continuous time and the first to systematically
investigate the differences in outcomes between continuous and discrete time oligopoly
experiments.
The key insights are as following. Irrespective of the underlying competition model
(Bertrand or Cournot) and the number of firms (two or three) competitors coordinate
better on collusive outcomes under discrete time than under continuous time. This is
in contrast to the experiment by Friedman and Oprea (2012), who find higher levels
of coordination in (repeated) continuous time than (one-shot) discrete time prisoner’s
dilemma games. Thus, the combined experimental evidence suggests that idiosyn-
crasies of the game matter to determine whether a continuous or discrete time setting
facilitates cooperative behavior. Although these findings support researchers in mak-
ing an informed decision on the time framework in an experiment, the potential benefit
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of continuous time in terms of a laboratory experiment’s external validity is naturally
hard to assess.
3.2 Timing in experiments
Economic lab experiments are used to verify theoretical predictions or to assess the po-
tential implications of economic market designs in the field. For this purpose, human
participants face repeated decisions in a given experimental scenario. In market exper-
iments, repetition is usually implemented as a (fixed or random) number of successive
(and otherwise independent) periods. A period does not start before all subjects have
made a decision in the previous period. This yields synchronous (predominantly si-
multaneous) decision making by participants, which however does not correspond to
most strategic interactions in reality such as competition between firms in a market. In
reality, firms can make decisions about their products and prices at any given time and
respond to their rivals’ actions accordingly, i.e., decisions are asynchronous. In other
words, in case an experiment is run with a discrete time framework in an effort to re-
semble the repeated nature of the real-world environment, this design is used to model
a situation in which decisions are actually made in continuous time.
Since the computerization of economic lab experiments researchers implement different
timing schemes. However, there is little evidence on how decision making in the lab
differs between experimental setups in discrete and continuous time, although the body
of literature is currently growing (Berninghaus et al., 2007; Friedman and Oprea, 2012;
Oprea et al., 2014; Kephart and Friedman, 2015a; Kephart and Rose, 2015). In lack of
a consensual definition across the literature, it is unclear which aspects constitute a
discrete time framework and consequently, non-discrete time frameworks, in economic
lab experiments. Before reviewing the extant literature, therefore, a classification of
discrete and non-discrete time experiments is proposed.
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3.2.1 Classification of discrete and non-discrete time experiments
In order to set out the scope of non-discrete time frameworks, a definition of what
is commonly referred to as discrete time in experiments is necessary: Discrete time is
a synchronous-move repeated games framework with an unlimited period length. A
period, i.e., a discrete time step, ends only after all subjects have confirmed their de-
cisions. All experimental modes that deviate from this set-up are thus experiments in
non-discrete time and are reviewed in the next subsection. However, among the non-
discrete time experiments again exist a variety of modes that require distinction.
The classification of non-discrete time experiments is motivated by Freeman and Am-
bady (2010), who show that the human reaction time for very simple computerized
tasks as measured by the time needed to process information presented on the screen
and to perform a mouse click lies above 0.5 seconds. Thus, in the most conservative
way, continuous time in experiments is defined as a time framework with rapidly re-
peated periods of a fixed time length which does not exceed the threshold of human
reaction time, i.e., period lengths of 0.5 seconds or below. Technically speaking, as
computers perform operations in discrete steps, a computerized experiment is said to
run in continuous time if the transaction time (period length) between the experimental
server and its clients is smaller than the human participants’ reaction time. In continu-
ous time experiments an action instantaneously impacts profits and can be observed by
other subjects accordingly. The (potential) consequences of an action cannot be tested
prior to making the decision but have to be assessed meanwhile the decision itself is
in effect. Moreover, with time running continuously it is virtually impossible that two
participants in an experiment make decisions simultaneously. Consequently, in contin-
uous time experiments the order or time of decision making is not exogenously given
and thus, inter-period asynchronous interaction emerges naturally. Subjects can act
and react upon each others’ moves at a self-specified time. Profits and other outcome
variables become flow values. The key aspect of a continuous time framework is thus
that it endogenizes the timing of decisions and thereby captures asynchronicity in de-
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cision making as in many real-world strategic interactions, i.e., decision making which
is neither simultaneous nor sequential.
Continuous time experiments need to be distinguished from those running in near-
continuous time, which is a synchronous-move repeated games framework with con-
stant, finite period lengths above the human reaction time, during which subjects have
to decide on their action in the subsequent period. As in continuous time experiments,
individual decisions are transferred from one period to the next, and hence, doing noth-
ing results in choosing the same action as before. Without communication between sub-
jects, decisions by rivals do not become public and profit-relevant before the end of a
period. Therefore, as the reaction time is above the human decision threshold, interac-
tion is potentially synchronized and decision making is simultaneous. Hence, as under
discrete time, inter-period asynchronous interaction or even sequential moving may
occur behaviorally, but not naturally. The advantages of near-continuous time in com-
parison to discrete time experiments are a high control over the length of the session
and the possibility to collect a large amount of data in relatively short time. Thereby,
patterns of repeated decisions may occur that would not have been observable in a dis-
crete time experiment (with fewer periods). However, this time framework also bears
two potential problems. First, different cognitive and physical abilities of human par-
ticipants may have a greater influence on experimental results than in an experiment
run in discrete time, i.e., some subjects may not be able to change actions fast enough
and hence, data on intended decisions would be lost. Second, the repetition of short
periods with a fixed length may induce an aspiration to use the limited amount of time
in a period and adapt one’s decision every period. Both caveats generally apply to con-
tinuous time experiments as well. However, since profit is a flow value in continuous
time experiments, a small difference in participants’ reaction times has only a relatively
small impact on profits as subjects can react promptly to another subject’s decision. For
example, in a duopoly the additional profit gained by defecting from a cooperative state
is linear in the rival’s reaction time under a continuous time framework but step-wise
constant under a near-continuous time framework. Consequently, for the same rival’s
reaction time below the near-continuous period length, (myopic) profits from defection
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are higher in near-continuous time than in continuous time. A potential problem of the
continuous time framework—which is discussed later—is that the theoretical predic-
tion of the repeated game may change due to its dynamic nature.
Finally, the continuous time framework has to be differentiated from a clock or deadline
mechanism, which is a synchronous-move repeated games time framework with con-
stant, finite period lengths under which subjects’ current actions are common knowl-
edge and may be changed (freely), but do not become binding, until a clock runs out or
a deadline is reached. The currently chosen action at the time of the deadline becomes
binding and constitutes the subject’s profit-relevant decision for this period. Conse-
quently, the current action of a subject may be interpreted as an intention for the final
decision in the period but is profit-irrelevant, and thus, cheap talk. During a period
subjects can react to each others’ actions, which shall be referred to as intra-period asyn-
chronous interaction. As Roth (1995, p. 324) points out, this experiment design gives
some indication of how “last-minute agreements” in negotiations evolve.1 With respect
to experimental design, the clock or deadline mechanism is a hybrid of the continuous
time framework and the near-continuous time framework. Whereas intra-period in-
teraction between subjects (i.e., cheap talk before the deadline) is asynchronous, inter-
period interaction between subjects (i.e., decision making at the deadline) is synchro-
nized. See Roth (1995) for an overview on the effects of the clock or deadline mechanism
and proposed models to explain these effects.
3.2.2 Review of non-discrete time experiments
Table 3.1 lists non-discrete time experiments in the extant literature and classifies them
according to the definitions derived in the previous subsection. Apart from the type
1There are two further strands of experiments that implement a variant of this clock or deadline mecha-
nism. The first strand (Dorsey, 1992; Goren et al., 2003; Ishii and Kurzban, 2008) introduces restrictions
on how actions may be adjusted during the period, e.g., individual contributions in a public good game
may only be increased but not decreased over time. Kurzban et al. (2001) compares public good exper-
iments in a clock framework with and without revocable contributions. In the second strand (Levati
and Neugebauer, 2004; Murphy et al., 2006), prior to a clock running out, the period may end by other
means such as a player dropping out of an auction or exiting a market. Both strands may be viewed as
extensions to the basic clock/deadline mechanism.
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of game run in the laboratory, the length of a period, the mode of asynchronous in-
teraction (i.e., between or within a period) and the ensuing classification to one of the
non-discrete time frameworks are reported for each experimental study. For this pur-
pose, a period is defined in the context of repeated games as the amount of time a
subject has to decide on a binding action. Note that this is identical to the minimum
amount of time that a binding decision by a subject holds. Consequently, a supergame
is referred to as a complete sequence of a fixed or random number of periods.
Feeley et al. (1997), Berninghaus and Ehrhart (2003), and Berninghaus et al. (1999, 2006,
2007) are among the first to conduct continuous time experiments with period lengths
below the human reaction time and a fixed supergame length of several minutes up to
half an hour.2 More recently, Cheung and Friedman (2009), Friedman and Oprea (2012),
Oprea et al. (2014), Bigoni et al. (2015a), Kephart and Friedman (2015a), and Kephart
and Rose (2015) run experiments in continuous time with supergame lengths from 20
seconds to four minutes. Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998), Deck and Wilson (2002, 2003,
2008), Davis (2009a), Davis and Korenok (2009), Davis et al. (2009, 2010), and Friedman
et al. (2015) conduct near-continuous time experiments with a high number of rapidly
repeated periods. The clock or deadline framework is employed by Roth et al. (1988),
Güth et al. (2002), Goren et al. (2004), and Deck and Nikiforakis (2012).
Of the continuous time experiments, only Berninghaus et al. (2007), Friedman and
Oprea (2012), Oprea et al. (2014), Kephart and Friedman (2015a), and Kephart and Rose
(2015) compare outcomes under both discrete and continuous time. Berninghaus et al.
(2007) study network formation and network effects in social and economic networks
in which connections to other players are beneficial but costly. They find that the for-
mation of a certain star structure, which is the unique Nash equilibrium, prevails under
both time frameworks. However, subjects are found to alternate the coveted position of
the center player in the star network in continuous time but not in discrete time. Bern-
inghaus et al. suggest that their results may be explained by inequity aversion. As the
2Note that Millner et al. (1990) already follows a continuous time approach with output variables given
as flow values. However, technical constraints of the PLATO software used for the computerization of
the experiment resulted in a transaction time between clients and server of about 5 seconds, which lies
one order of magnitude above the threshold of 0.5 seconds.
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TABLE 3.1: Economic laboratory experiments in non-discrete time.
Study Type of game Period length† Async. interaction
Continuous time
Feeley et al. (1997) Prisoner’s dilemma n/a†† Inter-period
Berninghaus et al. (1999) Population 1/10 seconds Inter-period
Berninghaus and Ehrhart (2003) Evolutionary 1/10 seconds Inter-period
Berninghaus et al. (2006) Network formation 1/10 seconds Inter-period
Berninghaus et al. (2007) Network formation 1/5 seconds Inter-period
Cheung and Friedman (2009) Coordination 1/2 seconds Inter-period
Knigge and Buskens (2010) Network formation n/a†† Inter-period
Friedman and Oprea (2012) Prisoner’s dilemma 1/20 seconds Inter-period
Oprea et al. (2014) Public good 1/10 seconds Inter-period
Bigoni et al. (2015a) Prisoner’s dilemma 16/100 seconds Inter-period
Kephart and Friedman (2015a) Hotelling 1/20 seconds Inter-period
Kephart and Rose (2015) Hotelling 1/20 seconds Inter-period
Chapter 7 Wholesale competition 1/2 seconds Inter-period
Near-continuous time
Millner et al. (1990)††† Posted offer 5 seconds Inter-period
Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998) Public good 10–90 seconds Inter-period
Deck and Wilson (2002) Posted offer 3 seconds Inter-k-periods-block
Deck and Wilson (2003) Posted offer 3 seconds Inter-20-periods-block
Deck and Wilson (2008) Posted offer 1.7 seconds Inter-period
Davis (2009a) Posted offer 7 seconds Inter-period
Davis and Korenok (2009) Posted offer 7–70 seconds Inter-period
Davis et al. (2009) Posted offer 12 seconds Inter-period
Davis et al. (2010) Posted offer 12–18 seconds Inter-period
Friedman et al. (2015) Cournot competition 4 seconds Inter-period
Clock/deadline mechanism
Roth et al. (1988) Bargaining 9–12 minutes Intra-period
Dorsey (1992) Public good 180 seconds Intra-period
Kurzban et al. (2001) Public good 90 seconds Intra-period
Güth et al. (2002) Public good 3 minutes Intra-period
Goren et al. (2003) Public good 60–90 seconds Intra-period
Goren et al. (2004) Public good 60–90 seconds Intra-period
Levati and Neugebauer (2004) Public good ≤ 50 seconds Intra-period
Murphy et al. (2006) Trust dilemma ≤ 45 seconds Intra-period
Ishii and Kurzban (2008) Public good 90 seconds Intra-period
Deck and Nikiforakis (2012) Minimum-effort 60 seconds Intra-period
† Period length is defined as the minimum time that a binding decision by a subject holds.
†† The transaction time of the software is not stated, but assumed to be below 0.5 seconds.
††† The experiment uses the PLATO software. Period length is determined as its estimated latency.
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discrete treatment is composed of only 15 periods whereas the continuous treatment
runs for 30 minutes, subjects may find it easier to equalize payoffs among themselves
in the latter.
Oprea et al. (2014) compare contributions to a public good between discrete time and
continuous time over 10 minutes. In the continuous time treatments, contributions can
be changed in real time. In the discrete time treatments, incstead, subjects decide on
their contributions once a minute, i.e., they play 10 periods with a fixed length of one
minute. In this setup with few discrete periods of a fixed period length, the authors
find no differences in contributions between the two time frameworks.
In a yet simpler environment, Friedman and Oprea (2012) compare cooperative behav-
ior in the prisoner’s dilemma in discrete and continuous time. The authors find that the
continuous time framework fosters cooperation among the players relative to discrete
time. More precisely, they compare continuous and discrete variants of the prisoner’s
dilemma in supergames with a constant length of 60 seconds. In continuous time, they
find a median mutual cooperation rate of 90 percent over the supergames’ duration.
With the duration of each supergame being fixed, the number of periods is decreased
to eight in 60 seconds and finally to one in 60 seconds, i.e., a one-shot game.3 The main
finding of the study is that cooperation decreases as the number of periods decreases so
that the median rate of mutual cooperation is zero in the one-shot treatments. In other
words, cooperation is higher in a continuously repeated prisoner’s dilemma than in a
one-shot (discrete) prisoner’s dilemma. Friedman and Oprea also analyze the subjects’
individual behavior in the continuous time treatments and identify alternative strate-
gies. A model of e-equilibria (Radner, 1986; Bergin and MacLeod, 1993) predicts their
findings very well. A key aspect of their experimental design is “that period lengths
and potential payoffs are kept constant across [...] treatments” (Friedman and Oprea,
2012, p. 343). However, to achieve this, Friedman and Oprea are forced to implicitly
change two treatment variables simultaneously in the transition from continuous time
3Comparably, Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998) vary the number of periods (10, 30, and 90) in a public
good game of fixed total session length of 15 minutes and find that cooperation increases with the
number of repetitions.
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to the one-shot (discrete) treatment. The first treatment variable is obviously the time
framework of a repeated game, i.e., continuous or discrete, and the second treatment
variable is the repetition of the game itself, i.e., repeated game or one-shot game.
Both Kephart and Friedman (2015a) as well as Kephart and Rose (2015) compare a dis-
crete time and two continuous time variants of the Hotelling (1929) spatial competition
model with and without vertical differentiation. Kephart and Friedman (2015a) find
that under continuous time location choices resemble the static Nash equilibrium more
closely than under discrete time. With vertical differentiation and an additional choice
on price, Kephart and Rose (2015) find some support for the notion that continuous
time increases cooperation. Whereas subjects may decide instantaneously in one of the
continuous time treatments, they can change their decision only gradually at a spec-
ified speed in the other continuous treatment. Under discrete time, subjects have to
decide on location (and price in case of Kephart and Rose (2015)) during a three sec-
ond time interval. Note that with respect to the classification of timing in experiments
derived above, the discrete time treatments clearly fall under the near-continuous time
framework.
3.3 Experiment
The following experiment is aimed at studying and comparing the impact of discrete
time and continuous time on experimental oligopoly competition. As a means of ro-
bustness, not only a single mode of competition but symmetric differentiated Bertrand
as well as Cournot competition is run in duopolies and triopolies each. Thereby, the
experiment captures three dichotomous treatment variables, namely discrete vs. con-
tinuous time, Bertrand vs. Cournot competition, and duopolies vs. triopolies in a full-
factorial design, resulting in a total of eight treatments. The labels used to refer to the
treatments are stated in Table 3.2 by appending abbreviations from left to right, e.g.,
RB3 refers to the continuous (real-time) Bertrand triopoly treatment.
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TABLE 3.2: Treatment variables and their values.
Time framework Competition model Number of firms
Discrete time (D) Bertrand (B) Duopoly (2)
Continuous time (real time) (R) Cournot (C) Triopoly (3)
3.3.1 Oligopoly competition
Price competition à la Bertrand and quantity competition à la Cournot are the two
workhorse models of IO. When comparing different designs in experiments on firm be-
havior, they serve as good proxies for a large share of models on oligopoly competition.
As the Bertrand paradox of homogeneous price competition is often deemed unrealis-
tic and as it yields a discontinuous demand function, the model by Singh and Vives
(1984)—which generalizes the Hotelling (1929) model to exploit the duality between
price and quantity competition in differentiated goods—is utilized for the experiment;
more precisely the model’s generalization to more than two firms is employed such as,
e.g., in Häckner (2000) and Suetens and Potters (2007). See Appendix B.1 for a thorough
analysis of the model with asymmetric firms and three different theoretical predictions,
namely Nash equilibrium, Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium and collusive equilib-
rium.
Consider a market with n ∈N firms. Each firm i ∈ {1, ...,n} produces a single good.
The firms’ goods are differentiated horizontally but homogeneous in vertical quality
and have identical demand elasticity. Thus, firms are assumed to be symmetric. Note
that asymmetric (inverse) demand may result in additional behavioral effects in the
experiment which are not in focus here. See Chapter 4 for an asymmetric experimental
application of the model. For the Cournot treatments, the inverse demand for firm i is
given by
pi = ω− λ
(
qi + θ∑
j 6=i
qj
)
with ω,λ > 0 and the degree of substitutability θ ∈ [−1,1]. If θ < 0 goods are com-
plements, if θ = 0 goods are independent of one another, and if θ = 1 they are perfect
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substitutes. For non-perfect substitutes (θ < 1), the corresponding demand function for
firm i in the Bertrand treatments is given by
qi =Ω−Λpi +Θ
∑j 6=i pj
n− 1
with
Ω =
ω
λ(1+ θ(n− 1)) ,
Λ =
1+ θ(n− 2)
λ(1− θ)(1+ θ(n− 1)) ,
Θ =
θ(n− 1)
λ(1− θ)(1+ θ(n− 1)) ,
and n as the number of firms with non-negative demand, i.e., firms that have not exited
the market due to a too high price. If qi < 0 firm i exits the market, its quantity is set to
zero, and n is decreased by one. Normalizing costs to zero, firm i’s profit is Πi = piqi.
For the empirical assessment of tacit collusion as a measure of competition intensity
consider three equilibrium benchmarks for Bertrand and Cournot competition, respec-
tively. Note that, although goods are differentiated horizontally, equilibrium prices,
quantities, and profits are the same for all firms as firms are not differentiated vertically.
First, under the Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium all firms are assumed to be price-
takers so that they maximize their profit irrespective of their rivals’ decisions. Second,
the Nash equilibrium assumes that firms choose a price (quantity) such as to maximize
their own profit given their rivals’ prices (quantities). Third, under the collusive equi-
librium firms are assumed to cooperate and hence, maximize their joint profits, i.e.,
engage in JPM. See Appendix B.1 for the derivation of these theoretical predictions.
It is straightforward that ΠJPM ≥ ΠNashBertrand,ΠNashCournot ≥ ΠWalras for all valid parameter
combinations. If goods are substitutes (θ > 0), Nash prices and profits are higher under
Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. In contrast, consumer surplus
and total welfare are higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competi-
tion as they are monotonically decreasing in prices. If goods are complements (θ < 0),
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depending on the number of competitors, Nash prices and profits may be higher under
Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition (Häckner, 2000).
3.3.2 Measuring competitiveness
As Nash prices, quantities, and profits do not coincide under Bertrand and Cournot
and are additionally dependent on the number of competitors, these firm input or mar-
ket output variables are not adequate to compare cooperative intentions, i.e., tacit col-
lusion, across treatments. Therefore, combined indices of the degree of tacit collusion
proposed by Suetens and Potters (2007) and Engel (2007) are used to compare tacit col-
lusion between treatments irrespective of different theoretical predictions. The degree
of tacit collusion is measured as the relative deviation of a price, quantity, or profit
from the theoretical prediction towards the JPM price, quantity, or profit. With respect
to Bertrand (Cournot) competition, a price (quantity) set by a firm can thereby be un-
ambiguously converted to a degree of tacit collusion. Hence, for means of comparison
between treatments, firms may be assumed to decide on a certain degree of tacit collu-
sion instead of a price or quantity. In a similar fashion, a firm’s profit as well as average
profit of firms in a market may be expressed in a degree of tacit collusion. Therefore,
consider a degree of tacit collusion based on model input, i.e., price in Bertrand and
quantity in Cournot, as well as a degree of tacit collusion based on model output, i.e.,
profit. Formally, the degree of tacit collusion is
ϕEx =
x− xE
x JPM − xE
with x ∈ {p/q,Π} and E ∈ {Nash,Walras}, resulting in four different measures de-
pending on the theoretical benchmark (Nash or Walrasian equilibrium) and input or
output. If ϕEx = 0, the value of x corresponds to the theoretical prediction by the equi-
librium concept E. If ϕEx = 1, the market is completely collusive and competitors behave
as a single monopolist. Note that ϕEp/q may exceed one as joint profit is not monotonic
in price or quantity, but ϕEΠ ≤ 1.
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3.3.3 Repeated games in discrete and continuous time
Moving from the one-shot game introduced in the previous subsection to the repeated
game implemented in the experiment several experimental design implications from
the extant literature are inferred. First, in contrast to Friedman and Oprea (2012), the
repeated version of the game is employed in both the discrete time treatments and
the continuous time treatments. Second, the discrete time treatments are composed
of 60 periods—much more than in Berninghaus et al. (2007) or Oprea et al. (2014)—to
reduce differences to continuous time solely due to a longer time horizon of the experi-
ment. Third and contrasting Kephart and Friedman (2015a) as well as Kephart and Rose
(2015), the discrete time treatments refrain from limiting the time provided to subjects
for their decision-making process in each period. Fourth, discrete time sessions are run
first to set the duration of the continuous time sessions to equal the average duration of
the discrete time sessions, which amounted to approximately 30 minutes. Hence, the
total session length is similar across all treatments and one period in discrete time cor-
responds on average to 30 seconds in continuous time. The period length in the discrete
time treatments is infinite and it is 0.2 seconds in the continuous time treatments, i.e.,
considerably below the conservative threshold of 0.5 seconds. With respect to the latter
time framework, current profit represents a flow value of time. In an effort to maximize
comparability between treatments, the profit displayed in the experimental software in
the continuous time treatments is scaled to the profit that subjects would have earned if
the current prices or quantities would be held constant for 30 seconds, ceteris paribus.
Thereby, with same prices or quantities in one of the discrete time treatments and the
corresponding continuous time treatment, the information presented to the subjects is
not only qualitatively equal but also visually identical.
The model of differentiated Bertrand and Cournot competition considered in this ex-
periment has a unique strict Nash equilibrium in the one-shot (stage) game. In discrete
time, this also constitutes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the finitely re-
peated game. In continuous time, however, the theoretical prediction is not straightfor-
ward. Maskin and Tirole (1988a,b) consider two different continuous time frameworks
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with endogenous timing in duopolistic price and quantity competition and show that
equilibrium behavior is similar to a sequential-move infinitely repeated duopoly. In
particular, continuous time is modeled as a fine grid of periods in a sequential-move
game with commitment to a price or quantity for a deterministic or stochastic length
of time. Although the deterministic variant may rather apply to repeated games clas-
sified as near-continuous time, the stochastic variant does capture the asynchronous
nature of continuous time quite well. Irrespective of the continuous time variant, a col-
lusive equilibrium emerges for discount factors close to one. An assumption in their
model is that the Markov property holds, i.e., that future states of the stochastic process
only depend on the current state and not the sequence of states that preceded it. In
a comparable fashion, Simon and Stinchcombe (1989, p. 1171) model continuous time
as “a discrete time model, but with a grid that is infinitely fine” and thereby suggest a
more general definition of games in continuous time. Friedman and Oprea (2012) point
out that the model predicts mutual cooperation at all times in a prisoner’s dilemma,
which may be viewed as a highly abstracted variant of homogeneous Bertrand compe-
tition. In sum, theory predicts that, if anything, asynchronous-move continuous time
is more prone to tacit collusion than simultaneous-move discrete time. Additionally,
Bigoni et al. (2015a) find that a deterministic ending rule facilitates cooperation even
more than a stochastic ending rule under continuous time, whereas other experimen-
tal evidence indicates that the opposite may hold under discrete time (Dal Bó, 2005).
Theses findings add further support to the conjecture that the continuous time treat-
ments in our experiment are expected to exhibit more tacit collusion than the discrete
time experiments. In a nutshell, the theoretical and experimental evidence leads to the
following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 3.1. Oligopoly competition in continuous time is, ceteris paribus, more prone to
tacit collusion than in discrete time.
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TABLE 3.3: Theoretical benchmarks of oligopoly competition for each treatment.
Bertrand Cournot
Duopoly
pWalras = 0
qWalras = 60.00
ΠWalras = 0
pNash = 25.00
qNash = 45.00
ΠNash = 1125.00
pNash = 37.50
qNash = 37.50
ΠNash = 1406.25
pJPM = 50.00
qJPM = 40.00
ΠJPM = 1500.00
Triopoly
pWalras = 0
qWalras = 42.86
ΠWalras = 0
pNash = 16.47
qNash = 35.71
ΠNash = 595.24
pNash = 30.00
qNash = 30.00
ΠNash = 900.00
pJPM = 50.00
qJPM = 21.43
ΠJPM = 1071.43
3.3.4 Procedures
For the experiment, the parameters of the oligopoly competition model are ω = 100,
λ = 1, and θ = 23 so that goods are substitutes. Consequently, Ω =
300
2n+1 , Λ =
6n−3
2n+1 , and
Θ = 6n−62n+1 . Table 3.3 shows the corresponding theoretical benchmarks of the one-shot
game for each treatment.
In a further effort to maximize comparability between treatments and to prevent any
source for behavioral effects other than the treatment, input and output variables are
scaled in the following way. The action space of prices in Bertrand treatments and
quantities in Cournot treatments is equally set to [0,100] with a minimum increment
of 1 and the JPM action at a price or quantity of 50. This ensures that the collusive
action is not more or less behaviorally attractive across treatments and that the search
costs of finding the collusive action are the same in all treatments. With a similar in-
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tention profits are scaled so that they would be equal in Nash equilibrium. Thereby, a
subject playing the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game—given that its competitors
play Nash as well—would make identical profits in all treatments.4 Altogether, this
precludes confounding effects of the experimental design and parametrization. Fur-
thermore, perfect information is ensured in all treatments, i.e., subjects are provided
with individual feedback about each competitor’s price, quantity, and profit. Also, to
prevent misinterpretation due to short-time treatment effects, the number of repetitions
of the one-shot game, i.e., periods, is comparably high.
With respect to the technical requirements of continuous time and to ensure high con-
trol over the correct scaling of time in all treatments, the experiment is computerized
with Brownie, a newly-developed Java-based experimental software (Müller and Nor-
mann, 2014).5 All sessions were run at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in Karl-
sruhe, Germany between October and December 2014—first the discrete time treat-
ments and then the continuous time treatments. Disregarding the first period, in which
subjects familiarized themselves with the experimental software and decided on their
initial price or quantity, the discrete time sessions took on average roughly 30 minutes.
Continuous time sessions ran for the same amount of time (again without the phase of
deciding on initial price or quantity). Therefore, on average, one period in discrete time
corresponds to roughly 30 seconds in continuous time. Note that there are no practice
periods, neither with nor without interaction between subjects, and thus, no unobserv-
able learning confounds occur. The matching of subjects is constant throughout a ses-
sion (fixed partner matching). In total, 240 students of economic fields with an average
age of 22 years participated in the experiment. Subjects were recruited via the ORSEE
platform (Greiner, 2015) and participated only in one of the treatments (between-subject
design).
4Alternatively, profits may be standardized with respect to the collusive outcome. However, this would
in turn lead to different Nash profits across treatments. Hence, firms would face diverse incentives to
deviate from the theoretical Nash prediction. Moreover, the normalization based on Nash profits yields
specific properties with regard to the degree of tacit collusion based on the Walrasian equilibrium,
which will prove important for an experiment reported in Chapter 4 which also uses part of the data
used here.
5Recently, further experimental software capturing continuous time is introduced, e.g., by Pettit et al.
(2014) for experimenters with limited programming skills and by Hawkins (2014) for web-based ex-
periments.
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The protocol for each session follows five steps. First, upon entering the lab, subjects
are randomly assigned to a chair, from which they can neither see nor speak to any
other participant of the experiment. Second, after everyone has been seated, the exper-
imental instructions are handed out to the participants in print and read aloud from
a recording.6 The recording ensures that any confounding effect of the reader’s voice,
accent, or intonation is identical across sessions from the same treatment and as simi-
lar as possible across treatments. Therefore, identical paragraphs across treatments are
recorded once and the recording is used in all treatments. Third, prior to the beginning
of the experiment, each participant has to complete a computerized test of questions
regarding the comprehension of the instructions. It is only allowed to proceed to the
next question after the correct answer to the current question is entered. Fourth, after
all subjects have successfully completed the test, the experiment starts automatically.
Over the course of experiment participants wear ear protectors so that they are not
influenced by clicking noises of computer mouses or other disturbing noise. Fifth, fol-
lowing the end of the experiment, each participant is paid out the profits accumulated
during the experiment privately and in cash. Following this protocol, the total length
of a session from subjects’ entering to leaving the lab was about one hour. The average
payoff per subject is EUR 16.85.
3.4 Results
The experimental data amounts to 12 independent duopolies or triopolies in each treat-
ment. Due to no-shows, two exceptions are the RB3 treatment for which there are only
11 triopolies and the RC3 treatment for which data on 13 triopolies exists since the
number of no-shows necessitated an additional session. For each cohort there is data
on market variables over 60 periods in a discrete time treatment and on 9,000 ticks (at an
interval of 0.2 seconds each) in a continuous time treatment. Considering the compre-
hensiveness of the data, the statistical analysis initially deals with aggregate data on the
6As an example, the experimental instructions for the RB3 treatment together with a screenshot of the
experimental software are provided in Appendix C.1.
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TABLE 3.4: Average degrees of tacit collusion across treatments.
Treatment N ϕNashp/q ϕ
Nash
Π ϕ
Walras
p/q ϕ
Walras
Π
DB2 12 0.860 0.861 0.930 0.965
(0.285) (0.326) (0.142) (0.081)
DB3 12 0.659 0.683 0.773 0.859
(0.352) (0.327) (0.235) (0.145)
DC2 12 0.674 0.532 0.918 0.971
(0.574) (0.994) (0.143) (0.062)
DC3 12 0.473 0.364 0.789 0.898
(0.551) (0.785) (0.220) (0.126)
RB2 12 0.769 0.736 0.885 0.934
(0.371) (0.468) (0.185) (0.117)
RB3 11 0.555 0.505 0.703 0.780
(0.329) (0.350) (0.219) (0.156)
RC2 12 0.842 0.760 0.960 0.985
(0.279) (0.374) (0.070) (0.023)
RC3 13 0.424 0.233 0.770 0.877
(0.516) (0.784) (0.206) (0.125)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
level of cohorts and is followed by further disaggregated analyses. Descriptive statis-
tics on price respective quantity and profit, and thus first impressions on the treatment
effects are provided by Table 3.4 in degrees of tacit collusion across treatments and av-
eraged over cohorts.7 As a first insight, comparing the average degree of tacit collusion
based on Nash profits over the entire length of the experiment without controlling for
the competition model or the number of competitors, discrete time is significantly more
prone to tacit collusion than continuous time according to a one-tailed non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U test (z = 1.77, p = 0.038). In the following, this preliminary finding is
investigated thoroughly by means of panel analyses of cohort and individual behavior
over the entire time horizon on market level and on firm level.
In order to allow for a comparison of panel data from discrete time treatments and con-
tinuous time treatments, the experimental data from the latter treatments is mapped to
7For Table 3.4, the first and last sixth of periods are dropped to reduce distortions by start- and end-game
effects. For purposes of comparison, average degrees of tacit collusion over the entire time horizon
across treatments are reported in Appendix D.1. All following non-descriptive statistical analyses are
based on data from all periods.
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the 60 periods of the discrete time treatments. In particular, for each discrete period, the
degree of tacit collusion in the continuous time treatments is averaged over 30 seconds,
i.e., 150 consecutive ticks of 0.2 seconds. Thereby, the first 30 seconds correspond to the
first discrete period, the next 30 seconds correspond to the second discrete period, and
so on. The mean is used as a single proxy for the behavior over 30 seconds as it has the
advantage that a maximum of information about the distribution is preserved and that
it is, loosely speaking, merely a reduction in data resolution rather than a reduction in
data itself. In contrast to the median or other point statistics, changing the value of any
single data point inevitably changes the mean as well. For a direct comparison of the
two time frameworks using the mean is therefore arguably most conservative.
RESULT 3.1. The degree of tacit collusion based on profits is significantly higher under discrete
time than under continuous time.
A firm’s profit is determined not only by its own decisions but also by the decisions of
its rivals. One firm’s profit in a period is hence not independent from its rivals’ prof-
its. Therefore, the degree of tacit collusion based on profits is a market level outcome
variable, i.e., it is measured using the average of each firm’s profit in a duopoly or
triopoly. There are a total of 96 markets across all treatments with 60 discretized peri-
ods each. Testing for treatment effects in such clustered panel data requires to control
for the dependence between observations from the same market as opposed to obser-
vations from different markets. Consequently, the following multilevel mixed-effects
regression model is estimated, for which treatment DB2 serves as a baseline:
ϕEΠ,k,t = β0 + ξk
+ βContinuous · Continuous
+ βTriopoly · Triopoly
+ βCournot · Cournot
+ (βPeriod + βPeriod,k) · t
+ ek,t,
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where ϕEΠ,k,t is the degree of tacit collusion based on average firm profit Π on market,
i.e., duopoly or triopoly, k in period t. On the market level, ξk is the random inter-
cept that controls for intra-cluster correlation in terms of different base levels of tacit
collusion between markets and βPeriod,k is a random slope for the time trend in each
market. Table 3.5 reports estimates for the degree of tacit collusion based on Nash prof-
its in Model (1) and on Walrasian profits in Model (2). Irrespective of the theoretical
benchmark, continuous time has a significant negative effect on tacit collusion and re-
duces the degree of tacit collusion between 4 percentage points (pp) and 20 pp, ceteris
paribus. This is in stark contrast to Hypothesis 3.1 and also contradicts previous ex-
perimental findings (Friedman and Oprea, 2012; Oprea et al., 2014). Yet, both control
treatment dummies for the competition model and the number of firms have the ex-
pected effects. First, in line with the meta-study on oligopoly experiments presented in
Chapter 4, triopolies exhibit (10 pp to 22 pp) less tacit collusion than duopolies. Second,
price competition facilitates tacit collusion more than quantity competition if measured
based on Nash profit. In this case, the degree of tacit collusion is almost 26 pp lower
under quantity competition compared to price competition. However, this is reversed
if tacit collusion is measured based on Walrasian profit. Then, the degree of tacit col-
lusion under quantity competition is almost 5 pp higher than under price competition.
This is also in line with the expectation as the Walrasian equilibrium is independent of
the competition model so that the Walrasian-based degree of tacit collusion does not
control for differing Nash predictions of price and quantity competition. Furthermore,
there are no significant interaction effects between the treatment variables in either re-
gression model. In conclusion, the effect of continuous time compared to discrete time
is not only statistically significant but has similar magnitudes as the number of competi-
tors and mode of competition—which is supported for the Nash-based degree of tacit
collusion by insignificant Wald tests of pairwise coefficient comparisons in Model (1).
In the following, apart from these findings with respect to profit, i.e., an output variable,
a similar yet complementary analysis of prices and quantities, i.e., input variables is
conducted. Thereby, instead of aggregate market behavior the individual firm choices
of prices and quantities are compared across treatments.
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TABLE 3.5: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on treatment variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covariate ϕNashΠ ϕ
Walras
Π ϕ
Nash
p/q ϕ
Walras
p/q ϕ
Nash
p/q ≤ 1 ϕWalrasp/q ≤ 1
Continuous −0.196∗ −0.037∗ −0.109∗∗ −0.092∗∗ −0.106∗∗ −0.094∗∗
(0.110) (0.022) (0.052) (0.037) (0.053) (0.038)
Triopoly −0.219∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.022) (0.054) (0.038) (0.054) (0.039)
Cournot −0.264∗∗ 0.048∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ −0.053 −0.235∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.110) (0.022) (0.052) (0.037) (0.053) (0.038)
Period < 0.001 > −0.001 > −0.001 −0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
(0.002) (< 0.001) (0.001) (< 0.001) (0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 0.851∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.022) (0.055) (0.039) (0.056) (0.040)
Cohorts/Firms 96 96 240 240 240 240
Observations 5,760 5,760 14,400 14,400 13,876 13,876
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
RESULT 3.2. The degree of tacit collusion based on prices and quantities is significantly higher
under discrete time than under continuous time.
Each decision by a firm on a price or quantity can be unambiguously transferred into
a choice for a certain degree of tacit collusion, which makes decisions on prices and
quantities comparable across treatments. Applying the same approach as above, firms’
behavior as measured by the degree of tacit collusion is estimated over time whilst
controlling for firm-specific random effects using the following multilevel mixed-effects
regression model—again, all effects are estimated with respect to treatment DB2:
ϕEp/q,i,t = β0 + ξi
+ βContinuous · Continuous
+ βTriopoly · Triopoly
+ βCournot · Cournot
+ (βPeriod + βPeriod,i) · t
+ ei,t,
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with ϕEp/q,i,t as the degree of tacit collusion based on firm i’s price p or quantity q played
in period t. Estimation results for Models (3) and (4), reported in Table 3.5, confirm
that the degree of tacit collusion of firms’ price and quantity choices is 9 pp to 11 pp
significantly higher under discrete time than under continuous time, both with respect
to Nash equilibrium as well as Walrasian equilibrium. Similarly, prices and quantities
in triopolies are 14 pp to 18 pp less collusive than in duopolies. With respect to the
mode of competition, however, price competition elicits more collusive behavior than
quantity competition irrespective of the underlying theoretical benchmark. Although
the difference is significant and economically relevant with almost 28 pp in the Nash-
based degree of tacit collusion, quantity competition is—contrary to expectations—not
more prone to tacit collusion than price competition based on Walrasian equilibrium.
Again, there are no significant treatment interaction effects.
A possible criticism of the previous analysis is that ϕEp/q is not monotonic in collusive-
ness as the measure can exceed a value of one, which is, however, not related to more
but less successful JPM than in case of ϕEp/q = 1. In fact, 3.6% of firms’ price and quan-
tity choices are related to a degree of tacit collusion above one. However, any value of∣∣∣ϕEp/q∣∣∣ < 1 is a deviation from the collusive equilibrium. This is not captured in Mod-
els (3) and (4) in Table 3.5. Excluding all observations with ϕEp/q > 1 yields Models (5)
and (6), which show that the treatment effects are robust to degrees of tacit collusion
exceeding one. Other alternatives dealing with these outliers such as folding down all
observations with a degree of tacit collusion above one, i.e., rendering 1−
∣∣∣1− ϕEp/q∣∣∣ as
the dependent variable, lead to similar results.
3.5 Discussion
This study provides empirical evidence that tacit collusion is higher in discrete time
experimental oligopolies than in continuous time experimental oligopolies. Thereby,
discrete time is based on synchronized and simultaneous decision making, whereas
continuous time is based on asynchronous and an endogenized sequence of decision
92
3.5 Discussion
making. For purposes of robustness, a full-factorial treatment design is considered,
with (i) the two work-horse models of IO, namely Bertrand and Cournot competition,
(ii) in duopolies and triopolies, (iii) under discrete time and continuous time. The key
insights from the laboratory experiment can be summarized as follows. First, the repli-
cation of two well-known findings from the IO literature shows that participants in the
experiment behaved in line with previous experimental endeavors of oligopoly com-
petition: Duopolies are found to be more collusive than triopolies and Bertrand com-
petition in prices is found to be more prone to tacit collusion than Cournot competition
in quantities. Second, controlling for the competition model as well as the number of
firms the main result of the study is derived: There is significantly more tacit collusion
under discrete time than under continuous time, which is in stark contrast to the theory
(Maskin and Tirole, 1988a,b; Simon and Stinchcombe, 1989) as well as previous experi-
mental studies on continuous and discrete time repeated games (Friedman and Oprea,
2012; Oprea et al., 2014).
The implications for further research on IO are two-fold. First, researchers designing
oligopoly experiments should consider that the time framework employed to capture
the repeated nature of the underlying game affects their results. In particular, exper-
imental investigations of tacit collusion—which are until now solely run in discrete
or, more recently, in near-continuous time—may have potentially overestimated the
supra-competitive effect. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that the mode of timing
interacts with other properties of oligopoly competition such as market demand, cost
structure or strategy space. Second and more general, the effect of continuous time
on repeated non-cooperative games is ambiguous. In contrast to this study, experi-
ments on simpler games such as contribution to a public good (Oprea et al., 2014) or
the prisoner’s dilemma (Friedman and Oprea, 2012) find no differences between time
frameworks let alone higher propensities to collude under continuous time than under
discrete time. The experiment described in this chapter differs from these two studies
in several ways, especially with regard to a greater action space and a higher number
of periods in the discrete time treatments. Thus, it may prove worthwhile to systemati-
cally vary the number of periods in future research on discrete time versus continuous
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time and extend the comparison to other games (with a different number of possible
actions).
For a deeper understanding of why oligopolistic firms find it easier to tacitly collude
under discrete time than under continuous time a more profound analysis of firms’ be-
havior is warranted. Firms may apply different strategies or learn from past behavior in
many different ways: For example, behavior by firms in repeated oligopoly competition
may be characterized by a static strategy (see, e.g., Fudenberg et al. (2012) for strategies
in a prisoner’s dilemma), by a dynamic strategy such as the imitation of a competitor’s
behavior (Huck et al., 1999), or by learning from own and competitors’ decisions in the
past (Huck et al., 2004a). In particular, reinforcement learning, for which agent-based
simulations show it to converge to collusion in a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly
(Waltman and Kaymak, 2008), may be a fruitful approach in explicitly capturing the
different dynamics of simultaneous-move discrete time and asynchronous-move con-
tinuous time. Furthermore, as continuous time makes simultaneous decision making
virtually impossible, experiments comparing sequential-move and simultaneous-move
games may be connected to the findings presented here. In fact, experiments on quan-
tity (Huck et al., 2001) and price (Kübler and Müller, 2002) competition suggest that
sequential-move interaction is less prone to tacit collusion than simultaneous-move
competition. However, this finding holds only if the sequence of decision making is
exogenous. Instead, if timing of sequential decisions is endogenous, behavior is equal
to simultaneous-move oligopolies (Fonseca et al., 2005; Müller, 2006).
A key feature of the experimental design employed here is that it contrasts two ex-
tremes of time frameworks to each other: Discrete time with no limit on period lengths
and continuous time with a fixed period length below the human reaction time. Ob-
viously, this design inherently cedes control over the duration of sessions in discrete
time and one may argue that both extremes lack parallelism to decision making in re-
ality. Therefore, an investigation of period lengths in the transition from discrete time
to continuous time is likely to provide valuable insights to disentangle the effect of
the time framework, i.e., whether its effect is driven by the period length, the number
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of repetitions, or the (a)synchronicity of decision making. In particular, this calls for
an experimental examination of near-continuous time with varying period lengths and
different numbers of periods—an issue that is left to future work.
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Part II
Market Structures and Tacit
Collusion

Chapter 4
Number of Competitors and Tacit Collusion
THE most apparent characterizing feature of oligopolies is their limited number offirms in competition. In their overview on experimental oligopoly experiments,
Potters and Suetens (2013, p. 17) summarize that “the scope of collusion is strongly af-
fected by the number of competitors”. Indeed, the consensus of the economic literature
is that the ability to implicitly coordinate among competitors, i.e., to tacitly collude, is
effectively reduced as the number of firms in a market increases. Thereby, a monotonic
relationship is assumed where tacit collusion is “frequently observed with two sellers,
rarely in markets with three sellers, and almost never in markets with four or more
sellers” (Potters and Suetens, 2013, p. 17). However, to date there exists neither an
empirical comparison of experimental studies varying the number of competitors nor a
coherent experimental investigation of the effects of the number of competitors across
different modes of competition.
Thus, the supposed fact that there is a negative monotonic relationship between the
number of competitors in a market and the extent of tacit collusion is scrutinized with
the following investigation that is organized in three complementary studies. First,
over and beyond the meta-studies by Huck et al. (2004b), Suetens and Potters (2007),
and Engel (2007), the relationship between the number of firms and tacit collusion, i.e.,
the deviation of prices or profits relative to a competitive benchmark outcome, is exam-
ined in an integrated review and a consistent empirical comparison of oligopoly exper-
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iments. Second, findings from an experiment are provided that is explicitly designed to
systematically test the effect of the number of competitors in a market on tacit collusion
under price and quantity competition. Third, as the majority of oligopoly experiments
deal with situations of symmetric firms, whereas the majority of real-world oligopolies
consist of firms which are asymmetric in their market power, a further experiment in-
vestigates whether previous findings with regard to the number of firms also hold in
markets with asymmetric firms.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 highlights the policy
implications of an evaluation of number effects in oligopolies for both antitrust and
regulatory authorities. Regarding the relationship between the number of firms and
tactic collusion, Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, report the design and results of the meta-
analysis, the first experiment with symmetric firms, and the second experiment with
asymmetric firms, respectively. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes and discusses the findings
pooled over all three studies in the context of current policy issues.
4.1 Motivation
The question whether three firms are just as good as four firms in order to ensure ef-
fective competition is by far not only an academic one. In practice the question how
many competitors are enough is frequently asked in the context of competition policy and
ex ante regulation of markets. Naturally, merger control is inherently concerned with
the effects of a reduced number of competitors in a respective market. For example,
recent merger control proceedings in the European Union1 as well as in the US2 deal
with cases that would reduce the remaining number of competitors from four to three
major mobile telecommunications operators in the respective relevant market. Con-
sequently, the question whether competition is just as fierce with three as with four
1Hutchinson 3G Austria / Orange Austria (European Commission, 2012), Telefónica Deutschland / E-
Plus (European Commission, 2014b), Hutchinson 3G UK / Telefónica Ireland (European Commission,
2014c).
2AT&T / T-Mobile US (Federal Communications Commission, 2011), Sprint Corp / T-Mobile US (Federal
Communications Commission, 2014).
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competitors, everything else being equal, is paramount. Similarly, sector-specific reg-
ulatory agencies implicitly or explicitly examine the sufficient number of competitors
when assessing the need for ex ante regulation of access obligations.3
While ex ante merger simulations based on empirical market data are apt to estimate
case-specific consequences of an anticipated change in market conditions, laboratory
experiments are well suited to identify systemic effects and to isolate distinct sources
for a deviation in market prices through controlled variation of exogenous variables.
Thus, experiments are a valuable means of comparing the effect of the number of com-
petitors in an environment of high control allowing the researcher to randomize or
hold constant any potential confounding variable. By contrast, empirical field stud-
ies are naturally framed in a specific market context and are thus neither generalizable
per se nor immediately applicable to other market scenarios as causal relationships are
inherently difficult to prove. Particularly with regard to the issue of tacit collusion,
which is notoriously hard to detect in field studies, laboratory experiments can provide
general insights by analyzing in- and out-of-equilibrium strategies and respective mar-
ket outcomes relative to benchmark equilibria predicted by economic theory. See also
Chapter 2 for an in-depth discussion on the advantageous and disadvantageous of the
experimental method with regard to issues of regulatory policy.
The main findings of all three studies reported in this chapter can be summarized as
follows. While they unisono provide further support for the notion that “two are few
and four are many” (Huck et al., 2004b, p. 435) with regard to the difference in com-
petitiveness between markets with a different number of firms, the competitive effect
between three and four firms relative to two firms is found to be similar according to
the tacit collusion measures introduced by Suetens and Potters (2007) and advocated
by Engel (2007), which are also utilized in Chapter 3.
3See, e.g., the geographically segmented deregulation of the wholesale broadband access market in the
UK, which is subject to the number of active competitors in a region (Ofcom, 2014).
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4.2 Meta-analysis
The focus of the meta-analysis is on economic laboratory experiments on oligopoly
competition varying the number of firms in the market. As highlighted before, with
respect to the effect of the number of competitors on tacit collusion, the extant literature
(e.g., Potters and Suetens, 2013) clearly suggests the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 4.1. Tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets with two, three, and four competitors
decreases monotonically with the number of competing firms in the market.
4.2.1 Experimental designs
Most experimental studies that vary the number of competing firms in a market im-
plement one of the two workhorse models in IO: price competition à la Bertrand
(Fouraker and Siegel, 1963; Dolbear et al., 1968; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Orzen,
2008; Davis, 2009b; Fonseca and Normann, 2012) or quantity competition à la Cournot
(Fouraker and Siegel, 1963; Bosch-Domènech and Vriend, 2003; Huck et al., 2004b;
Waichman et al., 2014).4 A third strand of literature observes tacit collusion in posted-
offer markets, i.e., simultaneous competition in prices and quantities (Ketcham et al.,
1984; Alger, 1987; Brandts and Guillén, 2007; Ewing and Kruse, 2010). As the latter
experiments use very diverse models and are hence hardly comparable between one
another, the focus is on price or quantity competition here. Table 4.1 lists ten oligopoly
experiments which are surveyed in this meta-analysis and that all vary the number of
competitors in a market, n, in one way or another.5
4Note that merger experiments induce asymmetry exogenously (see Götte and Schmutzler (2009) for
a comprehensive review) or endogenize merger formation which yields asymmetric markets post-
merger (Lindqvist and Stennek, 2005). In order to prevent path dependencies from merger formation,
only data from those experimental studies that vary the number of competing firms exogenously across
treatments is used for this meta-analysis.
5To the extent of the author’s knowledge, the list in Table 4.1 is complete with the exception of Abbink
and Brandts (2005, 2008) for which no experimental data is attainable.
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TABLE 4.1: Economic laboratory experiments that vary the number of competing firms.
Information
Study Competition Complete Perfect Matching n
Bertrand (price) competition
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) Homogeneous 3 3/ 7 Partner {2,3}
Dolbear et al. (1968) Differentiated 3/ 7 3 Partner {2,4,16}
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) Homogeneous 3 3 Stranger {2,3,4}
Orzen (2008) Differentiated 3 3 Partner, Stranger {2,4}
Davis (2009b) Homogeneous 3/ 7 3 Partner {2,3,4}
Fonseca and Normann (2012) Homogeneous 3 3 Partner {2,4,6,8}
Cournot (quantity) competition
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) Homogeneous 3 3/ 7 Partner {2,3}
Bosch-Domènech and Vriend (2003) Homogeneous 3/ 7 3 Partner {2,3}
Huck et al. (2004b) Homogeneous 3 3/ 7 Partner {2,3,4,5}
Waichman et al. (2014) Homogeneous 3 3/ 7 Partner {2,3}
3: applicable | 7: not applicable | 3/ 7: both (as treatment variable)
Six experiments employ price competition. Four of those investigate homogeneous
Bertrand competition, i.e., firms’ products are perfect substitutes. Hence, the firm with
the lowest price supplies the entire market demand. The remaining two experiments
use differentiated price competition, i.e., competitors’ products are differentiated with
regard to quality or consumers have heterogeneous preferences: Dolbear et al. (1968)
consider a model in which the cross-price elasticity is half the own-price elasticity;
in Orzen (2008) a fraction of consumers are price-insensitive “convenience shoppers”
(Orzen, 2008, p. 392). All of the four quantity competition experiments included in this
meta-analysis employ a homogeneous Cournot model.
Experiments differ further in the amount of information provided to participants. In
a situation of complete information, each firm, represented by an individual partici-
pant, knows about (or can retrieve) the cost and demand function of all firms in the
market. Moreover, a firm with perfect information can observe all decisions made by
its competitors, and hence, has knowledge over the full history of the game. Lastly, all
but one study employ a fixed matching of firms over the entire time horizon. Instead,
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) match firms randomly in each period. Orzen (2008)
additionally compares partner and stranger matching in a between-subject manner.
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4.2.2 Measuring competitiveness
In order to compare the effect of different numbers of firms using data from vari-
ous experimental designs a measure of competitiveness or likewise, tacit collusion, in
oligopolies is warranted. As absolute price or quantity levels are inconclusive across
experiments, different metrics are proposed in the literature to measure competitive-
ness in experimental oligopoly outcomes. For a review of Cournot experiments, Huck
et al. (2004b) report the ratio between a market’s average total quantity Q and the to-
tal Nash quantity QNash, r = Q/QNash. However, as Engel (2007, p. 494) points out, r is
“sensitive to arbitrary changes in the level of QN[ash]”. In addition, the measure is not
well suited to quantify and compare non-equilibrium outcomes between treatments
and experimental designs, because it does not incorporate the JPM quantity as a sec-
ond benchmark.
Therefore, the measure introduced in Subsection 3.3.2, which combines the indices pro-
posed by Engel (2007) and Suetens and Potters (2007) is utilized here as well. It mea-
sures tacit collusion as the relative deviation of average price or profit from the theo-
retical equilibrium E ∈ {Nash,Walras} towards the JPM price (pJPM) or profit (ΠJPM).
Formally,
ϕEx =
x− xE
x JPM − xE
with x ∈ {p,Π}. In this vein, ϕEx represents the degree of tacit collusion based on
prices or profits as compared to either the Nash equilibrium or the Walrasian (com-
petitive) equilibrium as the theoretical prediction. The concept of Walrasian equilib-
rium assumes all competitors to be price-takers and thus, under homogeneous Bertrand
competition, the Nash prediction and the Walrasian prediction coincide. Moreover, in
any oligopoly competition model, Walrasian profits cannot exceed Nash profits, i.e.,
ΠWalras ≤ΠNash. If ϕEx = 0, the average market outcome x corresponds to the theoretical
prediction by the equilibrium concept E. If ϕEx = 1, the market is completely collusive
and competitors behave like in the case of a single monopolist. Note that ϕEp may ex-
ceed one if joint profit is not monotonic in prices, but ϕEΠ ≤ 1. The measures’ lower
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limits, however, depend on the experimental design. To account for differences due
to treatment designs and for means of robustness, tacit collusion is reported and com-
pared in this meta-analysis by all four different metrics resulting from a full-factorial
combination of variable x and equilibrium concept E.6 Which of the metrics is consid-
ered to constitute the relevant benchmark for competitiveness depends foremost on the
primary concern of the regulatory authority. Whereas tacit collusion based on profits
(instead of prices or quantities) is arguably most relevant to the competitors in a mar-
ket, regulatory authorities may be primarily concerned about consumer surplus.7 In
oligopoly markets, tacit collusion based on prices serves as an adequate proxy for the
competitiveness of a market as viewed by consumers.
In addition, Friedman (1971) suggests a theoretical benchmark to assess the likelihood
“that tacit collusion can be sustained as an equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game
context as part of a grim trigger strategy” (Suetens and Potters, 2007, p. 73), which is
given by
Friedman =
ΠJPM −ΠNash
ΠDe f ect −ΠJPM
withΠDe f ect as the maximum profit for a firm that unilaterally deviates from a collusive
agreement. Hence, the Friedman (1971) index measures the incentive to collude im-
plicitly by comparing the collusive markup on the Nash profit to the additional profit
for defecting from cooperation. In repeated oligopoly experiments each firm has to
trade off short-term profits from deviating to foregone profits in future periods. The
higher the Friedman (1971) index, the less profitable a deviation from a collusive agree-
ment.8 Although the Friedman (1971) index assumes an infinitely repeated game, it
may nonetheless be informative in the context of finitely repeated games in experi-
ments with fixed lengths across treatments as it is well-known that tacit collusion is no
phenomenon that is limited to experiments with random termination rules.
6Suetens and Potters (2007) exclude negative prices in Cournot experiments from their calculation of the
degree of tacit collusion. In this meta-analysis, however, negative prices are considered as well, as they
correctly reflect the high competitiveness of excess capacity in Cournot markets.
7For the discussion about the relevant welfare standard in merger control see, e.g., Farrell and Katz (2006).
8For Orzen (2008) the Friedman (1971) index has to be averaged over all three successive phases in each
treatment in order to gain a single index value.
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TABLE 4.2: Degrees of tacit collusion in economic laboratory experiments that vary the number of competing firms.
Study Treatment Periods† n N ϕNashp ϕNashΠ ϕ
Walras
p ϕ
Walras
Π Friedman
Bertrand (price) competition
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) Complete information [1,15] ∈ [1,15] 2 17 0.412 0.441 0.412 0.441 0.766
3 10 0.039 −0.318 0.039 −0.318 0.311
Incomplete information [1,15] ∈ [1,15] 2 17 0.149 0.141 0.149 0.141 0.766
3 11 0.019 −0.252 0.019 −0.252 0.311
Dolbear et al. (1968) Complete information [8,12] ∈ [1,15] 2 18 0.300 0.300 0.500 0.611 1.250
4 9 −0.040 −0.200 0.257 0.333 1.250
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) 2/3/4 [1,10] ∈ [1,10] 2 12 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.260 1.000
3 8 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.497
4 6 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.331
Orzen (2008) Fixed matching [1,90] ∈ [1,90] 2 6 0.352 0.352 0.604 0.604 0.624
4 6 −0.025 −0.025 0.381 0.381 0.206
Random matching [1,90] ∈ [1,90] 2 6 0.113 0.113 0.462 0.462 0.624
3 6 −0.008 −0.008 0.391 0.391 0.206
Davis (2009b) 2np/3np/4np [1,220] ∈ [1,220] 2 6 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.754
3 6 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.376
4 6 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.251
Fonseca and Normann (2012) NoTalk [1,29] ∈ [1,29] 2 6 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.504 1.020
4 6 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.338
6 6 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.202
8 6 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.145
Cournot (quantity) competition
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) Complete information [1,22] ∈ [1,22] 2 16 −0.244 −1.371 0.585 0.737 1.000
3 11 −0.266 −0.869 0.367 0.533 0.750
Incomplete information [1,22] ∈ [1,22] 2 16 −0.114 −0.533 0.629 0.830 1.000
3 11 −0.260 −0.773 0.370 0.557 0.750
Bosch-Domènech and Vriend (2003) Easy [1,22] ∈ [1,22] 2 9 0.296 0.475 0.765 0.942 0.889
3 6 −0.176 −0.399 0.451 0.688 0.732
Hard [1,22] ∈ [1,22] 2 9 −0.159 −0.428 0.614 0.841 0.889
3 6 −0.107 −0.284 0.484 0.714 0.732
Hardest [1,22] ∈ [1,22] 2 9 −0.164 −0.410 0.612 0.843 0.889
3 6 −0.491 −1.234 0.304 0.501 0.732
Huck et al. (2004b) Unified frame [1,25] ∈ [1,25] 2 6 0.403 0.600 0.801 0.956 0.889
3 8 0.032 −0.002 0.516 0.750 0.750
4 6 0.065 0.070 0.439 0.665 0.640
5 6 −0.109 −0.270 0.260 0.436 0.556
Waichman et al. (2014) DSNC/TSNC [1,17] ∈ [1,17] 2 12 −0.154 −0.332 0.615 0.852 0.889
3 13 −0.265 −0.600 0.367 0.600 0.750
DMNC/TMNC [1,17] ∈ [1,17] 2 10 −0.046 −0.094 0.651 0.878 0.889
3 11 −0.062 −0.127 0.469 0.718 0.750
† Periods used to compute the average degree of tacit collusion. If possible, data from all periods is used to maximize comparability.
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4.2.3 Results
Table 4.2 reports the number of independent observations N, the four collusion met-
rics, and the Friedman (1971) index for all experiments and treatments considered in
this meta-analysis.9 The following analysis is two-fold: In a first step, the analysis is
limited to effects within single studies (intra-study). As a second step, tacit collusion in
duopolies, triopolies, and quadropolies is compared across all studies (inter-study).
RESULT 4.1. Within and across the surveyed oligopoly experiments, markets with two firms
are significantly more prone to tacit collusion than markets with three as well as four firms,
everything else being equal. However, markets with three firms do not facilitate tacit collusion
significantly more than markets with four firms.
Data on the level of independent observations within studies can be obtained for five
experiments.10 Table 4.3 provides p-values from one-tailed non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U tests of intra-study number effects on tacit collusion in these experiments.
Following Hypothesis 4.1, i.e., the general assumption of a monotonic relationship be-
tween tacit collusion and the number of competitors, the null hypothesis is that tacit
collusion is always higher in a market with more firms. With the exception of the met-
rics based on Nash predictions for Fouraker and Siegel’s Cournot treatments, all test
results indicate that tacit collusion is higher in duopolies than in triopolies (2 vs. 3) or
quadropolies (2 vs. 4) at the 5% level of significance. However, triopolies are not found
to be more prone to tacit collusion than quadropolies (3 vs. 4), neither under Bertrand
competition nor under Cournot competition.
For inter-study comparisons at first the most comparable treatments between studies
are selected in an effort to rule out any explanations for differences other than the
number of competitors. Thus, only treatments with complete and perfect information,
9The original experimental data is either collected from tables in the respective study, downloaded from
an online repository, or provided by the authors. One exception is Bosch-Domènech and Vriend (2003)
for which the data is retrieved from figures.
10The author thanks Hans-Theo Normann and Henrik Orzen for providing the experimental data used in
Huck et al. (2004b) and Orzen (2008), respectively.
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TABLE 4.3: Intra-study one-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests and associated p-values.
Study Treatment n ϕNashp ϕNashΠ ϕ
Walras
p ϕ
Walras
Π
Bertrand (price) competition
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) Complete information 2 vs. 3 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Incomplete information 2 vs. 3 0.003 < 0.001 0.003 < 0.001
Orzen (2008) Fixed matching 2 vs. 4 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Random matching 2 vs. 4 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Davis (2009b) 2np/3np/4np 2 vs. 3 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
2 vs. 4 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
3 vs. 4 0.437 0.437 0.437 0.437
Cournot (quantity) competition
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) Complete information 2 vs. 3 0.294 0.215 0.008 0.004
Incomplete information 2 vs. 3 0.084 0.215 < 0.001 < 0.001
Huck et al. (2004b) Unified frame 2 vs. 3 0.019 0.019 0.004 0.004
2 vs. 4 0.019 0.019 0.002 0.002
3 vs. 4 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261
which are apparent in all studies, are considered for the following analysis.11 Conse-
quently, there are ten independent duopoly observations, seven independent triopoly
observations, and six independent quadropoly observations. As there is only a single
study for any n > 4 the statistical analysis is limited to markets with n ∈ {2,3,4} firms.
The Friedman (1971) index, which is suggested to assess the likelihood of tacit collu-
sion, predicts poorly if correlated with ϕNashΠ (ρ= 0.005, p = 0.983) but is positively and
significantly correlated with ϕWalrasΠ (ρ= 0.594, p = 0.003). In order to control for poten-
tial dependencies between treatments from the same study, i.e., different base levels of
tacit collusion between experimental settings, the following three-level linear random-
intercept model is estimated:
ϕEx,s,m,n = β0 + ξs + ζm
+ βDuopoly · Duopoly
+ βQuadropoly ·Quadropoly
+ βCournot · Cournot
+ es,m,n,
11The following treatments reported in Table 4.2 are not considered in this step of the inter-study analy-
sis: Incomplete information (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963), Random matching (Orzen, 2008), Hard and
Hardest (Bosch-Domènech and Vriend, 2003), and DMNC/TMNC in which participants are managers
instead of students (Waichman et al., 2014).
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where ϕEx,s,m,n is the average degree of tacit collusion ϕEx of markets with n competi-
tors under model m ∈ {Bertrand,Cournot} in study s, ζm is the error component shared
between observations of the same model in study s (see Bertrand and Cournot treat-
ments in Fouraker and Siegel, 1963), and ξs is the error component shared between
observations from the same study. The results, as portrayed in Table 4.4, confirm the
insight of the above intra-study findings that there is significantly more tacit collusion
in duopolies compared to triopolies and quadropolies. Furthermore, there is no signifi-
cant difference in tacit collusion between triopolies and quadropolies. In particular, the
degree of tacit collusion is on average 26 pp to 35 pp higher in duopolies than triopolies
across the different metrics. However, the same does not hold for the comparison be-
tween markets with three and four firms as triopolies are found to have on average
an insignificant 2 pp lower to 5 pp higher degree of tacit collusion than quadropolies.
Also notice that the regression analysis replicates the finding by Suetens and Potters
(2007) that Bertrand colludes more than Cournot—however, only if tacit collusion is based
on Nash predictions. In contrast, when compared to Walrasian equilibrium, this effect
is significant in the opposite direction. Thus, if a competitive market outcome where
price equals marginal cost represents the benchmark for the degree of tacit collusion,
Cournot may collude more than Bertrand. All these results hold if tacit collusion metrics
are averaged over all treatments from each study with the same competition model and
two, three, or four firms, respectively. See Appendix D.2 for results of the respective
multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions.
The use of multilevel regression models in meta-analyses has a shortcoming: The im-
plicit weights associated to each observation, i.e., each treatment in a study, are of equal
magnitude. However, each of these values stems from an experiment designed to pre-
dict a true effect. In other words, the averages of the degree of tacit collusion in each
treatment of a study (i.e., the sample means) used in the analysis here are estimators
of the true degree of tacit collusion (i.e., the population mean) in duopolies, triopolies,
and quadropolies, respectively. Consequently, one might argue that the standard error
of each sample mean should be considered as an indication of a sample mean’s reli-
ability. Meta-regression, a method vastly used in medical research (see, e.g., Higgins
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TABLE 4.4: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on number of competi-
tors and competition model on the basis of most comparable treatments.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariate ϕNashp ϕNashΠ ϕ
Walras
p ϕ
Walras
Π
Duopoly 0.259∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.119) (0.031) (0.056)
Quadropoly −0.020 0.018 −0.003 0.053
(0.060) (0.147) (0.039) (0.069)
Cournot −0.227∗∗ −0.461∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.221) (0.050) (0.074)
Constant 0.056 −0.022 0.156∗∗∗ 0.088
(0.067) (0.168) (0.049) (0.067)
Studies 9 9 9 9
Models 10 10 10 10
Observations 23 23 23 23
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
and Thompson, 2002), does exactly this by using the within-treatment standard errors
as the standard deviations of the normal error terms in the model. More specifically,
a random-effects meta-regression model is estimated which allows for between-study
variance not explained by the covariates, i.e., the dummies for the number of firms.12
This yields a weighted regression in which the inverse of the sum of the estimated
between-study variance and the estimates’ within-treatment variances are the individ-
ual weights associated to each treatment.
Table 4.5 depicts the estimates of meta-regression models with the same dependent and
independent variables as in the multilevel mixed-effects regressions. With one excep-
tion, the results are strikingly similar. The singular exception is the insignificant effect
of the competition model in the degree of tacit collusion based on Nash profits. With
an effect of considerable magnitude, its estimated standard error is yet conspicuously
high. It cannot be ruled out that this is due to the different number of observations
in the meta-regressions as the standard errors of treatment averages cannot be gath-
12The estimates reported in Table 4.5 are derived with the metareg command of the statistical software
package Stata in its version 12. See Harbord and Higgins (2008) for further information on the com-
mand.
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TABLE 4.5: Meta-regression of tacit collusion on number of competitors and competition model
on the basis of most comparable treatments.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariate ϕNashp ϕNashΠ ϕ
Walras
p ϕ
Walras
Π
Duopoly 0.269∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.201) (0.073) (0.106)
Quadropoly 0.026 0.198 0.083 0.148
(0.082) (0.215) (0.082) (0.115)
Cournot −0.182∗∗ −0.240 0.320∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.207) (0.067) (0.098)
Constant 0.023 −0.136 0.064 −0.024
(0.063) (0.164) (0.064) (0.088)
Observations 21 17 21 17
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
ered from all studies:13 For this reason, Bosch-Domènech and Vriend (2003) cannot be
considered in the meta-regressions and Dolbear et al. (1968) as well as Waichman et al.
(2014) cannot be included in the regressions on the profit-based degrees of tacit collu-
sion.
Although the previous analyses control for different base levels of tacit collusion be-
tween experiments in the multilevel mixed-effects regression models as well as for the
reliability of sample means in the meta-regressions, the data used in the previous re-
gression models may be unbalanced with regard to the different number of treatments
with different numbers of competitors by the studies. Consequently, number effects are
next investigated inter-study also via matched samples. By this means, a comparison of
n1 and n2 competitors includes all studies that have conducted treatments with n1 and
n2 competitors. Note that, therefore, the number of included studies varies between
pairwise comparisons, e.g., when comparing two with four and two with three com-
petitors. Table 4.6 presents average degrees of tacit collusion and p-values based on
13The standard errors of the degree of tacit collusion estimates are derived with the follow-
ing relationship: SE
(
ϕEx
)
= 1√
N
√
1
N−1 ∑
N
i=1
(
x−xE
x JPM−xE − x−x
E
x JPM−xE
)2
= 1√
N
√
1
N−1 ∑
N
i=1
(
x−x
x JPM−xE
)2
=
1
x JPM−xE
1√
N
√
1
N−1 ∑
N
i=1 (x− x)2 = 1x JPM−xE SE(x) with N as the number of independent observations
for the corresponding treatment.
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TABLE 4.6: Inter-study average degrees of tacit collusion and one-tailed matched-samples
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the basis of most comparable treatments.
Studies ϕNashp ϕNashΠ ϕ
Walras
p ϕ
Walras
Π
2 vs. 3
Duopoly 7 0.155 0.027 0.507 0.614
Triopoly 7 −0.081 −0.302 0.259 0.332
p-value 7 0.009 0.046 0.009 0.009
2 vs. 4
Duopoly 6 0.322 0.355 0.464 0.508
Quadropoly 6 0.024 −0.002 0.203 0.254
p-value 6 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
3 vs. 4
Triopoly 3 0.035 0.024 0.196 0.274
Quadropoly 3 0.049 0.051 0.174 0.249
p-value 3 0.946 0.946 0.500 0.500
one-tailed non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Again, the tested null hypothe-
sis is that tacit collusion is higher in markets with more firms than in markets with less
firms.
Test results show that tacit collusion is significantly higher in duopolies than in tri-
opolies (2 vs. 3) and quadropolies (2 vs. 4), respectively. However, based on all experi-
ments that run triopolies as well as quadropolies, the former is not more prone to tacit
collusion than the latter (3 vs. 4). In fact and in stark contrast to Hypothesis 4.1, tacit
collusion may even be slightly higher in markets with four firms (ϕNashΠ = 0.051) than
in markets with three firms (ϕNashΠ = 0.024) and this difference is almost significant at
the 5% level (N = 3, p = 0.054). Again, results are similar if tacit collusion metrics are
averaged over all treatments from each study with the same competition model and
two, three, or four firms, respectively. See Appendix D.2 for results of similar Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests. All these results support the previous findings in the context of intra-
study comparisons. In sum, there is no evidence, neither individual nor aggregate, in
the surveyed oligopoly experiments that markets with four firms may be more compet-
itive than markets with three firms.
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4.3 Experiment with symmetric firms
Meta-analyses provide valuable insight across heterogeneous studies by verifying ro-
bustness and external validity of systematic effects. However, meta-studies in general
and the above in particular has several limitations. First, due to a lack of control for
all differences between studies considered in the same analysis, the internal validity of
meta-results is per definitionem questionable. Second, in this specific meta-analysis, the
number of independent observations of the pairwise comparisons is rather low. In par-
ticular, only three studies cover triopoly and quadropoly treatments. Last but foremost,
none of the experiments in the meta-study employs treatments with all the relevant
characteristics considered here, i.e., Bertrand and Cournot markets with two, three, and
four firms. Thus, in an effort to reassess the findings of the meta-analysis, an experi-
ment with price and quantity competition in duopolies, triopolies, and quadropolies
is warranted. In the following, such an experiment is reported which is based on a
model that exploits the duality between Bertrand and Cournot. By means of controlled
variation, this allows to validate the results obtained in the meta-analysis.
4.3.1 Oligopoly competition
Price competition à la Bertrand and quantity competition à la Cournot serve as good
proxies for a large share of models on oligopoly competition. As homogeneous price
competition is often deemed unrealistic and yields a discontinuous demand function,
a model by Singh and Vives (1984) is considered that generalizes the Hotelling (1929)
model to exploit the duality between price and quantity competition in differentiated
goods. More precisely, the model’s generalization to more than two firms (see, e.g.,
Häckner, 2000) is used, which is described in detailed in Subsection 3.3.1. See Appendix
B.1 for a thorough analysis of the model with asymmetric firms and three different
theoretical predictions, namely Nash equilibrium, Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium
and collusive equilibrium. With regard to the model, in the following it is assumed that
firms differ horizontally, but not vertically, i.e., all firms’ products are equal in quality.
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4.3.2 Procedures
Treatments cover Bertrand and Cournot competition in duopolies, triopolies, and
quadropolies in a full-factorial design, i.e., there is a total of six different treatments.
In the following, these treatments are referred to with abbreviations such as B4 for the
Bertrand quadropoly treatment. The model is parametrized with ω = 100, λ = 1, and
θ = 23 so that goods are substitutes. Consequently, Ω =
300
2n+1 , Λ =
6n−3
2n+1 , and Θ =
6n−6
2n+1 .
Table 4.7 shows the corresponding theoretical benchmarks of the one-shot game for
each treatment. As Nash prices, quantities, and profits do not coincide under Bertrand
and Cournot competition and are additionally dependent on the number of competitors
n, these values are not adequate to compare cooperative intentions, i.e., tacit collusion,
across treatments. Thus, the same measure as for the meta-analysis is utilized, i.e., the
degree of tacit collusion ϕEx .
Note that the parametrization is identical to the experiment reported in Chapter 3. The
same holds for the experimental software, instructions, and all other procedural details.
Therefore, data from discrete time sessions of duopoly and triopoly treatments is used
here again. The quadropoly sessions were run in April 2015, also at the Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology in Karlsruhe, Germany. In total, 212 students of economic fields
with an average age of 22 years participated in the sessions of the experiment run in
a between-subject design. Their payoff, which they received privately and in cash,
averaged at EUR 17.61.
4.3.3 Hypotheses
Due to an effort to normalize input and output variables of the model, the different
measures of the degree of tacit collusion have two desirable characteristics in the ex-
periment. First, the Nash prediction-based degrees serve as good predictors of relative
differences in tacit collusion between treatments as Nash equilibria vary with the com-
petition model as well as with the number of firms in the market. In other words,
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TABLE 4.7: Theoretical benchmarks of oligopoly competition for each treatment with symmetric
firms.
Bertrand Cournot
Duopoly
pWalras = 0
qWalras = 60.00
ΠWalras = 0
pNash = 25.00
qNash = 45.00
ΠNash = 1125.00
pNash = 37.50
qNash = 37.50
ΠNash = 1406.25
pJPM = 50.00
qJPM = 40.00
ΠJPM = 1500.00
Triopoly
pWalras = 0
qWalras = 42.86
ΠWalras = 0
pNash = 16.47
qNash = 35.71
ΠNash = 595.24
pNash = 30.00
qNash = 30.00
ΠNash = 900.00
pJPM = 50.00
qJPM = 21.43
ΠJPM = 1071.43
Quadropoly
pWalras = 0
qWalras = 33.33
ΠWalras = 0
pNash = 12.50
qNash = 29.17
ΠNash = 364.58
pNash = 25.00
qNash = 25.00
ΠNash = 625.00
pJPM = 50.00
qJPM = 16.67
ΠJPM = 833.33
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TABLE 4.8: Nash predictions as measured by the Walrasian-based degrees of tacit collusion.
Bertrand Cournot
Duopoly
ϕWalrasp/q (p
Nash) = 0.50
ϕWalrasΠ (Π
Nash) = 0.75
ϕWalrasp/q (p
Nash) = 0.75
ϕWalrasΠ (Π
Nash) = 0.94
Triopoly
ϕWalrasp/q (p
Nash) = 0.33
ϕWalrasΠ (Π
Nash) = 0.56
ϕWalrasp/q (p
Nash) = 0.60
ϕWalrasΠ (Π
Nash) = 0.84
Quadropoly
ϕWalrasp/q (p
Nash) = 0.25
ϕWalrasΠ (Π
Nash) = 0.44
ϕWalrasp/q (p
Nash) = 0.50
ϕWalrasΠ (Π
Nash) = 0.75
these measures effectively control for the different theoretical predictions of the Nash
concept. A difference in the degree of tacit collusion between treatments would thus
indicate a higher or lower competitiveness in contrast to standard theory. The findings
from the previous meta-analysis suggest the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 4.2. The degrees of tacit collusion based on Nash prices and profits are signifi-
cantly higher in markets with two firms than in markets with three as well as four firms but not
significantly higher in markets with three firms than in markets with four firms, everything else
being equal.
Second, whilst the Nash-based degrees measure relative differences in tacit collusion,
the Walrasian-based degrees measure absolute differences to a universal baseline, as
the experiment is specifically designed to have a constant Walrasian equilibrium and
collusive equilibrium across treatments. Due to the normalizations of input variables,
choosing a price or quantity of p,q ∈ [0,100] in the experiment directly translates to a
Walrasian price-based degree of tacit collusion of 2p% in the Bertrand or 2(100− q)% in
the Cournot treatments, respectively. Furthermore, the degree of tacit collusion based
on Walrasian profit is identical across treatments and centered symmetrically about its
maximum at a value of 50. Consequently, the Walrasian-based measures do not control
for Nash predictions.
In order to emphasize that the Walrasian-based measures do not take account of the
differing Nash equilibria, Table 4.8 depicts the degree of tacit collusion based on Wal-
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rasian predictions associated with each treatment’s Nash equilibrium. It is decreasing
with the number of firms in the market. Therefore, if participants in the experiment do
not have an inexplicable preference towards a certain integer within the interval [0,100]
or even choose prices and quantities randomly, these tacit collusion measures should
decrease with the number of firms. By this means, the degree of tacit collusion based on
Walrasian price and profit has two purposes. First, the measures serve as a robustness
check if subjects’ behavior in the experiment is reasonable. Second, in the model con-
sumer surplus as well as total welfare are monotonically decreasing in prices if goods
are substitutes and hence, for regulatory authorities, Walrasian equilibrium may also
serve as a relevant theoretical benchmark.
HYPOTHESIS 4.3. The degrees of tacit collusion based on Walrasian price and profit are sig-
nificantly higher in markets with two firms than in markets with three as well as four firms and
significantly higher in markets with three firms than in markets with four firms, everything else
being equal.
4.3.4 Results
The experimental data amounts—with one exception—to 12 Bertrand and Cournot
duopolies, triopolies, and quadropolies each. The exception is the C4 treatment, for
which there are only 11 independent observations due to a no-show. Before analyzing
the experimental data longitudinally, Table 4.9 provides an overview of experimental
data based on the level of independent cohorts over all 60 periods each.14 Similar to
the previous meta-study, the Friedman (1971) index predicts the degree of tacit collu-
sion poorly in terms of ϕNashΠ (ρ=−0.151, p = 0.775) but is significantly correlated with
ϕWalrasΠ (ρ = 0.846, p = 0.034).
For an in-depth analysis of firms’ longitudinal behavior, a mixed-effects model is em-
ployed to control for different base levels of tacit collusion in cohorts via a random
14Note that one duopoly in treatment C2 is exceptionally competitive. In particular, its average degree of
tacit collusion based on Nash profits lies almost three standard deviations below the treatment mean.
All results reported in the following hold if this outlier is dropped.
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TABLE 4.9: Average degrees of tacit collusion across treatments.
Treatment N ϕNashp/q ϕ
Nash
Π ϕ
Walras
p/q ϕ
Walras
Π Friedman
B2 12 0.832 0.806 0.916 0.951 0.750
(0.249) (0.302) (0.124) (0.075)
B3 12 0.605 0.611 0.737 0.827 0.556
(0.324) (0.301) (0.216) (0.134)
B4 12 0.433 0.390 0.575 0.657 0.438
(0.286) (0.263) (0.215) (0.148)
C2 12 0.627 0.437 0.907 0.965 0.936
(0.550) (1.030) (0.138) (0.064)
C3 12 0.397 0.249 0.759 0.880 0.831
(0.484) (0.702) (0.193) (0.112)
C4 11 0.280 0.202 0.640 0.800 0.750
(0.391) (0.556) (0.196) (0.139)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
intercept as well as for different time dependencies due to learning via a random slope.
Thus, the estimated model is
ϕEx,k,t = β0 + ξk
+ βDuopoly · Duopoly
+ βQuadropoly ·Quadropoly
+ βCournot · Cournot
+ (βPeriod + βPeriod,k) · t
+ ek,t
with ϕEx,k,t as the average degree of tacit collusion of all firms’ prices, quantities or prof-
its in cohort k in period t. Table 4.10 shows the estimated coefficients for each of the
four different measures of the degree of tacit collusion.15 All results reported in the
following with respect to prices or quantities hold also if the degree of tacit collusion is
measured by transaction prices, i.e., prices weighted by the quantities sold.
15Note that due to the dualism of the competition model used in the experiment, the degrees of tacit
collusion measured by prices or quantities coincide.
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RESULT 4.2. In the experiment with symmetric firms, the degree of tacit collusion based on
Nash prices and profits is significantly higher in markets with two firms than in markets with
three as well as four firms, everything else being equal. However, markets with three firms do
not facilitate tacit collusion significantly more than markets with four firms.
In line with the meta-analysis, the duopolies show on average a statistically significant
20 pp to 26 pp higher degree of tacit collusion than triopolies based on Nash predic-
tions. Furthermore, the Nash-based degree of tacit collusion is statistically indistin-
guishable in experimental markets with three and four firms. According to the same
measures, Bertrand competition colludes more than Cournot competition. In sum, the
experiment confirms Hypothesis 4.2 and replicates the findings in the meta-analysis if
tacit collusion is normalized by Nash predictions. Moreover, there is a small but signif-
icant negative time trend in the degree of tacit collusion based on Nash prices, which is
a well-known property of economic lab experiments with fixed termination rules.
RESULT 4.3. In the experiment with symmetric firms, the degree of tacit collusion based on
Walrasian prices and profits is significantly higher in markets with two firms than in markets
with three as well as four firms and significantly higher in markets with three firms than in
markets with four firms, everything else being equal.
With respect to the Walrasian-based degree of tacit collusion measures the data shows
an almost symmetric significant 10 pp to 14 pp increase (decrease) in duopolies
(quadropolies) compared to triopolies. Hence, without controlling for different Nash
equilibria there is a monotonically decreasing, approximately linear trend of the degree
of tacit collusion as the number of firms in the market increases, which supports Hy-
pothesis 4.3. These findings indicate that subjects do indeed react to differences in the-
oretical predictions. In other words, although tacit collusion is higher than suggested
by theory throughout, the treatment differences approximately match the differences
in Nash predictions (see Table 4.8). The same holds for differences between the two
modes of competition. Measured in Walrasian-based degree of tacit collusion, Nash
prices in Cournot competition have a small constant markup compared to Bertrand
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TABLE 4.10: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on number of com-
petitors and competition model under competition between symmetric firms.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariate ϕNashp/q ϕ
Nash
Π ϕ
Walras
p/q ϕ
Walras
Π
Duopoly 0.204∗∗ 0.262∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.123) (0.045) (0.031)
Quadropoly −0.140 −0.081 −0.131∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.124) (0.046) (0.031)
Cournot −0.226∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗ −0.006 0.064∗∗
(0.078) (0.101) (0.037) (0.026)
Period −0.002∗ −0.003 −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(< 0.001) (0.002) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 0.670∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.101) (0.037) (0.025)
Cohorts 71 71 71 71
Observations 4,260 4,260 4,260 4,260
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
competition and Nash profits have a markup in the same direction that is increasing
with the number of firms in the market. In this experimental sample, the latter differ-
ence is apparent which is indicative of an interaction effect between the competition
model and quadropoly treatment dummy. Adding this interaction to the regression
model on ϕWalrasΠ its effect (βCournot x Quadropoly = 0.091,SE = 0.054, p = 0.090) is in fact
significant on the 10% level and renders the pure treatment effect of Cournot competi-
tion (βCournot = 0.034,SE = 0.031, p = 0.261) insignificant. None of the other collusion
degree measures has a similar significant interaction effect (see Table D.4 in Appendix
D.2). Moreover, there is a small yet significant negative time trend in both Walrasian-
based degrees of tacit collusion as well as the degree of tacit collusion based on Nash
prices and quantities.
In summary, the results attained from the experiment with symmetric firms validate
the pooled findings of the meta-analysis. In particular, the experimental data provides
evidence that diverging Nash predictions have some explanatory power of the degree
of tacit collusion and that tacit collusion in triopolies and quadropolies is statistically
indistinguishable if controlled for differences in Nash equilibria. Moreover, all results
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from the meta-analysis hold if the data from the experiment is added in the same ag-
gregated manner as for the other studies.
4.4 Experiment with asymmetric firms
In reality, firms are likely not only to differ in horizontal terms but also in a vertical
sense. The assumption of symmetry of firms with regard to technologies and cost struc-
tures, i.e., the assumption of vertical homogeneity, is frequently challenged in models
of oligopoly competition. Although for some markets, e.g., for electricity, competition
may be perceived as vertically symmetric, most oligopolistic markets for tangible and
intangible goods alike exhibit differences in the market power of firms. As tacit collu-
sion has been attributed to be driven by symmetry of firms in the economic literature
(Ivaldi et al., 2003), number effects in oligopolies may also interact with the symmetry
of firms. In other words, the propensities of different numbers of competitors may de-
pend on the assumption of symmetry and thus, change if firms are differentiated not
only horizontally but also vertically. Therefore, two additional experimental treatments
are considered with asymmetric, i.e., vertically differentiated, firms to test whether dif-
ferences in the degree of tacit collusion emerge between triopolies and quadropolies,
which clearly is the most decisive comparison both scientifically as well as for antitrust
policy.
Many oligopolistic industries emerged from former monopolies. This holds especially
for network industries such as telecommunications or energy. In case such industries
have not (yet) reached a state of relatively symmetric market power between firms, they
are often characterized by one single firm dominating several other firms. In the fol-
lowing, for means of simplicity and as a reference to network industries as a prominent
example, it will be convenient to think of an incumbent and two or three entrants com-
peting against each other. More specifically, such a market design resembles the regu-
larities of a vast majority of European mobile telecommunications markets, which are
comprised of one large dominating and two or three smaller network operators, total-
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ing at three or four cellular networks in each national market. In the model, asymmetry
is implemented by establishing a single firm with a higher quality good (incumbent)
than the remaining—two or three—firms (entrants). As consumers value quality, the
incumbent’s market share is higher than that of the entrants with equal prices. Equiv-
alently, for equal market shares the incumbent may charge a higher price for its good
than the entrants.
4.4.1 Asymmetric oligopoly competition
For means of comparability to the previous experimental treatments, the model intro-
duced in Subsection 3.3.1 is extended to allow for asymmetric firms. See Appendix B.1
for a thorough analysis of the model with horizontal as well as vertical differentiation.
In the model, ωi constitutes the reservation price of firm i’s consumers and thus, may be
interpreted as the quality of firm i’s product. Consequently, if the quality of one firm’s
product is higher than that of the other firms, i.e., ωi > ω−i, the former has higher mar-
ket power that results in higher equilibrium price, market share, and thus, profit. Fol-
lowing the asymmetric market scenario described above, let ∆ = ωIncumbent − ωEntrant
denote the markup quality of the incumbent’s good compared to the entrants’ goods.
Thereby, the extent of asymmetry in product quality may be determined by a single
parameter.
4.4.2 Procedures
Two additional asymmetric treatments—an asymmetric Bertrand triopoly (B3A) and
an asymmetric Bertrand quadropoly (B4A)—are considered as a robustness check with
respect to the previous finding that (symmetric) triopolies are not significantly more
prone to tacit collusion than quadropolies. The parametrization is the same as for the
symmetric treatments, i.e., ωEntrant = 100, λ = 1, and θ = 23 , except for the single asym-
metry parameter. The only difference now is that ∆ is greater than zero. Motivated by
common market shares in European telecommunications markets, ∆ is chosen such that
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TABLE 4.11: Theoretical benchmarks of oligopoly competition for the asymmetric Bertrand
treatments.
Incumbent Entrant
Triopoly
pWalras = 0
qWalras = 55.92
ΠWalras = 0
pWalras = 0
qWalras = 37.63
ΠWalras = 0
pNash = 19.38
qNash = 41.52
ΠNash = 804.46
pNash = 15.82
qNash = 33.90
ΠNash = 536.31
pJPM = 53.05
qJPM = 27.96
ΠJPM = 1483.16
pJPM = 50.00
qJPM = 18.82
ΠJPM = 940.82
Quadropoly
pWalras = 0
qWalras = 44.50
ΠWalras = 0
pWalras = 0
qWalras = 30.14
ΠWalras = 0
pNash = 14.67
qNash = 34.23
ΠNash = 502.04
pNash = 11.98
qNash = 27.95
ΠNash = 334.69
pJPM = 52.39
qJPM = 22.25
ΠJPM = 1165.70
pJPM = 50.00
qJPM = 15.07
ΠJPM = 753.58
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the incumbent’s Nash equilibrium profit is 50% higher than an entrant’s Nash equilib-
rium profit. Thus, the incumbent’s market share with regard to its proportion of joint
Nash equilibrium profits is 3/7 ≈ 43% in a triopoly and 1/3 ≈ 33% in a quadropoly. As
market power is a relative rather than an absolute concept, matching the equilibrium
profit markup for different numbers of firms has two important advantageous over
alternative approaches such as holding the incumbent’s market share constant. First,
entrants are equivalent to firms in the symmetric treatments which increases compa-
rability between symmetric and asymmetric market structures. Second, the additional
relative market power of the incumbent compared to any single entrant is independent
of the number of firms which increases comparability between asymmetric triopolies
and quadropolies. For the two asymmetric Bertrand treatments a Nash equilibrium
profit markup for the incumbent of 50% requires ∆ = 6.10 in triopolies and ∆ = 4.79 in
quadropolies. Table 4.11 lists the corresponding theoretical predictions of the one-shot
game for both asymmetric treatments.
The same procedures as for the symmetric treatments are applied to further increase
comparability across treatments and minimize potential experimental confounds. First,
the action space of the incumbent is rescaled such that the JPM prices of all firms co-
incide at a price of 50 in an action space of [0,100]. Second, profits are standardized
such that an entrant would have the same Nash equilibrium gains as a firm in any
of the symmetric treatments. Consequently, incentives to deviate from the theoretical
Nash prediction are equal for entrants and symmetric firms. The same scaling factor is
applied to the entrants’ as well as to the incumbent’s profits so that the asymmetry in
market power is not affected.
Except for an additional paragraph in the experimental instructions explaining how
one of the firms deviates from the others, the exact same experimental procedures are
followed for the asymmetric treatments as previously for the symmetric counterparts.16
Again, the experiment was run at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in Karlsruhe,
Germany, and participants were recruited via the ORSEE platform for sessions between
16For illustrative purposes, experimental instructions for the asymmetric Bertrand quadropoly treatment
are provided in Appendix C.2.
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TABLE 4.12: Nash predictions as measured by Walrasian-based degree of tacit collusion under
asymmetric Bertrand competition controlling for scaling in each treatment.
Incumbent Entrant
Triopoly
ϕWalrasp/q (p
Nash) = 0.37
ϕWalrasΠ (Π
Nash) = 0.54
ϕWalrasp/q (p
Nash) = 0.32
ϕWalrasΠ (Π
Nash) = 0.57
Quadropoly
ϕWalrasp/q (p
Nash) = 0.28
ϕWalrasΠ (Π
Nash) = 0.43
ϕWalrasp/q (p
Nash) = 0.24
ϕWalrasΠ (Π
Nash) = 0.44
June and August 2015. None of the 84 students of economic fields participating in one
of the two asymmetric treatments had previously participated in one of the symmetric
treatments. The participants’ payoff averaged at EUR 19.90.
4.4.3 Hypotheses
Evidence from both the meta-analysis and the experiment with symmetric firms sug-
gests that triopolies do not facilitate tacit collusion more than quadropolies if all other
market structure parameters are equal. Similar to the symmetric treatments, the rescal-
ing of prices and profits described above yields an important property of the Walrasian-
based degrees of tacit collusion: They measure tacit collusion in an absolute fashion
since both the Walrasian equilibrium and the collusive equilibrium are constant across
treatments. Thus, Nash predictions vary across firms and treatments if measured ac-
cording to the Walrasian-based degrees of tacit collusion (see Table 4.12). Taken to-
gether, the previous findings suggest the following pooled hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 4.4. The degrees of tacit collusion based on Walrasian (Nash) prices and profits
are (not) significantly higher in markets with three asymmetric firms than in markets with four
asymmetric firms, everything else being equal.
Even if evidence suggests that asymmetric triopolies and quadropolies do not facilitate
collusion to different extents, introducing asymmetry in an oligopoly whilst keeping
the number of firms constant may alter the strategic interaction of firms and thus the
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propensities of firms to collude tacitly. Most of the economic literature suggests that
symmetry is a driver of the ability to collude (see, e.g., Ivaldi et al., 2003). Fonseca and
Normann (2008) test experimentally for the impact of asymmetry in capacity alloca-
tions on tacit collusion in Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolies and triopolies. Controlling
for the number of firms they find that symmetric allocations facilitate tacit collusion
compared to asymmetry. Following the theoretical and experimental evidence, the fol-
lowing hypothesis is derived.
HYPOTHESIS 4.5. The degrees of tacit collusion based on Nash as well as Walrasian prices and
profits are significantly lower in markets with asymmetric firms than in markets with symmetric
firms, everything else being equal.
4.4.4 Results
Same as for the symmetric treatments, there are 12 independent asymmetric Bertrand
triopolies and quadropolies each. Summary statistics for both new treatments are pro-
vided in Table 4.13. Means over cohorts are computed by averaging over all firms,
i.e., the incumbent and each entrant are weighted equally. However, all results re-
ported in the following hold also if only the incumbent’s degree of tacit collusion in
prices and profits is considered as well as if only the entrants’ degrees of tacit collusion
are used. With regard to the former, the Friedman (1971) index is significantly corre-
lated with ϕNashΠ (ρ = 0.424, p = 0.039) as well as ϕ
Walras
Π (ρ = 0.639, p = 0.001). Regard-
ing the entrants, the Friedman (1971) index—in line with the symmetric treatments—
predicts ϕNashΠ poorly (ρ= 0.115, p = 0.592) but has some explanatory power for ϕ
Walras
Π
(ρ = 0.393, p = 0.058). Furthermore, the Friedman (1971) index predicts that the in-
cumbent faces a higher incentive to tacitly collude—or, vice versa, that it has a lower
incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement. Thus, according to the Friedman (1971)
index, the entrants are supposed to be the drivers of competition. In the experimental
sample, however, prices and profits in terms of the degree of tacit collusion vary neither
largely nor significantly between firms based on Nash prices and profits as well as Wal-
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TABLE 4.13: Average degrees of tacit collusion across asymmetric treatments.
Friedman
Treatment N ϕNashp/q ϕ
Nash
Π ϕ
Walras
p/q ϕ
Walras
Π Incumbent Entrant
B3A 12 0.332 0.316 0.554 0.700 0.792 0.444
(0.296) (0.276) (0.197) (0.121)
B4A 12 0.244 0.214 0.432 0.560 0.619 0.379
(0.163) (0.246) (0.122) (0.137)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
rasian profits. The single exception is the degree of tacit collusion based on Walrasian
prices, according to which the incumbent chooses about 5 pp more collusive prices than
the entrants over both treatments. This difference coincides with the disparity between
the Nash predictions (see Table 4.12) and is significant according to a matched-samples
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (z = 3.29, p = 0.001).
For an analysis of firms’ behavior in the asymmetric treatments, a similar mixed-effects
model as for the symmetric treatments is employed to control for different base levels
of tacit collusion in cohorts via a random intercept as well as for different time depen-
dencies due to learning via a random slope. Thus, the estimated model is
ϕEx,k,t = β0 + ξk
+ βQuadropoly ·Quadropoly
+ (βPeriod + βPeriod,k) · t
+ ek,t
with ϕEx,k,t as the average degree of tacit collusion of the incumbent’s and the entrants’
prices, quantities or profits in cohort k in period t. Table 4.14 provides estimated coeffi-
cients for each of the four different measures of the degree of tacit collusion.
RESULT 4.4. In the experiment with asymmetric firms, the degree of tacit collusion based on
Walrasian (Nash) prices and profits is (not) significantly higher in markets with three firms
than in markets with four firms, everything else being equal.
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TABLE 4.14: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on number of com-
petitors under Bertrand competition between asymmetric firms.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariate ϕNashp/q ϕ
Nash
Π ϕ
Walras
p/q ϕ
Walras
Π
Quadropoly −0.174 −0.099 −0.173∗ −0.138∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.109) (0.094) (0.051)
Period −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 0.498∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.077) (0.066) (0.036)
Cohorts 24 24 24 24
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The Nash-based degrees of tacit collusion are, on average, 10 pp to 17 pp lower in
quadropolies than in triopolies. However, in line with the previous findings from the
meta-analysis as well as the symmetric treatments, this difference is statistically in-
significant. Also consistent with the results under symmetry, the Walrasian-based de-
grees of tacit collusion are significantly lower in markets with four firms than markets
with three firms with a magnitude of 14 pp to 17 pp. Furthermore, the common neg-
ative time trend of prices due to an end-game effect can be found. All these results
hold accordingly if incumbent and entrants are analyzed separately and thus, sup-
port Hypothesis 4.4 and replicate the findings under symmetry. Across symmetric and
asymmetric market structures, however, the degree of tacit collusion may differ, as a
comparison of Tables 4.9 and 4.13 indicates.
Although there is only a single parametrization difference between each asymmetric
treatment and its symmetric counterpart, the necessary adjustment of ∆ according to
the number of firms in the market impedes a simultaneous analysis of asymmetry and
the number of firms. In other words, the treatment dummy between asymmetric tri-
opolies and quadropolies is not the same as the one between symmetric triopolies and
quadropolies. Therefore, in order to assess the effect of the specific type of asymme-
try implemented here, i.e., providing a single firm with a 50% higher Nash profit than
its competitors, requires separate analyses of triopolies and quadropolies. In the same
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TABLE 4.15: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on (a)symmetry of
firms in triopolies.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariate ϕNashp/q ϕ
Nash
Π ϕ
Walras
p/q ϕ
Walras
Π
Asymmetry −0.185 −0.291∗∗ −0.123 −0.125∗∗
(0.149) (0.119) (0.099) (0.052)
Period −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 0.685∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.084) (0.070) (0.037)
Cohorts 24 24 24 24
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
vein as the previous regression analyses, mixed-effect regression models are estimated
controlling for heteroscedasticity via a random intercept for the cohort and a random
slope for the time trend.
RESULT 4.5. Across both oligopoly experiments, the degree of tacit collusion based on Nash or
Walrasian prices and profits is significantly higher in markets with symmetric than in markets
with asymmetric firms, everything else being equal.
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 depict estimates of mixed-effects linear regression models of tacit
collusion on symmetry and asymmetry of firms, i.e.,
ϕEx,k,t = β0 + ξk
+ βAsymmetry · Asymmetry
+ (βPeriod + βPeriod,k) · t
+ ek,t,
in triopolies and quadropolies, respectively. For maximum comparability, only the
Bertrand treatments are included in the analysis for which there is data with both sym-
metric and asymmetric firms. In terms of profits, asymmetry is a significant driver of
competition, with the degree of tacit collusion being 12 pp to 29 pp lower in asymmet-
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TABLE 4.16: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on (a)symmetry of
firms in quadropolies.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariate ϕNashp/q ϕ
Nash
Π ϕ
Walras
p/q ϕ
Walras
Π
Asymmetry −0.205∗∗ −0.223∗∗ −0.155∗∗ −0.123∗∗
(0.088) (0.097) (0.066) (0.054)
Period −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 0.527∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.068) (0.047) (0.038)
Cohorts 24 24 24 24
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
ric than symmetric triopolies and 12 pp to 22 pp lower in asymmetric than symmetric
quadropolies. With regard to prices, the degree of tacit collusion is not significantly
lower with asymmetry in triopolies, but it is 15 pp to 20 pp lower in quadropolies with
asymmetric compared to symmetric firms.
Prominent theories of fairness and equity in the behavioral sciences (e.g., Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) suggest that cooperation is harder to sus-
tain in asymmetric than in symmetric games, which is in line with the finding here. In
an effort to assess whether social preferences in fact account for the effect of asymmetry
on tacit collusion, subjects’ social value orientation is measured using the Murphy et al.
(2011) questionnaire, which is filled out by every participant directly after the oligopoly
experiment at the end of a session. Remember that incumbent firms are provided with
higher market power than entrants in the asymmetric treatments. A comparison of the
continuous social value orientation index reveals no differences between incumbents
and entrants or subjects in triopolies and quadropolies. Among the four idealized so-
cial orientations of altruistic, prosocial, individualistic, and competitive behavior, the
average participant is on the verge of prosocial and individualistic behavior. This find-
ing is further corroborated in a categorical analysis which matches subjects to a single
category. According to the classification, 43% of subjects are prosocials, 46% are indi-
vidualists, and none are altruists or of competitive type—the remaining 11% cannot be
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assigned due to incomplete questionnaires. Again social orientations are not signifi-
cantly different between subjects acting as firms of different types or participating in
different treatments. Furthermore, social value orientations are neither correlated with
the degree of tacit collusion connected to price decisions nor with subjects’ total profit
in the experiment. In sum, these findings suggest that social orientations cannot explain
why asymmetric firms collude less than symmetric firms.
The combined experimental evidence suggests that asymmetry fosters competition be-
tween firms in a market considerably and significantly, which is in line with Hypoth-
esis 4.5. Put into context, the effect size of implementing asymmetry in a triopoly or
quadropoly by increasing the market power of a single firm is comparable to the num-
ber effect on tacit collusion between markets with two and markets with three firms.
4.5 Discussion
This chapter encompasses three different studies: Firstly a meta-analysis of extant ex-
periments on competition in oligopolies; secondly an economic lab experiment specif-
ically designed to validate the findings of the meta-analysis regarding the relationship
between the number of firms and the level of competitiveness in a market; and thirdly
a further economic lab experiment that extends the previous experiment from horizon-
tally to also vertically differentiated, i.e., asymmetric firms. The individual as well as
combined findings, implications, and limitations from these studies are detailed in the
following.
The first study is a meta-analysis that provides an overview of the extant literature on
number effects in experimental oligopolies and consolidates the results of heteroge-
neous study designs by measuring tacit collusion based on a set of metrics proposed
in the literature. The consideration of these metrics provides a more consistent picture
since these measures are independent of the specific experimental design. Their use
is thus encouraged for future experimental studies on tacit collusion. Although the
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meta-analysis supports the view that markets tend to become more competitive as the
number of competitors increases, it does not provide support for the prominent belief
of a strictly monotonic relationship. While duopolies are more prone to tacit collusion
than triopolies and quadropolies, respectively, triopolies are not found to be more col-
lusive than quadropolies, everything else being equal. Hence, no positive effect on
competitiveness of four relative to three firms in a market could be found with regard
to tacit collusion. Moreover, the meta-analysis demonstrates that even the judgment
of the competitiveness of a certain mode of competition (price vs. quantity competi-
tion) depends on the point of reference (Nash vs. Walrasian equilibrium). In particular,
Suetens and Potters (2007) suggest that Bertrand colludes more than Cournot. How-
ever, as the empirical analysis reveals, this holds only with respect to Nash equilibria.
Instead, if tacit collusion is measured with regard to Walrasian equilibrium, the op-
posite holds. This finding is in line with the stronger competition predicted by Nash
equilibrium under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition.
The limitations of this meta-analysis are two-fold. First, the number of experimental
studies that investigate number effects, also for triopolies and quadropolies, is rather
low and thus the results are based on a small number of observations. Second, the data
collected from experimental studies is heterogeneous in quality, i.e., it is either obtained
from the authors directly, from tables in the article, or even retrieved from figures. As
a consequence, the granularity of the data varies across studies. Data on the level of
independent observations from sessions is only provided for half of the studies consid-
ered here and hence, intra-study treatment differences are not replicable nor testable
for the remaining studies. Since meta-analyses represent a valuable instrument to gain
additional insights across heterogeneous studies and to check for the robustness of ex-
perimental findings, the author strongly supports that the availability of experimental
data is further improved to allow for replicability of study results.
For the second study and in an effort to deal with the short-comings of the meta-
analysis, an economic lab experiment is specifically designed to validate the findings of
the meta-analysis regarding the relationship between the number of firms and the level
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of competitiveness in a market. In particular, in the experiment the number of firms
is systematically varied between two and four, while additionally considering the two
most prominent models of oligopoly competition, Bertrand and Cournot, with horizon-
tally differentiated yet vertically symmetric firms. The results of the experiment largely
correspond to the findings in the meta-analysis. In particular, the experiment provides
further support for the notion that triopolies are not more prone to tacit collusion than
quadropolies. However, this finding largely depends on what is viewed as the relevant
theoretical prediction in markets with a different number of firms. As the experiment is
especially designed to normalize prices, quantities, and profits between treatments, it is
found to be crucial whether Nash equilibrium or Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium
is viewed as the appropriate benchmark for the competitiveness of a market, e.g., by a
competition authority. In case of the former, tacit collusion between markets with three
and markets with four firms is indistinguishable. However, in case of the latter, tacit
collusion decreases significantly as the number of firms in the market moves from two
to three to four. Note that this finding is a consequence of the specific properties of the
model and experimental design in the validation study, which is further illustrated by
the opposing finding in the meta-study with respect to the Walrasian-based degrees of
tacit collusion.
The central limitation of the experiment is that although it allows for horizontal differ-
entiation among firms, it is assumed that firms’ goods are all of equal quality so that
they are not vertically differentiated. In comparison to real-world markets, a situation
of (almost) symmetric firms is hardly probable. Instead, firms in oligopolistic markets
often face a single dominant rival. An apparent example of such a market structure is
the mobile telecommunications industry.
Therefore, the third study considers the same model of horizontally differentiated
oligopoly competition as the second study, but additionally implements asymmetry
among the firms by providing one firm with a higher market power than its rivals
through an increased product quality. Since the previous findings clearly suggest that
the comparison between three and four firms is crucial to the question of how many
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competitors are required for effective competition in a market, asymmetry is consid-
ered in triopolies and quadropolies only. The key finding is that the previous result
holds: There is no significant difference in any of the considered tacit collusion metrics
between markets with three or four asymmetric firms. Furthermore, a comparison be-
tween markets of the same number of competitors but with either symmetric or asym-
metric firms reveals that asymmetry hampers tacit coordination and thus reduces tacit
collusion based on profits and (in most cases) prices significantly.
Due to various potential forms of parametrization that result in asymmetry between
firms, an obvious limitation of the third study is that there are not generalizable to
any type of asymmetry in oligopolistic markets. A similar line of argument applies to
how the parametrization strategy depends on the number of firms. More specific, the
asymmetry between competitors may be measured in various ways, e.g., by differences
in Nash profits or by absolute differences in product quality, and hence it cannot be
ruled out that this also affects the assessment of competitive intensity in markets with
asymmetric three or four firms.
Altogether, these results bear important implications for merger control and ex ante
regulation. Everything else being equal, experimental evidence indicates that a mar-
ket with three firms may ensure competition just as good as a market with four firms
if Nash equilibrium is viewed as the relevant benchmark of effective competition. In-
stead, if regulatory authorities perceive Walrasian equilibrium as the appropriate the-
oretical prediction, the evidence is more nuanced. Whereas the meta-analysis reveals
similar results as with regard to Nash equilibrium, the oligopoly experiments in the val-
idation studies suggest that markets with four firms may indeed hinder tacit collusion
compared to markets with three firms.
However, further research is warranted to assess how this latter finding depends on
the specifics of the experimental design. Furthermore, future experimental work on
number effects in oligopolies should assess these directly in conjunction with asym-
metric market power of firms. In particular, a decrease in the number of competitors
in a market, e.g., through a merger, is also likely to affect the horizontal and vertical
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differentiation of firms’ products. For instance, a merger may introduce asymmetry in
the market power of the remaining firms and thus not only relax competition due to
the decrease in the number of firms but also foster competition.
Furthermore, to a risk-averse regulator not only averages of market outcomes may be
of interest. Instead, authorities may also take into account the effect the number of firms
and regulatory institutions in general have on the variance of the expected competitive
intensity in order to minimize the possibility of tacit collusion. However, with the given
samples in the meta-analysis as well as in the validation studies, there are no significant
differences in this regard.
A limitation common to all parts of this chapter is that the nonexistence of an effect
can hardly be inferred from the insignificance of a covariate’s estimate. This implies
that the insignificant difference in tacit collusion between markets with three firms and
markets with four firms can only be judged with respect to the specific samples used
in the meta-analysis and validation studies. Note that also retrospective power analy-
sis, which is frequently advocated in need for an interpretation of insignificant effects,
cannot solve this problem since “for any test the observed power is a 1:1 function of
the p value” (Hoenig and Heisey, 2001, p. 20). As a further limitation to all studies,
competition in experimental Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies is merely considered
with exogenously symmetric or asymmetric firms but no endogenous merger forma-
tion is analyzed. Furthermore, neither the experiments considered in the meta-analysis
nor the experiments in the validation studies allow for investments in order to increase
market size, which arguably play an important role in most industries that are char-
acterized by an oligopolistic market structure . Depending on these characteristics, the
conclusion of what represents a necessary number of competitors may differ significantly.
But even if “case-by-case analysis implies that there is no ‘magic number’” (Walle and
Wambach, 2014, p. 10), the findings reported here point to systematic effects with re-
gard to tacit collusion that should be given careful consideration by competition and
regulatory authorities when assessing the question of how to achieve and safeguard
effective competition in a market.
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Chapter 5
Price Discrimination and Tacit Collusion
WHEN firms sell their products in more than one (geographic) market, they mayeither charge the same price across markets, i.e., employ uniform pricing, or
they may charge differentiated prices according to the specific market conditions, i.e.,
engage in price discrimination. According to conventional wisdom, firms should price
discriminate whenever possible, due to asymmetric costs or differences in demand elas-
ticity across markets. Although some exceptions to this conventional wisdom are iden-
tified (Dobson and Waterson, 2008), the existing literature agrees that price discrimi-
nation and uniform pricing generally yield different market outcomes when there are
differences in the market conditions. On the contrary, there is currently no theory that
predicts differences in market outcomes due to the two pricing regimes when there are
no differences across markets.
This study suggests a new explanation for the observed differences that relates to be-
havioral aspects rather than demand- or supply-side effects. The remainder of this
chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 introduces the issue of price discrimina-
tion vs. uniform pricing and summarizes the key results of the experimental analysis.
Its design and procedures are reported in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, the experimental
results are derived and contrasted to theoretical predictions. Finally, Section 5.4 dis-
cusses the results and their policy implications while also acknowledging the study’s
limitations.
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5.1 Motivation
This note demonstrates in a laboratory experiment that price discrimination leads to
systematically higher average prices than uniform pricing even when firms and mar-
kets are symmetric in. More specific, in a symmetric homogeneous Bertrand duopoly,
a new explanation is suggested for differences in economic outcomes between the two
pricing regimes that relates to their impacts on tacit collusion, rather than cost or de-
mand asymmetries. Thereby, this study is the first experimental investigation of tacit
collusion in an industry scenario that specifically considers the possibility to price dis-
criminate as a treatment variable.
In this context, the findings also relate to the literature on mutual forbearance (Ed-
wards, 1955), which discusses the collusive effects of multimarket contact. Whereas
under price discrimination the underlying markets remain, in principle, independent,
uniform pricing creates a bond between the markets that effectively makes them one
market. Porter (1980) argues that firms meeting in several markets (price discrimina-
tion) may find it easier to tacitly collude than firms meeting only in one market (uni-
form pricing). This is because every colluding firm anticipates that a price deviation in
any one market will be punished by price cuts in all markets by the other firms. How-
ever, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) criticize this view and argue that a rational price
deviation should never occur only in one, but in all markets simultaneously, thus ren-
dering the multimarket retaliation as no more effective than the retaliation in a single
market environment. Moreover, the authors formally establish an irrelevance result,
which states that multimarket contact cannot facilitate tacit collusion between sym-
metric firms meeting in symmetric markets.1 Hence, the findings of this experimental
analysis can also not be explained by the mutual forbearance theory. Instead, Chapter
6 offers a new theoretical explanation in the context of multimarket contact that also
relates to price discrimination.
1In their model, Bernheim and Whinston consider an infinite time horizon, whereas a finite time hori-
zon is considered here. However, note that collusion is harder to sustain with a finite time horizon
(Harrington, 1987) and thus, the irrelevance result remains to hold in the present context.
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5.2 Experiment
The laboratory experiment explicitly addresses the issue of price discrimination and
uniform pricing across (geographic) markets. It thereby considers symmetric markets
and firms in an effort to depict an industry scenario for which existing theories predict
no differences with respect to tacit collusion in prices.
5.2.1 Design
Consider an industry with two distinct markets, M1 and M2, in which two symmetric,
price competing firms, i ∈ {A, B}, offer a homogeneous product for T periods, respec-
tively. The supply of one unit of the product to either market implies the same marginal
cost to each firm. Denote i’s price for market X ∈ {M1, M2} by pXi . Then, according to
Bertrand competition, the demand of firm i in market X in each period is either the full
market size if firm i offers at a lower price than its competitor, half the market size if
firms offer the same price (below the consumers’ homogeneous willingness to pay), or
zero if firm i offers at a higher price than its rival. Consequently, i’s total profit in each
period is given by the sum of profits in both markets. Then, the only difference between
price discrimination and uniform pricing is that prices have to be equal across markets
in the latter case.
It is well known that the unique strict Nash equilibrium of the above Bertrand stage
game is marginal cost pricing in both markets irrespective of whether firms can dis-
criminate prices or not. Further, under reasonable assumptions about the equilibrium
concept of the finitely repeated Bertrand game, the above unique equilibrium of the
Bertrand stage game is also the unique price equilibrium of the repeated Bertrand game.
For example, Farrell and Maskin (1989a) show that the price equilibrium of the Bertrand
stage game is the unique weakly renegotiation proof price equilibrium of the repeated
Bertrand game. It is also the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In conclusion, the
139
Chapter 5 Price Discrimination and Tacit Collusion
theoretical prediction of both pricing scenarios is equivalent in terms of equilibrium
prices and hence, in terms of profits and consumer surplus.
The experiment is comprised of T = 10 repeated interactions (periods) of the Bertrand
stage game. Profits are accumulated over the periods. For a more direct relation be-
tween reward signals and participants’ decisions, the model is parametrized using EUR
instead of an experimental currency unit. Marginal costs are set to EUR 0.30. Each mar-
ket has 10 consumers with a willingness to pay of EUR 0.50 each. The minimum price
increment is EUR 0.01. Treatments differ only with respect to whether participants can
engage in price discrimination (PD) or are restricted to uniform pricing (UP) between
the two markets. As noted above, the unique strict Nash equilibrium entails that both
firms choose prices EUR 0.31 for both markets (treatment PD) or EUR 0.31 as the uni-
form price (treatment UP) during all periods.
5.2.2 Procedures
For each treatment condition, there are twelve cohorts with four subjects each, i.e., 96
participants in total. The experiment is designed between subject, i.e., participants are
exclusively assigned to one treatment condition. In total, each subject participates in
three rounds. Each round consists of ten consecutive repetitions of the Bertrand stage
game, which are commonly referred to as periods. Within each round, participants are
matched according to a fixed partner matching. However, after each round, partici-
pants are matched with a new partner that they did not previously encounter. Thus,
each subject plays with all other participants of the same cohort for exactly one round
(i.e., for ten periods). Since firms are designed to be symmetric, subjects are not labeled
in any order. Instead, a firm’s current partner is referred to as the other firm.
Every effort is made to ensure salience in the experiment. Participants are equipped
with a calculator and the experimental software provides a forecast tool for demand
and profit in the next round, given a subject’s expectation of both firms’ prices. More-
over, a history of previous prices within the same round and the same group is pro-
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TABLE 5.1: Summary statistics on subject and group level.
Treatment Variable N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
UP Average price 96 40.45 4.75 31.80 50.00
Average market price 48 38.74 4.92 31.10 49.70
Subject’s profit 96 873.96 532.04 10.00 2,140.00
PD Average price 96 44.50 5.06 34.45 50.00
Average market price 48 42.89 5.84 33.10 49.60
Subject’s profit 96 1,289.17 625.27 255.00 2,240.00
vided. However, there is no exchange of information or interaction between subjects in
different groups, i.e., no population feedback (Bruttel, 2009). To avoid budget effects,
the earnings of only one round are paid out. Participants throw a dice to determine
which of the last two rounds is paid out to them. The first round, which is declared a
practice round, is not relevant for the final payoff and thus, it is not considered in the
subsequent statistical analysis. The experimental instructions provided to the subjects
cover all stated design features of the experiment, including the number of periods and
rounds as well as how the profits and their final payment would be determined.2
The experiment is computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All sessions were
run at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in Karlsruhe, Germany, in May and June
2012, and April 2013. Participants were recruited via the ORSEE platform (Greiner,
2015). Subjects were exclusively students of economic fields. None of the sessions
lasted more than one hour. No initial budget was given to the participants. Subject’s
average monetary earning was EUR 10.86.
5.3 Results
The experimental data is aggregated by computing the average market price over all
ten periods of a round. Note that under price discrimination the average is taken also
across markets. At the group level an observation is uniquely identified by treatment
(UP or PD), cohort (1 to 12), group (1 to 2), and round (1 or 2). Thus, there are 48 ob-
2Experimental instructions for the PD treatment are provided in Appendix C.3.
141
Chapter 5 Price Discrimination and Tacit Collusion
FIGURE 5.1: Average market price over time across treatments. The boundaries of the gray cor-
ridor depict the average of minimum and maximum market prices across markets
for the PD treatment.
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servations for each of the treatments. However, note that due to the matching scheme,
observations on the group level from a single cohort are not statistically independent.
This is controlled for by means of a hierarchical mixed-effects regression model and by
considering only the cohort-averaged market prices, respectively. Prices in each group
and round over time for both treatments are provided in Appendix D.3.
Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics with respect to a subject’s average price and profit
and a group’s average market price as a measure for tacit collusion. Moreover, Fig-
ure 5.1 shows the average market price for both treatments over the ten periods and
allows to contrast them to the equilibrium price. Both table and figure indicate two
notable deviations from the theoretical prediction. First, prices have a positive offset
from marginal costs, i.e., from the theoretical equilibrium. This is in line with previous
experimental results on Bertrand competition (e.g., Engel, 2007). Second, there seem to
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TABLE 5.2: Multilevel mixed-effects regression of the average market price.
Covariate Coef. Std. err. z p 95% conf. interval
PD 4.152 1.612 2.58 0.010 0.992 7.312
Round 1.344 0.834 1.61 0.107 −0.290 2.977
Constant 38.068 1.214 31.36 < 0.001 35.688 40.447
96 observations clustered in 24 cohorts.
be differences in market prices and hence in tacit collusion between the treatments. On
average, the market price is EUR 0.42 (10.71%) higher for the PD treatment.
In order to test for differences in the average market price between treatments, consider
the following two-level linear random-intercept model, which controls for the potential
dependence of observations within one cohort:
pk,g,Round = β0 + ζk + βPD · PD + βRound · Round + ek,g,Round,
where pk,g,Round is the average of market prices over a round’s ten periods in group g
in cohort k, PD is the treatment dummy, Round is a dummy for first or second payout
relevant round, and ζk is the error component shared between observations of the same
cohort. Note that this regression model does not constitute a panel analysis in the classic
sense as it uses aggregate data from ten repeated interactions in each group and round
before rematching.
Table 5.2 reports the results, which show that the average market prices are signifi-
cantly higher for the PD treatment, whilst the round has no significant impact, i.e.,
there is no learning effect. Also by a one-tailed non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U test
on cohort averages, the market price is significantly higher under price discrimination
(z = 1.67, p = 0.047). These findings suggest that the possibility to differentiate prices
between geographic markets facilitates tacit price collusion more than uniform pricing.
Hence, consumers’ surplus decreases in the transition from uniform pricing to price
discrimination.
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5.4 Discussion
Contrary to existing theory, the laboratory experiment finds that tacit collusion is sig-
nificantly higher under price discrimination than under uniform pricing. This result
offers the insight that even under symmetric market conditions the mere possibility to
be able to engage in differential pricing may facilitate collusion and thus, lead to higher
prices than price uniformity.
This result bears important policy implications. For example, competition policy may
investigate more closely the impact on competition when firms switch from uniform
pricing to discriminatory pricing. Furthermore, whether price discrimination should
be allowed for different geographic markets is currently under consideration by many
national regulatory authorities in the telecommunications domain. Currently, in many
countries telecommunications operators are bound by a universal service obligation,
which usually includes a uniform pricing constraint. In order to stimulate investments
in so-called next generation networks, regulators are considering to move towards a
geographically segmented regulation, which would imply the possibility for price dis-
crimination. For example, recently the German legislator has explicitly enacted that a
differentiation of retail prices in next generation networks is not abusive per se. As the
experimental results show, such a relaxation of the pricing constraints may also have
unexpected consequences on consumers’ surplus and should therefore be closely scru-
tinized by regulators.
Of course, these results are subject to several limitations. Although the competition
model is believed to be fairly robust to alternative theoretical explanations (e.g., other-
regarding preferences, heterogeneous products), only price competition is considered.
Thus, it might be worthwhile to investigate whether the empirical results would also
hold in the context of quantity (Cournot) competition. Future work may also address
the role of elastic demand, i.e., heterogeneous willingness to pay among consumers,
which may alter the collusive strategy. Likewise, it would be interesting to see whether
the results carry over to settings in which there are more than two firms or markets.
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Multimarket Contact and Tacit Collusion
CONGLOMERATE firms operate on multiple geographic or product markets andare thus likely to meet a rival conglomerate firm in more than one market. Such
multimarket contact of conglomerate firms is long-since suspected to facilitate tacit
collusion. Sixty years ago, Edwards (1955) formulated the mutual forbearance hypothe-
sis which suggests that multimarket contact reduces the competitive intensity, because
firms meeting in multiple markets fear to trigger a price war across all markets if they
undercut their rivals in any one market. In this chapter, a new theoretical explana-
tion based on behavioral research is suggested for why multimarket contact of firms,
or likewise, their organizational centralization, may facilitate tacit collusion between
conglomerate firms.
The theory is motivated by the experimental analysis in Chapter 5, which shows that
price discrimination across two identical geographic markets in a duopoly of conglom-
erate firms facilitates tacit collusion more than if firms are subject to a uniform pricing
constraint obliging each of them to commit to a single price in all markets. Obviously,
in this situation of symmetric markets, price discrimination and multimarket contact or
uniform pricing and single market contact are effectively identical, respectively. In this
chapter, based on this finding, a theory of price signaling is formulated that explains
why multimarket contact allows for easier coordination between conglomerate rivals.
Subsequently, this theory is successfully validated in a further experimental environ-
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ment which is specifically designed so that existing theories of mutual forbearance fail
to explain differences in cooperation tendencies between multimarket contact and sin-
gle market contact.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 highlights the im-
portance of multimarket research, briefly reviews the extant empirical and theoretical
literature, and sketches the price signaling theory as well as its managerial and regu-
latory implications. Section 6.2 is dedicated to previous experimental work on multi-
market contact. The theoretical model of price signaling under single and multimarket
contact is formalized in Section 6.3 and the economic laboratory experiment designed
to validate the assumptions of the model is reported in Section 6.4. In Section 6.5, ex-
perimental results are assessed with regard to the price signaling theory in order to
investigate the theory’s predictive power for the experimental price setting behavior.
Finally, Section 6.6 discusses the results, derives implications for management and reg-
ulatory policy, and lists the study’s limitations.
6.1 Motivation
Until today, the mutual forbearance hypothesis stimulates considerable empirical re-
search on multimarket contact in several industry contexts, including manufacturing
(Scott, 1982), airlines (Evans and Kessides, 1994; Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Baum and
Korn, 1999; Ciliberto and Williams, 2014), cement (Jans and Rosenbaum, 1997; Ghe-
mawat and Thomas, 2008), telecommunications (Parker and Röller, 1997), hotels (Fer-
nandez and Marin, 1998), banking (Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000; Koçak and Öz-
can, 2013), software (Young et al., 2000), footwear (Audia et al., 2001), media (Waldfogel
and Wulf, 2006), insurances (Greve, 2008), and personal computers (Kang et al., 2010).
A recent and comprehensive overview is provided by Yu and Cannella (2013). By and
large, this research confirms a relationship between multimarket contact and tacit collu-
sion. In regard to innovation activities by conglomerate firms, Alcácer and Zhao (2012)
find that internal linkages across geographical locations may spur knowledge appro-
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priation and that conglomerate firms reinforce such interdependency if they encounter
competitors at a location, but not in the presence of a firm that merely engages in the
same technological field. With respect to market entry (Ghemawat and Thomas, 2008)
and market exit (Boeker et al., 1997), empirical findings show that firms seek multimar-
ket contact to their rivals. Thus, firms are more likely to enter (geographic or product)
markets in which their rivals are present and are in turn less likely to leave those mar-
kets, which suggests a favorable competitive environment under multimarket contact.
Also with regard to market entry and exit, Koçak and Özcan (2013) study the banking
industry and find support for an inverted-U-shaped relationship between geographic
market entry and multimarket contact suggesting that firms choose to enter markets
with some competitors but refrain from doing so in markets with many rivals. Kalnins
(2004) find that firms in the franchised fast-food industry try to avoid divisional multi-
market contact among their franchisees in case they want to induce intra-firm compe-
tition between divisions. Finally, regarding antitrust policy, Scott (2008) reviews con-
glomerate and horizontal mergers over different geographic areas and makes a strong
case for considering multimarket contact as a potential anti-competitive harm.
Despite the empirical evidence, the theoretical underpinning why multimarket contact
facilitates tacit collusion was for a long time under question. Bernheim and Whinston
(1990, p. 3) highlight that Edwards’ (1955) seminal reasoning is logically flawed, be-
cause “once a firm knows that it will be punished in every market, if it decides to cheat,
it will do so in every market.” In this vein, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) formally
establish an irrelevance result, which states that multimarket contact may not explain
mutual forbearance in situations where identical firms experiencing identical and con-
stant returns to scale meet in identical markets. Therefore, to date “most researchers
assume that mutual forbearance requires asymmetric markets, rivals, and competitive
positions” (Yu and Cannella, 2013, p. 77). This view is challenged by Spagnolo (1999) as
he shows that the irrelevance result depends on the assumption that firms’ static objec-
tive functions are non-concave, i.e., that firms purely maximize expected profits. This
is likely not to be the case whenever managerial objectives diverge from pure profit
maximization. Moreover, also Matsushima (2001) builds on Bernheim and Whinston’s
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seminal theoretical work and argues that the irrelevance result breaks down if firms
cannot perfectly monitor each others’ actions. Similar results are derived by Anand and
Mendelson (1997), who suggest that in a world of imperfect information conglomerate
firms are faced with a trade-off between maximizing coordination by centralization and
maximizing exploitation of local knowledge by decentralization. In the extremes, the
decision authority lies with the (conglomerate firm’s) headquarter alone in the former
case, whereas local branches would behave as independent (single product or market)
firms in the latter case. On these grounds, Chang and Harrington (2000, 2003) develop
an agent-based simulation in which conglomerate multimarket firms choose between
centralization and decentralization strategically. Their simulation suggests that decen-
tralization leads to higher profits than centralization under uncertainty and with asym-
metric markets. However, if markets are identical and in the presence of perfect infor-
mation, both organizational structures perform equally well—an observation akin to
the irrelevance result.
In this study, a new theoretical explanation is offered for why multimarket contact, or
likewise, organizational centralization, may facilitate tacit collusion between conglom-
erate firms. The explanation rests on two assumptions, which are scrutinized later.
First, it is assumed that firms are able to signal their intention for collusive play solely
through their price setting behavior by sharply raising their price in a market. Clearly,
in the short run such price signaling will yield opportunity costs, as the signaling firm
experiences a sharp decline in demand. However, if the other firm recognizes the col-
lusive price signal and reacts to it accordingly, i.e., by raising its price as well, then tacit
collusion can emerge in this vein without the need for explicit communication. Second,
the main conjecture is that such price signaling can be conducted more efficiently in an
environment where the same competitors meet in several markets rather than in one
single market. In this context, the distinct strategic feature of multimarket contact is
that firms are able to discriminate prices across the markets they operate in and thus
they can send more nuanced price signals. To exemplify this point, consider a multi-
market contact situation in which two conglomerate firms meet in two identical (e.g.,
geographically distinct) small markets with U consumers each, as opposed to a single
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market contact situation in which (non-conglomerate) firms meet in one large market
with 2U consumers, everything else being equal. Hence, under multimarket contact
a firm can send a price signal in only one small market which yields comparably less
opportunity cost than if the signal is sent in both small markets, or equivalently in one
large market as under single market contact. Because the same competitors meet in
both markets under multimarket contact, a price signal that is sent in only one market
may be just as effective in raising prices in all markets as a signal which is actually sent
in all markets. In particular, the herein suggested price signaling theory shows that, in
consequence, multimarket contact expedites the tacit process through which a collusive
state is reached—provided that the probability that a firm’s signal in any one market
will evoke a reaction by the rival firm in the other market is sufficiently high. In other
words, given the assumptions, then at any point in time, a collusive state is more likely
to be reached under multimarket contact than under single market contact. Moreover,
in the present example a firm incurs less opportunity costs to reach a collusive state
under multimarket contact. Therefore, in conclusion, it is suggested that multimarket
contact enables firms to signal more efficiently than under single market contact.
Note that this argument does not depend on the firms’ asymmetry (Bernheim and
Whinston, 1990), concave objective functions (Spagnolo, 1999) or imperfect monitor-
ing (Anand and Mendelson, 1997; Matsushima, 2001; Chang and Harrington, 2003) as
in previous literature. It only depends on the two assumptions, which are assessed and
validated by means of an economic laboratory experiment. Hence, the results bear not
only important insights for strategic management by demonstrating the strategic effects
of decentralization of decision authority, but also for competition policy by highlight-
ing that limiting firms’ possibilities to engage in price signaling can effectively miti-
gate the emergence of tacit collusion. This is particularly relevant if tacit collusion is
suspected among firms that meet in several geographically distinct, but otherwise rel-
atively homogeneous markets (such as telecommunications or airline markets), where,
for example, a uniform pricing constraint could therefore be an effective tool to render
multimarket price signaling ineffective, and hence, may undermine the process that
establishes tacit collusion.
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6.2 Related experimental literature
As tacit collusion lacks explicit agreements, it is difficult to obtain robust empirical
evidence for its existence in field data. Economic laboratory experiments, however, al-
low to specifically prohibit communication between firms so that tacit collusion can be
measured. In the context of multimarket contact, early experimental studies are mainly
motivated by the fact that empirical studies can hardly delineate the boundaries of indi-
vidual geographic or product markets when testing the mutual forbearance hypothesis
(see Kang et al., 2010, for a discussion of approaches to measure multimarket contact
in empirical data). Naturally, such identification problems do not exist in economic
laboratory experiments, where all focus variables are known and controlled by the re-
searcher.
The first experimental investigation of the mutual forbearance hypothesis is owed to
Feinberg and Sherman (1988) who find some support for the hypothesis in a within-
subject design. Phillips and Mason (1992, 1996) confirm Bernheim and Whinston’s the-
oretical prediction for asymmetric markets in the laboratory. In a large-scale laboratory
experiment, Güth et al. (2015) consider horizontally differentiated quantity competition
on two asymmetric markets and control for conglomeration and multimarket contact
independently. Their results do not ascertain previous experimental findings. Instead,
both conglomeration and multimarket contact are found to foster competition com-
pared to single market contact with non-conglomerate firms. Comparably, in a recent
experiment with a random termination rule, Yang et al. (2015) find that cooperation
rates are lower when subjects play two asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma games simul-
taneously instead of playing each game separately. Therefore, taken together, experi-
mental findings on multimarket contact are mixed.
This work combines two hitherto separate strands of literature: The literature on mul-
timarket contact and the literature on price signaling. Unfortunately, the term signaling
is used ambiguously in the economic literature. Here it refers to (price) signaling exclu-
sively as implicit communication through price setting behavior. This is in line with
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the extant experimental literature (Hoggatt et al., 1976; Durham et al., 2004; Davis et al.,
2010). However, note that in a similar context signaling is also used to refer to explicit
communication in the form of cheap talk about future prices (Grether and Plott, 1984;
Holt and Davis, 1990; Cason, 1995; Cason and Davis, 1995), which is not considered in
this study. More generally, signaling is associated with signaling games (Spence, 1974)
in which players use signals to reveal their type (see Srinivasan, 1991, for an application
in the context of multimarket contact). The pivotal conjecture of this study is that price
signaling in terms of the first definition is facilitated by multimarket contact because
firms meeting in several geographic or product markets can set different prices (i.e.,
distinct price signals) on each market. This allows conglomerate multimarket firms
to signal prices more efficiently in contrast to non-conglomerate single market firms,
which only have a single price (i.e., one price signal) at their disposal. Although novel
in the context of multimarket contact, the conjecture on price signaling and tacit collu-
sion is not new per se. However, previous research could not find clear evidence on the
effectiveness of price signaling on the emergence of tacit collusion (Potters and Suetens,
2013).
Initial observations of signals in repeated price competition experiments are provided
by Hoggatt et al. (1976) and Friedman and Hoggatt (1980). Plott (1982) discusses these
early attempts to model the effect of signals and conjectures that price signaling occurs,
but “it happens so infrequently [...] that the implications cannot be ascertained” (Plott,
1982, p. 1517).1 Hoggatt et al. (1976) reports on oligopoly experiments with repeated
price decisions. They differentiate between pulses (“sequence of two or three succes-
sive price changes which sum to zero”, Hoggatt et al. (1976, p. 263)) and steps (“price
change of unusually large magnitude”, Hoggatt et al. (1976, p. 263)). Only the latter are
found to have an effect on the price development and to be more probable in a positive
direction if a firm’s price is low, but in turn more probable in a negative direction if a
firm’s price is high, thus also indicating downward signaling. However, all these effects
are found to be temporary and do not evolve in an overall effect on tacit collusion.
1Surprisingly, price signaling is addressed again not until 20 years later.
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Comparably, in an auction experiment, where information about losing bids is a treat-
ment variable, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002) find prices to be supra-competitive if
bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods. They hypothesize that
this is due to signaling behavior during repeated interaction but do not formally test
their conjecture. Durham et al. (2004) observe signaling behavior in pricing decisions
in an extensively repeated posted offer market experiment. According to Durham et al.
(2004, p. 155), “a price signal is defined as any price submitted by any firm that is
greater than or equal to the lowest posted price that failed to attract buyers in the pre-
vious period”. Based on this definition, frequent signaling activity is detected in all ex-
perimental treatments, especially in those with sunk fixed cost. Price signals are found
to elicit higher prices in the subsequent period, yet a test for an overall effect of price
signaling on tacit collusion is not reported. Furthermore, the presence of fixed cost has
a significantly positive effect on prices. As the presence of fixed cost assures firms a loss
if they play the Nash equilibrium, subjects clearly face a particular incentive to collude.
It cannot be ruled out that this accounts for the effect of price signals on prices in the
immediately following period. Davis et al. (2010) explicitly address the open issue of a
direct effect of price signaling on tacit collusion. To this end, past price choices (baseline
treatment) are combined with non-binding price announcements (forecast treatment).
The latter are based on cheap talk which, as noted above, is also sometimes referred to
as price signals in the literature.2 Recall that this study refers to price signals based on
past price choices that do not require any means of explicit communication. Davis et al.
consider a market with Bertrand-Edgeworth competition among three firms. The ex-
periment comprises two successive sequences. Firms first play the baseline treatment
and, after regrouping, they play the forecast treatment in which firms are additionally
provided with the other firms’ expectations on the maximum price in the next period.
Thereby, a price signal is defined as a firm’s price that is higher than its forecast on the
rivals’ price choices. Hence, the baseline treatment serves as a benchmark and price
signaling is limited to the forecast treatment. In this market structure, market prices
are supra-competitive throughout but not different between the two treatments. More-
2Cason and Davis (1995) study non-binding price communication in a multimarket environment. How-
ever, they do not compare their findings to a single market context.
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over, there is frequent signaling activity in the forecast treatment raising prices in the
immediately following period but no overall effect on tacit collusion.
Finally, in a duopoly experiment with symmetric firms and markets, Horstmann and
Krämer (2013) find that firms compete more fiercely under a uniform pricing constraint
across markets (i.e., under single market contact) than if firms are allowed to differen-
tiate prices (i.e., under multimarket contact) as reported in Chapter 5. However, the
study does not consider price signaling, and hence, cannot provide evidence why mul-
timarket contact facilitates tacit collusion.
6.3 Price signaling under multimarket contact
The model of price signaling, which is formally developed in the following, provides
an explanation why and under which conditions multimarket contact can facilitate tacit
collusion. The model rests on two fundamental assumptions: First that, without the
need for explicit communication, firms can induce the rival firm to raise its price by
sending a price signal. As reviewed above, there exists evidence in the experimental
literature that price signaling has a positive effect on prices at least in the short run.
Second, it is assumed that under multimarket contact price signals that are sent in any
one market may also raise the price in the other market(s).
For expositional clarity, the theoretical model is described in the most simplistic market
setting under which alternative explanations why multimarket contact facilitates tacit
collusion (cf. Bernheim and Whinston, 1990; Spagnolo, 1999; Matsushima, 2001) can be
ruled out. Consider a setting in which two identical firms i ∈ {A, B} each offer a homo-
geneous product with marginal cost of c. Under single market contact, the firms meet
in only one product market X ∈ {M1} with 2U consumers. By contrast, under multi-
market contact the firms meet in two identical (e.g., geographic) markets X ∈ {M1, M2}
with U consumers each. Under the assumption of repeated Bertrand competition and
simultaneous decision-making, firm i sets a price pXi,t in period t = 1, ..., T in market X
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and receives the full market demand if and only if it offers the lowest price in market
X.3 Otherwise, if both firms offer the same price, the market demand is split equally.
As marginal cost pricing constitutes the unique strict Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand
stage game (neglecting price increments), this is also the unique subgame perfect equi-
librium (Selten, 1975) and the unique weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (Farrell
and Maskin, 1989b) of the finitely repeated Bertrand game. To convey the working of
the theory, consider the following example. Assume that in t− 1 firm A sets the cur-
rent market price (lowest price) in market X, i.e., pXt−1 ≡ min{pXA,t−1, pXB,t−1} = pXA,t−1
and that this price is above marginal cost. Therefore, according to the logic of Bertrand
competition, firm A receives full market demand. Evidently, in this situation, assuming
that firm A maintains this price in period t, the myopic best response by firm B in pe-
riod t is to undercut the rival’s price slightly or, if this would incur a loss, to match the
rival’s price. In any case, from a game-theoretical point of view firm B is not expected
to raise its price in period t. However, from a long-term strategic point of view, such
price setting behavior may occur nevertheless, and if it does, it is considered to be a
price signal by which firm B wishes to implicitly communicate to firm A that it wants
to coordinate on a higher market price, rather than to engage in a price war. More for-
mally, firm i is said to send a price signal in period t > 1 if its price pXi,t is greater than
the rival’s price pX−i,t−1 in the previous period.
On the grounds of this price signal definition, a simple iterative price setting strategy is
suggested which demonstrates how multimarket contact can facilitate tacit collusion.
For simplicity, consider the following additional assumptions about each firm’s price
setting behavior:
(i) When firm i seeks to communicate its collusive intention in period t through a
price signal in market X, it will do so by setting the JPM price, i.e., pXi,t = p
JPM.
3For simplicity, price competition with homogeneous goods is assumed. However, the price signaling
theory is not limited to this setting and can be readily adapted to quantity competition as well as
differentiated goods.
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(ii) When firm i reacts collusively in period t to a price signal sent by the rival firm −i
in period t − 1, then it will do so by matching firm −i’s price signal, i.e., pXi,t =
pJPM.
(iii) On each market, the probability that a firm sends a collusive price signal in period
t is σ ∈ (0,1). Likewise, on each market the probability that a firm reacts collu-
sively to a signal in the same market X is ψX ∈ (0,1) and in the other market −X
is ψ−X ∈ (0,1).
(iv) Whenever firm i in period t neither sends nor collusively reacts to a signal, it will
set the myopic best response price, i.e., pXi,t = BR(p
X
−i,t−1).
(v) Whenever both firms have reached a collusive state in period t− 1 in market X,
i.e., pXi,t−1 = p
X
−i,t−1 = p
JPM, then they will maintain that state in the subsequent
period, i.e., pXi,t = p
X
−i,t = p
JPM.
To fix ideas, suppose that each firm i sets a random price pXi,1 < p
JPM in each market in
the first period t = 1. The price setting strategy for t > 1 suggested above can then be
written in pseudocode as follows:4
1: // Set best response price by default
2: for each market X do set pXi,t = BR(p
X
−i,t−1) =
p
X
−i,t−1 − ε if pX−i,t−1 > c,
c otherwise.
3: end for
4: // If signal is received, instead of best response, possibly react collusively
5: if other firm −i has sent signal pX−i,t−1 = pJPM in period t− 1 in at least one market X then
6: if other firm −i has sent signal pX−i,t−1 = pJPM in period t− 1 in all markets then
7: for each market X do with probability ψX , set pXi,t = p
JPM.
8: end for
9: else
10: // Only possible for conglomerate firms
11: in market X in which signal was received, with probability ψX , set pXi,t = p
JPM.
12: in market −X in which signal was not received, with probability ψ−X , set p−Xi,t = pJPM.
13: end if
14: else
4Let ε > 0 denote the smallest possible price increment.
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15: // If no signal was received, instead of best response, possibly send price signal
16: for each market X do with probability σ, set pXi,t = p
JPM.
17: end for
18: end if
19: // Maintain collusive state
20: for each market X do
21: if pXi,t−1 = p
X
−i,t−1 = p
JPM in period t− 1 in market X then set pXi,t = pJPM.
22: end if
23: end for
Note that the price setting strategy does not distinguish between a single market and
a multimarket environment except for the case handled in lines 10–12, which applies
only to conglomerate firms that operate on both markets. In particular, line 12 captures
the assumption that multimarket contact allows firms to infer a collusive intention for
all markets from a price signal that was sent in only one market. The extent of this
assumption is captured by ψ−X. In the extreme, if ψ−X = 0, a signal sent in market
X will never evoke a price increase in market −X and thus, multimarket contact is
behaviorally not different from single market contact. In fact, such an industry sce-
nario would not be distinguishable from an industry of conglomerate firms competing
against each other on several markets but without ever meeting the same rival on more
than one market.
The price setting strategy described above triggers a Markov price process, as a firm’s
price in t depends only on prices in t − 1 and the time-independent probabilities
σ,ψX,ψ−X ∈ (0,1). Moreover, it is easy to see that the collusive state pXi,t = pX−i,t = pJPM
is an absorbing state, which can be reached from any other state with positive prob-
ability. Thus, independent of the market structure, the price process will eventually
reach a collusive steady state, provided T approaches infinity. It is therefore interesting
to analyze under which conditions multimarket contact will converge to the collusive
outcome faster than single market contact.
PROPOSITION 6.1. Under the specified price setting strategy the collusive outcome will
be reached in fewer periods under multimarket contact if and only if the probability to re-
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FIGURE 6.1: Critical cross-market signal reaction probability above which tacit collusion is
reached faster under multimarket contact than under single market contact.
act to a price signal on the other market is large enough, i.e., iff ψ−X > ψ̂−X(σ,ψX) with
σ /∈ [σ(ψX),σ(ψX)].
While the detailed proof is relegated to Appendix B.2, an intuition for this result is pro-
vided here. Note that ψ−X only applies under multimarket contact, and thus, given the
respective absorbing Markov processes under single market contact and multimarket
contact, a critical value ψ̂−X(σ,ψX) may be calculated for which the expected numbers
of periods needed to reach the collusive outcome (on all markets) under each market
scenario coincide. The surface depicted in Figure 6.1 is a graphical representation of
this critical value.
When the probability of sending a signal is not too high, i.e., σ < σ(ψX), then
ψ̂−X(σ,ψX) < 1 so that for any ψ−X > ψ̂−X(σ,ψX) the process of reaching the collu-
sive outcome is expedited under multimarket contact. This is because a single price
signal under multimarket contact elicits an increase in market price not only on the
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market that the signal was sent but also on the other market, which eventually leads to
a faster conversion to the collusive outcome than under single market contact. How-
ever, as σ increases, the probability increases that there are not only one but rather
two price signals sent by the firms. Under single market contact, such a situation di-
rectly leads to JPM whilst under multimarket contact this may result in JPM at most on
one market. In this vein, if the probability of signaling is higher, i.e., σ ≥ σ(ψX), then
ψ̂−X(σ,ψX)≥ 1, which is outside the valid parameter space, would be required to com-
pensate for the faster conversion to the collusive outcome under single market contact.
Consequently, if σ ∈ [σ(ψX),σ(ψX)], firms find it easier to tacitly collude on one mar-
ket than on two markets. Yet, for very high levels of the probability of sending a price
signal, i.e., σ > σ(ψX), very frequent signaling occurs and multimarket contact may
again facilitate tacit collusion more than single market contact. In this case, under both
industry settings the collusive outcome is reached very fast due to parallel signaling by
firms. To reach the collusive outcome by parallel signaling without the requirement of
signal reaction, two parallel signals (one by each firm) are needed under single market
contact, whereas four parallel signals (two by each firm) are required under multimar-
ket contact. As the probabilities for different signals are independent of each other the
probability for two parallel signals is given by σ2, whereas four parallel signals occur
with probability σ4. For very high levels of σ close to one, the difference between these
two probabilities decreases and the collusive state is reached through parallel signaling
with almost the same probability. If, in this case, ψX is very small, a sufficiently high
ψ−X results in (slightly) faster convergence to the collusive outcome under multimarket
contact than under single market contact.
Besides the faster process towards tacit coordination, the price setting strategy features
another notable property. In case Proposition 6.1 holds, the opportunity costs for sig-
naling under multimarket contact in two small markets with U consumers each are
always lower than under single market contact, i.e., in one large market with 2U con-
sumers. To see this, let Γ be the opportunity costs that a firm bears in any market when
it signals (e.g., due to a loss in demand). Because the small market has half the size of
the large market, with equal market prices in each market a signal in the small market
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incurs only half of the opportunity costs of a signal in the large market. Under single
market contact, a firm sends a price signal with probability σ and thus in each period
until the collusive state is reached, it has expected signaling costs of σΓ.5 Under multi-
market contact, a firm signals on only one of the two markets with probability 2σ(1− σ)
and on both markets simultaneously with probability σ2. Thus, until a collusive state
is reached, it also has expected signaling costs of 2σ(1 − σ)Γ/2 + σ2Γ = σΓ.6 Conse-
quently, whenever the condition in Proposition 6.1 holds, firms can expect to bear less
opportunity costs for signaling in order to reach a collusive state under multimarket
contact.
6.4 Experiment
The price setting strategy in the previous section and thus also Proposition 6.1 rest on
the assumptions that firms send price signals with some probability (σ) and that the
rival firm reacts to such price signals in the same market with some probability (ψX),
but in the case of multimarket contact also in the other market with some probability
(ψ−X). In the following, these assumptions are tested by means of an economic lab-
oratory experiment, and subsequently parameters σ, ψX and ψ−X are estimated from
experimental data. The experiment is specifically designed under the same single mar-
ket and multimarket setting as the example for the price setting strategy, i.e., for which
the existing theories (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston, 1990; Spagnolo, 1999; Anand and
Mendelson, 1997; Matsushima, 2001; Chang and Harrington, 2003) do not predict any
differences with respect to tacit collusion. Of course, in the experiment no assumptions
or restrictions on the subjects’ price setting behavior are imposed at all, which allows
to study whether the observed behavior is in line with the theoretical model.
5For the sake of the simple argument to be made here, the cases where both firms signal simultaneously
on a market or when firms react to signals are neglected. While taking this into account would consid-
erably complicate the analysis, it will not change the offered insight.
6Again the same simplification as under single market contact is made here. In addition the probability
that one of the two markets has already reached a collusive state is neglected. Evidently this will lead
to less signals and thus reduce the expected opportunity costs of signaling under multimarket contact.
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6.4.1 Design
The main experimental setup considers two identical markets with 10,000 consumers
each. In each of the two markets the same two rival firms offer a homogeneous good
and compete in prices, i.e., the markets follow the rules of Bertrand competition.7 Each
consumer has a valuation of monetary units (MU) 50 for the homogeneous good of both
firms. The firms each have marginal cost of production of MU 10 in each market. The
two firms interact for a total of T periods, where T is uniformly distributed on [45,50].
Hence, participants know that the experiment lasts at least 45 periods but no more than
50 periods. This termination rule is the result of a trade-off between the length of an
experimental session and the effort to mitigate end-game effects.8 The main advantage
of this stopping rule compared to an unbounded random ending-rule is that the under-
lying repeated game is finite and thus, a folk theorem of tacit collusion does not apply.
Selten et al. (1997) argue against unbounded random termination rules in laboratory
experiments, noting that subjects know that the duration of the experiment will not in
fact be unbounded, and thus, in such a case subjects build expectations about the total
length of the experiment. As those expectations are unknown to the experimenter, they
form a potential confound to experimental behavior and a potential loss of control is
the consequence. Furthermore, Normann and Wallace (2012) find no difference in co-
operation rates in prisoner’s dilemma experiments with fixed or random ending rules.
Note that in the experiment reported here the probability for a termination in period
45 is the same for all experimental sessions. Thus, only periods 1 to 45 are used for the
statistical analysis.
Within this setup, the two investigated market structures are captured by the multimar-
ket contact (MMC) treatment and the single market contact (SMC) treatment. In MMC
firms may set prices independently in each market. By contrast, in SMC firms have to
7Note that the markets are independent of one another and there is no cross-market demand link (cf.
Garcıa-Gallego and Georgantzıs, 2001).
8Such a termination rule is used for opening, intraday, and closing auctions in financial stock markets
to limit auction price volatility towards the end of auctions, as is indicated exemplarily by the market
model of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Deutsche Börse, 2015). Other experimental designs employ
similar ending rules (see, e.g., Vossler et al., 2013).
160
6.4 Experiment
choose the same price in both markets, i.e., a uniform pricing constraint is imposed,
everything else being equal. Evidently, the uniform pricing constraint bonds the two
(otherwise independent) markets and effectively renders them a single market. This
setup is chosen for the experiment in order to keep the differences between the MMC
and SMC treatment at a minimum with regard to the experimental design, procedures,
and display of the experimental software.
In addition, as a robustness check for the theoretical model, a market structure with
multimarket competition but without multimarket contact is considered. More pre-
cisely, in the additional experimental treatment a conglomerate firm competes against
different non-conglomerate firms in each of the two duopoly markets. This treatment
is therefore denoted as partial multimarket contact (PMC). Based on the theoretical
model, the conjecture is that multimarket competition without multimarket contact,
i.e., PMC, will lead to similar levels of tacit collusion as in the SMC treatment on both
markets. Although the conglomerate firm may set different prices on both markets and
hence, can send a price signal on one market only, this price signal should not be recog-
nized as an intention to collude on both markets to the same extent as in MMC, because
the conglomerate firm meets different firms in each market. The same reasoning applies
even more so to the two non-conglomerate single market firms. A price signal by one
of these firms does not imply an intention to collude by the other single market firm.
Therefore, if the price signaling theory is valid under multimarket contact, an industry
with only one conglomerate firm, i.e., multimarket competition without multimarket
contact, should therefore not facilitate tacit collusion in the same way as multimarket
contact. Consequently, the behavior in the PMC treatment should be similar to that in
the SMC treatment and significantly different to that in the MMC treatment.9 In terms
of the proposed theory, the PMC treatment allows to investigate the interconnectedness
9Phillips and Mason (2001) compare multimarket competition without multimarket contact on two asym-
metric markets to single market contact and find that connecting the asymmetric markets horizontally
does not facilitate tacit collusion in both markets but rather leads to less (more) tacit collusion in one
(the other) market. This result replicates previous findings by the authors (Phillips and Mason, 1992)
under multimarket contact. They conclude that with asymmetric markets the impact of multimarket
competition is similar to that of multimarket contact.
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of markets with respect to the cross-market signal reaction probabilities in the firms’ de-
cision making process.
Note that standard economic theory does not expect any differences in price setting
behavior between the three treatments, and also not between the two markets in the
MMC and PMC treatment, as identical firms meet in identical markets with the same
constant returns to scale technology, linear objective functions, and perfect information.
Consequently, in the unique strict Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated Bertrand
stage game, all firms choose a price of MU 11 in all markets and periods in the SMC,
MMC, and PMC treatment, respectively.
6.4.2 Procedures
The experiment is computerized with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and was conducted
at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in Karlsruhe, Germany. The sessions for the
SMC and MMC treatments were held between December 2012 and March 2013 and the
sessions for the PMC treatment sessions were run in February and March 2014. In total,
185 students of economic fields were recruited as participants via the ORSEE platform
(Greiner, 2015). The experiment was conducted between-subject, i.e., each participant
was assigned to one of the treatments exclusively. Subjects were randomly assigned
to cohorts of two (in the SMC and MMC treatment) or three (in the PMC treatment)
and played with the same firm(s) for the whole time horizon of the game, i.e., a fixed
partner matching. Thus, the experimental data is independent at the industry level and
there are 78 independent observations.
The protocol for each of the sessions reads as follows: Upon entering the lab, partic-
ipants are randomly assigned to a seat. Neither do they see each other, nor are they
allowed to talk to other participants. To ensure common knowledge, instructions are
handed out and read aloud by the person in charge of the experiment.10 Subsequently,
10Experimental instructions for the MMC treatment together with a screenshot of the experimental soft-
ware are provided in Appendix C.4.
162
6.4 Experiment
a computerized questionnaire controls that participants know about the consequences
of their actions during the experiment. Wrong answers are identified by the software
and highlighted accordingly. Each participant repeats the questionnaire until all ques-
tions are answered correctly. After completion of the questionnaire by all participants
the experiment starts automatically.
During the experiment perfect information is ensured, i.e., subjects are at all times in-
formed about the past prices of all firms in their industry. The experimental software
allows to display past prices both in a table and a price graph that visualizes the devel-
opment of the cohort’s prices over time. Moreover, subjects are equipped with a profit
calculator in order to provide a maximum level of price transparency and salience. All
sessions lasted between 30 minutes and one hour. In the experiment MU 1 million cor-
responded to EUR 1. None of the subjects experienced a loss. Their total monetary
earnings averaged at EUR 11.88.
6.4.3 Results
There are 20 cohorts and thus, independent observations, for the SMC treatment, 29 for
the MMC treatment, and 29 for the PMC treatment. The imbalance in the number of
observations is a consequence of no-shows that happened to be more frequent in the
SMC treatment. Prices by cohorts over time for all three treatments are provided in
Appendix D.4.
The level of tacit collusion is assessed through market prices because marginal cost are
equal in all treatments and markets, and thus no conversion into a collusion metric,
e.g., the Lerner index or a degree of tacit collusion (cf. Engel, 2007), is necessary. For
all subsequent analyses, if not stated otherwise, values of both markets are averaged in
the MMC and PMC treatment in order to compare them to the SMC treatment.
Table 6.1 provides summary statistics for cohort level data from all three treatments.
The average market price is computed over the first 45 periods of all independent ob-
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TABLE 6.1: Summary statistics on cohort level.
Treatment Variable N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
SMC Average market price 20 34.04 10.83 15.04 49.60
Time to collude 9 19.00 9.08 5.00 34.00
MMC Average market price 29 36.78 10.64 15.46 50.00
Time to collude 13 6.62 6.78 1.00 24.00
PMC Average market price 29 33.68 10.01 16.74 49.58
Time to collude 15 15.87 10.45 1.00 33.00
servations. In the PMC treatment, prices set by the different types of firms average at
MU 36.33 for conglomerate multimarket firms and MU 36.17 for non-conglomerate sin-
gle market firms, which is not significantly different according to a matched-samples
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (z = 0.64, p = 0.524). Statistics for the time to collude in the
table are given for the collusive observations—two concepts that are introduced in the
following.
RESULT 6.1. Market prices are significantly higher under multimarket contact than under sin-
gle market contact or partial multimarket contact, but not significantly different between single
market contact and partial multimarket contact.
In line with previous experimental evidence (e.g., Engel, 2007), market prices are supra-
competitive, i.e., above the strict Nash equilibrium, throughout the time time horizon
of the experiment. Despite the effort to soften the end-game effect by experimental
design, it can be clearly noticed in Figure 6.2. The illustration indicates further that
market prices are initially higher under MMC compared to SMC and PMC. Controlling
for dependencies between observations from the same cohort and thus, heteroscedas-
ticity of errors across cohorts, consider the following two-level mixed-effects regression
model:
pk,t = β0 + ξk + βMMC ·MMC + βPMC · PMC + (βPeriod + βPeriod,k) · t + ek,t,
with pk,t as the market price averaged over both markets in cohort k in period t, ξk
as a random intercept controlling for the error component shared between repeated
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FIGURE 6.2: Average market price over time across treatments.
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observations from the same cohort k and βPeriod,k as a random slope for the time trend
in market prices in each cohort. Estimates, as reported in Table 6.2, show that market
prices are significantly higher under MMC than SMC but not different between SMC
and PMC. Furthermore, a Wald test of the equality of treatment dummy coefficients
shows that market prices are also significantly higher under MMC than PMC (χ2(1) =
4.16, p = 0.041). Figure 6.2 indicates that these differences are predominantly driven
by the first half of the repeated game as market prices approach each other eventually.
In fact, the average market price is almost 20% (15%) higher under MMC than SMC
(PMC) during the first 25 periods. However, differences in average market prices fall to
less than 5% during the 20 final periods. Overall, the average market price is about 10%
higher under MMC than under the other two market structures, which are statistically
indistinguishable throughout.
RESULT 6.2. Multimarket contact does not significantly affect the likelihood for eventually
achieving a collusive state.
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TABLE 6.2: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression of the average market price.
Covariate Coef. Std. err. z p 95% conf. interval
MMC 8.891 2.850 3.12 0.002 3.305 14.478
PMC 3.640 2.850 1.28 0.202 −1.947 9.226
Period 0.038 0.039 0.98 0.329 −0.038 0.115
Constant 29.391 2.193 13.40 < 0.001 25.093 33.690
3,510 observations clustered in 78 cohorts.
A market is defined to be in a collusive state if both firms’ prices are above the strict
Nash equilibrium and do not change for at least five successive periods.11 Note that, al-
though arbitrary to some extent, the identification of collusive markets is robust against
changes of the number of periods without price changes. In the MMC treatment the in-
dustry is conservatively defined to be in a collusive state if and only if the firms have
reached a collusive state in both markets.12 As the two markets in the PMC treatment
are not strategically connected as in the MMC treatment, an industry is deemed to be
in a collusive state also if that state is reached only on one of the markets. Generally,
firms hold their prices once they have reached a collusive state until the onset of the
end-game effect. There is only one exception to this rule: a duopoly in the MMC treat-
ment in which a collusive state is reached again a few periods later. Throughout, the
collusive state is achieved at the JPM price, i.e., consumers’ willingness to pay, or one
marginal price unit below it. Using the above definition, 9 out of 20 (45%) cohorts in the
SMC treatment, 13 out of 29 (45%) cohorts in the MMC treatment, and 15 (four of those
only on one market) out of 29 (52%) cohorts in the PMC treatment reach a collusive state
at all. These relative frequencies are not significantly different according to Fisher’s ex-
act test (p = 0.880). In the following, these duopolies are denoted as collusive, whereas
the remaining duopolies that do not reach a collusive state but may nevertheless show
above-equilibrium prices are referred to as non-collusive. Figure 6.3 depicts the average
11Obviously, this definition covers the case of stable JPM pricing assumed in the price setting strategy.
Yet, the definition adopted here is broader and serves as a robustness check whether there are stable
collusive price configurations below the JPM price. In fact, there is no stable collusive price configura-
tion that lies more than one marginal price unit below the JPM price. More specific, one observation in
each of the three treatments is deemed to be in a collusive state at a price level of one marginal price
unit below the JPM price.
12There is no duopoly in which firms reach a collusive state on one market alone. Neglecting time lags in
reaching a collusive state between markets, collusive states are always either reached on both or none
of the markets.
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FIGURE 6.3: Average market price of collusive duopolies over time across treatments.
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market prices in each period only for the collusive duopolies and highlights that the
treatment differences prevail.
RESULT 6.3. If a collusive state is achieved, it is reached significantly faster under multimarket
contact.
As the difference in market prices vanishes for later periods, it is now analyzed whether
a collusive state is reached faster under MMC among the collusive duopolies. To this
end, the number of periods needed to reach a collusive state is determined by the first
period of the onset of a collusive state as defined above. With regard to the PMC treat-
ment, the time until a collusive state is reached is determined in the most conservative
way with respect to the hypothesis, namely as the mean rather than the maximum
number of periods required on both markets in case a collusive state is reached on
both markets. Then, the number of periods required to reach a collusive state is sig-
nificantly lower in the MMC treatment than in the SMC treatment as well as the PMC
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treatment according to a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis H test (χ2(2) = 10.26, p= 0.006)
and multiple-comparison tests with Bonferroni-adjustment.13 Furthermore, the time to
collude is not significantly different between collusive cohorts from the PMC treatment
and the SMC treatment. In particular, on average a collusive state is reached in the 19th
period, i.e., after 42% of the minimum game length, in the SMC treatment, whereas it
is already reached in the 7th period, i.e., after 15% of the minimum game length, in the
MMC treatment. In the PMC treatment, a collusive state is reached on average in the
16th period, i.e., after 36% of the minimum game length.
6.5 Price setting behavior
While the previous results indicate that multimarket contact may indeed facilitate tacit
collusion, an investigation into whether the suggested price setting strategy offers a
reasonable microfoundation for the experimental results is still warranted. According
to the price setting strategy, a firm’s behavior is determined through the signaling prob-
ability σ as well as the signal reaction probabilities ψX and ψ−X. Hence, in the following
these parameters are estimated for each firm from the experimental data. Furthermore,
the estimations are conducted separately for all collusive and for all non-collusive co-
horts in an effort to explain why collusion occurred in some, but not in all cases. As
firm parameters may influence each other and change over time, the estimation proce-
dure is designed in the most conservative way possible in an effort to keep parameter
estimations independent. First, in the multimarket treatments, reaching a collusive
state on one market may strongly affect future behavior on the remaining market due
to the fact that markets are strategically connected. Therefore, estimations of all pa-
rameters are based only on the periods and signals until a collusive state is reached
on the first market. Second, in contrast to the other two treatments, in the PMC treat-
ment not all firms operate on all markets. Consequently, markets have to be considered
separately in the PMC treatment. However, this would inevitably reduce comparabil-
13While the more conservative non-parametric test is reported here, a parametric one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) model with multiple-comparison tests yields the same result.
168
6.5 Price setting behavior
ity between parameter estimates between treatments. Therefore, in both the PMC and
the MMC treatment, signal reaction parameters are only estimated for the market that
reached a collusive state first. In a similar fashion, the probability of sending a price
signal is estimated separately for each conglomerate firm but combined for the two
non-conglomerate firms (in PMC). In other words, in order to harmonize the estimation
process across treatments this procedure allows that the two non-conglomerate firms in
the PMC treatment behave as one conglomerate firm. Clearly, this procedure is conser-
vative with respect to the hypothesis that MMC facilitates tacit collusion compared to
PMC. In line with the price setting strategy, a price signal in period t is identified as
choosing the JPM price in period t when the other firm’s price in that market in t− 1
was lower than the JPM price.
The probability of sending a price signal σ for firms in the SMC treatment is readily
given by the number of price signals by a firm divided by the number of periods until
a collusive state is reached or by the number of total periods in case a collusive state is
never reached. Under MMC, firms can send a price signal on none, one or both markets.
According to a Bernoulli process, the probability that a conglomerate firm sends at least
one price signal in a period is given by σ2 + 2σ(1− σ). This is equal to the number of
periods in which a firm sends at least one price signal divided by the number of periods
until a collusive state is reached on the first market or by the number of total periods
in case a collusive state is never reached. In the PMC treatment, the same rationale as
for the MMC treatment applies to the conglomerate firm individually and to the two
non-conglomerate firms combined. With regard to the probability of recognizing and
reacting to a price signal on market X, in all treatments it is equally determined for
each firm how often it raises its own price on the same market (ψX) or the other market
(ψ−X) to the price level at which the price signal is sent, i.e., the JPM price, following a
price signal by the other firm in the previous period.
The left part of Table 6.3 reports average point estimates for all three parameters accord-
ing to the cohorts of firms specified above, i.e., for each treatment as well as collusive
or non-collusive cohorts separately. Note that about half of all firms in each of the
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TABLE 6.3: Average probabilities for sending and reacting to a price signal and correspond-
ing numbers of periods until the collusive state is reached in the experiment and
according to the price setting strategy.
Parameters Time to collude
Collusiveness Treatment σ ψX ψ−X Experiment Price setting strategy
Collusive
MMC 0.166 0.854 0.864 6.62 6.09
PMC 0.116 0.686 0.467 15.87 12.66
SMC 0.137 0.725 19.00 19.23
Non-collusive
MMC 0.078 0.150 0.138 116.28
PMC 0.037 0.190 0.085 360.26
SMC 0.041 0.047 588.08
treatments sent at least one price signal. The probabilities for reacting to a price signal
can only be calculated for firms whose competitor(s) sent at least one price signal. As
the probabilities for sending and reacting to price signals are not independent between
firms from the same cohort, industry averages are reported and used in the following
to test the foundations of the price signaling theory.
RESULT 6.4. The probabilities for sending a price signal and reacting to it on the same mar-
ket are significantly higher for collusive than for non-collusive cohorts within a treatment, but
do not differ across treatments. However, the probability for reacting to a price signal on the
other market is significantly higher under multimarket contact than under partial multimarket
contact.
In line with the conjecture, estimates of all three parameters are on average significantly
higher for firms in a collusive cohort than in a non-collusive cohort, but are not different
(with one notable exception, which is discussed below) between firms from collusive
respective non-collusive cohorts across treatments. This is supported by corresponding
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with treatment dummies, interaction effects,
and the MMC treatment as the baseline. In particular, Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 report
estimates of OLS regressions of the form
yk = β0 + βCollusive · Collusive + βPMC · PMC + βSMC · SMC
+ βPMC x Collusive · PMC · Collusive + βSMC x Collusive · SMC · Collusive + ek
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TABLE 6.4: OLS regression of the probability for sending a price signal σ.
Covariate Coef. Std. err. t p 95% conf. interval
Collusive 0.088 0.047 1.87 0.065 −0.006 0.182
PMC −0.041 0.046 −0.89 0.375 −0.133 0.051
SMC −0.037 0.049 −0.75 0.458 −0.135 0.062
PMC x Collusive −0.010 0.066 −0.14 0.885 −0.142 0.123
SMC x Collusive 0.008 0.074 0.11 0.916 −0.139 0.155
Constant 0.078 0.031 2.48 0.015 0.015 0.141
78 observations, R2 = 0.131.
TABLE 6.5: OLS regression of the probability for reacting to a price signal on the same market
ψX.
Covariate Coef. Std. err. t p 95% conf. interval
Collusive 0.704 0.108 6.52 < 0.001 0.487 0.921
PMC 0.039 0.113 0.35 0.729 −0.187 0.265
SMC −0.103 0.108 −0.96 0.342 −0.320 0.113
PMC x Collusive −0.207 0.159 −1.31 0.197 −0.526 0.111
SMC x Collusive −0.025 0.161 −0.16 0.876 −0.350 0.299
Constant 0.150 0.067 2.26 0.028 0.017 0.284
55 observations, R2 = 0.659.
with y ∈ {σ,ψX,ψ−X}. Obviously, as ψ−X does not apply in the SMC treatment, the cor-
responding covariates are omitted for this regression. All three OLS regressions show
that the effect of collusive cohorts is positive and significant throughout, while treat-
ments as well as interactions between treatments and collusion are insignificant. The
only exception—in accordance with the theoretical prediction—is the cross-market re-
action to a price signal. Here, the average estimated probability ψ−X is significantly
lower for collusive PMC cohorts than for collusive MMC cohorts. In other words, un-
der multimarket competition without multimarket contact price signals have a smaller
cross-market impact than under multimarket contact. As the conglomerate firm in the
PMC treatment meets different (non-conglomerate) rivals on both markets and hence,
there is no multimarket contact as in the MMC treatment, this is in line with the price
signaling theory. These parameter differences have implications for the time to collude
that is estimated by the price setting strategy, as is proven analytically in the following.
Thereby, it is assessed whether the price setting strategy successfully explains signif-
icant differences in the time needed to reach a collusive state using the parameters
estimated from the experimental data.
171
Chapter 6 Multimarket Contact and Tacit Collusion
TABLE 6.6: OLS regression of the probability for reacting to a price signal on the other market
ψ−X.
Covariate Coef. Std. err. t p 95% conf. interval
Collusive 0.726 0.133 5.46 < 0.001 0.455 0.998
PMC −0.053 0.126 −0.42 0.679 −0.311 0.205
PMC x Collusive −0.344 0.193 −1.79 0.084 −0.737 0.049
Constant 0.138 0.075 1.84 0.075 −0.015 0.290
34 observations, R2 = 0.559.
RESULT 6.5. With the empirically observed signal sending and reaction probabilities in collu-
sive cohorts, the price setting strategy accurately predicts the empirically observed time needed
to reach a collusive state for each market scenario.
The expected number of periods until JPM is reached is readily given by the expected
time to absorption of the corresponding Markov chain. Given the transition matrix of
a Markov chain with a unique absorbing state, the expected number of steps until that
absorbing state is reached can be computed from its fundamental matrix (see Appendix
B.2). Using the parameter estimations specified in the left part of Table 6.3, the expected
number of periods until JPM is reached is calculated analytically as 6.09 for the collusive
MMC cohorts and 19.23 for the collusive SMC cohorts. The right part of Table 6.3 allows
to compare these values and shows that they match well to the empirical findings in the
experiment, which are on average 6.62 periods in the MMC treatment and 19.00 periods
in the SMC treatment.
In an effort to ensure comparability across treatments, signaling parameters in the PMC
treatment and the MMC treatment are estimated with identical procedures. Conse-
quently, in order not to impose further assumptions onto the price setting in the PMC
treatment, the same analytical Markov chain is applied for MMC and PMC. This allows
for cross-market reaction to price signals in PMC. As shown above, the probability to
react to a price signal on the other market is significantly lower for collusive PMC firms
than collusive MMC firms. This carries over to the time needed to reach a collusive
state, which is estimated at 12.66 periods by the price setting strategy—slightly lower
than the 15.87 periods in the experiment. For the observed signal probabilities for the
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FIGURE 6.4: Expected number of periods until a collusive state is reached.
(A) Multimarket contact. (B) Single market contact.
Note. The lines in the contour plots delimit areas with an expected number of periods until a collusive
state is reached in steps of tens from below 10 periods (light gray) to above 50 periods (dark gray). For
each treatment, the circles and boxes depict the parameter estimates for collusive and non-collusive firms,
respectively. Panel 6.4a is compiled using σ = 0.1.
non-collusive duopolies, the price setting strategy predicts that an industry does not
converge to JPM until more than 100 periods in any treatment, i.e., more than double
the 45 to 50 periods in the experiment.
These observations are supported visually by Figure 6.4 which depicts the expected
number of periods until the collusive state is reached according to the proposed price
setting strategy under MMC (Figure 6.4a) and under SMC (Figure 6.4b), respectively.
For both contour plots, the time to collude is lowest in the top right corner and highest
in the bottom left corner. Note that the vertical axes of the two panels in Figure 6.4
differ. In particular, for the sake of a two-dimensional presentation, Figure 6.4a is com-
piled using σ= 0.1 (i.e., the average over all parameter estimates from treatments MMC
and PMC), whereas in Figure 6.4b ψ−X = 0 by definition. Additionally, point estimates
of parameters are depicted for the non-collusive cohorts of treatments as boxes and
for the collusive cohorts of treatments as circles. Both panels in Figure 6.4 emphasize
the differences between collusive and non-collusive parameter estimates from the same
treatment as well as the differences in the corresponding expected steps until a collu-
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sive state is reached. In particular, non-collusive parameter estimates across MMC and
PMC lie closely together. In relative comparison, the collusive parameter estimates for
the probability of cross-market reaction to a price signal vary greatly across the two in-
dustry settings, thus portraying the distinction of multimarket contact and multimarket
competition without multimarket contact.
The conclusion of these findings is twofold. First, both the probability for sending a
price signal as well as the probability for recognizing and reacting to a price signal (on
the same market or cross-market) are significantly higher for firms in collusive cohorts
than for firms in non-collusive cohorts. Therefore, different values for the parameters
may indicate different types of firms, i.e., those with and without intentions to tacitly
collude. Second, the price setting strategy successfully predicts systematic differences
in the behavior of firms and the extent of tacit collusion in the experiment. This evi-
dence suggests that the strategy captures relevant aspects of oligopolistic competition
under single market and multimarket contact.
6.6 Discussion
Multimarket contact is known to relax price competition in a number of circumstances.
However, the extant literature relates this finding either to asymmetry of firms (Bern-
heim and Whinston, 1990), concave objective functions (Spagnolo, 1999) or imperfect
monitoring of actions (Anand and Mendelson, 1997; Matsushima, 2001; Chang and
Harrington, 2003). We explicitly consider an industry setting in which none of these
theories apply and instead provide a new, theoretical explanation based on behavioral
research for why multimarket contact may facilitate the emergence of tacit collusion
even in—but not limited to—this case.
A price setting strategy is suggested that explains the process through which firms can
tacitly reach a collusive outcome faster under multimarket contact than under single
market contact, everything else being equal. This finding rests on two assumptions.
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First, it is assumed that firms can implicitly communicate their intention for collusive
play solely through their price setting behavior without communicating explicitly. Sec-
ond, it is conjectured that such price signaling is more efficiently in a multimarket envi-
ronment, because a price signal that is sent in only one market may also have a collusive
cross-market impact on the other market. Firms meeting in several distinct (geographic
or product) markets can discriminate prices across these markets, which offers con-
glomerate multimarket firms a means to signal their pricing intentions with less op-
portunity cost. In other words, a price signal that is sent on only one market (thus,
constituting opportunity cost also only on that one market) may evoke a market price
increase in all markets. Conversely, under single market contact of non-conglomerate
firms, or equivalently, if conglomerate firms are subject to a uniform pricing constraint,
or if authority over business decisions is decentralized, the price signaling possibilities
are curtailed which effectively limits the efficiency of a price signal.
By means of an economic laboratory experiment, in which firms are not allowed to com-
municate explicitly, these two assumptions are validated and it is shown that the price
setting strategy replicates behavior in the experiment accurately. Furthermore, the price
setting strategy can also explain why some, but not all industries reach a collusive state
if one controls for firm-specific parameters of the price setting strategy. In particular,
multimarket contact expedites the speed at which a collusive state is reached, how-
ever it does not affect the likelihood of reaching a collusive state per se. Thus, one can
argue that multimarket contact facilitates the emergence of tacit collusion. This also
explains why prices are initially higher under multimarket contact—as firms collude
earlier here—but why price differences eventually vanish in later periods—as multi-
market contact does not affect the likelihood to achieve a collusive state after all.
The signal sending and reaction probabilities obtained from the experimental data are
significantly higher for firms that reach a collusive outcome than for those firms that do
not reach a collusive state, but are similar across treatments for collusive firms respec-
tive non-collusive firms. This clearly supports the rationale of the price setting strategy.
With these parameters the process described by the price setting strategy converges to
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the collusive outcome, i.e., JPM, in a similar number of periods as in the experiment.
Thus, the price setting strategy captures the emergence of tacit collusion accurately,
both overall as well as the differences between multimarket and single market contact.
Finally, it is worth noting that these results are robust in the sense that they are driven
by multimarket contact and not multimarket competition per se, which is highlighted
by similar market outcomes under single market and partial multimarket contact.
Evidently, these results bear important managerial as well as policy implications. First,
conglomerate firms find it easier to collude tacitly with their conglomerate competitors
if they are meeting them in more than one market. Second, in such an industry setting,
organizational centralization may facilitate tacit coordination by mere observation of
rivals’ prices. Third, multimarket contact between oligopolistic firms, which is com-
mon in many industry contexts, should even more so be subject to scrutiny by antitrust
authorities. Even if symmetric firms with linear objective functions and perfect infor-
mation on their competitors meet in symmetric markets, which is so far not considered
to be a concern, multimarket contact may facilitate the emergence of tacit collusion.
Moreover, while this setting excludes alternative explanations, the behavioral explana-
tion presented here is, of course, not limited to this case. Rather, it is likely that price
signaling under multimarket contact also facilitates tacit collusion in industries with
asymmetric firms and markets. Therefore, this study sheds new light on theoretical as
well as empirical research on multimarket contact. Fourth, the results indicate that the
implementation of uniform pricing constraints in regulated industries such as telecom-
munications markets may effectively mitigate tacit collusion. Hence, uniform pricing
constraints could be considered by competition authorities in comparison to access reg-
ulation or price regulation. As the latter are often connected to issues of information
asymmetries and regulatory commitment, uniform pricing may be an effective alterna-
tive to preserve competition in multimarket industries. However, side effects of such
ex ante regulation should be scrutinized simultaneously.
This study stresses that underlying propensities of the communicative content of price
choices between rivals should gain more attention in the context of multimarket con-
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tact. Yet, this finding is subject to several limitations which give rise to open questions
for future research. In particular, the analysis is focused on a specific market setting.
Although the suggested price setting strategy generalizes easily to other market set-
tings, future research should delineate the boundaries and limiting conditions of the
empirical findings in more detail. First, the price setting strategy should be formally
adopted and empirically tested for asymmetric firms and markets. Second, future re-
search should also address whether the findings carry over to other modes of price or
quantity competition, e.g., with horizontal or vertical product differentiation. Third,
it is conceivable that a higher number of markets and competing firms may alter the
findings substantially, allowing firms to send even more sophisticated signals (as in the
case of more markets), but also limiting the scope for strategic interaction (as in the case
of more firms). Fourth and lastly, further insights on the dynamics of price adjustments
may be gained by considering more nuanced definitions of price signals.
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Chapter 7
Upstream and Downstream Competition,
and Tacit Collusion
IN several industries effective retail competition downstream is only feasible ifwholesale access is provided to an essential input resource upstream. The regula-
tion of wholesale access to an upstream bottleneck resource that represents an essential
input for non-integrated firms to compete in the retail market downstream stimulates
considerable economic research. This issue arises most prominently in network indus-
tries such as the telecommunications (Krämer and Vogelsang, 2014) and energy (Boots
et al., 2004) industries, in which the bottleneck arises naturally through subadditivity of
the cost structure. Yet, access regulation is also of concern in other contexts such as the
licensing of intellectual property (Dewatripont and Legros, 2013), where the bottleneck
is constituted artificially. This chapter is concerned with these antitrust and regula-
tory issues—most prominently the emergence of tacit collusion—in a vertical industry
structure of an upstream market and a downstream market along the same value chain.
Thereby, different market structures at the upstream market and different regulations
on the wholesale level are investigated by means of an economic laboratory experiment
and assessed according to their effect on market outcomes with a particular attention
on consumers.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 motivates this re-
search and describes the industry scenarios under investigation: a monopoly and two
duopoly variants with respect to the upstream market structure and in regard to regula-
tion at the wholesale level a margin squeeze rule, which prohibits firms to set upstream
prices above their downstream prices, or no regulation at all. In Section 7.2 the re-
lated literature on wholesale competition and margin squeeze regulation is reviewed.
In Section 7.3, the experimental design is described and hypotheses derived based on
theoretical predictions for four timing variants of the basic model. Section 7.4 presents
the experimental results. In Section 7.5 results are examined with respect to the hy-
potheses and incentives for tacit collusion in a repeated game context are discussed.
Finally, Section 7.6 discusses possible limitations and extensions.
7.1 Motivation
The anti-competitive effects that possibly arise in a scenario of an upstream bottleneck
resource as well as accompanying regulatory remedies are widely studied in the litera-
ture for the case of a single access provider. In particular, the questions of how to set an
optimal wholesale charge under access regulation (Armstrong et al., 1996; Armstrong
and Vickers, 1998) and the incentive to raise rivals’ costs (Salop and Scheffman, 1983,
1987) through price discrimination (DeGraba, 1990; Inderst and Valletti, 2009; Vick-
ers, 1995) and non-price discrimination (Economides, 1998; Mandy, 2000; Mandy and
Sappington, 2007; Weisman and Kang, 2001) are examined in detail. Moreover, firms’
strategic incentives to vertically integrate across retail and wholesale markets and the
effect of such conduct on competition (see Lafontaine and Slade, 2007, for an overview)
are thoroughly investigated, in particular with respect to the softening of retail compe-
tition (Chen, 2001; Gans, 2007) and foreclosure of non-integrated resellers (Choi and Yi,
2000; Hart and Tirole, 1990; Ordover et al., 1990; Rey and Tirole, 2007) or upstream ri-
vals (Chen and Riordan, 2007). Based on this theoretical literature, vertical foreclosure
is also examined by means of economic laboratory experiments (Martin et al., 2001;
Normann, 2011).
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However, a set of new issues arises when there is more than one vertically integrated
access provider such that competition at the wholesale level may emerge in addition to
retail competition. Especially in the likely case of a highly concentrated wholesale mar-
ket, i.e., a duopoly, the question arises whether access regulation is (still) warranted.
Evidently, the answer to this question has direct ramifications on how regulators and
competition authorities should deal with this kind of market structure, but also on
whether authorities should promote the entry of a second integrated access provider
in markets in which the essential input is currently supplied monopolistically. Al-
though not confined to this context, the relevance of this scenario is exemplified in the
telecommunications industry, in which technological progress and consolidation create
an environment with few vertically integrated firms as well as several non-integrated
resellers that rely on access, both in the fixed and in the mobile markets. On the one
hand, with respect to fixed networks, technological progress leads to the roll out of new
fiber-optic networks as well as the evolution of broadband cable networks, which both
create new vertically integrated firms that compete most notably in densely populated
urban areas with the traditional telecommunications incumbent. On the other hand,
mobile telecommunications markets experience a recent wave of mergers and acquisi-
tions that reduce the number of independent operators maintaining a distinct cellular
infrastructure, thus increasing market concentration at the wholesale level.
Despite its practical relevance, the explicit analysis of simultaneous wholesale and re-
tail competition in the presence of both vertically integrated and non-integrated firms
receives less attention in the economic literature. The extant theoretical analyses, which
are reviewed in detail below, suggest that wholesale competition is likely to improve
and not deteriorate market outcomes for resellers and consumers, i.e., wholesale and
downstream prices are lower compared to the case of a wholesale monopoly, although
monopoly-like equilibria may exist. Thereby, the theoretical models generally rest on
the assumption of effective competition at the wholesale level, in particular by assum-
ing homogeneous Bertrand competition between duopolistic access providers (see, e.g.,
Bourreau et al., 2011). However, empirical results from both laboratory (see Engel
(2007), Potters and Suetens (2013), and Chapter 4) and field studies (see, e.g., Parker
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and Röller, 1997, in the context of telecommunications markets) suggest that duopoly
markets are prone to high levels of tacit collusion, which may give rise to market out-
comes that differ from those identified in the theoretical literature.
This study scrutinizes the effect of wholesale competition on market outcomes by ex-
plicitly taking into account the emergence of tacit collusion that may arise from this
scenario. Based on the Bourreau et al. (2011) framework of two integrated firms and
one non-integrated reseller, an economic laboratory experiment is designed that allows
to empirically observe market outcomes under various modes of wholesale competi-
tion while keeping all other factors fixed. Furthermore, a continuous time framework is
employed that allows to endogenize the timing of price settings and therefore incorpo-
rates settings in which wholesale and retail prices are set simultaneously, which is also
assumed in the context of upstream collusion (Nocke and White, 2007). First, the case
where only one of the integrated firms provides wholesale access (access monopoly) is
examined. This constitutes the benchmark case, which is extensively studied in the lit-
erature. Second, homogeneous Bertrand competition between the two integrated firms
at the wholesale level is considered. In this setting, firms can adjust their wholesale
prices at any time and the firm that offers the lower price serves the entire wholesale
market. Third, as Bertrand competition is known to be susceptible to tacit collusion
(Potters and Suetens, 2013), a variant of Bertrand competition at the wholesale level is
implemented in which integrated firms are obliged to maintain their wholesale price
for a fixed period of time (i.e., a price commitment), everything else being equal to
the second case. Due to this price commitment, the firm that decides on the lower
price is granted a wholesale monopoly position for some time. Thus, this latter treat-
ment induces an element of competition for the market (Geroski, 2003), which is con-
jectured to hinder tacit collusion and intensify competition at the wholesale level. All
three modes of wholesale competition are examined both under a no regulation regime,
where firms are free to set wholesale and retail prices, and under a margin squeeze reg-
ulation regime, in which an integrated firm’s wholesale price may not exceed its retail
price. Margin squeeze regulation recently gained attention in the debate on open access
policies and is perceived as a viable alternative to price regulation, e.g., by the Euro-
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pean Commission (2013a), particularly when there is more than one wholesale access
provider.
The results of this study indicate that, over and beyond the findings of the theoreti-
cal literature, wholesale competition may in fact lead to a worse market outcome for
consumers than a wholesale monopoly. For the case of homogeneous Bertrand com-
petition at the wholesale level both wholesale as well as retail market prices are above
the level that is observed when there is only a single access provider. Drawing on the
literature on upstream collusion (Nocke and White, 2007; Normann, 2009) it is shown
that incentives for tacit collusion are actually higher under wholesale competition if an
infinitely repeated game context is considered. Thus, even in the presence of wholesale
competition regulators should closely monitor the outcomes of such vertically related
markets. However, the results also demonstrate that wholesale competition may be in-
tensified by simple procedural regulation, namely a price commitment, which in turn
restores the theoretical prediction to the extant that access prices are lower than un-
der a wholesale monopoly. However, even in this case, wholesale access prices remain
well above the predicted Nash equilibrium, i.e., marginal costs. Furthermore, in the
context of the open access debate, there is no evidence that a margin squeeze regula-
tion reduces retail market prices compared to a no regulation regime. Although margin
squeeze regulation may benefit the reseller, it tends to increase retail prices and thus
reduce consumers’ surplus.
7.2 Related literature
Two strands of literature are related to this study. First, the literature on upstream
market structures considers and compares effects that arise in case the wholesale mar-
ket is governed by a monopoly or by competition, i.e., in general a duopoly. Second,
the literature on margin squeeze regulation investigates whether a margin squeeze is
anti-competitive behavior at all and what effects on the market are connected to the
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implementation of such a regulatory remedy. Both strands of literature are reviewed in
the following.
7.2.1 Wholesale monopoly and competition
Before reviewing the literature on wholesale competition, it is worth noting some of the
effects that arise already in the presence of a monopolistic access provider. Even in the
absence of regulation a vertically integrated firm may be willing to supply the whole-
sale market on a voluntary basis if the additional revenues generated at the wholesale
level exceed the business stealing effect of the reseller in the retail market (Farrell and
Weiser, 2003; Höffler and Schmidt, 2008). More generally, if downstream organizations
exhibit efficiency advantages or if retail goods are sufficiently quality-differentiated
(e.g., due to brand reputation or additional sales channels as illustrated by Banerjee
and Dippon, 2009), the provision of wholesale services allows the integrated firm to
generate additional revenues. In this case, the access provider benefits from a demand
expansion effect relative to a situation where the integrated firm is the single seller of
its goods in the retail market (Boudreau, 2010).
In the presence of wholesale competition the incentives to provide access on a volun-
tary basis are likely to be increased compared to a wholesale monopoly, because the
integrated firms may now find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma with respect to the
provision of the wholesale good (Brito and Pereira, 2010). Studies that investigate these
incentives can be classified according to the assumed competition model: The major-
ity considers price competition with horizontally differentiated retail products (Atiyas
et al., 2015; Brito and Pereira, 2010; Bourreau et al., 2011; Höffler and Schmidt, 2008;
Ordover and Shaffer, 2007) where competition is either spatial (Hotelling, 1929; Sa-
lop, 1979) or non-spatial (Shubik and Levitan, 1980). The remainder assumes quantity
competition in the retail market (Dewenter and Haucap, 2006; Kalmus and Wiethaus,
2010). In particular, these studies are interested in the conditions under which resellers
are supplied in equilibrium and whether resale actually increases downstream market
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efficiency. Although the precise nature of the supply and non-supply equilibria as well
as the retail equilibria that emerge under wholesale competition depend on the specific
modeling assumptions, all theoretical investigations agree that wholesale competition
neither leads to more foreclosure of the reseller nor increases wholesale or retail market
prices in comparison to a wholesale monopoly.
More specifically, under wholesale competition Ordover and Shaffer (2007) as well as
Brito and Pereira (2010) find that integrated firms provide the reseller with the retail
good at marginal cost if products are sufficiently differentiated although they would be
individually better of without entry as retail prices and profits decrease. On the other
hand, resellers are generally not supplied if retail products are close substitutes and
none of the integrated firms has an incentive to make a profitable wholesale offer in
the first place. Furthermore, Ordover and Shaffer (2007) show that the supply equilib-
rium disappears if inputs are differentiated as well, or if the reseller chooses its quality
endogenously and cannot commit ex ante to its product positioning.
Moreover, the analyses by Brito and Pereira (2010) and Höffler and Schmidt (2008)
reveal that if competition is spatial and the degree of quality differentiation is in-
termediate, one integrated firm may provide access while the other integrated firm
makes an unprofitable offer. This finding of a partial foreclosure equilibrium is further
generalized—including the case of non-spatial competition—by Bourreau et al. (2011)
based on the characterization of the softening effect: A vertically integrated wholesale
provider chooses its retail price with regard to its opportunity costs in the wholesale
market (DeGraba, 2003) and thus is less aggressive in the retail market than its vertically
integrated rival who does not provide wholesale access. In other words, the considera-
tion of opportunity costs weakens competition in the retail market and may at the same
time make it less attractive to compete for wholesale revenues. In consequence, the
monopoly outcome may be restored, because the integrated rival of the access provider
benefits from higher retail profits and thus prefers to exit the upstream market. Note,
however, that the equilibrium hinges on the assumptions that retail goods are close
substitutes and that at least one firm supplies the retail firm, e.g., due to a reseller’s effi-
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ciency advantage (Bourreau et al., 2011) or due to regulatory coercion (Bourreau et al.,
2015). Otherwise, marginal cost pricing in the upstream market constitutes the unique
equilibrium under wholesale competition in the non-spatial model if goods are suffi-
ciently differentiated (Höffler and Schmidt, 2008). Moreover, Atiyas et al. (2015) show
that unobservable, more complex wholesale contracts may stimulate voluntary access
and wholesale competition, thus making foreclosure of the reseller less likely.
Höffler and Schmidt (2008) investigate the effects of resale on consumer welfare, which
may be increased either by a decline in retail prices and/or an increase in variety. Under
the assumption that the reseller will be supplied by one of the integrated firms, i.e.,
there is no foreclosure, it is shown that resale may actually increase the market price
if quality differentiation is sufficiently high. In the case of non-spatial competition the
price increase is always compensated by an increase in variety with respect to consumer
welfare. In the spatial model however, consumers may be worse off as the price effect
dominates. Then again, if wholesale competition for resellers is considered in the non-
spatial model, wholesale prices are found to equal marginal cost and, in consequence,
retail prices are lower than compared to a situation without resale.
Whereas the reported analyses of wholesale competition focus exclusively on the one-
shot interaction between firms, the literature on upstream collusion examines incen-
tives for coordinated firm behavior in an infinitely repeated game setting. Nocke and
White (2007) compare critical discount factors that are necessary to sustain collusion
by the means of grim trigger strategies and find that vertical integration facilitates tacit
collusion among upstream firms relative to a vertically separated industry structure.
Normann (2009) replicates the finding that vertical integration facilitates upstream col-
lusion for the case of linear input charges and a sequential setting of wholesale and
retail prices, whereas Nocke and White (2007) model wholesale contracts as two-part
tariffs and assume simultaneous price setting. Although sequential price setting is as-
sumed by most of the presented studies, the work by Nocke and White (2007) exem-
plifies that the timing of firms’ actions and the interaction may in fact be more diverse
and nuanced.
186
7.2 Related literature
This study contributes to the literature on wholesale competition by showing empir-
ically that wholesale prices may be above the monopoly level even if theory predicts
wholesale supply at marginal costs as the unique equilibrium. It is further shown that
tacit collusion at the wholesale level may effectively be reduced by a price commitment
rule that fosters the integrated firms’ competition for the market. Moreover, the ex-
perimental framework allows for a systematic comparison of retail market prices and
consumer surplus under the different modes of wholesale competition.
7.2.2 Margin squeeze regulation
In the presence of a duplicate infrastructure the traditional economic rationale for ex
ante price regulation is no longer applicable as the bottleneck does not represent a sin-
gle essential facility anymore (Renda, 2010). In consequence, regulators and competi-
tion agencies may be concerned with identifying suitable alternatives and regulatory
rules that still ensure open access for downstream competitors, but give integrated firms
more freedom in setting their wholesale prices (Krämer and Vogelsang, 2014). The
margin squeeze rule represents a potential surrogate for price regulation that is already
applied in various forms and different contexts. Next to its application in (European)
competition law, the basic mechanism, which is designed to ensure a viable wholesale-
retail margin for a downstream reseller, is also implemented by retail minus X regulation
(Gonçalves, 2007) and the efficient component-pricing rule (Baumol et al., 1997). Ever
since the landmark decision Deutsche Telekom1 in 2003, the application of the margin
squeeze rule as an antitrust instrument is controversially debated within the economic
and the legal literature (Briglauer et al., 2011; Carlton, 2008; Geradin and O’Donoghue,
2005). While the European Commission has repeatedly convicted firms based on a mar-
gin squeeze accusation2 and has been confirmed by European courts3, the US Supreme
Court has dismissed allegations based on the margin squeeze rationale in comparable
cases (Trinko and linkLine).
1Commission Decision 2003/707/EC.
2See the Commission Decision of 4 July 2007 (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España vs. Telefónica).
3See the cases Deutsche Telekom (T-271/03, C-280/08), Telefónica (T-336/07, T-398/07 C-295/12), and Telia-
Sonera (C-52/09).
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The rationale for margin squeeze regulation is that protecting competitors in the con-
text of monopolistic bottlenecks or concentrated input markets will ultimately benefit
consumers. Particularly in competition policy the latter goal is emphasized and held in
high regard, e.g., the European Commission (p.7 2009) clarifies that “what really mat-
ters is protecting an effective competitive process and not simply protecting competi-
tors”. Sector-specific regulation may widen the scope of application, as is illustrated
by the debate about the relevant efficiency standard for the margin squeeze conduct
(Geradin and O’Donoghue, 2005), but fundamentally still aims at the protection of con-
sumers, where competition itself is a means to an end (Vogelsang, 2013).
In this vein, Jullien et al. (2014) provide an overview of the economic theories of harm
that may qualify a margin squeeze as an abuse of market power and could provide
the basis for a stand-alone antitrust doctrine. Petulowa and Saavedra (2014) qualify
the circumstances under which a margin squeeze can occur in the case of differentiated
goods and state that a margin squeeze is rather the result of competition and not of an
exploitative abuse. Jullien et al. (2014) conclude that the effects of a margin squeeze rule
are ambiguous as wholesale prices may decrease, but retail prices may also rise, due to a
price umbrella effect. With regard to retail minus X regulation, Höffler and Schmidt (2008)
criticize that its application may lead to consumer welfare losses and higher prices.
In the past, the margin squeeze rule has mostly been investigated in the case of a sin-
gle access provider, as indispensability has initially constituted a central criterion in its
application as an antitrust instrument. More recently, as illustrated by the ex ante eco-
nomic replicability test in the European Commission’s 2013a Recommendation on con-
sistent non-discrimination, the margin squeeze test may also be applied to an environ-
ment with competing infrastructures (Jaunaux and Lebourges, 2015). While this rule
is already applied in practice, little research is conducted with regard to actual conse-
quences and the particular application context.
The experimental analysis in this study suggests that the margin squeeze rule is likely
to be ineffective in lowering retail prices irrespective of the mode of wholesale compe-
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tition. Although margin squeeze regulation may benefit the reseller in some circum-
stances, it tends to increase retail prices and thus reduces consumer surplus.
7.3 Experiment
The underlying experimental framework explicitly addresses the presented issues of
wholesale competition and open access by incorporating an industry structure that al-
lows for competition at the wholesale and retail level along the same value chain.
7.3.1 Theoretical model
The general experimental design is based on the model of upstream competition devel-
oped by Bourreau et al. (2011)—illustrated in Figure 7.1— in which two integrated firms
(Firm A & Firm B) are able to supply the wholesale good, while a third firm (Firm D)
operates only in the downstream market. In order to supply the retail good, the down-
stream reseller is required to purchase the wholesale good at the upstream market from
one of the two integrated firms. The wholesale prices of Firm A and Firm B are denoted
aA and aB, respectively. In the retail market, all firms choose their respective retail prices
pi, i ∈ {A, B, D}.
It is assumed that Firm D chooses the wholesale product with the lowest price and
does not split its demand.4 Thus, the integrated firms compete à la Bertrand with ho-
mogeneous goods. For each quantity that the downstream reseller supplies to con-
sumers in the retail market it must buy an identical quantity of the wholesale good.
In the downstream market, firms compete likewise in prices, but goods are differen-
tiated. In line with previous theoretical studies on wholesale competition, competi-
4Note that, as the stage game is played repeatedly in the experiment, the following tie breaking rule is
used: If Firm A and Firm B offer the same wholesale price, Firm D chooses to purchase access from the
firm that has previously offered the lower price. If both integrated firms offer an identical wholesale
price in the first period, the access provider is chosen randomly.
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FIGURE 7.1: Conceptual model of wholesale competition with two integrated firms and a non-
integrated reseller (based on Bourreau et al., 2011, p. 683).
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tion in horizontally differentiated goods based on Shubik and Levitan (1980)5 is as-
sumed, where the retail demand of each firm i in the case of n = 3 active firms is given
by qi = 13 (1− pi − γ(pi −
∑3j=1 pj
3 )) and the differentiation parameter γ defines the de-
gree of substitution between firms’ retail goods. Across all treatments, γ = 30, which
corresponds to a diversion ratio of 10/21 for each pair-wise relationship between firms
(Shapiro, 1996).
Throughout all experimental treatments, Firm D is modeled to mimic the behavior of a
competitive fringe in the retail market that reacts to the price setting by the integrated
firms, Firm A and Firm B. It is therefore assumed that Firm D always chooses the best-
response retail price, i.e., the price that maximizes its profit given the wholesale and
retail prices set by the integrated firms.
In the experiment, prices are scaled as follows: Values obtained by the Shubik and Lev-
itan (1980) model are multiplied by φ = 100/0.15 and firms can decide for their prices
on any integer in the range of zero to one hundred. In terms of the original Shubik
and Levitan (1980) values, this corresponds to the price interval [0;0.15]. As a con-
sequence, the joint profit among integrated firms’ is maximized when integrated firms
choose maximum prices in both the wholesale market (amax = 100) and the retail market
5The experimental design follows Höffler (2008) with regard to the derivation of the demand structure
and the active number of firms in the market. Therefore, consumers explicitly value variety.
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(pmax = 100). Therefore, the JPM outcome is identical across treatments. Moreover, the
scaling allows for a more granular representation of the relevant price interval between
the theoretically predicted competitive and collusive prices as well as the monopoly
price in the case of a single access provider.
In contrast to the theoretical literature on wholesale competition, which usually pre-
scribes a specific temporal sequence of actions, timing of price decisions is endogenized
in the experiment by means of a continuous time framework. Endogenous timing of
price setting has two aspects: First, no assumption is made on the sequence of upstream
and downstream decisions. While it is frequently assumed that wholesale prices are set
prior to retail prices (Bourreau et al., 2011), prices may also be chosen simultaneously
(Nocke and White, 2007). Second, price setting of the integrated firms at a specific mar-
ket level is equally unconstrained, i.e., these firms decide not only about the magnitude
of a price, but also about timing when to change it. Therefore, the experimental design
includes various time settings that are captured by the theoretical literature, but at the
same time allows for a more general approach as it also incorporates additional settings
that may arise endogenously. In consequence of the endogenous timing induced by the
continuous time framework, multiple theoretical predictions may apply, depending on
the specific temporal sequence of firms’ actions. In order to provide a robust theoreti-
cal prediction, consider the following four alternative timing models, which are variants
of either a sequential-move or a simultaneous-move game proposed in the theoretical
literature:
(1) Two-stage game as suggested by Bourreau et al. (2011)6: First, integrated firms set
their wholesale prices and the downstream reseller chooses its access provider. Sec-
ond, all firms decide on their retail prices. Within each stage, firms set prices simul-
taneously.
6Note that, in contrast to Bourreau et al. (2011), in the experiment no assumption is made on that the
downstream reseller will always be supplied by at least one integrated firm. Consequently, integrated
firms may choose to set wholesale prices in excess of their own retail prices and consequently foreclose
the reseller from the downstream market, which implies qD = 0.
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TABLE 7.1: Predicted wholesale and retail price differences between industry structures.
No regulation Margin squeeze regulation
Wholesale monopoly
Monopoly outcome ≥ Constrained
or monopoly
Foreclosure ≤ outcome
≥ >
Wholesale competition
Competitive outcome
or ≥ Competitive outcome
Foreclosure
(2) Three-stage Stackelberg game: Same as Timing Model (1) with the exception that
the downstream reseller chooses its retail price in a third stage, i.e., after the inte-
grated firms have chosen their respective retail prices.
(3) Simultaneous-move game as assumed by Nocke and White (2007): All firms set
their prices, both wholesale and retail, simultaneously.
(4) Two-stage Stackelberg game: Same as Timing Model (3) with the exception that the
downstream reseller chooses its retail price in a second stage, i.e., after the inte-
grated firms have chosen their prices.
Table 7.1 depicts ordinal differences in theoretical equilibrium predictions of wholesale
and retail prices for all four timing models. Note that the hypotheses regarding the
direction of a price difference hold equally for wholesale and retail prices of each in-
dividual firm. Although the timing models vary with regard to the specific numerical
predictions for equilibrium prices in the investigated scenarios, the direction of price
effects between scenarios align—with one exception that is discussed below.7
In order to allow for a benchmark for the evaluation of wholesale competition, con-
sider first the market outcome under a wholesale monopoly. In this scenario only
Firm A offers a wholesale price and may provide the wholesale good to the reseller
Firm D. By contrast, Firm B relies on its vertically integrated structure to produce its
own wholesale good, but does not offer access to its wholesale resource. In the absence
7See Appendix B.3 for the complete analysis and a comprehensive comparison of all models.
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of regulation, given γ = 30, Firm A is expected to set the wholesale price either at the
wholesale monopoly level or such that the reseller is foreclosed from the downstream
market. As shown in Appendix B.3, the latter outcome arises if the reseller’s price reac-
tion is not explicitly anticipated by the monopolistic wholesale provider, i.e., in Timing
Models (1) and (3). The introduction of margin squeeze regulation changes the equi-
librium outcome only if equilibrium prices of Firm A under no regulation violate the
margin squeeze condition aA ≤ pA. Whereas margin squeeze regulation is expected to
decrease prices compared to the case of foreclosure under no regulation, it instead in-
creases wholesale and retail prices for all firms according to the theoretical prediction
in Timing Model (2). In sum, theoretical predictions on whether the implementation of
margin squeeze regulation decreases prices in a wholesale monopoly are ambiguous.
In the case of wholesale competition, it is straightforward that symmetric marginal cost
pricing, i.e., aA = aB = 0, is a Nash equilibrium, as is shown by Bourreau et al. (2011).
The corresponding equilibrium retail prices are thus symmetric for all three firms. In
Timing Models (2) and (4) this equilibrium is unique, because integrated firms antici-
pate that Firm D as a follower can only act as a price taker and therefore find it always
profitable to make a viable wholesale offer.8 In contrast, in Timing Models (1) and (3),
there exists a second foreclosure equilibrium in which both integrated firms decide not
to offer a viable wholesale price to the reseller, i.e., the reseller does not supply any re-
tail consumers (Atiyas et al., 2015). Introducing margin squeeze regulation in the case
of wholesale competition renders foreclosure impossible, thus, the competitive equi-
librium remains as the unique predicted outcome in all presented timing models. In
conclusion and in line with previous theoretical analyses, prices under wholesale com-
petition are likely to be below prices in a wholesale monopoly and never exceed them
across all model variants.
8Hence, modelling the reseller as a follower in a Stackelberg retail setting may be viewed as an alternative
implementation of the a priori assumption made by Bourreau et al. (2011) which guarantees that the
integrated firms have no incentive to foreclose the reseller.
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7.3.2 Design
The experimental design is based on a continuous time framework in which partici-
pants can observe competitors’ price changes immediately and market variables are
updated in real time. Similar designs have recently been used in experimental eco-
nomics, e.g., in the context of a prisoner’s dilemma game (Bigoni et al., 2015a; Fried-
man and Oprea, 2012) as well as in a Hotelling setting (Kephart and Friedman, 2015b).
Next to its property to endogenize the timing of the game and thereby to reconcile dif-
ferent timings proposed in the theoretical literature, the continuous time framework is
chosen for the following reasons. First, continuous time is conjectured to promote the
emergence of a theoretical prediction in complex industry settings (Kephart and Fried-
man, 2015b; Kephart and Rose, 2015). Second, under both Cournot as well as Bertrand
competition, the extent of tacit collusion that emerges under continuous time and dis-
crete time is systematically compared in Chapter 3 and lower levels of tacit collusion
are found in continuous time for both competition models. Therefore, the continu-
ous time framework offers a more conservative experimental test of the robustness of
theory than a discrete time framework in the present context. Third, through the con-
tinuous feedback loop subjects can directly assess the interdependency between prices
in the wholesale and retail market, which aids them in evaluating the impact of their
decisions on their individual performance and on aggregate market outcomes.
The experiment is computerized using Brownie, a newly-developed experimental soft-
ware (Müller and Normann, 2014) based on the Java programming language. The
course of the experiment is separated in two phases: the trial phase and the game phase.
During the trial phase subjects are able to test various price configurations for all firms
in the industry and to observe the resulting payoffs, while these actions do not impact
the subjects’ earnings and are not visible to other participants, i.e., the subjects do not
interact with each other during the trial phase. The game phase, which starts after all
subjects confirm their initial prices in the trial phase, lasts for exactly 30 minutes. All
decisions in the game phase directly impact the monetary payoff of the subjects. Earn-
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ings are the cumulative profits over the time horizon of the experiment. Current profits
and cumulative earnings are displayed to subjects over the entire game phase.
As motivated above, the integrated firms, Firm A and Firm B, are represented by hu-
man subjects while the downstream reseller, Firm D, is represented by an automated
software agent. The agent is programmed to constantly choose its profit-maximizing
price given the wholesale and retail prices set by the integrated firms. Thereby, the
software agent reacts immediately to any price change made by one of the other firms.
In this setup, the experiment covers the following three modes of wholesale competi-
tion and two regulatory open access regimes in a full-factorial manner, thus ensuing six
treatments (see Table 7.2):
Wholesale monopoly (WM): Only Firm A sets a wholesale price and can change it at any
time. Firm B does not participate in the wholesale market.
Wholesale competition (WC): Firm A and Firm B set and can change wholesale prices at
any time.
Wholesale competition with price commitment (WCPC): Firm A and Firm B set wholesale
prices, however, each firm’s wholesale price is fixed for an embargo period of 30
seconds after it is changed, everything else being equal to WC.
No regulation (NR): Firms set wholesale and retail prices freely.
Margin squeeze regulation (MSR): Firm A and Firm B may set neither their wholesale
price above their own retail price nor their retail price below their own wholesale
price. If firms set wholesale (retail) prices that violate these conditions, the exper-
imental software displays a warning and sets the price to the allowed maximum
(minimum), which is the current own retail (wholesale) price.
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TABLE 7.2: Full-factorial treatment design.
No regulation Margin squeeze regulation
Wholesale monopoly WM-NR WM-MSR
Wholesale competition WC-NR WC-MSR
Wholesale competition with price commitment WCPC-NR WCPC-MSR
7.3.3 Procedures
The experimental sessions were conducted with students of economics fields at the
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in Karlsruhe, Germany. Student subjects were re-
cruited via the ORSEE platform (Greiner, 2015). Overall, 128 subjects participated in
the study and each participant played only one of the treatments (between-subject de-
sign). The average experimental session lasted 70 minutes. On average, subjects earned
a performance-based payment of EUR 16.80 in addition to a base fee of EUR 5.00. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to cohorts of two and interacted with the same firm
for the entire time horizon of the experiment (fixed partner matching). Consequently,
there are 64 independent observations at the cohort level, i.e., at the level of indepen-
dent cohorts of subjects, as denoted by Table 7.2. The current market data is recorded
every 500 ms, thus, there are 3,600 data tuples per market that include wholesale and
retail prices as well as the corresponding quantities and profits.
While the main analyses and results focus on the student sample, there is also a comple-
mentary validation study for the WCPC-NR treatment with 16 industry professionals
in an effort to address external validity concerns. The professionals were recruited from
the regulatory department of a major German telecommunications operator, where
they deal with issues of access regulation on a daily basis. The study was executed
under identical conditions as in student experiments with three exceptions. First, the
duration of the game phase is only ten minutes. Second, the payment scheme a lottery
system, where participants can win one of three vouchers with a monetary value of
EUR 30 each. The number of lottery tickets that participants receive depends on their
payoff in the experiment. By this means, monotonicity is ensured with regard to the re-
lationship between individual performance and payoffs. Third, each participant plays
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a second WCPC-NR treatment with a more differentiated retail market (γ = 50). The
sequence of the two treatments is randomized across three experimental sessions.
All experimental sessions with students as well as industry professionals were con-
ducted with the same experimental software and hardware in order to ensure consis-
tency, particularly with regard to the graphical user interface. Each session was run ac-
cording to the following protocol. Upon entering the laboratory, subjects are randomly
assigned to a seat, from which they can neither see nor speak to any other participant
of the experiment. Subsequently, the experimental instructions are handed to the par-
ticipants in print and read aloud from a recording.9 Paragraphs that are identical across
treatments are recorded once and the recording is used in all treatments. Prior to the
beginning of the experiment, each subject has to complete a computerized comprehen-
sion test that includes a set of questions regarding the experimental instructions and
the experimental procedure. Participants are allowed to proceed to the next question
only after entering the correct answer to the current one. After all subjects successfully
complete the test, the experiment starts automatically. In addition to this procedure,
student participants wore ear protectors from the beginning of the questionnaire un-
til the end of the game phase in order to avoid any influence from clicking noises of
computer mouses.
7.4 Results
In the following, market prices, firms’ profits, and consumer welfare are evaluated
across treatments for the main study with students and for the validation study with
industry professionals. The wholesale market price am is given by the wholesale price
that the entrant faces, i.e., the minimum of both wholesale offers. The retail market price
τm is defined as the transaction price, which is the demand-weighted average of retail
prices, i.e., τm =∑i
qi
Q · pi where Q is the aggregate market demand. Profits are given by
the amount of money that participants earn during the game phase, i.e., the final payoff
9See Appendix C.5 for exemplary instructions for the WCPC-MSR treatment.
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excluding the fixed base fee. The average profit of both integrated firms is denoted by
piAB and the profit of the downstream reseller by piD. Consumer surplus is computed as
the utility of a representative consumer given the supplied quantities of all three firms
subtracted by the transaction price, i.e., CS = ∑i qi − 32(1+γ) (∑i q2i + γ3 (∑i qi)2)−∑i qi pi
(see Bouckaert and Kort, 2014, for a detailed derivation). For ease of interpretation
consumer surplus is standardized as C˜S = CS−CSminCSmax−CSmin on the interval of eligible prices,
i.e., pi ∈ [0,100]. Thus, C˜S = 0 denotes the minimum consumer surplus at pi = 100,
while C˜S = 1 represents the maximum consumer surplus at pi = 0. For a focus on
market outcomes in a stable market environment and due to the complexity of the ex-
periment start- and endgame effects are neglected by considering only the market data
from recorded ticks 601 to 3,000 with 1 tick corresponding to 500 ms, i.e., the first five
and last five minutes are dropped for the subsequent analysis. For the same reasons,
the analysis is based on medians as this mitigates the impact of outliers in compar-
ison to averages and should therefore provide a more conservative analysis (see, e.g.,
Friedman and Oprea (2012) for an identical approach in a continuous time experiment).
Arguably, regulators and policy makers should be more interested in the median out-
come that can be expected from a single scenario than the average effect across multiple
co-existing scenarios.10
7.4.1 Main study
Table 7.3 presents the treatment medians of median values at the cohort level for market
prices, firms’ profits, and consumer surplus together with the number of independent
markets and the number of partially dependent observed time ticks for the main study
with students. In addition, Figure 7.2 depicts the period medians of wholesale and retail
market prices across individual markets for each of the six treatment combinations. For
purposes of illustration, every point in the graphs of Figure 7.2 is a median over 50
subsequent ticks.
10Nevertheless, a similar analysis based on means rather than on medians leads to comparable results as
reported in Tables D.5 and D.6 as well as Figure D.9 in Appendix D.5.
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FIGURE 7.2: Median wholesale (dashed) and retail (solid) market prices over time across treat-
ments.
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TABLE 7.3: Median market prices, profits, and consumer surplus across treatments.
Treatment N Tuples am τm piAB piD C˜S
WM-NR 12 28,800 73.573 65.499 16.383 0.899 0.292
WM-MSR 11 26,400 72.572 83.124 20.750 1.028 0.153
WC-NR 9 21,600 86.085 88.407 22.434 0.258 0.097
WC-MSR 10 24,000 83.082 92.281 22.802 2.339 0.062
WCPC-NR 10 24,000 40.540 49.560 12.243 2.491 0.461
WCPC-MSR 12 28,800 49.049 67.415 15.866 2.322 0.298
Total 64 153,600 72.071 76.159 18.093 1.672 0.213
Medians are based on minutes [5,25] of the game phase.
In order to evaluate treatment effects statistically, consider the following quantile re-
gression (Koenker and Hallock, 2001):
Yk,t = β0
+ βWC ·WC
+ βWCPC ·WCPC
+ βMSR ·MSR
+ βWC x MSR ·WC ·MSR
+ βWCPC x MSR ·WCPC ·MSR
+ βPeriod · t
+ ek,t,
where Yk,t denotes the respective market variable Y ∈ {am,τm,piAB,piD, C˜S} in cohort k
and period t. Treatment WM-NR is adopted as the baseline.11 WC, WCPC, and MSR
are dummy variables indicating the respective mode of wholesale market structure and
open access regulation. Interactions WC x MSR and WCPC x MSR delineate the effects
of margin squeeze regulation under a specific mode of wholesale competition. Stan-
dard errors are clustered on cohort level to control for intra-cluster correlation over re-
peated observations from periods in the same cohort (Parente and Santos Silva, 2015).
The estimates of the respective models for market variables of interest, i.e., wholesale
market price am, retail market price τm, integrated firms’ average profit piAB, reseller’s
11Pairwise comparisons between treatments by means of quantile regressions are reported in Tables D.7,
D.8, D.9, D.10, and D.11 in Appendix D.5.
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TABLE 7.4: Quantile regressions of market variables on industry structures.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariate am τm piAB piD C˜S
WC 23.879∗∗ 18.376∗ 4.839∗∗∗ −0.813 −0.162∗∗
(10.073) (9.738) (1.830) (0.815) (0.080)
WCPC −28.154∗∗∗ −19.763∗∗ −5.459∗∗∗ 1.130 0.212∗∗∗
(8.851) (9.130) (1.729) (0.861) (0.077)
MSR 9.401 9.721 2.358 0.173 −0.081
(10.812) (9.927) (1.827) (0.798) (0.078)
WC x MSR −24.309∗ −7.156 −2.562 1.924∗∗ 0.060
(13.731) (12.170) (2.403) (0.926) (0.100)
WCPC x MSR −1.928 7.250 1.759 0.019 −0.088
(17.188) (12.692) (2.774) (0.930) (0.116)
Period 0.004 0.004∗∗ 0.001∗ > −0.001 > −0.001∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 62.893∗∗∗ 62.972∗∗∗ 16.251∗∗∗ 1.324∗ 0.319∗∗∗
(9.764) (9.148) (1.931) (0.769) (0.080)
Observations 153,600 153,600 153,600 153,600 153,600
Clustered standard errors (by cohort) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
profit piD, and consumer surplus C˜S, are reported in Table 7.4 and interpreted in the
following.
In the benchmark case WM-NR the wholesale monopolist sets a positive wholesale
price as is indicated by the estimated constant in Model (1), which is similar in mag-
nitude to the retail market price as reported in Model (2). This is in line with the
observation that margin squeezes occur frequently, such that the non-integrated firm
is effectively foreclosed, i.e., the wholesale market price is set above the retail prices of
both integrated firms.12 The median rate of foreclosure at the individual cohort level
amounts to 49.52% in this scenario. Still, the profit of Firm D is found to be significantly
different from zero, as indicated by the positive constant in Model (4). In other words,
even in the case of an unregulated wholesale monopoly, the downstream reseller can
profitably participate in the retail market. Due to its access monopoly, Firm A achieves
a significantly (p < 0.01) higher median profit (piA = 19.031) than its integrated com-
12Note that the non-integrated firm may still be marginally active in the retail market, since goods are
differentiated.
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petitor (piB = 14.294).13 Note that all of these results are in line with the theoretical
prediction.
RESULT 7.1. The introduction of wholesale competition reduces neither wholesale prices nor
retail prices. In fact, under homogeneous Bertrand competition at the wholesale level consumers
as well as the downstream reseller are worse off compared to the case of an unregulated wholesale
monopoly.
Surprisingly, relative to an unregulated wholesale monopoly, the introduction of ho-
mogeneous Bertrand competition at the wholesale level increases both wholesale and
retail market prices significantly. While under WC-NR the wholesale market price rises
by 24 percentage points (pp), consumers face an 18 pp higher retail market price in
comparison to WM-NR. Although it is well-known that Bertrand competition yields
supra-competitive prices, it is notable that under WC-NR prices are set even signifi-
cantly above price levels of WM-NR. In consequence, the ability to tacitly collude in
the wholesale market allows the integrated firms to extract higher profits than in the
monopoly treatment as indicated in Model (3). While the effect on the reseller’s profit
is negative but insignificant, the median rate of foreclosure is 62.46%, and thus higher
than under WM-NR.
RESULT 7.2. Competition in the wholesale market can be stimulated by introducing competi-
tion for the market through a price commitment. Then, wholesale and retail prices are lower
than under a wholesale monopoly, but remain above the theoretical prediction.
Remarkably, the collusive effect of wholesale competition is set off by a simple whole-
sale price commitment for integrated firms. In particular, under WCPC-NR the whole-
sale market price decreases significantly by 28 pp (52 pp) relative to WM-NR (WC-NR),
while the transaction price in the retail market is lowered significantly by almost 20 pp
(38 pp). As a result, consumers’ surplus increases significantly by 21 pp compared to
13See Table D.12 in Appendix D.5 for estimates of the quantile regression model pik,i,t = β0 + βFirm A ·
Firm A + βPeriod · t + ek,i,t which investigates the effect of the access provider role on Firm A’s profit
compared to Firm B’s profit.
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WM-NR as indicated by Model (5). In line with declining market prices, the integrated
firms’ profits decrease significantly as well. Despite lower wholesale prices, the margin
between wholesale and retail prices remains relatively slim due to the increasing price
competition at the retail level as is depicted by the lower left panel in Figure 7.2. In con-
sequence, the median rate of foreclosure amounts to 29.10%. The effect on the reseller’s
profit is found to be insignificant, although positive in absolute terms. Evidently, the
estimated wholesale access price of 62.893− 28.154 = 34.739 under WCPC-NR remains
well above the theoretical prediction of am = 0.
RESULT 7.3. There is no evidence that margin squeeze regulation reduces retail prices, and thus
consumers do not benefit from such a regulation. However, the introduction of a margin squeeze
regulation may reduce wholesale prices, and thus the downstream reseller may be better off.
As reported above, margin squeezes are frequently observed under all market struc-
tures at the wholesale level. Since the primary justification for margin squeeze regula-
tion is the prevention of exclusionary and exploitative abuses (Jullien et al., 2014), its
impact on prices and market outcomes is examined in the following. The regression
analyses reported in Table 7.4 reveal that margin squeeze regulation generally does not
have a significant impact on market outcomes, but rather tends to increase wholesale
and retail prices. In fact, the only reduction in wholesale prices evoked by margin
squeeze regulation is found in the case of a particularly collusive wholesale market as
under unregulated wholesale competition. More specific, the wholesale price under
WC-MSR is significantly lower than under WC-NR, which is indicated visually by the
middle panels in Figure 7.2 and supported empirically by the significant interaction ef-
fect WC x MSR. Although this effect is paralleled by an increase in the reseller’s profit,
margin squeeze regulation translates neither into significantly lower retail prices nor
into significantly higher consumer surplus. Taken together, the empirical results do not
provide any evidence that consumers or the reseller generally benefit from a margin
squeeze regulation.
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TABLE 7.5: Quantile regressions of market variables on margin squeeze regulation under
wholesale monopoly.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariate am τm piAB piD C˜S
MSR 8.286 9.928 2.661 0.165 −0.083
(15.569) (8.354) (1.786) (0.784) (0.083)
Period 0.006 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ > −0.001 > −0.001∗
(0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 60.290∗∗∗ 59.911∗∗∗ 15.112∗∗∗ 1.287∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(11.192) (7.423) (1.991) (0.703) (0.096)
Observations 55,200 55,200 55,200 55,200 55,200
Clustered standard errors (by cohort) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In an effort to further investigate the impact of the margin squeeze regulation and to
delineate effects on stakeholders under different wholesale competition models, con-
sider additionally the following (reduced) quantile regression model for each of the
wholesale market structures separately to allow for a pairwise comparison:
Yk,t = β0 + βMSR ·MSR + βPeriod · t + ek,t.
This analysis is of particular interest whenever policymakers are able to prescribe rules
that govern the competition at the wholesale level but may find themselves unable
to change the market structure completely. In these cases the margin squeeze condi-
tion may be considered as an ex ante regulatory remedy or as an ex post competition
policy instrument. The effect of margin squeeze regulation is therefore examined un-
der all three considered wholesale market structures. First, in the case of a wholesale
monopoly (Table 7.5), margin squeeze regulation has a positive yet insignificant ef-
fect for all price and profit variables, while the corresponding coefficient for consumer
surplus is negative and insignificant. In line with the theoretical prediction, margin
squeeze regulation therefore does not seem to represent a suitable safeguard for effec-
tive competition nor a beneficiary instrument for consumers in the case of a wholesale
monopoly when an integrated competitor is present.
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TABLE 7.6: Quantile regressions of market variables on margin squeeze regulation under
wholesale competition without price commitment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariate am τm piAB piD C˜S
MSR −14.632∗ 3.909 −0.149 2.051∗∗∗ −0.036
(8.254) (3.528) (1.034) (0.520) (0.030)
Period 0.005 < 0.001 < 0.001 > −0.001 > −0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 85.979∗∗∗ 88.125∗∗∗ 22.068∗∗∗ 0.650 0.105∗∗
(15.948) (5.347) (1.638) (0.869) (0.045)
Observations 45,600 45,600 45,600 45,600 45,600
Clustered standard errors (by cohort) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
TABLE 7.7: Quantile regressions of market variables on margin squeeze regulation under
wholesale competition with price commitment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariate am τm piAB piD C˜S
MSR 7.983 17.081∗∗ 4.157∗ 0.188 −0.165∗∗
(10.883) (8.071) (2.251) (0.474) (0.080)
Period 0.003 0.006∗ 0.001 > −0.001 > −0.001∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 37.475∗∗∗ 39.162∗∗∗ 10.374∗∗∗ 2.335∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗
(8.131) (5.664) (1.921) (0.609) (0.058)
Observations 52,800 52,800 52,800 52,800 52,800
Clustered standard errors (by cohort) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Second, in the case of wholesale competition (Table 7.6), margin squeeze regulation in-
stead significantly reduces the wholesale market price, which resembles the net effect
of the general margin squeeze impact, MSR, and the interaction effect WC x MSR re-
ported in Table 7.4. The pairwise comparison likewise confirms the positive and signif-
icant impact on the reseller’s profit compared to the unregulated regime. Again, there
is no significant negative impact on the retail market price. Accordingly, the effect on
consumer welfare is also insignificant. Therefore, it is concluded that the decline of the
wholesale market price that results from margin squeeze regulation allows the reseller
to increase its profitability, but retail prices do not decrease proportionately and hence,
consumers are not better off.
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Third, in the case of wholesale competition with price commitment, a positive and sig-
nificant effect on the retail market price (Table 7.7) advises further skepticism with re-
gard to margin squeeze regulation and its impact on consumers. The magnitude of the
relative price increase is estimated as 17 pp. The price increase benefits the integrated
firms by means of significantly higher profits, while the effect on the downstream re-
seller’s profit is insignificant. In sum, a margin squeeze regulation is clearly detrimental
to consumers’ interest in this scenario as consumer surplus decreases significantly by
almost 17 pp and may therefore even offset the gains from wholesale competition. For
completeness, a summary of all other pairwise comparisons between the treatments by
means of quantile regressions is arranged in Appendix D.5.
7.4.2 Validation study
Figure 7.3 illustrates the median wholesale and retail prices under WCPC-NR both for
the students treatment (left-hand panel) and for the industry professionals treatment
(right-hand panel). Again, medians over 50 subsequent ticks are plotted for purposes
of illustration. While wholesale market prices of professionals are lower according to
the median value over all periods (aStudentsm = 43.043, a
Pro f essionals
m = 29.029), retail market
prices are almost identical (τStudentsm = 50.326, τ
Pro f essionals
m = 50.613). Note that for both
subject pools wholesale prices are bounded away from zero which is the theoretical
prediction.
Consider first market outcomes between industry professionals and students over the
entire time horizon. In particular, the null hypothesis is that the median market prices
in the students sample and the median market prices in the professionals sample are
from populations with the same distribution. According to two-tailed non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U tests there is no significant difference in wholesale market prices (z =
1.42, p = 0.155) nor in retail market prices (z = 0.71, p = 0.477). Also with respect to
overall medians, i.e., the median of market medians, Fisher’s exact test does not reject
the equality of median market prices at the wholesale level (p = 0.637) or the retail level
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FIGURE 7.3: Median wholesale (dashed) and retail (solid) market prices over time of students
and industry professionals.
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(p = 1.0). Finally, the same result is obtained by a quantile regression that investigates
the differences of the subject pools while controlling for the time trend and intra-cluster
correlation, i.e.,
Yk,t = β0 + βPro f essionals · Pro f essionals + βPeriod · t + ek,t.
In order to obtain a comparable data basis with an equivalent number of periods for
the industry professionals and students treatments, the measures of the students treat-
ments are averaged over three subsequent 500 ms intervals. As shown in Table 7.8, the
effect of the industry professionals subject pool is insignificant for all market variables
except the reseller’s profit. The higher profit of the entrant can be attributed to a larger
spread between wholesale and retail prices in a subset of individual markets in the pro-
fessionals treatment, which is also indicated by the negative coefficient for the median
wholesale market price.
Naturally, general and conclusive evidence cannot be derived based on findings of sta-
tistical insignificance. However, in addition to the finding of statistical indifference,
descriptive measures as portrayed in Figure 7.3 show quantitatively similar and quali-
tatively equal behavior for both subject pools.
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TABLE 7.8: Quantile regressions of market variables on subject type under wholesale competi-
tion with price commitment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariate am τm piAB piD C˜S
Professionals −14.465 1.170 −0.613 1.839∗∗∗ 0.003
(10.259) (10.908) (2.923) (0.600) (0.126)
Period 0.001 0.003 0.001 < 0.001 > −0.001
(0.011) (0.008) (0.002) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 42.297∗∗∗ 48.270∗∗∗ 11.974∗∗∗ 2.043∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗
(9.791) (6.920) (2.179) (0.427) (0.078)
Observations 21,618 21,618 21,618 21,618 21,618
Clustered standard errors (by cohort) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
7.5 Infinitely repeated game
In an effort to relate the empirical findings of the experiment to the four timing mod-
els introduced in Section 7.3, their theoretical predictions are considered in a repeated
game context. Thereby, a comparison to observed experimental results may reveal
which of the timing models best captures the idiosyncrasies of endogenous timing un-
der the continuous time framework. Considering the benchmark scenario of an un-
regulated wholesale monopoly, observed wholesale prices suggest that the wholesale
provider does generally not foreclose the downstream reseller, but rather charges the
monopolistic wholesale price. Moreover, there is no evidence that margin squeeze reg-
ulation reduces wholesale prices in the monopoly scenario. Both observations are in
line with predictions by Timing Models (2) and (4) and contradict predictions by Tim-
ing Models (1) and (3). This may be considered as support for the experimental design
since it is in line with the intention to model the non-integrated reseller as a compet-
itive fringe, whose reaction is immediate, but subsequent and anticipated by the in-
tegrated firms. Furthermore, median prices for all wholesale competition treatments
are significantly above the competitive outcome, which is an equilibrium in all tim-
ing models. More specific, the significant increase in wholesale and retail prices from
wholesale monopoly to wholesale competition contradicts the consensus prediction.
Whereas wholesale prices close to amax = 100 may be interpreted as an indication for
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the foreclosure outcome, which is predicted by Timing Models (1) and (3), observed re-
tail prices close to pmax = 100 are predicted for the JPM outcome and for the foreclosure
outcome. This suggests the presence of substantial tacit collusion among integrated
firms in the wholesale competition scenario.
Although experiments in continuous time are thus far primarily used to consider static
one-shot games (Friedman and Oprea, 2012; Bigoni et al., 2015a; Kephart and Friedman,
2015b), continuous time may also be interpreted as an infinite repetition of a one-shot
game as described by the timing models. In this context, the incentives to tacitly col-
lude in the upstream market can be compared in the spirit of Nocke and White (2007)
and Normann (2009) with respect to the critical discount factor that is required to sus-
tain collusive outcomes. Assuming a grim trigger strategy, deviations from JPM prices
amax and pmax are punished by infinite play of the competitive Nash equilibrium (cf.
Nocke and White, 2007). Individual discount factors that support collusive behavior
are computed by δi =
piDeviatei −pi JPMi
piDeviate−piPunishi
for i ∈ {A, B}, where pi JPMi is firm i’s share of the
JPM profit, piDeviatei is the maximum deviation profit that firm i can achieve by unilateral
deviation, and piPunishi is firm i’s profit in periods after deviation (cf. Normann, 2009).
The minimum critical discount factor is then given by δ = max{δA,δB}. Although ex-
periments in continuous time are thus far primarily used to consider static one-shot
games (Friedman and Oprea, 2012; Bigoni et al., 2015a; Kephart and Friedman, 2015b),
continuous time may also be interpreted as an infinite repetition of a one-shot game
as described by the timing models. In this context, the incentives to tacitly collude
in the upstream market can be compared in the spirit of Nocke and White (2007) and
Normann (2009) with respect to the critical discount factor that is required to sustain
collusive outcomes. Assuming a grim trigger strategy, deviations from JPM prices amax
and pmax are punished by infinite play of the competitive Nash equilibrium (cf. Nocke
and White, 2007). Individual discount factors that support collusive behavior are com-
puted by δi =
piDeviatei −pi JPMi
piDeviate−piPunishi
for i ∈ {A, B}, where pi JPMi is firm i’s share of the JPM profit,
piDeviatei is the maximum deviation profit that firm i can achieve by unilateral devia-
tion, and piPunishi is firm i’s profit in periods after deviation (cf. Normann, 2009). The
minimum critical discount factor is then given by δ = max{δA,δB}.
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TABLE 7.9: Critical discount factors under wholesale monopoly.
Firm A Firm B
Timing Model pi JPMA pi
Deviate
A pi
Punish
A δA pi
JPM
B pi
Deviate
B pi
Punish
B δB
(1) 34.00 35.02 15.04 0.05 17.00 25.40 15.04 0.81
(2) 34.00 35.02 15.61 0.05 17.00 25.40 14.05 0.74
(3) 34.00 35.02 15.04 0.05 17.00 25.40 15.04 0.81
(4) 34.00 35.02 15.07 0.05 17.00 25.40 11.86 0.62
TABLE 7.10: Critical discount factors under wholesale competition.
Firm A Firm B
Timing Model pi JPMA pi
Deviate
A pi
Punish
A δA pi
JPM
B pi
Deviate
B pi
Punish
B δB
(1), (2), (3), (4) 25.50 30.21 5.79 0.19 25.50 30.21 5.79 0.19
Following this approach, the minimum critical discount factors can be computed for
wholesale monopoly and competition. Table 7.9 denotes the respective profits and dis-
count factors for both integrated firms in case of a wholesale monopoly for each timing
model. Likewise, Table 7.10 states profits and discount factors under wholesale compe-
tition. Here, critical discount factors are identical across all timing models, because in
each model punishment is exercised through the competitive equilibrium. Moreover,
integrated firms’ critical discount factors under wholesale competition are symmetric
because collusive and deviation profits are calculated as expected values, i.e., firms ex-
pect to be the access provider with probability one half.14
Pairwise comparisons of minimum critical discount factors under wholesale monopoly
and competition show that collusion is sustainable for a larger range of discount fac-
tors under wholesale competition, independent of the assumed timing of the one-shot
game. More specifically, Firm B has a stronger incentive to deviate in the case of a
wholesale monopoly, because foregone profits in the case of punishment are relatively
low compared to its JPM profit share. In contrast, in the case of wholesale competi-
tion, expected JPM profits are higher, while profits in the case of punishment are lower,
thus making a deviation less attractive. Therefore, tacit collusion is less likely in the
14Alternatively, one may assume that firms gain the entire wholesale profit if they deviate. Irrespective,
the ensuing minimum critical discount factor δ = 0.43 is still lower than the ones reported in Table 7.9.
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wholesale monopoly setting than in the wholesale duopoly setting. This may provide
a theoretical rationale for Result 7.1.
However, notice that this does not provide a rationale for Result 7.2, because the same
theoretical analysis applies to the case of wholesale competition with price commit-
ment. To see this, consider price commitment to induce sequential-move rather than
simultaneous-move interaction between the integrated firms regarding the wholesale
price.15 Evidently, this does not apply to the wholesale monopoly scenario and it is easy
to see that this would also not change the equilibrium in the wholesale competition sce-
nario: As each of the integrated firms has an incentive to be the access provider, the first
mover will anticipate to be undercut by the second mover and thus set the minimum
feasible access price, just like when access prices are determined simultaneously. Con-
sequently, the alternative timing would result in the same critical discount factors and
therefore the same prediction with respect to the incentives for tacit collusion. From
a more behavioral perspective, one could argue that the price commitment limits the
extent to which one of the integrated firms can immediately retaliate the other (in the
sense of the grim trigger strategy), which therefore makes the punishment less severe,
and ultimately tacit collusion less likely. However, in an infinitely repeated game this
lack of punishment in a short (finite) period does not matter.16 But from a behavioral
perspective it may. After all the price commitment is able to secure the second-mover
a guaranteed wholesale profit for a (short) period of time and as such, it may stimu-
late a notion of competition for the market that—in line with Result 7.2—amplifies the
competitive process.
15Note that this timing makes sense only in Timing Models (1) and (2), because it is the very nature of
Timing Models (3) and (4) that integrated firms’ decisions are made simultaneously in the upstream
and downstream markets.
16Obviously, it would matter in a finitely repeated game. However, note that in this case the only
subgame-perfect equilibrium would also be to play the (unique) equilibrium of the one-shot game in
each period. That is, for the case of wholesale competition, and irrespective of a price commitment, the
competitive outcome would be played. Consequently this model variant does not provide a theoretical
rationale for Result 7.2 either.
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7.6 Discussion
Although the regulation of access to an essential upstream resource is a perennial issue
for policymakers and industry stakeholders, the competitive supply of the bottleneck
resource by vertically integrated firms is investigated only recently in the theoretical
economic literature. By means of an economic laboratory experiment this study scruti-
nizes these theoretical analyses, particularly with respect to the effectiveness of whole-
sale competition in the relevant case when there are only two access providers. The re-
sults indicate that wholesale duopoly markets may be severely affected by high levels of
tacit collusion. In particular, this is found to be the case under homogeneous Bertrand
competition at the wholesale level, which is frequently assumed in the theoretical in-
vestigations (e.g., Bourreau et al., 2011, 2015). In this vein and in the spirit of a more
behaviorally oriented regulation (Normann and Ricciuti, 2009), this experimental analysis
serves as a regulatory testbed, which points at possible behavioral issues that may arise
in practice. After all, in light of the tremendous impact that regulatory decisions have
on the respective industry and—especially in the case of network industries—also on
other industries, policymakers should be particularly mindful when theoretical predic-
tions are not confirmed in the laboratory.
However, the study has shown that regulatory experiments cannot only provide a
means to test the robustness of theory, but are also able to identify possible behavioral
regulatory rules that enable policymakers to improve market outcomes. In the present
context, a simple price commitment rule significantly improves market outcomes, al-
though the competitive intensity in the wholesale market remains below the theoretical
prediction.
Furthermore, in reference to the theoretical analyses by Petulowa and Saavedra (2014)
and Jullien et al. (2014), the experimental results give a clear indication regarding the
theoretically ambiguous effect of margin squeeze regulation on retail prices in the pres-
ence of wholesale competition by vertically integrated firms. More specifically, the ex-
perimental evidence supports the rationale that the ban of a margin squeeze can impede
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the intensity of competition in the retail market. Moreover, the experiment points to a
particular problem of applying the margin squeeze rule to an environment of multiple
firms operating in the wholesale and retail market: When tacit collusion in the whole-
sale market is stable and leads to prices above the Nash equilibrium, retail pricing is
constrained correspondingly. Especially the integrated firm, which naturally has an
incentive to be more aggressive in the retail market because it is not affected by the
softening effect, may be restricted in setting lower retail prices as long as it decides not
to undercut prices in the wholesale market. Although the margin squeeze rule, as an
implicit open access rule, ensures non-discrimination between competitors, the premise
to treat all market participants equally is not aligned with the diverse incentives that
occur in the case of simultaneous retail and wholesale competition, e.g., due to the
consideration of opportunity costs by the access provider. Thus, non-discrimination of
competitors may not always be in the best interest of the consumer.17
With respect to the limitations of the experimental study, note that firms’ investment
incentives under the various market scenarios are not considered and thus, experimen-
tal insights are constrained to short-term issues of static efficiency. However, in many
industries, particularly in network industries such as telecommunications, dynamic ef-
ficiency is considered to be at least equally important by policymakers. Nevertheless,
the findings may still be informative in this context, as there is generally an inherent
trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency (Briglauer et al., 2015; Cambini and
Jiang, 2009; Krämer and Vogelsang, 2014) with some notable exceptions (Klumpp and
Su, 2010). That is, dynamic investment incentives are to a large extent influenced by the
expectations about the future (static) benefits that arise from a given market structure
(especially the market shares of competitors, see Klumpp and Su, 2015), the obtained
results may inform further research regarding the effects that arise under infrastructure-
based competition with multiple wholesale providers. In this context, the experimental
results also cast doubt on the premise that infrastructure-based competition should be
the undisputed regulatory goal (Cave and Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006), particularly
17Note that an additional well-known negative effect of non-discrimination on competition is articulated
by the theory of restoring monopoly power (Rey and Tirole, 2007), where non-discrimination allows the
upstream firm to resolve its commitment problem.
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when open access for independent resellers is required at the same time (e.g., as indi-
cated by the European Commission’s (2014a) digital agenda). This is in line with em-
pirical findings by Höffler (2007) which suggest that infrastructure duplication costs
may be higher than the gains from (supposedly) intensified competition. More general
with respect to economic experimentation, a second concern arises with respect to the
external validity of findings, although the validation study with industry profession-
als corroborates the robustness of the obtained student subject pool results. Naturally,
experimental results do not directly carry over to actual markets, however, at the same
time, one should also be cautious to believe that theoretical predictions will hold in
practice when they already fail in a laboratory environment. Furthermore, note that
the results are based on the relative differences between treatments and should thus
not be affected by factors that are held constant across treatments. Nevertheless, an
empirical field study of access in context of infrastructure competition would certainly
represent a highly valuable contribution complementing theoretical and experimental
work.
Finally, this study also inspires future experimental work. First, rules and remedies
that may intensify competition at the wholesale level may be investigated in further
depth. While this study considers two alternative modes of wholesale competition
which yield market outcomes below and above the wholesale monopoly treatment, the
investigation of the underlying competitive process and further investigation of instru-
ments that may intensify competition at the wholesale level appear promising. Second,
the presented analysis may be extended by a variation of the number of competitors
and resellers as well as the introduction of asymmetry between the integrated firms.
With regard to the competition across different access levels and quality layers—as in
Internet and telecommunications markets—such an extension could provide valuable
insight for decision makers and regulators within these fast-moving industries.
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Conclusion
THE aim of this thesis is to provide theoretical and empirical evidence to re-searchers, regulators, and practitioners regarding the propensities to tacit col-
lusion of market structures in and experimental designs for oligopolies and regulated
industries. To this end, each of the preceding chapters of this thesis addresses one of
the research questions formulated in Chapter 1. More specific, by means of qualitative
analysis, theoretical modeling, and experimental investigation, findings are derived
that are summarized and put into context in the following. Beyond a mere synopsis
of results, Section 8.1 relates the findings to implications for regulatory policy, manage-
ment strategies, and the theory of economic experimentation. Section 8.2 completes this
thesis with a critical appraisal of the research designs, procedures, and results of the re-
ported studies and finally derives propositions for future research on anti-competitive
behavior in oligopolies and regulated industries.
8.1 Summary and implications
The main research questions posed in Chapter 1 fall into two categories: Whereas Re-
search Questions 1, 2, and 3 consider whether and how generic features of oligopolistic
markets facilitate tacit collusion and are therefore primarily addressed at regulators,
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Research Questions 4 and 5 are aimed at advances in and promotion of the methodol-
ogy of economic experimentation in the laboratory and are thus directed towards re-
searchers and regulators. In the following, the summary and implications of obtained
results are organized by the corresponding research question.
Underlying Research Question 1 regarding the necessary number of firms in an indus-
try to safeguard competition is the general agreement on the fact that the competitive-
ness of an industry increases with the number of competitors. However, as reported in
Chapter 4, a meta-analysis of ten oligopoly experiments and two experimental studies
of oligopoly competition, in which the number of symmetric or asymmetric firms as
well as the mode of competition are systematically varied, contradict this hypothesis.
More specific, contrary to prominent belief, the competitiveness of an industry does
not strictly increase with the number of competitors. In fact, triopolies are not found
to be less competitive than quadropolies relative to Nash equilibrium. Further, results
from all three studies indicate that whether Bertrand competition colludes more than
Cournot competition depends on the competitive benchmark. Whereas price competi-
tion is more prone to tacit collusion than quantity competition if tacit collusion is mea-
sured according to a deviation from Nash equilibrium, the opposite holds relative to
Walrasian equilibrium. Evidently, these results bear important implications for merger
control and ex ante regulation of markets in which the number of potential competi-
tors is limited. First, in contrast to the prominent notion that “two are few and four
are many” (Huck et al., 2004b, p. 435) based on previous experimental investigation,
the meta-analysis and the two specifically designed experiments indicate that instead
it may hold that two are few and three are many. This may be viewed as support for the
EC’s recent consent to four-to-three mergers in mobile telecommunications markets.
Second, however, regulators should scrutinize which theoretical benchmark to regard
as effective competition. If instead of Nash equilibrium the Walrasian equilibrium is
considered to be the appropriate benchmark, e.g., as consumer surplus is maximized
in this case, the two specifically designed experiments, which have identical Walrasian
but differing Nash predictions indicate that quadropolies collude less than triopolies.
Third, in their competitiveness assessment of markets, authorities should also take into
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account the experimental finding that asymmetry between firms fosters competition as
this may change the perspective on an absolute evaluation of tacit collusion.
The extant evidence regarding Research Question 2 suggests no difference in terms of
tacit collusion between multimarket contact across geographic or product markets and
single market contact in case of profit-maximizing symmetric firms meeting in identical
markets. Albeit several empirical studies show that multimarket contact, or likewise,
organizational centralization, facilitates tacit collusion, “most researchers assume that
mutual forbearance requires asymmetric markets, rivals, and competitive positions”
(Yu and Cannella, 2013, p. 77). Also theoretical models require either asymmetry of
firms, markets or information, or non-linearity in objective functions to rationalize that
multimarket contact or single market contact facilitate tacit collusion more than the
other. In Chapter 6 a novel, behavioral explanation is offered based on the experi-
mental finding in Chapter 5 that price discrimination across two identical geographic
markets in a duopoly of conglomerate firms facilitates tacit collusion more than if firms
are subject to a uniform pricing constraint which obliges each of them to commit to a
single price in all markets. This theory holds even when previous explanations fail.
In particular, a price signaling strategy is suggested that provides a microfoundation
for the process leading to tacit collusion and explains under which circumstances mul-
timarket contact facilitates tacit collusion more than single market contact. The the-
ory rests on the assumptions that firms can communicate collusive intentions solely
through their price setting behavior and that such price signaling can be conducted more
efficiently under multimarket contact. These assumptions are verified by means of an
economic laboratory experiment, which also shows that the price signaling strategy
predicts market outcomes accurately. These results bear not only important insights for
strategic management but also for competition policy. On the one hand, organizational
centralization of conglomerate firms meeting the same rivals in multiple markets may
effectively facilitate tacit collusion. On the other hand, this is why multimarket contact
between conglomerate firms should be subject to scrutiny by competition authorities.
Both theory and experiment indicate that limiting firms’ possibilities to engage in price
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signaling, e.g., by a uniform pricing constraint across geographic markets, can effec-
tively mitigate the emergence of tacit collusion.
Complementary to the investigations regarding the number of firms in a single market
and competition across multiple horizontally connected markets, Research Question 3
is concerned with antitrust and regulatory issues in a vertical context of an upstream
market and a downstream market along the same value chain. In fact, in several in-
dustries effective retail competition downstream is only feasible if wholesale access is
provided to an essential input resource upstream. More specific, Chapter 7 consid-
ers the case where wholesale access for a non-integrated reseller is provided compet-
itively by two vertically integrated firms, who also compete with the reseller in the
retail market—a scenario that is akin to several industries with vertically related mar-
kets such as network industries with infrastructure duplication, e.g., European fixed
telecommunications markets. In an economic laboratory experiment with two subject
pools, students and telecommunications industry professionals, market outcomes are
compared in a full-factorial design of different modes of competition at the wholesale
level and regulation of upstream prices. In particular, above and beyond the theoretical
literature, the behavioral analysis reveals that under homogeneous Bertrand competi-
tion at the wholesale level, access and retail prices are likely to be higher in the duopoly
case in which both integrated firms offer the upstream good than in the monopoly case
of a single access provider. However, a simple price commitment rule that obligates
the integrated firms to commit to an upstream price for a specified amount of time can
stimulate competition at the wholesale level, such that prices drop below the monopoly
level. Irrespective of the mode of wholesale competition, there is no evidence that a
margin squeeze regulation—which conditions each firm’s upstream price to be lower
or equal to its downstream price—reduces retail market prices. In fact, although mar-
gin squeeze regulation may benefit the reseller, it tends to increase retail prices and
thus reduce consumer surplus. The regulatory implications of these findings are two-
fold. First, contrary to intuition, competition at an upstream market can be detrimental
for both downstream resellers and consumers compared to an upstream monopoly. In
other words and relating to the industry structure considered here, in a case of multiple
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integrated firms (e.g., an incumbent and a cable operator in a fixed telecommunications
market) it may be beneficial for resellers and consumers that only one firm (e.g., the
incumbent) provides access while the other (e.g., the cable operator) does not. Note,
however, that in the experiment there is no price regulation of access. Second, in case
of wholesale competition, instead of margin squeeze regulation, which has no effect
on competitiveness, regulators should consider more behaviorally oriented regulation
such as a price commitment rule that successfully hinders tacit collusion and drives
prices down below monopolistic levels.
Research Question 4 is addressed in Chapter 2 by means of a comprehensive review of
extant experiments investigating regulation in the lab. Thereby, a classification of experi-
ments emerges according to the key target of experiments, i.e., whether an experiment
aims for a maximum of external validity or internal validity of its findings. Whereas
in the former category most experiments are concerned with regulation in a specific
industry and therefore design a complex experimental environment that closely resem-
bles the specifics and regularities of that industry, experiments in the latter category
consider a specific regulatory instrument in a generic market context and thus create
a simple experimental design which encompasses a minimum of parameters. A quali-
tative analysis of a total of around 80 economic laboratory experiments along the four
variables (i) policy problem, (ii) experimental design, (iii) experimental results, and (iv)
policy implications results in 10 observations which may serve as guidelines with re-
spect to the design and procedures of a regulation in the lab experiment. The chapter
closes with an analysis of the experimental methodology’s potential in advising reg-
ulators and policy makers. The following contributions and implications ensue from
this qualitative research. First, it provides researchers with a consistent and holistic
overview of experimental research on economic regulatory institutions and at the same
time is a work of reference that offers regulators a summary of experimental insights in
this regard. Second, the observations made from extant experiments provide the basis
for a theory of regulation in the lab that aids researchers in conducting experiments on
regulatory policy and promotes the methodology. Third, the review as well as the sub-
sequent analysis of potential highlight that experiments can corroborate or undermine
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theoretical predictions and thus add complementary insights to regulatory policy and
also other fields of public policy that should be scrutinized by policy makers.
In response to Research Question 5 regarding a specific element of experimental de-
signs, Chapter 3 first classifies on modes of timing in experiments—namely discrete
time, near-continuous time, continuous time, and a clock/deadline mechanism—and
second reports on the very first oligopoly competition experiment with differentiated
goods in discrete and continuous time. Continuous time experiments allow for real-
time, asynchronous strategic interaction and are therefore argued to be a more real-
istic mode of interaction, particularly in the context of (electronic) markets. The ex-
periment considers duopolies and triopolies both under Bertrand as well as Cournot
competition and consistently finds that, ceteris paribus, tacit collusion is higher un-
der discrete time than under continuous time, which contrasts the theoretical predic-
tion. Thus, the results bear important methodological implications for research on
oligopoly competition. First, researchers designing an oligopoly competition experi-
ment can draw on these findings and make an informed decision about the mode of
timing used to resemble the underlying repeated game. Second, previous experimental
findings regarding oligopoly competition—which are exclusively drawn from a dis-
crete time environment—may overestimate the extent of tacit collusion compared to
the real-world scenario, which is argued to be resembled more closely by continuous
time.
8.2 Limitations and outlook
This thesis has several limitations in its scope and methodologies which point to possi-
ble avenues for future theoretical, experimental, and empirical work on ex ante and ex
post regulation of imperfectly competitive markets such as oligopolies. More general,
the findings reported in this thesis motivate further experimental research on issues of
economic and social regulation in an effort to provide valuable insights for regulatory
policy and help policy makers in implementing better policies. The specific content-
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related and methodological limitations and propositions for future work ensuing from
this thesis are detailed in the following.
The foremost and general limitation of this thesis is its specific focus on competition
and thus tacit collusion as a means to evaluate the functioning of oligopolistic markets.
However, apart from this static view on efficiency regulators are also concerned with
dynamic efficiency, i.e., how the market’s structure itself develops over time. Recon-
sider for instance the goal of the EC’s DSM strategy to “ensure that markets operate
more competitively [...], while ensuring the right regulatory conditions for innovation,
investment, fair competition and a level playing field” (European Commission, 2015b,
p. 3). As highlighted with respect to the telecommunications industry, regulators aim
in fact at both static efficiency, i.e., competition, and dynamic efficiency, i.e., innova-
tion and investments, at the same time. Yet there may be a trade-off between these
two goals so that regulation which tries to maximize efficiency, i.e., total surplus, has a
multi-attribute objective and will not unilaterally foster competition. Since none of the
theoretical models or experimental studies in this thesis allows for endogenous product
innovation or infrastructure investment, the implications are limited to static efficiency.
Note that with respect to the experimental methodology the implementation of an in-
vestment or innovation stage considerably complicates the experimental design and
procedures. Transferring such a multistage game to the lab poses the questions of how
the game may be repeated (e.g., as a whole or only certain periods) and consequently of
what the appropriate theoretical benchmark is (e.g., whether subjects can be assumed
to engage in backward induction or forward induction). Not least because of this fact
it would be a challenging yet promising direction for future experimental research on
oligopoly competition to investigate how anti-competitive behavior is affected by en-
dogenous investments and innovation.
Therefore, as neither investment nor innovation are allowed in any of the theoretical
models or experiments in this thesis, the reported results warrant critical appraisal in
this regard as well as with respect to other potential limitations. In particular, the exper-
iment on the fewness of firms in markets described in Chapter 4 considers mere price
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or quantity competition over a fixed number of repetitions. Allowing firms to invest
in product quality or likewise in infrastructure to increase the market size could not
only provide new insights into the extent of investments but also affect the findings
with respect to tacit collusion. On the one hand, investments may lead to asymmetry
which fosters competition as shown in the experiment with (exogenously) asymmetric
firms (Section 4.4). On the other hand, one may conjecture that investments—despite
being sunk cost—make rivals less aggressive in an effort to recur the expenditures (cf.
Krämer and Schnurr, 2014). Moreover, controlling for investments and thus accounting
for static and dynamic efficiency at the same time may decrease the number of firms
that a regulator deems necessary for a sufficient efficiency level. In sum, an experi-
mental analysis of the number effects in oligopolies in an environment that allows for
endogenous investment into product quality or infrastructure seems worthwhile.
The same line of argument holds for the experiment reported in Chapter 3 on discrete
time and continuous time as it utilizes the same model of oligopoly competition. Fur-
thermore, regarding the modes of timing, the experiment is limited to the two extremes
on a spectrum: Pure discrete time with unbounded period lengths and continuous time
that resembles real time in the experiment with a period length below the human re-
action time. As the classification of timing modes reveals, the near-continuous time
framework ranges in between these two extremes with period lengths of a few sec-
onds. As there is no microfoundation explaining the finding that discrete time colludes
more than continuous time, an experiment with systematically varying period lengths
may provide valuable insights (cf. Friedman and Oprea, 2012). Moreover, agent-based
simulation appear to be a promising methodology for an exploratory approach to-
wards a microfoundation as it allows to easily test and compare not only different
agent strategies but also modes of timing. In particular, a simulation could investi-
gate how the same set of agents behaves if the sequence of decision-making is specified
by simultaneous-move, sequential-move, or a stochastic decision time.
The lack of investments is also a limitation of the experiment on upstream and down-
stream competition described in Chapter 7. In fact, as the experiment is specifically
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concerned with access to an essential infrastructure, allowing for infrastructure invest-
ments appears to be a natural direction for future research. However, note that already
the current version of the experiment is based on a multistage game in which inte-
grated firms first choose their upstream prices and second all firms decide on their
downstream prices. To merge both stages into one, the continuous time framework is
utilized so that prices in all markets can be changed at any time. Although this makes
theoretical predictions more complicated, continuous time also allows for experimen-
tal environments that are closer to the real world. Therefore, the experiment highlights
that the new mode of timing allows for more diverse theoretical models to be tested in
the laboratory.
Firms may also not invest in infrastructure or product quality in the experiment on price
discrimination and uniform pricing reported in Chapter 5. Therefore, the experimen-
tal analysis does not allow to investigate whether the possibility to discriminate prices
affects investment incentives for firms. In the same line of argument, it is also left to
future work to assess whether investments in turn have an impact on firms’ propensi-
ties to engage in price discrimination. Further research should also investigate how the
issues of price discrimination vs. uniform pricing and multimarket contact vs. single
market contact overlap in industry scenarios with asymmetric firms and markets.
Also the price signaling theory introduced in Chapter 6 does not consider the effect of
investments. It may be conjectured that investments serve as a further signaling de-
vice above and beyond price signaling. In this line of argument, tacit collusion would
be even more pervasive if firms invest prior to price competition. Other limitations of
the price signaling theory is its limitation to two firms and markets. Whereas an ex-
tension to more than two markets could easily be implemented without changing the
foundations of the theory, it is far from obvious how a price signal would be sent and
received when there are more than two firms competing against each other. Further
worthwhile advancements for the behavioral price signaling theory are scenarios con-
sidered by previous theories on the mutual forbearance hypothesis, e.g., asymmetric
firms and markets.
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Lastly, two further limitations of the experimental methodology in general are that it
allows only for a relative assessment of treatment effects and that the external valid-
ity of the obtained empirical evidence is hardly assessable. First, due to the relative
nature of experimental findings, no absolute statement about the size of an effect can
be inferred. However, this holds likewise for any theoretical analysis and is therefore
no shortcoming that is exclusive for experiments. On the contrary, experimentation al-
lows for a quantification of effects at least within the boundaries of the experimental
environment. Second, laboratory experiments allow for a high level of internal validity,
but at the cost of a potential lack in external validity—although the use of practitioner
subject pools may partly make up for this (Chapter 7). Furthermore, as Angrist and
Pischke (2010, p. 23) note, the impossibility to assess external validity is not limited to
experiments since “empirical evidence on any given causal effect is always local, de-
rived from a particular time, place, and research design.” Finally, with respect to the
assessment of regulatory and antitrust policy, even if empirical evidence is always lo-
cal in nature, a combination of complementary methodologies will clearly improve the
robustness of findings and is thus encouraged for future research.
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TABLE A.1: Economic laboratory experiments on regulation in the electricity industry.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Denton et al.
(2001b,a)
Ensuring competitiveness in the
England and Wales wholesale
electricity market through an ef-
ficient auction mechanism.
Three (six) human sellers (experienced students)
with six (three) cost-asymmetric power generators
and four human wholesale buyers are located in a
three-node radial network and each bid prices and
quantities in a uniform price double auction for
12 to 30 periods. Offers are either sealed or may
be improved in real-time during a bidding period.
Demand is step-wise constant decreasing in price
and the share of inelastic demand is stochastic.
Prices are competitive through-
out. The sealed-bid auction
variant is more efficient than the
real-time auction variant. Three
sellers only exert more market
power than six sellers under the
real-time auction variant.
A uniform price sealed-bid dou-
ble auction may effectively pre-
vent the exertion of seller mar-
ket power, whereas a real-time
variant, e.g., common in stock
markets, may be less suited.
Weiss (2002) Ensuring competitiveness of
wholesale electricity markets
despite seller concentration
and transmission constraints
through an efficient auction
mechanism and the effect of
demand-side bidding.
One, three, or six human sellers (industry profes-
sionals) have nine, three, or three cost-asymmetric
power generators each, respectively, are located
along four nodes together with a computerized
competitive fringe and bid prices and quantities
for 33 periods over 12 weeks in an email-based
uniform price sealed-bid auction. Transmission
on one line is constrained for the first 23 periods.
Demand is step-wise decreasing in price and com-
puterized, except for one treatment with two hu-
man buyers and three human sellers.
Prices decrease with an increas-
ing number of sellers, but less
(more) so at nodes (not) af-
fected by the transmission con-
straint. With demand-side bid-
ding, prices are lower and close
to the competitive equilibrium.
Removing the transmission con-
straint, thus mimicking capacity
investments, decreases prices
at nodes previously benefiting
from the constraint.
Increasing the number of elec-
tricity producers may reduce
prices, but not if some firms
may exert local market power
due to transmission constraints.
Demand-side bidding in a uni-
form price sealed-bid double
auction may be more effective.
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Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Thomas et al.
(2002); Mount
et al. (2002);
Vossler et al.
(2009)
Effects of a soft price cap intro-
duced in California’s wholesale
electricity market with capacity
allocated by a hybrid sealed-bid
auction mechanism with uni-
form pricing below the price cap
and with discriminatory pricing
otherwise.
Six human sellers (students and professionals)
with five cost-asymmetric power generators each
bid prices and quantities for 25–50 periods. With-
out the price cap, a uniform price one-sided auc-
tion is used to allocate supply. Demand is uncer-
tain and either inelastic or step-wise constant de-
creasing in price, but complete information on the
seller’s side is provided.
Elasticity of demand reduces
prices, even more so in the ab-
sence of a soft price cap. De-
creasing cost decrease prices
only if the soft price cap is not
in place. Students behave simi-
lar to the industry professionals.
A soft price cap may be insen-
sitive to changes in load and
generation cost. Thus, cost re-
ductions may not be passed on
to consumers. A uniform price
double auction without price
caps may be more effective in
reaching competitive wholesale
electricity markets.
Rassenti et al.
(2003a,b)
Prevention of anti-competitive
effects associated to market
power in wholesale electricity
auctions.
Five human sellers with asymmetric generation
cost choose quantity and price and may have mar-
ket power through asymmetric capacities. Dur-
ing 14 periods of four trials with varying demand,
buyers bid for electricity in a uniform price or dis-
criminatory price sealed-bid double auction and
are either computerized or controlled by four hu-
mans. Demand is uncertain and step-wise con-
stant decreasing in price, but complete informa-
tion on the seller’s side is provided.
Market power increases prices,
but this effect is neutralized
by uniform price demand-side
bidding. Although prices are
less volatile in the discrimina-
tory price auction, they are also
higher—even in the absence of
market power.
Demand-side bidding may
reduce the anti-competitive
effects of market power which
suggests decentralization in
electricity markets. However,
auction mechanisms should be
designed to result in a uniform
transaction price.
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TABLE A.1: Continued.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Abbink et al.
(2003)
Potential efficiency losses in
wholesale electricity auctions
due to asymmetric information
of electricity producers on fu-
ture demand.
Four human sellers, two low-cost and two high-
cost, with two cost-asymmetric power generators
each bid prices and quantities for 30 periods in
a uniform price or discriminatory price one-sided
sealed-bid auction. Demand is step-wise constant
decreasing in price. The share of inelastic demand
is stochastic and its forecast is certain for low-cost
sellers. For high-cost sellers, the forecast is cer-
tain under complete information and noisy under
asymmetric information (between-subject).
With complete information,
there is no difference in per-
formance criteria between the
two auction mechanisms. With
asymmetric information, the
uniform price auction is more
efficient in terms of total surplus
than the discriminatory auction
due to higher marginal (not
average) prices under the latter
auction mechanism.
Uniform price auctions may be
more efficient than discrimina-
tory price auctions in case elec-
tricity producers have asym-
metric information on future
demand—however, not if in-
formation on future demand is
symmetric and certain.
Kench (2004) Potential of financial or physi-
cal transmission rights to mit-
igate market power through
congested transmission lines in
electricity networks.
Eight human sellers, four low-cost at a northern
node and four high-cost at a southern node, with
two or three units of electricity each bid prices for
13 periods of fixed length in a continuous double-
oral auction. Four human buyers, located at the
southern node, have demand of up to four units
and bid simultaneously. Transmission between
the two nodes may be congested and northern
sellers have and bid for financial or physical trans-
mission rights (between-subject) every three peri-
ods in a continuous double-oral auction.
With transmission rights, prices
increase at the northern, but not
at the southern node. Electric-
ity prices at the northern node
are again higher if physical (ex-
clusive utilization) instead of
financial (share of congestion
charges) transmission rights are
auctioned, but this is reversed
for sellers without the respec-
tive transmission right.
Transmission rights may mit-
igate market power. Physi-
cal transmission rights may ad-
ditionally remove uncertainty
about electricity transmission
more than financial rights.
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Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Adilov et al.
(2005)
Potential of demand-side man-
agement at the retail level to
mitigate market power of pro-
ducers in unregulated whole-
sale electricity auctions. In
particular, under a demand-
side program consumers are in-
centivized to reduce consump-
tion during high load phases
and under real-time pricing con-
sumers decide on consumption
based on price forecasts.
Six human sellers (experienced students) with
three cost-asymmetric power generators and one
computerized seller each choose price and quan-
tity in a uniform price double auction for 11 peri-
ods of day and night pairs. 13 to 17 human buy-
ers with discrete day and night demand decide on
how much electricity to purchase. Demand and
supply are parametrized with field data and face
random shocks. Treatment conditions were ap-
plied within-subject. Conducted using PowerWeb.
Compared to a situation of fixed
prices, price spikes are reduced
under both demand-side mech-
anisms, consumer surplus in-
creases substantially, and pro-
ducer surplus decreases. Under
the demand-side program (real-
time pricing), total surplus, i.e.,
efficiency, decreases (increases)
slightly.
Consumer participation in elec-
tricity markets may reduce mar-
ket power of producers, but
at the same time market ef-
ficiency may sink and corre-
sponding demand-side mecha-
nisms are very complex.
Chapman
et al. (2004)
Minimum number of producers
required for wholesale electric-
ity uniform price auctions to ex-
hibit effective competition.
24 human sellers (experienced students) with five
cost-asymmetric power generators each choose
price and quantity in a uniform price auction in
groups of six for 40 periods, then in groups of 12
for 25 periods, and then all together for 25 peri-
ods. Afterwards, all sellers compete again three
times for 20 periods each with pre-play communi-
cation of first cheap talk with a Chinese wall, then
unrestricted cheap talk, and finally binding agree-
ments (within-subject). Demand is stochastic, but
based on a forecast. Other parameters were cho-
sen to closely resemble real wholesale electricity
markets. Conducted using PowerWeb.
Prices are supra-competitive
throughout, but decrease with
the increasing number of sellers
in case no communication is al-
lowed. Each of the three forms
of explicit communication
raises prices substantially, with
unrestricted cheap talk and
binding agreements reaching
the reservation price.
Even markets with six, 12, and
24 electricity producers may al-
low for the exercise of mar-
ket power. Any communication
among suppliers, even cheap
talk with a prohibition to talk
about prices, may facilitate col-
lusive behavior.
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TABLE A.1: Continued.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Bernard et al.
(2005)
Potential of alternatives to the
uniform price last accepted offer
sealed-bid auction in wholesale
electricity markets to prevent
exploitation of market power
and minimum number of pro-
ducers required to exhibit effec-
tive competition.
Two, four, and six human sellers with three cost-
asymmetric power generators each choose price
and quantity for 75 periods in a uniform price last
accepted offer auction, a uniform price first re-
jected offer auction, or a multiunit Vickrey auction
in which a winner is paid the kth rejected bid for
its kth sold unit (between-subject). Demand is in-
elastic with a fixed reservation price and complete
information is provided.
Prices are highest for markets
with two sellers. In markets
with four sellers, prices are
higher than markets with six
sellers only for early periods.
Across the numbers of sellers,
prices are lowest in the mul-
tiunit Vickrey auction. In the
uniform price first rejected offer
auction, prices are lower than
in the last accepted offer variant
only for early periods.
Instead of the uniform price
last accepted offer auction im-
plemented in many wholesale
electricity markets, a multiunit
Vickrey auction may help to
prevent the exploitation of mar-
ket power.
Kiesling and
Wilson (2007)
Effects of an automated mitiga-
tion procedure with a fixed ref-
erence offer on prices in electric-
ity markets and investments in
generation capacity.
Five human sellers with three cost-asymmetric
power generators each bid prices and quantities
during 45 rounds of 48 near-continuous time peri-
ods in a uniform price auction. Demand is step-
wise decreasing in price and varies during the
course of a round. Under the automated miti-
gation procedure, bids may not be higher than a
seller-specific fixed reference offer. Under strong
market power, excess capacity is lower than un-
der weak market power. Treatment conditions are
applied between-subject. Network capacity may
be increased through investments during rounds
21 to 30.
The automated mitigation
procedure with fixed reference
offers reduces prices pre-
investment and does not inhibit
investments, but decreases
prices post-investment only
slightly under strong market
power and not at all under
weak market power. Invest-
ment in generation capacity
decreases prices most strongly.
Automated mitigation proce-
dures may effectively reduce
prices in wholesale electricity
markets prior to investments in
generation capacities and at the
same time do not seem to ham-
per investments.
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Mount and
Maneevitjit
(2008)
Effects of the forward capacity
market intended to provide fi-
nancial incentives to build ca-
pacity towards an economically
feasible mix and proposed by
regulators in New England, in
which annual capacity is pur-
chased by the independent sys-
tem operator three years in ad-
vance.
Three human incumbent sellers with existing
power generators offer future capacity in a
descending-clock auction and bid in a spot mar-
ket for 10 periods. Computerized entrants as well
as incumbents may invest in one or two types of
new capacity. New capacity may be priced higher
in the auction than installed capacity. Demand is
inelastic in each period and increases over time.
If there is only one type of new
generating capacity, incumbents
foreclose entrants by compen-
sating losses from low offers in
the capacity market with earn-
ings from the spot market. If
there is a baseload and a peak-
ing capacity, incumbents will in-
vest only in new baseload ca-
pacity if entrants may do so as
well.
The forward capacity market
may provide financial incen-
tives to incumbents and en-
trants alike to invest in new ca-
pacity if other regulatory mea-
sures do not prevent entrants
from investing in both baselod
and peaking capacity. A variant
of this market is in fact currently
implemented in New England.
Brandts et al.
(2008)
Potential efficiency gains from
adding forward contracting to
an electricity spot market.
Three or four human sellers compete in a spot
market, face increasing marginal cost, and choose
quantities or supply functions, i.e., multiple price-
quantity combinations, for 25 periods. Demand is
elastic and complete information is provided. If a
forward market is preceded, sellers choose quanti-
ties and two human traders compete á la Bertrand
for the total quantity, before selling in the spot
market as well.
Under both modes of spot mar-
ket competition, introducing a
forward market increases the
quantity supplied as well as ef-
ficiency, whereas adding a fur-
ther electricity producer instead
increases only quantity, but not
efficiency. With three sellers,
prices are lower for supply func-
tion than quantity competition.
Forward markets may reduce
prices and increase efficiency in
electricity markets, not account-
ing for demand uncertainty and
corresponding risk hedging.
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Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Shawhan
et al. (2011)
Effects of the automated mitiga-
tion procedure implemented in
New York’s wholesale electric-
ity market, i.e., a reference of-
fer replacing suppliers’ offers if
they exceed a price cap based on
a moving average of their past
transaction prices, on prices and
investments in generation ca-
pacity.
Six human sellers each bid prices and quanti-
ties during 50 periods in a uniform price auction
with alternating (un)congested periods. Without
congestion, all sellers have three cost-asymmetric
power generators and compete in one market.
Under congestion, sellers are equally separated
into two markets with six power generators each.
Market power varies between-subject due to ex-
cess capacity and presence of the automated miti-
gation procedure.
The automated mitigation pro-
cedure reduces prices in con-
gested periods substantially, but
is less effective if sellers have
strong market power and has no
effect on prices in uncongested
periods.
The automated mitigation pro-
cedure in New York may ef-
fectively keep prices at com-
petitive levels in the wholesale
electricity market. However, it
may be less effective in decreas-
ing prices if electricity produc-
ers have strong market power.
Henze et al.
(2012)
Potential of price cap regulation
in a spot market auction, regu-
latory holiday under which the
price cap is lifted for new in-
stalled capacity, and price cap
regulation with long term finan-
cial transmission rights in stim-
ulating investment in network
infrastructure by a monopolistic
network owner.
Four human firms with asymmetric demand com-
pete for usage of a network owned by another hu-
man firm in a lowest accepted bid uniform price
sealed-bid auction subject to a price cap during
five independent blocks of six periods each. At the
beginning of a block (after every three periods) the
network users (owner) may partly increase unit
valuations (install additional capacity) at a per-
period cost. The premium of the market price
above the price cap is transferred to the regulator.
Either the price cap may not apply for additional
capacity or long term financial transmission rights
are auctioned at the very beginning of a block in a
lowest accepted bid uniform price sealed-bid auc-
tion subject to a price cap.
Prices are lowest, capacity is
highest, and total as well as al-
locative and dynamic efficiency
are highest with price cap reg-
ulation. Profits of the network
owner are highest with regula-
tory holiday. Neither regulatory
holiday nor long term financial
transmission rights are benefi-
cial in terms of welfare.
Price cap regulation in spot mar-
kets for monopolistic network
capacity may not be outper-
formed by regulatory holiday
for new capacity or price cap
regulation with long term fi-
nancial transmission contracts
in terms of efficiency, although
none of the scenarios reaches so-
cially optimal levels of network
capacity.
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Le Coq and
Orzen (2012)
Robustness of competition in
wholesale electricity markets to
changing market properties, in
particular a raise of a fixed price
cap and increasing demand.
Four human sellers with nine single-unit power
generators with linear marginal cost offer prices
for each generator in a uniform price auction for
12 periods. Prices are subject to an either low or
high price cap (between-subject). Demand is in-
elastic and varies over time, but capacity exceeds
demand throughout and complete information is
provided.
In all treatments, market prices
are higher, but close to marginal
cost of last dispatched unit. Due
to unilateral attempts to raise
prices, allocative inefficiencies
arise. These are more severe
with a higher price cap and
higher demand.
Excess capacity alone may not
suffice to induce efficiency in
electricity markets, but rather in
addition price caps and demand
should be low enough.
Jullien et al.
(2012)
Efficiency of cross-border
congestion management mech-
anisms in allocating scarce
cross-border transmission ca-
pacity in a European internal
electricity market, in particular
the implicit auction imple-
mented in many European
countries and the coordinated
explicit auction proposed by the
European Transmission System
Operators.
Four human vertically integrated sellers (expe-
rienced students) have power generators dis-
tributed in a three-node network with transmis-
sion constraints and play for 14 to 30 periods. In
the implicit auction, firms submit node-specific of-
fers (price and quantity) to buy or sell electric-
ity in a combined uniform price sealed-bid auc-
tion, whereas in the coordinated explicit auction
first transmission capacities and second electricity
are allocated in separate uniform price sealed-bid
auctions for each line and node (between-subject).
Demand (supply) at each node is elastic, step-
wise constant decreasing (increasing) in price, and
varies over time.
With the implicit auction, effi-
ciency is higher, price volatil-
ity is lower, and transmission
capacities are better allocated
than with the coordinated ex-
plicit auction due to the latter’s
obligation to use bought trans-
mission capacities.
Cross-border congestion man-
agement in Europe may be more
efficient with a simultaneous al-
location of transmission capac-
ity and electricity as in the im-
plicit auction than with a se-
quential allocation as in the co-
ordinated explicit auction.
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TABLE A.1: Continued.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
van Koten
and Ortmann
(2013)
Potential efficiency gains from
adding forward contracting and
from increasing the number of
firms by divestiture in an elec-
tricity spot market.
Two to four human sellers compete in a spot mar-
ket, face increasing marginal cost, and choose
quantities for 24 periods. Demand is elastic and
complete information is provided. If a forward
market is preceded, sellers choose quantities and
two computerized traders compete in prices for
the total quantity, before selling in the spot mar-
ket as well. Aggregate production assets are kept
constant over varying numbers of sellers.
Introducing a forward mar-
ket and increasing the num-
ber of sellers by divestiture and
thereby keeping the aggregate
production assets constant in-
creases the quantity supplied.
Forward markets and increas-
ing the number of competi-
tors by divestiture may intensify
competition in electricity mar-
kets.
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Banks et al.
(2003)
Efficiency of the simultaneous
multiround ascending auction
used by the US Federal Commu-
nications Commission to assign
spectrum licenses for telecom-
munications services and com-
parison to a combinatorial mul-
tiround ascending auction as
mandated by the US Congress.
Varying numbers of human bidders (experi-
enced students) bid for 10 licenses with single-
item, sealed bids in the simultaneous multiround
auction and with single-item and/or packaged,
sealed bids in the combinatorial multiround as-
cending auction. Bidders face activity obligations
to stay in the auction with equal (equal or un-
equal) eligibility points across licenses and a flexi-
ble (flexible or nonflexible) amount of eligibility in
the combinatorial (simultaneous) auction.
In case of license value syn-
ergies, assignment efficiency is
higher and auctioneer’s revenue
is lower in the combinatorial
than in the simultaneous auc-
tion and, under the latter, effi-
ciency (revenue) is higher with
flexible eligibility (flexible el-
igibility and equal eligibility
points). All these efficiency
gains increase auction length.
A combinatorial multiround
ascending auction may increase
efficiency, but also auction
length compared to the simul-
taneous multiround ascending
auction, in which strict eligibil-
ity rules may hinder efficiency
further.
Plott and
Salmon (2004)
Prediction of length and final
prices in the 3G spectrum auc-
tion in the UK in 2000 from pat-
terns in early bids.
Eight (12) human bidders with asymmetric pref-
erences compete for six (eight) spectrum licenses
of two different types in a continuous simultane-
ous multiround ascending auction in which bid-
ders may only buy up to one license and bids are
subject to a fixed increment requirement. The auc-
tion runs continuously and ends if there is no in-
creasing bid for three minutes.
A behavioral model to predict
final prices and auction length is
suggested. In the experiment, fi-
nal prices are close the compet-
itive equilibrium and efficiency
is near its maximum. The num-
ber of bids ranges from 50 to
136, which is lower than pre-
dicted, but the model predicts
half of all bids correctly.
The proposed behavioral model
proposed may help auctioneers
in predicting the total length as
well as final prices of a spectrum
auction early on to make in-
formed decisions about the fur-
ther auction design.
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Abbink et al.
(2005)
Potential efficiency and revenue
of two multiround and sealed-
bid hybrid auction mechanisms
considered by the British Radio-
communications Agency prior
to the 3G spectrum auction in
the UK in 2000. Study com-
missioned by a potential bidder
before commenting on the sug-
gested auction mechanisms.
Eight human bidders, four incumbents and four
entrants, with asymmetric preferences compete
for four identical spectrum licenses in either a
pure simultaneous multiround ascending auction
with an increment requirement or a discrimina-
tory or (lowest winning bid) uniform price vari-
ant of a hybrid auction mechanism according to
which first a simultaneous multiround ascending
auction with an increment requirement is used
until only five bidders remain and then a final
sealed-bid auction determines the four winners.
Efficiency, winner’s curse, and
aggressive entrant bidding is
highest in the discriminatory
price hybrid auction. With ex-
perienced subjects, differences
in efficiency and auctioneer rev-
enue decrease or disappear. The
number of successful entrants is
highest in the pure simultane-
ous multiround ascending auc-
tion.
Suggested hybrid auction mech-
anisms seem to be as efficient or
revenue generating as a pure si-
multaneous multiround ascend-
ing auction. A variant of the lat-
ter was eventually employed for
the 3G spectrum auction in the
UK.
Seifert and
Ehrhart (2005)
Comparison of 3G spectrum
auctions in Germany and the
UK in 2000 in terms of auction-
eer revenue and bidder surplus.
Seven human bidders, two large incumbents,
two smaller incumbents, and three entrants, with
asymmetric preferences compete for 12 identical
(two large and three small) licenses in the Ger-
man (UK) variant of a simultaneous multiround
ascending auction. In the UK variant, bidders
may only buy up to one license. In the German
variant, bidders first bid for two or three licenses
and then for up to one license among the remain-
ing licenses.
Auctioneer revenue (bidder sur-
plus) is higher (lower) in the
German variant than in the UK
variant. Bidder surplus is even
slightly negative in the Ger-
man variant as bidders face the
risk of overbidding, i.e., pay-
ing more than their actual valu-
ations.
The design of 3G spectrum auc-
tion in Germany may result in
higher auctioneer revenue than
the design in the UK. How-
ever, bidders may be deterred
by the German auction design
resulting in lower participation
as was so in the real world.
Furthermore, subjects were stu-
dents unexperienced with auc-
tions.
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Brunner et al.
(2010)
Efficiency assessment of a com-
binatorial multiround auction
format developed by the US
Federal Communications Com-
mission, in which bidders may
have only one winning bid at
the same time, in comparison to
other combinatorial and simul-
taneous formats for spectrum
auctions.
Eight human bidders (experienced students),
thereof six regional and two global, compete for
12 licenses covering distinct geographic regions.
For each bidder, value synergies arise from ge-
ographic adjacency of licenses. Either a simul-
taneous multiround ascending auction or one of
three combinatorial auction formats in which bids
may be single-item or packaged is used (between-
subject). Bidders may either be allowed to have
multiple or only one winning bid at the same time
and prices may either increase by submitted bids
or automatically by a clock. Activity rules and an
increment requirement apply to all auctions.
Efficiency is higher in the com-
binatorial multiround auction
with multiple winning bids al-
lowed than in the other auc-
tions. If license value synergies
are high (low), efficiency is also
higher in the other combinato-
rial auctions (in the simultane-
ous multiround ascending auc-
tion). Auctioneer revenue (bid-
der surplus) is higher (lower) in
the combinatorial clock auction
than in the other auctions.
Efficiency in combinatorial mul-
tiround auctions may be higher
than in the simultaneous multi-
round ascending auction if the
licenses in neighboring regions
are assumed to have high value
synergies. However, the vari-
ant developed by the US Fed-
eral Communications Commis-
sion may be outperformed by
other combinatorial auctions.
Kagel et al.
(2010)
Comparison of combinatorial
and simultaneous price-guided,
i.e., clocked, spectrum auctions
with automatically increasing
prices if licenses have value syn-
ergies due to geographic adja-
cency and prediction of bidders
behavior.
Three human bidders, thereof two regional and
one global, with asymmetric preferences com-
pete for four or six licenses covering distinct ge-
ographic regions. Regional bidders have a posi-
tive valuation only for disjoint halves of licenses.
In the combinatorial multiround clock auction,
bids may be single-item or packaged and bidders
may have only one winning bid at the same time.
In the simultaneous multiround ascending clock
auction, bids are single-item and activity rules ap-
ply (between-subject). In both auctions, prices in-
crease automatically over rounds.
Efficiency is higher (lower) in
the combinatorial multiround
clock auction than the simul-
taneous multiround ascending
clock auction if bidder valua-
tions are easy (very hard) in
terms of high (low) efficiency
achieved in simulations; a clas-
sification of valuations that pre-
vails in the lab, indicating that
bidders focus on the most prof-
itable license (package).
Combinatorial multiround
clock auctions may be more
efficient than simultaneous
multiround ascending clock
auctions if the distribution of
bidder valuations does not pose
a hard coordination problem.
Price-guided, i.e., clocked,
auctions may fail to coordinate
buyers on relevant license pack-
ages. Reporting winning bids
may facilitate tacit collusion.
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Goeree and
Holt (2010)
Efficiency of a combinatorial
multiround ascending auction
with predefined packages, re-
ferred to as hierarchical pack-
age bidding and developed for
spectrum auctions in the US,
and comparison to a variant
with custom packages approxi-
mating shadow prices and a si-
multaneous multiround ascend-
ing auction.
Seven human bidders, thereof six regional and
one global, with asymmetric preferences compete
for 18 licenses organized in a national and regional
circle and have value synergies from the number
of licenses. Either a simultaneous multiround as-
cending auction or a combinatorial multiround as-
cending auction with custom (predefined) single-
item or packaged bids is used (between-subject).
Activity rules and an increment requirement ap-
ply. Bidders can have multiple winning bids at
the same time.
Efficiency, auctioneer revenue,
and the number of sold licenses
are higher and bidder surplus
is not lower in the combina-
torial auction with predefined
packages than in the other two
auction formats. Without value
synergies, efficiency is near its
maximum for all three auction
formats.
The hierarchical package bid-
ding auction used by the US
Federal Communications Com-
mission in a 2008 spectrum
auction may be more efficient
than a combinatorial auction in
which bidders can bid on any
custom package of licenses or
a simultaneous multiround as-
cending auction.
Scheffel et al.
(2012)
Efficiency of a combinatorial
multiround ascending auction
with predefined packages,
referred to as hierarchical
package bidding and devel-
oped for spectrum auctions
in the US, and comparison to
a combinatorial auction with
custom packages approxi-
mating shadow prices and a
combinatorial clock auction.
Seven (six) human bidders, thereof six (five) re-
gional and one global, with asymmetric prefer-
ences compete for 18 licenses and have value syn-
ergies from the number (geographic adjacency) of
licenses. Either a combinatorial clock auction or a
combinatorial multiround ascending auction with
custom (predefined) single-item or packaged bids
is used (between-subject). Activity rules and an
increment requirement apply. Bidders can have
multiple winning bids at the same time.
With value synergies from the
number (geographic adjacency)
of licenses, efficiency (efficiency
and auctioneer revenue) is
higher in the combinatorial auc-
tion with predefined packages
(combinatorial clock auction)
than in the combinatorial auc-
tion with custom (predefined)
packages.
Efficiency may be highest ei-
ther in combinatorial clock auc-
tions or combinatorial multi-
round ascending auctions with
predefined license packages as
bidders’ preselection of a small
number of packages appears to
be the main source of alloca-
tive inefficiencies in combinato-
rial spectrum auctions.
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Bichler et al.
(2013)
Efficiency and auctioneer rev-
enue of the core-selecting com-
binatorial clock auction adopted
in many countries for recent
spectrum auctions compared to
the simultaneous multiround
ascending auction.
Four human bidders with asymmetric preferences
compete for 24 licenses either under the base
value model with 14 licenses with value syner-
gies in band A and 10 licenses in band B or un-
der the multiband value model with six licenses
with value synergies in four bands each (between-
subject). Throughout, bidders have a higher
expected valuation for band A than the other
band(s). Eligibility rules apply in the simultane-
ous multiround ascending auction. In the core-
selecting combinatorial clock auction bids may be
single-item or packaged and bidders first bid un-
til there is no excess demand in any band and then
bid in a final sealed-bid round.
Efficiency (auctioneer revenue)
in the multiband value model
(both value models) is lower in
the core-selecting combinatorial
clock auction than in the simul-
taneous multiround ascending
auction. This may be due to the
few bundles that were bid for
compared to the very high num-
ber of potential bundles in the
former auction type.
The core-selecting combina-
torial clock auction recently
adopted for spectrum auctions
may neither be more efficient
nor auctioneer revenue in-
creasing than the simultaneous
multiround ascending auction.
Increased complexity and num-
ber of potential license bundles
in an auction may decrease its
efficiency.
Kagel et al.
(2014)
Comparison of combinatorial
and simultaneous price-guided,
i.e., clocked, spectrum auctions
with automatically increasing
prices if licenses have value syn-
ergies due to shared fixed costs
and prediction of bidders be-
havior.
Three human bidders, thereof two regional and
one global, with asymmetric preferences compete
for four or six licenses and each have fixed lumpy
shipping costs independent of the number of li-
censes purchased, thereby introducing value syn-
ergies of licenses. Bidder valuations used are such
that the efficient allocation is either (1) all licenses
to the global bidder or a split between the two re-
gional bidders or (2) some other allocation. Other
aspects are similar to Kagel et al. (2010).
Efficiency is higher (lower) in
the combinatorial multiround
clock auction than the simul-
taneous multiround ascending
clock auction if bidder valua-
tions are such that the efficient
allocation is (not) all licenses to
the global bidder or a split be-
tween the two regional bidders.
Taking into account bidders’
roles in spectrum auctions im-
proves predictions about bid-
ding behavior substantially. The
efficiency of combinatorial and
simultaneous multiround clock
auctions is largely unaffected if
constant shipping cost for li-
censes exist.
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Bichler et al.
(2014)
Increasing the efficiency of
the simultaneous multiround
ascending auction or combi-
natorial ascending clock and
sealed-bid auctions frequently
used in spectrum auctions by
simplifying the bid language
and the payment rule.
Four human bidders with asymmetric preferences
compete for 24 licenses in four bands á six licenses
each and have value synergies from the number
of licenses within a band. Combinatorial auctions
are used in either an ascending clock or a sealed-
bid variant. The bid language is either compact
(bidders can have only one winning bid within a
band, but multiple in different bands) or fully ex-
pressive (bidders can have only one winning bid
overall) bid language. The payment rule is either
pay-as-bid or core-selecting. Activity rules and an
increment requirement apply to all auctions.
Auction formats with a com-
pact bid language (pay-as-bid
payment rule) are more effi-
cient (yield higher auctioneer
revenue) than those with a fully
expressive bid language (core-
selecting payment rule). In as-
cending clock auctions with a
compact bid language, bidders
focus on the most profitable li-
cense (package).
Both simplifying the bid lan-
guage and the payment rule
may be beneficial for efficiency
and auctioneer revenue in spec-
trum auctions, although pre-
defining license packages to
simplify the bid language in
combinatorial auctions may be a
difficult task for regulators.
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Cox et al.
(2002)
Comparison of a competition
on (revenue-generating bids on
route/time-slot combinations)
and for (fare-structure bids
on regional monopolies) the
market mechanism to allocate
track capacity on state-owned
railways considered by the
Dutch Ministry of Transport in
the privatization of passenger
rail service.
Four human train operators (experienced stu-
dents) bid for allocation rights and route schedul-
ing over five time slots with varying demand in
a six node railway grid for three periods. With
competition on (for) the rails, first a combinatorial
multiround ascending (simultaneous multiround
descending) auction is used with a route/time-
slot combination (route with a regulated mini-
mum schedule) as a single auction item and li-
cense fees (passenger fares) as prices is used and
second trains are scheduled two (six) times.
The number of scheduled trains
is highest and public revenue
is positive under competition
on the market. The num-
ber of transported passengers is
higher, ticket prices are lower,
and efficiency is higher under
competition for the market than
competition on the market, un-
less the minimum schedule is
relatively inefficient.
A competition for the rail mech-
anism may be more efficient and
beneficial for consumers, how-
ever, it is crucial that the regu-
lator is capable of determining
a relatively efficient mandatory
minimum schedule.
Isacsson and
Nilsson (2003)
Efficiency assessment of auction
mechanisms to allocate track ca-
pacity on state-owned railways
by varying the auction’s pricing
and stopping rules.
Four to eight human train operators (experienced
subjects) with asymmetric valuations for 10 timed
connections between two stations bid in an auc-
tion for 15 to 16 periods. The simultaneous auc-
tion’s pricing rule (first-price or second-price) is
varied between-subject, whereas its stopping rule
(sealed-bid or multiround ascending) and con-
flicts due to free-riding incentives (three types of
increasing degree of conflict) are varied within-
subject over time.
Efficiency is above 90%
throughout, similar in the
second-price sealed-bid auction
as in the multiround ascend-
ing auctions, but lower in the
first-price sealed-bid auction.
Auctioneer revenue is similar
under all auction mechanisms.
The number of train operators
has no effect.
Several auction mechanisms, in
particular multiround ascend-
ing auctions as well as a second-
price sealed-bid auction, may be
used to allocate track capacity
on state-owned railways with-
out implications for allocative
efficiency and public revenue.
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TABLE A.4: Economic laboratory experiments on the regulation of emission permit trading markets.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Mougeot et al.
(2011)
Potential of non-compliance
speculation bidders in mit-
igating collusion based on
cheap-talk in auction formats
discussed for the initial alloca-
tion of emission permits as part
of the emission trading scheme
in the EU.
Six human firms, thereof either all emitters with
asymmetric marginal abatement cost or four emit-
ters and two speculators, first chat with each other
(cheap-talk) and then compete for a fixed num-
ber of emission permits in either a uniform price
sealed-bid auction or a uniform price multiround
ascending clock auction during each of 12 peri-
ods (between-subject). Acquired permits are then
traded in a uniform price sealed-bid double auc-
tion. Emitters face non-compliance penalties.
Auctioneer revenue is higher
with the uniform price sealed-
bid auction than the uniform
price multiround ascend-
ing clock auction and higher
(lower) with speculators in the
former (latter) auction format,
whereas efficiency is lower with
speculators.
Opening emission permit auc-
tions to non-compliance spec-
ulators may deteriorate effi-
ciency, but increase auctioneer
revenue if the auction format
for initial emission permit allo-
cation does not facilitate cheap-
talk collusion from the outset
which holds for a uniform price
sealed-bid auction.
Cason and
Gangadharan
(2011)
Efficiency of cross-country trad-
ing enabled through govern-
mental institutions or direct
firm to firm trading in emissions
permit programs, e.g., in an ef-
fort to meet international emis-
sions reduction goals.
16 human firms with asymmetric marginal val-
ues of acquired (buyer role) or marginal cost of
sold (seller role) permits are distributed across
two high cost and two low cost geographical mar-
kets and trade in a continuous double auction for
15 periods. Cross-market trading may either be
allowed, prohibited, or enabled through four hu-
man intermediaries with one in each market who
can trade among each other and are the only ones
allowed to bank permits over time.
Efficiency (price dispersion)
is highest (lowest) with direct
cross-market trading, followed
by intermediary cross-market
trading, and lowest (highest)
if cross-market trading is pro-
hibited. Profit of buyers in
high cost markets and sellers in
low cost markets is increased
through cross-market trading.
Linking emission permit trad-
ing across countries with dif-
fering marginal abatement cost
may increase efficiency, even
more so if international permit
trade is not ceded to govern-
mental institutions as the addi-
tional level of trading would in-
crease transaction cost.
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Stranlund
et al. (2011)
Potential of emission report au-
dits in ensuring permit compli-
ance and truthful emission re-
porting in emission trading pro-
grams.
Eight human firms of four types with asymmetric
initial emission permit allocations and marginal
abatement costs trade permits in a continuous
double auction and then report emissions, are au-
dited with fixed probability, and, if audited, pay
a penalty for permit violations during six periods
in each of three independent rounds. Rounds dif-
fered in that audit probability is high, low, or com-
pliance is forced. Banking is allowed and permit
supply drops after the first three periods.
Permit compliance rate is high
throughout and unaffected by
audit probability. Emission re-
port violations and emissions
are higher and permit price is
lower with a low than with a
high audit probability.
In emission trading programs
that cannot rely on continu-
ous emissions monitoring en-
forcement and compliance may
also be ensured with imper-
fect emissions monitoring and
low penalties for false reporting
and permit violations, although
truthful emission reporting may
increase in audit probability.
Camacho-
Cuena et al.
(2012)
Incentives to invest in emis-
sion abatement technologies un-
der alternative emission permit
auction formats with or with-
out preceding initial allocation
of permits, i.e., grandfathering,
proportional to emitters’ maxi-
mum emission levels.
18 human firms produce a good at five differ-
ent emission levels. Over six independent peri-
ods first firms may make a fixed investment in
an abatement technology reducing emissions and
second emission permits are either allocated in
a uniform price multiround ascending clock auc-
tion, distributed freely and re-allocated in a con-
tinuous single unit double auction, or distributed
freely and re-allocated in a uniform price multi-
round ascending clock double auction (between-
subject).
Dynamic investment efficiency
and overall efficiency are similar
across allocation mechanisms.
Final allocative static efficiency
of the permit market is higher in
the continuous single unit dou-
ble auction than in the multi-
round ascending clock double
auction, but unaffected by the
initial allocation mechanism.
Emission permit auctions may
provide the right incentives
to invest in emission abate-
ment technologies and neither
grandfathering or auctioning
are clearly superior in terms of
dynamic or static efficiency.
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TABLE A.4: Continued.
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Grimm and
Ilieva (2013)
Evaluation of key design fea-
tures of the EU Emission Trad-
ing System, in particular initial
distribution of emission permits
by auction or free allocation, i.e.,
grandfathering, which are both
elements of the real-world mar-
ket.
16 human firms produce a good at uncertain emis-
sions. Emissions are traded in four subsequent
continuous double auctions during each of four
compliance periods. Emission permits may be
banked and are allocated either at the beginning of
a compliance period—freely or in a uniform price
sealed-bid auction—or before each trade stage in
a similar auction (between-subject). Firms may
costly abate emissions and face penalties for ex-
cess emissions over their final permit holdings.
Optimal efficiency is never
reached. Final allocative effi-
ciency is higher with a single
permit auction than with
multiple permit auctions or
equal free permit allocation.
Permit price, abatement level,
and permit banking are only
initially higher if permits are
allocated by auction than freely
by grandfathering.
Initial distribution of emission
permits by auctioning may lead
to higher final efficiency than
free allocation according to ex-
pected needs, although the lat-
ter is connected to a high ini-
tial efficiency. Thus, emission
trading at secondary markets
may decrease efficiency of initial
grandfathering allocations.
Stranlund
et al. (2014)
Potential of price controls and
permission of permit banking
in containing permit price risk
such as price volatility over time
and price dispersion at a certain
time in emission permit mar-
kets.
Eight human firms of four types with asymmet-
ric cash endowments, initial emission permit al-
locations, and uncertain marginal abatement costs
trade permits in a continuous double auction for
13 to 20 periods. Banking, i.e., carrying emission
permits over to future periods, may be allowed
and/or price controls, i.e., a price ceiling and
a price floor, may be enacted (between-subject).
Compliance is enforced.
Permit price volatility between
and dispersion within periods
are lower with banking or
price controls, whilst emission
volatility between periods is
higher. Price volatility is again
lower with combined banking
and price controls. Initial per-
mit price is higher (lower) with
banking (banking and price
controls).
Combined price controls and al-
lowance of banking in emission
permit markets may decrease
price volatility without affect-
ing price dispersion, but at the
cost of higher emission volatil-
ity which may be detrimental
in the control of flow pollutants
with strictly convex damages.
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Taschini et al.
(2014)
Effect of irreversible invest-
ments in emission abatement
technologies and the presence
of traders that are not subject
to environmental regulation on
emission permit markets in a
cap and trade program.
12 human regulated firms with an asymmetric
initial number of emission permits each produce
a good whose demand and thus, related emis-
sions, are stochastic. In each of four independent
rounds, firms trade permits in a uniform price
sealed-bid auction during 20 periods, face penal-
ties for excess emissions, and may make an irre-
versible abatement investment cutting their emis-
sions. Additionally, zero, three, or six human non-
regulated firms (between-subject) compete in the
permit market.
Permit price is higher than
the marginal cost of abatement.
With non-regulated firms price
and liquidity in the permit mar-
ket are higher and excess emis-
sions of regulated firms are
lower.
In industries with irreversible
investments abating emissions
permit prices may not decrease
after investments, thereby in-
creasing the total cost of meet-
ing compliance obligations. Per-
mit traders that are not sub-
ject to environmental regula-
tion, e.g., banks or eco-friendly
firms, may increase prices and
liquidity.
Shobe et al.
(2014)
Evaluation of key design fea-
tures of the cap and trade pro-
gram implemented in the mar-
ket for greenhouse gas emission
permits in California, US.
12 human firms (experienced students) produce a
fixed price good and are endowed with a decreas-
ing number of emission permits during each of
12 periods. Half of the firms need one (two) per-
mit(s) to produce one unit of their good. Again
half of each group must consign all (none) of their
endowed permits to trade in a highest rejected or
lowest accepted bid uniform price sealed-bid auc-
tion, after which a spot market follows. Permit
holding limits are either tight or loose, permits in
a price containment reserve are released either in
or post auction.
Efficiency and permit liquidity
(price variability) are lower (is
higher) with tight than loose
holding limits. Market out-
comes are unaffected by the re-
lease timing of the price contain-
ment reserve and the auction’s
pricing rule.
The holding limit in Califor-
nia’s emission permit market,
intended to prevent market ma-
nipulation, may instead de-
crease liquidity, which is sug-
gested to facilitate the exploita-
tion of market power by large
greenhouse gas emitters. The
sale of price containment re-
serves may serve as a buffer for
low liquidity times.
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TABLE A.4: Continued.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Perkis et al.
(2015)
Potential of price controls such
as a hard (soft) price ceiling fix-
ing the maximum price (sup-
ply) but not the maximum sup-
ply (price) of emission permits
in keeping their prices in permit
auctions close to a target price
specified by the regulator.
Eight human firms with asymmetric initial emis-
sion permit allocations and marginal abatement
costs trade permits in a continuous double auction
subject to a price floor during each of 14 periods.
In each period a second continuous double auc-
tion may follow after a permit reserve is allocated
freely with either no price controls, a price ceiling
fixing the maximum price, or a price floor fixing
the maximum supply, both at the same target price
(between-subject).
Price converges above equilib-
rium with a reserve auction
with a price floor, to equilib-
rium without a reserve auction
or with a reserve auction with-
out price controls, and below
equilibrium to the target price
with a reserve auction with a
price ceiling in both auctions.
Hard price ceilings may effec-
tively limit prices in emission
permit markets and thus the
risk for emitting firms con-
nected to permit trading,
whereas a soft price ceiling
specifying a minimum price in
a permit reserve auction may
lead to high prices but limits the
total amount of emissions.
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TABLE A.5: Economic laboratory experiments on the regulation of conservation markets.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Banerjee et al.
(2012)
Effectiveness of conservation
programs based on an agglom-
eration bonus that rewards
spatial coordination between
landowners depending on the
number of landowners par-
ticipating in the conservation
program.
Six or 12 human landowners arranged on a circle
own two parcels with different conservation costs
each and choose which of the two to conserve for
20 periods. Payoffs depend on own and direct
neighbors’ choices and are lowest (highest) if only
one landowner chooses the cheap parcel and the
others choose the expensive parcels (all landown-
ers choose the cheap parcel). Landowners have
information on direct neighbors’ actions.
Landowners choose the parcel
with lower conservation cost
and thus benefit from agglomer-
ation bonus less in a bigger net-
work with 12 than six landown-
ers as coordination is impeded.
However, global coordination is
obtained in half of all networks.
Conservation programs with an
agglomeration bonus may be
more likely to lead to the effi-
cient ecosystem service of glob-
ally coordinated land manage-
ment on landscapes with fewer
landowners, so that conserva-
tion programs may be orga-
nized to result in a limited num-
ber of participants.
Banerjee et al.
(2014)
Improving the effectiveness of
conservation programs based
on an agglomeration bonus that
rewards spatial coordination
between landowners through
regulated dissemination of
information on neighboring
landowners’ program participa-
tion.
12 human landowners arranged on a circle choose
between conservation management or nature
farming on their land for 30 periods. Payoffs de-
pend on own and direct neighbors’ choices and
are lowest (highest) if only one landowner chooses
nature farming and the others conservation man-
agement (all landowners choose nature farming).
Landowners have information on direct neigh-
bors’ actions or additionally on their direct neigh-
bor’s direct neighbors (between-subject).
Landowners choose nature
farming more often with more
information, but the share of
nature farming choices and
thus coordination drops sharply
over time.
Effectiveness of an agglomer-
ation bonus in incentivizing
landowners to coordinate their
land use for ecosystem services
may be improved by imple-
menting information dissemi-
nation about program participa-
tion among landowners.
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TABLE A.5: Continued.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Banerjee et al.
(2015)
Effect of disclosure of informa-
tion on regulators’ preferences
for spatially adjacent conser-
vation areas on the efficiency
of conservation auctions with-
out a subsidized agglomeration
bonus.
Six human landowners arranged on a circle com-
pete in an inverse discriminatory price multi-
round auction for conservation activities during
13 periods with five to 10 auction rounds each. En-
vironmental benefits from conservation are asym-
metric across landowners and time-variant un-
known (known) to them (the regulator). Due
to agglomeration benefits the regulator has pref-
erences for bids from adjacent landowners and
this information may or may not be disclosed
(between-subject).
Landowners’ profits are higher
with information on agglom-
eration benefits, but the envi-
ronmental effectiveness in terms
of allocative efficiency is un-
changed.
Disclosing regulators’ prefer-
ences for spatially adjacent con-
servation areas may not lead to
a more efficient allocation con-
servation activities but rather al-
low landowners to coordinate
on higher prices.
Parkhurst
et al. (2015)
Improving the effectiveness of
conservation programs with
incentive mechanisms that ag-
gregate conservation decisions
of geographically connected
landowners such as an agglom-
eration bonus to prevent habitat
fragmentation.
Four human landowners own 25 asymmetrically
valuable parcels of land each (in a 10×10 grid) and
face a conservation set-aside requirement of five
parcels each for 20 periods. No value may be ex-
tracted from conserved parcels. Set-aside require-
ments may be tradable in a continuous multiu-
nit double auction and landowners may addition-
ally gain an agglomeration bonus for each border
shared between two own conserved parcels.
The number of shared bor-
ders between conserved parcels
(aggregate profits) are higher
(lower) if set-aside requirements
are tradable, even more so with
the agglomeration bonus. Ag-
gregate production is higher if
set-aside requirements are trad-
able.
Allowing landowners to trade
set-aside requirements in con-
servation programs may lead to
a more efficient allocation and
thus mitigate habitat fragmenta-
tion, even more so if landown-
ers receive a subsidized agglom-
eration bonus for connected
conservation areas.
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TABLE A.6: Economic laboratory experiments on the regulation of water markets.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Tisdell (2011) Efficiency of a uniform price
sealed-bid auction compared to
a continuous multiunit double
auction in the water market of a
specific catchment area in Aus-
tralia.
10 human farmers arranged in a nodal network
can each plant six different crops with asymmet-
ric values and maximum water usage and have
asymmetric initial water allocations and thus,
supply and demand, resulting in market power
for some farmers. Water may be traded either in a
uniform price sealed-bid auction or a continuous
multiunit double auction for 20 periods. All bids
and offers are made public after trading.
Allocative efficiency, water
price, and traded quantity are
higher in the uniform price
sealed-bid auction than in the
continuous multiunit double
auction. For the latter, price and
quantity are even lower than
the competitive equilibrium.
A continuous multiunit double
auction may not be more effi-
cient than the traditional uni-
form price sealed-bid auction in
allocating water if asymmetries
in market power, as in real wa-
ter markets, are taken into ac-
count.
García-
Gallego
et al. (2012a,b)
Short- and long-run efficiency of
different market structures, in
particular a private monopoly, a
private or coordinated duopoly,
and a public utility acting as a
social planner in allocating wa-
ter of differing quality to house-
holds and farmers.
One (two) human producers with an initial stock
of high and low (either high or low) quality wa-
ter sell it at varying extraction cost over a total
of 50 periods to farmers and households valuing
quality differently. Each period, a fixed amount of
water is added to producers’ stocks and demand
is computerized to maximize consumer surplus.
Producers choose a price schedule for the first five
units of each water type. The market is cleared at
a uniform price for each water type.
Price (quality to price ratio)
is highest (lowest) in the pri-
vate monopoly, followed by the
duopoly, and lowest (highest) in
the public monopoly. A coordi-
nated duopoly is similar to the
private monopoly. Resources
are overexploited in all market
structures, but deplete fastest in
the public monopoly.
Water provision from a monop-
olistic public utility may be ben-
eficial for consumers at the cost
of higher resource overexploita-
tion; however, the latter arises
not only from market design but
also due to human decision er-
rors.
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TABLE A.6: Continued.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Holt et al.
(2012)
Efficiency of alternative mecha-
nisms to allocate water among
competing farmers if water is
a scarce common-pool resource
with unidirectional flow as in
the case of an exogenously filled
water canal.
Six human farmers organized along a water canal
own four fields with asymmetric time-variant pro-
ductivity each and decide sequentially on water
appropriation from a total of 12 units in each of
six periods. The productivity of the three down-
stream farmers’ fields is higher than the upstream
farmers’. Irrigation triples the value of a field.
Either cheap-talk, bilateral bargaining, a uniform
price auction of water rights, or an optimal irriga-
tion fee is implemented (between-subject).
Allocation efficiency is high-
est with the optimal irrigation
fee, followed by the multiu-
nit uniform price auction, fol-
lowed by bilateral bargaining
and cheap-talk (indistinguish-
able), and lowest in the baseline
scenario.
An irrigation fee based on a
Pigouvian tax may lead to op-
timal efficiency in a water mar-
ket characterized by a common-
pool resource with unidirec-
tional flow. If an optimal irri-
gation fee cannot be calculated
due to uncertainty, a multiunit
uniform price auction may lead
to high efficiency.
Lefebvre et al.
(2012)
Effect of two security level wa-
ter rights, as implemented in
water markets in the western
part of the US and two Aus-
tralian states, compared to one
security level water rights on
allocation of water and risk of
not being served unter water
scarcity.
Six human farmers of two types with asymmet-
ric crop values and irrigation-sensitivity trade first
water rights and second the distributed water al-
locations, the quantity of which varies between
two random weather scenarios, in separate con-
tinuous double auctions in each of 9 to 12 periods.
There may be high and low security water rights
with the former traded first and served first in case
of scarcity and there are transaction cost either for
trading water rights or water allocations.
Efficiency and profit are higher
with two (one) security level
water rights if there are no
transaction cost for trading wa-
ter rights (water allocations).
With two security level water
rights, high and low security
types are allocated such that the
variability of profits is reduces
for less risk-tolerant farmers.
Security-differentiated water
rights may enable an allocation
of the risk of not being served
under water scarcity according
to the risk-preferences of farm-
ers. However, the effect of the
number of security levels on
efficiency may heavily depend
on transaction cost for trading
water rights and allocations.
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TABLE A.6: Continued.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Hansen et al.
(2014)
Potential of water options to
increase water allocation effi-
ciency in arid regions with
highly weather-dependent wa-
ter supply.
Four human sellers have asymmetric time-variant
initial water allocations which are either certain
or uncertain (within-subject) and one or four hu-
man buyers (between-subject) with asymmetric
time-variant water valuations trade in a contin-
uous double auction during each of 22 periods.
There may be another concurrent continuous dou-
ble auction for options for water rights, which al-
low buyers to purchase a unit of water at a fixed
price after the state of the nature is revealed.
Price and quantity is lower with
a single dominant buyer than
four competing buyers. Ef-
ficiency is higher when wa-
ter options can be traded and
gains from trade are not only
higher but also more evenly dis-
tributed.
Water option markets may lead
to more efficient water alloca-
tions and equalized gains from
trade, especially across sellers
facing a single dominant buyer,
which is reminiscent of the Cal-
ifornia water market structure.
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TABLE A.7: Economic laboratory experiments on price controls.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Dufwenberg
et al. (2007)
Effect of price floors on compe-
tition.
Two or four human firms with zero production
cost compete in a homogeneous Bertrand with
inelastic demand over 10 periods with random
matching. Firms are either subject to a low or high
price floor.
With two (four) firms, prices
are lower (similar) under a high
than (and) a low price floor.
Price floors above production
cost ensuring firms a profit may
intensify competition rather
than relaxing it.
Engelmann
and Normann
(2009); En-
gelmann and
Müller (2011)
Effect of price ceilings on com-
petition.
Two (four) human firms with asymmetric (sym-
metric) and increasing marginal production cost
compete in homogeneous goods and choose
prices in a posted offer market over 60 periods.
Firms are subject to a (low) price ceiling either in
the first or second 30 periods (or first to a high and
then a low price ceiling). Demand is decreasing in
price and either known or unknown to firms.
Prices are lower with the price
ceiling than with unconstrained
pricing and rise if the price ceil-
ing is lifted over time but do
not differ between a low or high
price ceiling. The degree of col-
lusion is unaffected.
Price ceilings below the
monopoly price may inten-
sify competition rather than
relaxing it.
Berninghaus
et al. (2012)
Effect of a price regulation that
allows firms to raise their prices
only at specified times on com-
petition.
Two human symmetric firms compete in a dif-
ferentiated Bertrand and choose one out of four
prices over at least 30 periods. Firms are allowed
to raise their prices either in any period or only in
certain known periods.
Prices are higher and less
volatile if firms may raise their
prices only in regulated periods
than in any period.
Price volatility regulation spec-
ifying the times of permitted
price increases may lead to
higher prices and thus facilitate
collusion.
Horstmann
and Krämer
(2013)
Effect of a uniform pricing con-
straint across geographic mar-
kets on competition.
Two human symmetric firms compete in two sep-
arate homogeneous Bertrand markets over 10 pe-
riods. Firms are either allowed to choose different
prices for both markets or obliged to choose the
same price for both markets.
Prices are higher if firms are
allowed discriminate prices
across markets than if they have
to choose a uniform price.
Uniform pricing constraints
across geographic markets may
intensify competition.
252
TABLE A.8: Economic laboratory experiments on leniency programs for cartel detection.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Apesteguia
et al. (2007)
Potential of different leniency
programs that grant self-
reporting cartel members a
reward or a reduced fine
compared to antitrust policy
based on fixed cartel fines in
deterring cartel formation and
maintaining competition.
Three human firms compete in a homogeneous
Bertrand with inelastic demand for one period.
Firms may be able to chat, but for a chat to occur
all firms have to indicate that they want to form
a cartel. Price agreements are not binding. After
learning the market price, firms may report an ex-
isting cartel and either all firms pay a fine, or the
reporting firm(s) share a fine reduction or the fines
of the non-reporting firm(s).
Market prices are lower if re-
porting firms get a fine reduc-
tion than if they are rewarded
the fines of the non-reporting
firms or if all firms pay a fine.
The number of (reported) cartels
is lower (higher) if the reporting
firms pay a lesser than if all pay
the same fine.
Leniency programs imple-
mented in many OECD coun-
tries that grant self-reporting
cartel members amnesty from
fines or reduced fines in case
of simultaneous reporting from
multiple cartel members may
effectively deter cartel forma-
tion and intensify competition.
Hinloopen
and Soetevent
(2008)
Potential of leniency programs
that encourage early self-
reporting of cartels through
amnesty only for the first
reporting cartel member in
deterring cartel formation and
mitigating cartel duration.
Three human firms compete in a homogeneous
Bertrand with inelastic demand for at least 20 peri-
ods. Firms may be able to communicate preferred
price ranges via a structured protocol if all firms
indicate that they want to form a cartel. Price
agreements are not binding. A cartel is detected
and fined either with 0% or 15% probability. Be-
forehand, firms may be able to costly report a car-
tel for amnesty (a fine reduction) for the first (sec-
ond) reporting firm.
Prices, the number of cartels,
and cartel duration are lower if
cartels can be reported within a
leniency program than if cartels
can only be detected but not re-
ported, if cartels cannot also not
be detected, or even if cartels
cannot be formed.
Leniency programs that grant
amnesty for the first and a fine
reduction for subsequent self-
reporting cartel members irre-
spective of the cartel’s duration
may be more effective in deter-
ring cartel formation and inten-
sifying competition than relying
solely on cartel detection.
Hamaguchi
et al. (2009)
Potential of leniency programs
based on rewards or fine reduc-
tions in dissolving existing car-
tels.
Two or seven human firms form a cartel for at least
one period and are detected with 10% probability.
Firms can report the cartel for either a reward of
others’ then maturing fines, a partial or a full re-
duction of the fine. This is granted to either the
first or all reporting firms.
Cooperation rates are lower
with more firms and if report-
ing is rewarded than if it leads
to fine reduction, but not differ-
ent whether this applies to all or
only the first reporting firm.
Leniency programs that grant
rewards to self-reporting firms
may be more effective in dis-
solving existing cartels than
programs based on fine reduc-
tions.
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TABLE A.8: Continued.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Bigoni et al.
(2012, 2015b)
Potential of leniency programs
based on rewards or fine reduc-
tions compared to fines in deter-
ring cartel formation and main-
taining competition.
Two human firms compete in a differentiated
Bertrand with elastic demand for at least 20 pe-
riods with a random matching with 15% probabil-
ity. Firms can communicate preferred prices via a
structured protocol if both indicate that they want
to form a cartel. Price agreements are not bind-
ing. Firms can costly report a cartel before and
after price choices for either a reward of the other
firm’s fine, no or a full reduction of the fine for the
first reporting firm. A cartel is detected and fined
either with 0% or 10% probability.
Prices and the number of
(reported) cartels are lower
(higher) with a reward or fine
reduction for the first reporting
firm than if all firms pay the
fine. This holds even more so
if fines are higher although
expected fines are the same. If
all firms pay the fine prices are
even higher than if cartels are
permitted. Prohibited cartels
are more stable and choose
higher prices.
Leniency programs both based
on amnesty or rewards may
deter cartel formation and re-
duce prices more than tradi-
tional antitrust law enforcement
based on fines, which may even
increase prices compared to a
laissez-faire policy. However,
leniency programs may also in-
crease prices in those cartels that
do form.
Hinloopen
and Onderstal
(2014)
Effect of traditional antitrust
policy and leniency programs
on cartel formation in single
round and multiround auctions.
Three human firms compete in either a first-price
sealed-bid auction or a multiround ascending auc-
tion during 40 periods. Firms form a cartel if
all vote to cooperate, which constitutes a non-
binding agreement that one randomly selected
firm will be the only bidder and compensates the
other firms. A cartel is detected and fined either
with 0% or 15% probability. Beforehand, firms
may be able to costly report a cartel for a fine
reduction whose value decreases in expectation
with the number of reporting firms.
In the first-price sealed-bid auc-
tion, the number of cartels is
lower if cartels can be detected
but not reported or detected and
reported than if they cannot,
firms defect from an agreement
mostly if cartels can be detected
but not reported, and winning
bids are lowest if cartels can be
detected and reported.
Antitrust policy may have no
effect in multiround ascending
auctions. In first-price sealed-
bid auctions, traditional an-
titrust policy and leniency pro-
grams may both deter cartel for-
mation, while the former (latter)
decreases (increases) cartel sta-
bility and increases (decreases)
winning bids.
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TABLE A.9: Economic laboratory experiments on vertical mergers.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Martin et al.
(2001)
Anti-competitive effect of clear-
ing a vertical merger between
a downstream firm and a mo-
nopolistic upstream firm or of
the publication of upstream of-
fers to downstream firms by a
monopolistic upstream firm on
foreclosure of downstream com-
petitors.
One human monopolistic upstream firm makes
either public or secret price-quantity take-it-or-
leave-it offers to either two human downstream
firms or is vertically integrated with one down-
stream firm and makes an offer only to the re-
maining downstream firm over 10 periods with
either random or fixed matching. Downstream
firms compete in a homogeneous Cournot, pro-
vided they accept their respective upstream firm’s
offer.
Upstream output is restricted to
the monopoly level more fre-
quently if upstream offers are
public or if the upstream firm is
integrated than if upstream of-
fers are secret, but is not differ-
ently frequent between the for-
mer two. More downstream
surplus is extracted if the up-
stream firm is integrated.
Vertical integration of or merger
with a monopolistic upstream
firm may facilitate foreclosure
of downstream competitors in a
broad sense, although the up-
stream monopolist may restrict
output equally if its offers to
downstream firms are public.
Normann
(2011)
Anti-competitive effect of clear-
ing a vertical merger between
a downstream firm and an up-
stream firm in duopolistic mar-
kets on foreclosure of down-
stream competitors.
Two human upstream firms compete in a homoge-
neous Bertrand with demand from two comput-
erized downstream firms decreasing in price over
15 or 25 periods with random or fixed matching.
One upstream firm may be integrated with one of
the downstream firms making its profit strictly in-
creasing in price.
Upstream prices are higher in
markets with a vertically in-
tegrated firm than with sep-
arated firms. The vertically
integrated firm charges higher
prices than the non-integrated
upstream firm.
Vertical integration or mergers
in duopolistic markets may in-
crease downstream prices and
facilitate collusion between up-
stream firms and thus facilitate
foreclosure of downstream com-
petitors in a broad, but not in a
narrow sense.
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TABLE A.10: Economic laboratory experiments on product bundling.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Caliskan et al.
(2007); Muris
and Smith
(2008)
Effect of allowing or prohibiting
a dominant firm to bundle prod-
ucts across markets on competi-
tors and consumers.
Five human firms, of them one dominant firm sell-
ing products A and B, one competitive fringe sell-
ing A, and three firms selling B have asymmetric
fixed cost and capacities, market-specific marginal
cost, and choose prices in a posted offer market
over 210 five seconds long periods. The dominant
firm is either allowed or not to bundle both prod-
ucts and the fringe either exists or not.
Consumer and total surplus are
unaffected by bundling and it
deters entry to the B market
only if the parameters favor
exclusion. The presence of
the fringe reduces transaction
prices, but does not interact
with bundling.
Bundling may not have adverse
welfare effects and exclusion ef-
fects only in special cases so
that regulation should not ban
bundling per se.
Hinloopen
et al. (2014)
Effect of allowing or prohibiting
a firm to bundle products from a
monopolistic and a competitive
market on competitors and con-
sumers.
Two human firms, of them one multi-product
firm selling products D and M and one firm sell-
ing only D choose quantities in either a homo-
geneous Cournot or Stackelberg—with the dom-
inant firm as first mover—over 15 periods with
random matching. The dominant firm either bun-
dles always and does not offer products sepa-
rately, is prohibited to bundle products, or may
decide whether to bundle or not.
Total surplus and profit of the
single-product firm (consumer
surplus and profit of the multi-
product firm) are lower (unaf-
fected) if bundling occurs, but
the mere possibility to bundle
does not affect market perfor-
mance as the multi-product firm
decides rarely to bundle.
The possibility to bundle may
not have adverse welfare effects
whereas a bundle itself does, al-
though it occurs rarely. This
supports the current regulatory
policy in the EU to investigate
each instance of bundling sepa-
rately for abuses of a dominant
position.
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TABLE A.11: Economic laboratory experiments on transparency regulation and information dissemination.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Huck et al.
(1999, 2000)
Effect of publishing either only
aggregate industry or also firm-
specific data on competition.
Four symmetric firms compete in either a homo-
geneous Cournot, a differentiated Cournot, or a
differentiated Bertrand over 40 periods. Firms are
informed about either only average competitors’
quantity or also firm-specific prices or quantities
and profits of competitors.
Quantities (prices) in Cournot
(Bertrand) markets are higher
(similar) with firm-specific than
(as with) aggregate information.
More information in form of
an obligation to publish firm-
specific data on output and
profits may intensify competi-
tion in industries.
Dufwenberg
and Gneezy
(2002)
Effect of announcing none, win-
ning, or winning and losing bids
across inverse first-price sealed-
bid auctions on competition.
Two firms compete in an inverse first-price sealed-
bid auction with known common value, i.e., a ho-
mogeneous Bertrand, over 10 periods with ran-
dom matching over 12 firms. Firms are informed
about either bids of all 12 firms, only the six win-
ning bids, or no bids at all.
Prices are initially similar but
later higher if bids of all 12 firms
are known and not different be-
tween the other two informa-
tion scenarios.
Auctioneers may inhibit tacit
collusion in inverse first-price
sealed-bid auctions if they an-
nounce winning but not losing
bids across parallel auctions.
Offerman
et al. (2002)
Effect of publishing either only
aggregate industry or also firm-
specific data on competition.
Three symmetric firms compete in a homoge-
neous Cournot with increasing marginal cost over
100 periods. Firms are informed about either only
total quantity and price, also firm-specific quanti-
ties, or, above that, also firm-specific profits.
Total quantities are highest with
most, followed by least, and
lowest with medium informa-
tion. Individual quantities are
more frequently collusive with
more information.
More information in form of
an obligation to publish firm-
specific data on output (and
also profit) may relax (intensify)
competition in industries.
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TABLE A.11: Continued.
Policy problem Experimental design Experimental results Policy implications
Altavilla et al.
(2006)
Effect of publishing either firm-
specific data on competitors
or aggregate data from related
markets on competition.
Two symmetric firms compete in either a homoge-
neous Cournot, a differentiated Cournot, or a dif-
ferentiated Bertrand over 20 periods. Firms are in-
formed about either only own profit, also the aver-
age profit across all duopolies, or instead also the
price/quantity and profit of the competitor. There
is a random (fixed) matching in the first two (the
last) cases.
Quantities (prices) in Cournot
(Bertrand) markets are lowest
(highest) with information on
average profit across duopolies
(only on own profit). Price and
quantity dispersion is reduced
with more information.
More information in form of
firm-specific data on output and
profits (aggregate data on prof-
its from other markets) may in-
tensify (relax) competition in in-
dustries.
Bruttel (2009) Effect of announcing either
only competitors’ bids or bids
across parallel inverse first-
price sealed-bid auctions on
competition.
Two firms compete in an inverse first-price sealed-
bid auction with known common value, i.e., a ho-
mogeneous Bertrand, over 10 or 25 periods with
random matching over 12 firms. Firms are in-
formed about either bids of all 12 firms or only
their competitor’s bid.
Prices are initially similar but
later higher if bids of all 12 firms
are known and approach the
theoretical prediction if only the
competitor’s bid is known.
Auctioneers may inhibit tacit
collusion in inverse first-price
sealed-bid auctions if they do
not announce bids across paral-
lel auctions.
Sluijs et al.
(2011); Henze
et al. (2015)
Effect of transparency regula-
tion, i.e., an obligation to dis-
close information about product
quality, on quality and prices in
markets for experience goods,
e.g., broadband internet access
or health care plans.
Two human sellers choose product quality and,
after observing each others’, choose prices. Four
buyers valuing quality in different degrees de-
cide from which seller to buy having full infor-
mation, no information, full information only for
half the buyers, or an imperfect signal on quali-
ties (between-subject). Buyers with full informa-
tion are computerized, the others are played by
humans. Buyers are subject to a random match-
ing for 30 periods.
Product quality is ordered
(highest to lowest): full infor-
mation, full information only
for half the buyers, imperfect
signal, no information. Time
trend is negative for the latter,
but positive for the other infor-
mation treatments. Prices do
not differ across treatments.
Transparency regulation may
be effective in protecting con-
sumers from low product qual-
ity and increasing welfare as it
increases quality of experience
goods substantially whilst keep-
ing prices at similar levels.
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Theoretical Analyses
B.1 Oligopoly competition
Let the relevant industry consist of n ∈ N firms. Each firm produces one good and
goods between firms are differentiated. Considering the representative consumer’s
utility function suggested by Singh and Vives (1984) and extending the generalization
by Häckner (2000), inverse demand for firm i ∈ {1, ...,n} is given by
pi = ωi − λiqi − γ∑
j 6=i
qj
with ωi,λi > 0,∀i ∈ {1, ...,n} and the degree of substitutability γ. If γ < 0 goods are
complementary, if γ = 0 goods are independent of one another, and if γ > 0 they are
substitutes. ωi may be interpreted as quality and thus, differences among firms as
vertical differentiation. With substitute goods, ωi is also firm i’s reservation price. λi is
the elasticity of inverse demand of firm i’s good. For simplicity, assume that λi = λ,∀i ∈
{1, ...,n} and let θ = γλ . This bounds θ ≤ 1 with goods being perfect substitutes if θ = 1.
The inverse demand for firm i then transforms to
(B.1) pi = ωi − λ
(
qi + θ∑
j 6=i
qj
)
.
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Note that firms are vertically differentiated, i.e., asymmetric, and that symmetry re-
quires ωi = ω,∀i ∈ {1, ...,n}. To calculate the demand for firm i, summarize Equation
(B.1) over all n firms, which results in
n
∑
i=1
pi =
n
∑
i=1
ωi − λ
(
n
∑
i=1
qi + θ(n− 1)
n
∑
i=1
qi
)
using ∑ni=1∑j 6=i qj = (n− 1)∑ni=1 qi. Solving this for ∑ni=1 qi yields
n
∑
i=1
qi =
1
λ(1+ θ(n− 1))
n
∑
i=1
(ωi − pi).
As a transformation of this equation, noting that
n
∑
i=1
qi = qi +∑
j 6=i
qj,
n
∑
i=1
ωi = ωi +∑
j 6=i
ωj,
(B.2)
and using Equation (B.1), firm i’s demand for non-perfect substitutes (θ < 1) is given
by
(B.3) qi =
(ωi − pi)(1+ θ(n− 2))− θ∑j 6=i(ωj − pj)
λ(1− θ)(1+ θ(n− 1))
provided that the quantity is non-negative and with n as the number of firms with
non-negative demand. Otherwise, if qi < 0, firm i exits the market and its demand is
zero.
With costs normalized to zero and q−i = {q1, ...,qn} \ qi, firm i’s profit is given by
Πi = piqi with price pi(qi,q−i) as a function of quantities in Cournot competition and
quantity qi(pi, p−i) as a function of prices in Bertrand competition. In the following
analysis of Walrasian, Nash, and collusive equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits,
subscripts are used to differentiate between Bertrand and Cournot competition.
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Walrasian equilibrium
In the Walrasian equilibrium, also referred to as competitive equilibrium, firms are as-
sumed to have no market power and hence, are price-takers with all prices at marginal
cost. Therefore, the Walrasian equilibrium is identical under Bertrand and Cournot
competition. Setting Equation (B.1) to marginal cost, i.e., zero, it can be transformed
to
qi(q−i) =
ωi − λθ∑j 6=i qj
λ
.
Summing over all n firms gives
n
∑
i=1
qi =
∑ni=1ωi − λθ(n− 1)∑ni=1 qi
λ
,
which, using the previous Equation together with Equation (B.2), yields the Walrasian
equilibrium
qWalrasi =
ωi(1+ θ(n− 2))− θ∑j 6=iωj
λ(1− θ)(1+ θ(n− 1)) ,
pWalrasi = 0,
ΠWalrasi = 0.
(B.4)
Nash equilibrium
In the Nash equilibrium under Cournot competition firm i maximizes Πi with respect
to its quantity qi given the other firms’ quantities q−i. Firm i’s best response is given
by
qi(q−i) =
ωi − λθ∑j 6=i qj
2λ
and its sum over all n firms amounts to
n
∑
i=1
qi =
∑ni=1ωi − λθ(n− 1)∑ni=1 qi
2λ
.
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Using the previous Equation together with Equation (B.2), the Cournot Nash equilib-
rium can be retrieved as
qNashCournot,i =
ωi(2+ θ(n− 2))− θ∑j 6=iωj
λ(2− θ)(2+ θ(n− 1)) ,
pNashCournot,i =
ωi(2+ θ(n− 2))− θ∑j 6=iωj
(2− θ)(2+ θ(n− 1)) ,
ΠNashCournot,i =
(ωi(2+ θ(n− 2))− θ∑j 6=iωj)2
λ(2− θ)2(2+ θ(n− 1))2 .
(B.5)
In the Nash equilibrium under Bertrand competition firm i maximizes Πi with respect
to its price pi given the other firms’ prices p−i. Firm i’s response function can be calcu-
lated as
pi(p−i) =
ωi
2
− θ∑j 6=i(ωj − pj)
2(1+ θ(n− 2)) .
Summing over all n firms yields
n
∑
i=1
pi =
∑ni=1ωi
2
− θ(n− 1)∑
n
i=1(ωi − pi)
2(1+ θ(n− 2)) ,
which can be transformed using the previous Equation together with Equation (B.2) to
retrieve the Bertrand Nash equilibrium
qNashBertrand,i =
(1+ θ(n− 2))(ωi(θ2(n2 − 5n + 5) + 3θ(n− 2) + 2)− θ(1+ θ(n− 2))∑j 6=iωj)
λ(1− θ)(1+ θ(n− 1))(2+ θ(n− 3))(2+ θ(2n− 3)) ,
pNashBertrand,i =
ωi(θ
2(n2 − 5n + 5) + 3θ(n− 2) + 2)− θ(1+ θ(n− 2))∑j 6=iωj
(1+ θ(n− 1))(2+ θ(n− 3))(2+ θ(2n− 3)) ,
ΠNashBertrand,i =
(1+ θ(n− 2))(ωi(θ2(n2 − 5n + 5) + 3θ(n− 2) + 2)− θ(1+ θ(n− 2))∑j 6=iωj)2
λ(1− θ)(1+ θ(n− 1))2(2+ θ(n− 3))2(2+ θ(2n− 3))2 .
(B.6)
As Häckner (2000) shows, Nash prices are always higher under Cournot competition
than under Bertrand competition for substitute goods (θ > 0). Instead, if goods are
complements (θ < 0) and vertical differentiation between firms is high, Nash prices
of low-quality firms may be higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot
competition. With respect to profits there are different nuances. For complementary
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goods, Nash profits are always higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot
competition. Instead, if goods are substitutes, the opposite holds unless vertical differ-
entiation between firms is low, when Nash profits of high-quality firms may be higher
under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition.
Collusive equilibrium
In the collusive equilibrium firms employ JPM, i.e., firms behave like a single monop-
olist and maximize ∑ni=1Πi. Therefore, the collusive equilibrium is identical under
Bertrand and Cournot competition. Using Equation (B.1) and summing over the corre-
sponding profit functions, joint profit of all n firms is given by
n
∑
i=1
Πi =
n
∑
i=1
(ωiqi)− λ
n
∑
i=1
q2i − λθ
n
∑
i=1
(qi∑
j 6=i
qj).
Noting that
∂∑ni=1(qi∑j 6=i qj)
∂qi
= 2∑j 6=i qj, the first-order condition of joint profit maximiza-
tion can be calculated as
qi(q−i) =
ωi − 2λθ∑j 6=i qj
2λ
.
Again summing over all n firms results in
n
∑
i=1
qi =
∑ni=1ωi
2λ
− θ(n− 1)
n
∑
i=1
qi,
which finally yields the collusive equilibrium using the previous Equation and Equa-
tion (B.2) as
qJPM =
ωi(1+ θ(n− 2))− θ∑j 6=iωj
2λ(1− θ)(1+ θ(n− 1)) ,
pJPM =
ωi
2
,
ΠJPM =
ωi(ωi(1+ θ(n− 2))− θ∑j 6=iωj)
4λ(1− θ)(1+ θ(n− 1)) .
(B.7)
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Note that joint profit maximizing prices are linearly connected to vertical differentiation
as firm i’s price in collusive equilibrium depends solely on its own quality.
Symmetric firms
In case of symmetric firms without vertical product differentiation, i.e., ωi = ω,∀i ∈
{1, ..., N}, i’s demand function, i.e., Equation (B.3), simplifies to
qi =
(ω− pi)(1+ θ(n− 2))− θ∑j 6=i(ω− pj)
λ(1− θ)(1+ θ(n− 1))
=
ω
λ(1+ θ(n− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω
− 1+ θ(n− 2)
λ(1− θ)(1+ θ(n− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ
pi +
θ(n− 1)
λ(1− θ)(1+ θ(n− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ
∑j 6=i qj
n− 1
=Ω−Λpi +Θ
∑j 6=i qj
n− 1
with Ω,Λ,Θ > 0 for substitute goods (θ > 0). Consequently, the Walrasian equilibrium
given by Equation (B.4), which predicts marginal cost pricing, simplifies to
qWalras =
ω
λ(1+ θ(n− 1)) ,
pWalras = 0,
ΠWalras = 0.
In the Nash equilibrium under Cournot competition firm i maximizes Πi with respect
to qi. With symmetric firms, Equation (B.5) yields the Cournot Nash equilibrium
qNashCournot =
ω
λ(2+ θ(n− 1)) ,
pNashCournot =
ω
2+ θ(n− 1) ,
ΠNashCournot =
ω2
λ(2+ θ(n− 1))2 .
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In the Nash equilibrium under Bertrand competition firm i maximizes Πi with respect
to pi. With symmetric firms and Equation (B.6), the Bertrand Nash equilibrium is given
by
qNashBertrand =
ω(1+ θ(n− 2))
λ(2+ θ(n− 3))(1+ θ(n− 1)) ,
pNashBertrand =
ω(1− θ)
2+ θ(n− 3) ,
ΠNashBertrand =
ω2(1− θ)(1+ θ(n− 2))
λ(2+ θ(n− 3))2(1+ θ(n− 1)) .
Finally, in the collusive equilibrium, with firms employing JPM and irrespective of
Bertrand or Cournot competition, Equation (B.7) simplifies to
qJPM =
ω
2λ(1+ θ(n− 1)) ,
pJPM =
ω
2
,
ΠJPM =
ω2
4λ(1+ θ(n− 1)) .
B.2 Multimarket contact
Proof of Proposition 6.1 The price setting strategy depends only on the current state
of the industry and not on the sequence of states and choices that preceded it. The
process described by the strategy is thus memoryless, i.e., the Markov property holds.
Consequently, it may be modeled by a Markov chain. With parameters σ, ψX, and ψ−X
bounded away from zero, the process described by the price setting strategy eventually
reaches JPM with probability one—and remains in this state. Therefore, JPM pricing is
an absorbing state which may be reached from any initial price configuration, i.e., from
any other transient state of the process. Consequently, the Markov chain describing the
process is an absorbing chain. Furthermore, requiring that the random initial prices are
bounded away from the JPM price leads to a unique starting state.
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The square transition matrix H = (he, f ) of such an absorbing Markov chain, indicating
the probabilities of transitioning from one state e to any other state f , can be written in
the following canonical form (Grinstead and Snell, 2012, p. 415–432):
H =
V W
0 Iw

Let v be the number of transient, i.e., non-absorbing, states and w the number of ab-
sorbing states. Then, V is the v-by-v transition matrix between transient states, W is
the v-by-w matrix of probabilities for transitioning from any of the transient to any of
the absorbing states, 0 is the w-by-v zero matrix, and Iw is the w-by-w identity matrix.
A crucial property of an absorbing Markov chain is that the expected number of times
the process is in state f when starting from state e—before absorption—is given by the
entries of the v-by-v fundamental matrix F, which is calculated as
F = (Iv −V)−1
with Iv as the v-by-v identity matrix. Given the fundamental matrix, the expected num-
ber of steps before absorption from a starting state e is the eth entry of the vector
t˜ = F1
with 1 as the length-v transposed unit vector. Due to this specific property of the ab-
sorbing Markov chain and as the process described by the price signaling strategy has
a unique absorbing state, t˜ constitutes the vector of the expected number of steps until
JPM is reached on all markets when starting in state e.
Note that, according to the price setting strategy, firms play best response at all times
that they are not sending or reacting to a price signal. Any price configuration in which
all prices lie below the JPM price may thus w.l.o.g. be viewed as playing best response.
Consequently, each market can have three different states that will be denoted accord-
ing to the following notations:
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◦ BR denotes that both firms do not signal and thus, play best response,
◦ si denotes that firm i ∈ {A, B} sends a price signal and the other firm does not,
and
◦ JPM denotes that both firms choose the JPM price.
It is worth noting that if both firms send a price signal in the same market at the same
time, JPM is already reached on that market.
Under single market contact of non-conglomerate firms, i.e., SMC, ψ−X does not apply
as firms operate only on one market. Instead, the process at which the price setting
strategy converges to JPM depends solely on the probabilities of sending a price signal,
i.e., σ, and reacting to it (on the same market), i.e., ψX. The state space for the single
market X is given by
SSMC = {XBR, Xsi , X JPM}.
The transition matrix indicating the probabilities of transitioning between these three
states is
HSMC =

(1− σ)2 2σ(1− σ) σ2
(1− σ)(1− ψX) σ(1− ψX) + (1− σ)ψX σψX
0 0 1

and reads as follows: The probability of transitioning from state e to state f is given by
the entry in row e and column f . It is easy to see that the Markov chain specified by this
transition matrix (in canonical form) is an absorbing chain. Then, the expected number
of steps until state JPM is reached when starting with both firms playing BR is
t˜SMC =
2σ2 − 2σψX − σ+ ψX − 1
σ2(σ− ψX − 1) ,
which is strictly monotonically decreasing in σ and ψX.
Under multimarket contact (MMC) between conglomerate firms, both firms may send
a price signal on none, one or both markets and may also react to any price signal
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on none, one or both markets. As a consequence, both markets M1 and M2 have to
be considered separately to indicate industry states, i.e., a tuple of market states, in
case the states of both markets are not symmetric. The state space has a cardinality of
|SMMC| = 10 states and is given by
SMMC = {(XBR,−XBR), (MBR1 , Msi2 ), (Msi1 , MBR2 ), (Xsi ,−Xs−i), (Xsi ,−Xsi),
(MBR1 , M
JPM
2 ), (M
JPM
1 , M
BR
2 ), (M
si
1 , M
JPM
2 ), (M
JPM
1 , M
si
2 ), (X
JPM,−X JPM)}.
Thereby, when the order of markets does not matter, they are referred to generically
as X and −X. This applies to all industry states in which the states of both markets
are identical or in which market states are interchangeable in such a way that does
not change transition probabilities to any other industry state. The transition matrix
between states is
HMMC =

h1,1 h1,2 · · · h1,10
h2,1 h2,2 · · · h2,10
...
...
. . .
...
h10,1 h10,2 · · · h10,10

with
h1,1 = (1− σ)4,
h1,2 = h1,3 = 2σ(1− σ)3,
h1,4 = h1,5 = 2σ2(1− σ)2,
h1,6 = h1,7 = σ2(1− σ)2,
h1,8 = h1,9 = 2σ3(1− σ),
h1,10 = σ4,
h2,1 = (1− σ)2(1− ψX)(1− ψ−X),
h2,2 = σ(1− σ)(1− ψX)(1− ψ−X) + (1− σ)2ψX(1− ψ−X),
h2,3 = σ(1− σ)(1− ψX)(1− ψ−X) + (1− σ)2(1− ψX)ψ−X,
h2,4 = σ(1− σ)ψX(1− ψ−X) + σ(1− σ)(1− ψX)ψ−X,
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h2,5 = σ2(1− ψX)(1− ψ−X) + (1− σ)2ψXψ−X,
h2,6 = σ(1− σ)ψX(1− ψ−X),
h2,7 = σ(1− σ)(1− ψX)ψ−X,
h2,8 = σ2ψX(1− ψ−X) + σ(1− σ)ψXψ−X,
h2,9 = σ2(1− ψX)ψ−X + σ(1− σ)ψXψ−X,
h2,10 = σ2ψXψ−X,
h3,1 = (1− σ)2(1− ψX)(1− ψ−X),
h3,2 = σ(1− σ)(1− ψX)(1− ψ−X) + (1− σ)2(1− ψX)ψ−X,
h3,3 = σ(1− σ)(1− ψX)(1− ψ−X) + (1− σ)2ψX(1− ψ−X),
h3,4 = σ(1− σ)ψX(1− ψ−X) + σ(1− σ)(1− ψX)ψ−X,
h3,5 = σ2(1− ψX)(1− ψ−X) + (1− σ)2ψXψ−X,
h3,6 = σ(1− σ)(1− ψX)ψ−X,
h3,7 = σ(1− σ)ψX(1− ψ−X),
h3,8 = σ2(1− ψX)ψ−X + σ(1− σ)ψXψ−X,
h3,9 = σ2ψX(1− ψ−X) + σ(1− σ)ψXψ−X,
h3,10 = σ2ψXψ−X,
h4,1 = (1− ψX)2(1− ψ−X)2,
h4,2 = h4,3 = ψX(1− ψX)(1− ψ−X)2 + (1− ψX)2ψ−X(1− ψ−X),
h4,4 = ψX
2
(1− ψ−X)2 + (1− ψX)2ψ−X2,
h4,5 = 2ψXψ−X(1− ψX)(1− ψ−X),
h4,6 = h4,7 = ψXψ−X(1− ψX)(1− ψ−X),
h4,8 = h4,9 = ψXψ−XψX(1− ψ−X) + ψXψ−X(1− ψX)ψ−X,
h4,10 = ψX
2
ψ−X2,
h5,1 = (1− σ)2(1− ψX)2,
h5,2 = h5,3 = σ(1− σ)(1− ψX)2 + (1− σ)2ψX(1− ψX),
h5,4 = 2σ(1− σ)ψX(1− ψX),
h5,5 = σ2(1− ψX)2 + (1− σ)2ψX2,
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h5,6 = h5,7 = σ(1− σ)ψX(1− ψX),
h5,8 = h5,9 = σ2ψX(1− ψX) + σ(1− σ)ψX2,
h5,10 = σ2ψX
2
,
h6,1 = h6,2 = h6,3 = h6,4 = h6,5 = 0,
h6,6 = (1− ψ−X)2,
h6,7 = 0,
h6,8 = 2ψ−X(1− ψ−X),
h6,9 = 0,
h6,10 = ψ−X
2
,
h7,1 = h7,2 = h7,3 = h7,4 = h7,5 = h7,6 = 0,
h7,7 = (1− ψ−X)2,
h7,8 = 0,
h7,9 = 2ψ−X(1− ψ−X),
h7,10 = ψ−X
2
,
h8,1 = h8,2 = h8,3 = h8,4 = h8,5 = 0,
h8,6 = (1− ψX)(1− ψ−X),
h8,7 = 0,
h8,8 = ψX(1− ψ−X) + (1− ψX)ψ−X,
h8,9 = 0,
h8,10 = ψXψ−X,
h9,1 = h9,2 = h9,3 = h9,4 = h9,5 = h9,6 = 0,
h9,7 = (1− ψX)(1− ψ−X),
h9,8 = 0,
h9,9 = ψX(1− ψ−X) + (1− ψX)ψ−X,
h9,10 = ψXψ−X,
h10,1 = h10,2 = h10,3 = h10,4 = h10,5 = h10,6 = h10,7 = h10,8 = h10,9 = 0,
h10,10 = 1.
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Exploiting the properties of the absorbing Markov chain starting with both firms play-
ing BR on both markets yields the expected number of steps until JPM is reached on
both markets t˜MMC, which is monotonically decreasing in σ, ψX, and ψ−X. As the term
is very lengthy and thus uninformative, it is avoided to print it here.
Provided with the expected numbers of periods until the collusive state is reached un-
der single market contact as well as under multimarket contact, a critical ψ̂−X(σ,ψX)
can be computed above which t˜MMC < t˜SMC. As t˜MMC is monotonically decreasing in
ψ−X the critical value is unique. Again, the analytical result is very lengthy and can
thus not be interpreted intuitively. Therefore, w.l.o.g. Figure 6.1 provides a graphical
representation of ψ̂−X for all feasible values of σ, ψX, and ψ−X. The collusive state of
JPM is reached faster under multimarket contact than under single market contact for
all parameter combinations above the surface. In particular, the critical probability of
cross-market signal reacting is increasing in the probability of sending a price signal,
but is far less sensitive to changes in the probability of reacting to a price signal on the
same market. Furthermore, single market contact converges faster to JPM than multi-
market contact for all feasible values of ψ−X if σ ∈ (σ(ψX),σ(ψX)). In other words, as
Figure 6.1 indicates, there is an σ-frontier above which ψ̂−X > 1 except for cases of very
high values of σ together with very low values of ψX. 
B.3 Upstream and downstream competition
Retail demand for firm i ∈ {A, B, D} in case of n = 3 active firms according to Shubik
and Levitan (1980) is given by
qTriopolyi =
1
3
· (1− pi − γ · (pi − pA + pB + pD3 ).
In the case of foreclosure, i.e., if both integrated firms’ wholesale prices exceed their
respective retail prices such that Firm D is unable to set a retail price that would yield a
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positive profit, Firm D does not supply any retail consumers and per firm retail demand
for the remaining two firms is given by
qDuopolyi =
1+ γ
3
· (1− pi − γ(3+ 2γ) · (2− (pA + pB)).
See Höffler (2007) for derivations of the demand functions. In the following, let γ= 30.
Assume w.l.o.g. that Firm A provides wholesale access to the reseller Firm D. This
yields profits
piA = pA · qA(pA, pB, pD) + a · qD(pA, pB, pD),
piB = pB · qB(pA, pB, pD),
piD = (pD − a) · qD(pA, pB, pD).
In the following, Nash predictions are calculated for the industry scenarios (i) whole-
sale monopoly under no regulation, (ii) wholesale monopoly under margin squeeze
regulation, (iii) wholesale competition under no regulation, and (iv) wholesale compe-
tition under margin squeeze regulation, each for all four timing models as described
in Subsection 7.3.1. For the sequential-move Timing Models (1), (2), and (4) subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria are determined through backward induction. In order to fa-
cilitate the comparison of theoretical predictions and experimental results, final prices
and profits are scaled as in the experiment. Note that scaling affects only the output,
but calculations are conducted based on the original Shubik and Levitan (1980) values.
Price (profit) values are multiplied by the factor φ = 100/0.15 (Φ = 400) to obtain scaled
values.
Timing Model (1): Under a wholesale monopoly, in stage II, two (integrated) or
three firms may operate in the retail market depending on the wholesale price cho-
sen in stage I. In stage II, in case of foreclosure, i.e., qD = 0, integrated firms’ profit-
maximizing prices are given by pDuopolyA = p
Duopoly
B = 55.55 and profits amount to
pi
Duopoly
A = pi
Duopoly
B = 15.04. Instead, in case there is a viable wholesale offer, firms
choose retail prices pTriopolyA = φ(
1
22 +
265
572 a), p
Triopoly
B = φ(
1
22 +
155
572 a), and p
Triopoly
D =
272
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φ( 122 +
193
286 a). In stage I, anticipating retail prices, Firm A chooses the monopolistic
wholesale price aTriopoly = 66.36. Ensuing retail prices are given by pTriopolyA = 61.05,
pTriopolyB = 48.29, and p
Triopoly
D = 75.08 and profits by pi
Triopoly
A = 14.97, pi
Triopoly
B = 14.69,
and piTriopolyD = 0.48. Comparing pi
Duopoly
A to pi
Triopoly
A , Firm A prefers the foreclosure out-
come and thus sets a wholesale price aDuopoly ∈ (84.66,100], which forces the reseller to
exit the retail market.
Taking into account margin squeeze regulation, foreclosure is ruled out as a valid mar-
ket outcome and therefore does not constitute an equilibrium. However, as aTriopolyA >
pTriopolyA , Firm A would violate the margin squeeze condition. Instead, Firm A is re-
quired to maximize its profit piA subject to the condition aA ≤ pA in stage II, while the
other firms maximize profits unconstrained. This yields pMSRA = a, p
MSR
B = φ(
1
32 +
365
832 a),
and pMSRD = φ(
1
32 +
701
832 a). In stage I, Firm A sets the monopoly wholesale price to
aMSRA = 66.16 and corresponding retail prices are given by p
MSR
A = 66.16, p
MSR
B = 49.86,
and pMSRD = 76.57 with profits pi
MSR
A = 15.09, pi
MSR
B = 15.66, and p
MSR
D = 0.68.
Considering unregulated wholesale competition, two equilibria emerge, namely a com-
petitive and a foreclosure type. Atiyas et al. (2015) show that for γ > 26.77 (and ob-
servable wholesale contracts) the foreclosure outcome constitutes an additional Nash
equilibrium next to the competitive outcome. As shown for the case of a wholesale
monopoly, an integrated firm does not find it profitable to deviate from the state of
coordinated foreclosure in the wholesale market, because wholesale profits are out-
weighed by the reseller’s business stealing effect in the retail market, even at the
monopoly price. Moreover, given the nonviable wholesale offers, no firm i has an in-
centive to deviate from its foreclosure price pDuopolyi . In contrast, as shown by Bourreau
et al. (2012), if a firm is required to make a viable wholesale offer, integrated firms al-
ways find it profitable to undercut their rival in the wholesale market for γ < 40.97.
Once wholesale prices are driven to zero, i.e., aCompetitiveA = a
Competitive
B = 0, firms can-
not unilaterally increase the wholesale price profitably. Thus the competitive outcome
aCompetitiveA = a
Competitive
B = 0 with ensuing retail prices p
Competitive
i = 30.30 and profits
pi
Competitive
i = 5.79, ∀i ∈ {A, B, D}, constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
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TABLE B.1: Theoretical predictions for Timing Model (1).
No regulation Margin squeeze regulation
Wholesale monopoly aA = 100.00 aA = 66.19
pA = 55.56 pA = 66.19
pB = 55.56 pB = 49.86
pD = 100.00 pD = 76.57
Wholesale competition aA = aB = 100.00 aA = aB = 0.00
pA = pB = 55.56 pA = pB = pD = 30.30
pD = 100.00
or:
aA = aB = 0.00
pA = pB = pD = 30.30
Whereas in the case of no regulation two types of equilibria coexist, the competitive
equilibrium is unique in the case of wholesale competition under margin squeeze reg-
ulation. Integrated firms are now unable to foreclose the reseller, due to the margin
squeeze condition, while the Bertrand logic applies as described above for the unregu-
lated case. These results are summarized in Table B.1.
Timing Model (2): In stage III, the reseller’s optimal price as a follower is given by
its best response function, i.e., pD = BR(pA, pB) = φ( 142 +
5
21 pA +
5
21 pB +
1
2 a) across
all scenarios. Anticipating the reseller’s reaction, integrated firms’ simultaneous (un-
constrained) profit-maximization in stage II yields pA = φ( 13261 +
5320
15109 a) and pB =
φ( 13261 +
7595
30218 a).
In the monopoly case, Firm A maximizes its profit by setting its wholesale price to aA =
67.39 in stage I. Ensuing retail prices are given by pTriopolyA = 56.94, p
Triopoly
B = 50.14, and
pTriopolyD = 75.07 and firms make profits pi
Triopoly
A = 15.61, pi
Triopoly
B = 14.05, and pi
Triopoly
D =
0.37. Note that under this timing model piTriopolyA exceeds the foreclosure profit pi
Duopoly
A
as Firm A internalizes the reseller’s reaction to its own prices. Therefore, Firm A finds
it profitable to make a viable wholesale offer to Firm D.
Although foreclosure does not constitute an equilibrium under no regulation, Nash
prices of Firm A still violate the margin squeeze condition. Taking into account
this condition, constrained maximization of Firm A’s profit in stage II yields prices
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TABLE B.2: Theoretical predictions for Timing Model (2).
No regulation Margin squeeze regulation
Wholesale monopoly aA = 67.39 aA = 70.14
pA = 56.94 pA = 70.14
pB = 50.15 pB = 54.90
pD = 75.07 pD = 80.72
Wholesale competition aA = aB = 0.00 aA = aB = 0.00
pA = pB = pD = 30.30 pA = pB = pD = 30.30
pMSRA = aA and p
MSR
B = φ(
13
391 +
365
782 a). The optimal wholesale price in stage I is given by
aMSR = 70.14 and respective retail prices are pMSRA = 70.14, p
MSR
B = 54.90, p
MSR
D = 80.72.
Firms’ profits amount to piMSRA = 16.24, pi
MSR
B = 16.84, and pi
MSR
D = 0.70. Note that
margin squeeze regulation leads to unambiguously higher prices and increased profits
compared to the no regulation outcome, given this timing model.
In the case of wholesale competition, the Bertrand logic, as laid out in Timing Model (1),
applies equally with regard to the integrated firms’ behavior in stage I. Moreover, the
competitive outcome is unique, because one of the integrated firms will always find
it profitable to unilaterally deviate from coordinated foreclosure and supply the re-
seller.
Given the theoretical prediction, margin squeeze regulation does not affect the market
outcome under wholesale competition in Timing Model (2), because equilibrium prices
in the unregulated outcome do not violate the margin squeeze constraint. See Table B.2
for a summary of results.
Timing Model (3): In the case of an unregulated monopolistic wholesale provider, si-
multaneous setting of all prices (wholesale and retail) leads to foreclosure as the unique
equilibrium. Consider, in contrast, a situation in which Firm D makes positive profit,
i.e., aA < pD. Obviously, Firm A can then increase its profit by setting aA = pD. How-
ever, Firm D would in turn increase its retail price pD as long as it is able to obtain a
positive demand (qD > 0). Consequently, this reverse Bertrand logic gives rise to fore-
closure as the unique equilibrium.
275
Appendix B Theoretical Analyses
TABLE B.3: Theoretical predictions for Timing Model (3).
No regulation Margin squeeze regulation
Wholesale monopoly aA = 100.00 aA = 67.61
pA = 55.56 pA = 67.61
pB = 55.56 pB = 50.49
pD = 100.00 pD = 77.80
Wholesale competition aA = aB = 100.00 aA = aB = 0.00
pA = pB = 55.56 pA = pB = pD = 30.30
pD = 100.00
or:
aA = aB = 0.00
pA = pB = pD = 30.30
In the case of margin squeeze regulation, Firm A solves ∂piA∂pA = 0 and
∂piA
∂aA
= 0 simulta-
neously subject to the constraint aA ≤ pA, while Firm B and Firm D solve first order
conditions ∂piB∂pB = 0 and
∂piD
∂pD
= 0. Optimal prices are given by aMSRA = p
MSR
A = 67.61,
pMSRB = 50.49, and p
MSR
D = 77.80 leading to profits pi
MSR
A = 15.08, pi
MSR
B = 16.06, and
piMSRD = 0.65.
If both integrated firms are active in the wholesale market, the same rationale as un-
der Timing Model (1) applies, i.e., the competitive as well as the foreclosure outcome
constitute an equilibrium. On the one hand, if both firms choose a wholesale price that
forecloses Firm D, there is no unilateral deviation that increases an integrated firm’s
profit, because the business stealing effect outweighs the wholesale revenue effect. On
the other hand, in the case of the competitive outcome, an integrated firm is unable to
establish the foreclosure outcome unilaterally.
If wholesale competition is combined with margin squeeze regulation, the foreclosure
equilibrium disappears—as under Timing Model (1)—and the competitive outcome
constitutes the unique equilibrium. These results are summarized in Table B.3.
Timing Model (4): Like in Timing Model (2), the reseller as a follower maximizes
its profit given the previously set wholesale price(s) and retail prices of the integrated
firms, i.e., according to its best response function it chooses pD = BR(pA, pB) = φ( 142 +
5
21 pA +
5
21 pB +
1
2 a). In stage I, integrated firms maximize profits simultaneously taking
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TABLE B.4: Theoretical predictions for Timing Model (4).
No regulation Margin squeeze regulation
Wholesale monopoly aA = 51.25 aA = 51.25
pA = 51.25 pA = 51.25
pB = 46.09 pB = 46.09
pD = 64.68 pD = 64.68
Wholesale competition aA = aB = 0.00 aA = aB = 0.00
pA = pB = pD = 30.30 pA = pB = pD = 30.30
into account the reaction by Firm D in stage II. Optimal prices are given by aTriopolyA =
pTriopolyA = 51.25, p
Triopoly
B = 46.09, and consequently p
Triopoly
D = 64.67. Accordingly, firms
obtain profits piTriopolyA = 15.07, pi
Triopoly
B = 11.86, and pi
Triopoly
D = 1.14. Again, considering
the reseller as a follower allows the integrated firms to internalize Firm D’s reaction to
their own prices which makes foreclosure relatively less profitable.
The margin squeeze condition is non-binding, because Firm A’s equilibrium prices in
the case of an unregulated wholesale monopoly do not constitute a margin squeeze.
Therefore, the theoretical prediction is the same as under an unregulated wholesale
monopoly.
Having ruled out foreclosure as an equilibrium in the case of a wholesale monopoly, the
same rationale holds under unregulated wholesale competition, because an integrated
firm has always an incentive to deviate in the upstream market and charge the monop-
olistic wholesale price. Thus, as argued above, the competitive outcome remains as the
unique equilibrium.
In consequence, under wholesale competition the margin squeeze regulation does
not affect the theoretical prediction and the outcome is identical to the unregulated
wholesale competition scenario, i.e., aCompetitiveA = a
Competitive
B = 0, p
Competitive
i = 30.30, and
pi
Competitive
i = 5.79, ∀i ∈ {A, B, D}. See Table B.4 for a summary of results.
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Experimental Instructions
For each experiment, the instructions of only one treatment are reported in the follow-
ing. The instructions for the other treatments are identical except with respect to the
specifics of the treatments. Note that the experimental instructions are translated from
German and are only translations for information; they are not intended to be used in
the lab. The instructions in the original language are carefully polished in grammar,
style, comprehensibility, and avoidance of strategic guidance.
C.1 Sequences of decision-making
The following experimental instructions are for the RB3 treatment.
Preliminary remarks
Welcome to the experiment and thank you very much for your participation. In this
experiment you can earn an amount of money that depends on your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants. Please address the person in charge of the experi-
ment in case of questions. Please do not talk to the other participants during the entire
experiment. Throughout the experiment we will use the currency euro and its subunit
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cent. The euro that you will have earned by the end of the experiment will be paid to
you in cash.
Experimental structure
There are three firms competing with each other:
◦ Firm A
◦ Firm B
◦ Firm C
Each firm is represented by one participant of the experiment. Throughout the experi-
ment the same firms compete with each other. Which firm you represent is randomly
chosen at the beginning of the experiment. Each firm offers a good that is demanded
by consumers. There are no cost for producing these goods. You choose the price at
which you want to sell your good. The quantity demanded of your good is determined
by your price. Thereby, the following holds:
◦ The higher your price, the lower the quantity demanded of your good. Thereby,
the quantity demanded of your good can fall to zero.
◦ The higher a price of the other firms, the higher the quantity demanded of your
good. Thereby, only prices of firms selling a positive quantity are relevant.
Your profit is calculated by multiplying your price with the quantity demanded of your
good.
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Experimental procedure
The experiment is composed of two stages. At stage one you choose your initial price.
Before making the final decision, you can test how a price combination affects the quan-
tities and profits of all firms. After all firms made their final decision by pressing the
button “Finalize decision”, the second stage of the experiment begins. The second stage
lasts exactly 30 minutes. During this time all decisions are made in real-time and with-
out any interruptions. Your price decision is valid until you change your price. Every
decision of a firm is immediately visible for all other firms.
Software display
FIGURE C.1: Display of the experimental software.
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Figure C.1 depicts the display of the experimental software. To distinguish the firms,
their information is colored as follows:
◦ Firm A: BLUE
◦ Firm B: GREEN
◦ Firm C: ORANGE
In the following, the individual parts of the display will be explained bottom up.
Decision and testing environment
On the left side you can set your price by using the slider of the firm. Please be aware
that you can use all sliders during the first stage of the experiment and only the slider
of your own firm during the second stage. During the second stage the sliders show
the current prices of the other firms.
Prices
On the left side the history of all firms’ prices as well as the average price is visualized.
On the right side the current prices are displayed.
Quantities
On the left side the history of all firms’ quantities is visualized. On the right side the
current quantities are displayed.
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Profits
On the left side the history of all firms’ profits is visualized. On the right side the current
profits are displayed. Please be aware that current profits are scaled to the profit you
would earn if the current combination of all prices would be held for 30 seconds. As
soon as one firm changes its price, the profits are recalculated. Your current profit is
added to your account proportionally several times per second.
Status of the experiment
On the left side it is displayed which firm you represent. Figure C.1 shows this for firm
A as an example. During the first stage there is a button “Finalize decision” in the mid-
dle of the display. Please press it when you are ready to finalize your decision. On the
right side your current account balance and the remaining duration of the experiment
is displayed. Your current account balance is the sum of all realized profits.
Concluding remarks
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked some comprehension questions on the
screen with regard to the understanding of the rules and the course of the experiment.
Please enter the respective answers into your computer. Afterwards, the experiment
will start automatically and it will be displayed which firm you represent.
In case of any questions, please remain seated and give the person in charge of the
experiment a hand signal. Please wait until the person in charge of the experiment has
arrived at your seat. Talk as quietly as possible when asking your question. Please
remain seated after the end of the experiment as well and wait for further instructions
from the person in charge of the experiment.
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C.2 Number of competitors
The following experimental instructions are for the B4A treatment.
Preliminary remarks
Welcome to the experiment and thank you very much for your participation. In this
experiment you can earn an amount of money that depends on your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants. Please address the person in charge of the experi-
ment in case of questions. Please do not talk to the other participants during the entire
experiment. Throughout the experiment we will use the currency euro and its subunit
cent. The euro that you will have earned by the end of the experiment will be paid to
you in cash.
Experimental structure
There are four firms competing with each other:
◦ Firm A
◦ Firm B
◦ Firm C
◦ Firm D
Each firm is represented by one participant of the experiment. Throughout the experi-
ment the same firms compete with each other. Which firm you represent is randomly
chosen at the beginning of the experiment. Each firm offers a good that is demanded
by consumers. There are no cost for producing these goods. You choose the price at
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which you want to sell your good. The quantity demanded of your good is determined
by your price. Thereby, the following holds:
◦ The higher your price, the lower the quantity demanded of your good. Thereby,
the quantity demanded of your good can fall to zero.
◦ The higher a price of the other firms, the higher the quantity demanded of your
good. Thereby, only prices of firms selling a positive quantity are relevant.
Please be aware that the quantity demanded of Firm A differs from the quantity de-
manded of any other firm, everything else being equal. If all firms choose the same
price, the quantity demanded of Firm A is greater than the quantity demanded of any
other single firm. Additionally, the following holds:
◦ If Firm A raises its price, the quantity demanded of Firm A decreases less than
the quantity of any other firm if it raises its price.
◦ If another firm raises its price, the quantity demanded of Firm A increases more
than the quantity of any other firm.
Your profit is calculated by multiplying your price with the quantity demanded of your
good.
Experimental procedure
The experiment lasts 60 periods. In each period you chose your price. Before making
the final decision, you can test how a price combination affects the quantities and profits
of all firms. After all firms made their final decision by pressing the button “Finalize
decision”, quantities and profits are calculated and the next period begins.
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FIGURE C.2: Display of the experimental software.
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Software display
Figure C.2 depicts the display of the experimental software. To distinguish the firms,
their information is colored as follows:
◦ Firm A: BLUE
◦ Firm B: GREEN
◦ Firm C: ORANGE
◦ Firm D: PURPLE
In the following, the individual parts of the display will be explained bottom up.
Decision and testing environment
On the left side you can set your price by using the slider of your firm. At the beginning
of a period the sliders show the prices of the firms of the previous period. Before mak-
ing the final decision, you can test the consequences of your price decision by adjusting
the sliders of the other firms to your expectations. As soon as you release a slider, the
quantities and profits that would result in the next period if the currently set prices in
the testing environment get chosen are displayed on the right side of the screen above
the sliders. On the right side you can reset the sliders to the prices of the last period by
pressing the button “Show last period results”.
Prices
On the left side the history of all firms’ prices as well as the average price is visualized.
On the right side the currently set prices in the testing environment are displayed.
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Quantities
On the left side the history of all firms’ quantities is visualized. On the right side the
quantities that would result in the next period if the currently set prices in the testing
environment get chosen are displayed.
Profits
On the left side the history of all firms’ profits is visualized. On the right side the profits
that would result in the next period if the currently set prices in the testing environment
get chosen are displayed.
Status of the experiment
On the left side it is displayed which firm you represent. Figure C.2 shows this for firm
A as an example. In the middle of the display is the button “Finalize decision”. Please
press it when you are ready to finalize your decision. On the right side your current
account balance and the current period of the experiment is displayed. Your current
account balance is the sum of all realised profits.
Concluding remarks
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked some comprehension questions on the
screen with regard to the understanding of the rules and the course of the experiment.
Please enter the respective answers into your computer. Afterwards, the experiment
will start automatically and it will be displayed which firm you represent.
In case of any questions, please remain seated and give the person in charge of the
experiment a hand signal. Please wait until the person in charge of the experiment has
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arrived at your seat. Talk as quietly as possible when asking your question. Please
remain seated after the end of the experiment as well and wait for further instructions
from the person in charge of the experiment.
C.3 Price discrimination
The following experimental instructions are for the PD treatment.
Preliminary remarks
Welcome to the experiment and thank you very much for your participation. If you
read through these instructions carefully and consider them during the experiment,
you can earn an amount of money that depends on your decisions and the decisions of
the other participants. Please address the person in charge of the experiment in case of
questions. Please do not talk to the other participants during the entire experiment.
Throughout the experiment we will use the currency euro and its subunit cent. The
euro that you will have earned by the end of the experiment will be paid to you in
cash.
The experiment is divided into several rounds. The decisions and the results of each
round are not interdependent.
In each round, you will simulate the decision of a firm that sells a good to consumers.
There is exactly one other firm apart from you (which will be called “the other firm” in
the following). You will be competing against this other firm.
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Setup of a round
In each round, you and the other firm offer a good in two markets. In each market there
are 10 consumers.
The provision of the good will cost you 30 cent per consumer in market A and in market
B. You and the other firm produce equal goods. Therefore, the consumers will buy the
good from the firm that offers the good at a lower price. The consumers are willing to
pay a maximum of 50 cent for the good.
One round consists of 10 retail periods. In each retail period you offer your good to all
consumers. Thereby, you choose an individual price for market A and market B.
Demand
The demands in market A and market B will be determined separately and depend on
your prices and the prices of the other firm. All consumers will always demand the
good that is offered at the lower price. However, they are not willing to pay more than
50 cent per retail period.
Thus, if you offer your good in a market at a higher price than the other firm, there will
be no demand for your good in this market. The same applies if one of the two firms
offers the good at a price higher than 50 cent. If both firms offer the same price in a
market, each firm will receive half of the demand in this market. If both prices of the
same market are above 50 cent, there will be no demand for both firms in this market.
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Profit
Your profit in a retail period depends on your prices and your demand. Therefore, the
profit in one market is calculated as follows:
Pro f it = Demand · (Price− Costs o f Provision)
Your profit in a retail period is calculated by summing up your profit in market A and
your profit in market B. The profits in both markets are being accumulated over all 10
retail periods and make your overall profit.
Example Firms 1 and 2 offer the following prices:
Market A Market B
Firm 1 35 cent 50 cent
Firm 2 40 cent 45 cent
The profits of firm 1 in both markets are calculated as follows:
◦ Profit in market A: 10 · (35 cent− 30 cent) = EUR 0.50
◦ Profit in market B: 0 · (50 cent− 30 cent) = EUR 0.00
◦ Profit of retail period: EUR 0.50 + EUR 0.00 = EUR 0.50
The profits of firm 2 in both markets are calculated as follows:
◦ Profit in market A: 0 · (40 cent− 30 cent) = EUR 0.00
◦ Profit in market B: 10 · (45 cent− 30 cent) = EUR 1.50
◦ Profit of retail period: EUR 0.00 + EUR 1.50 = EUR 1.50
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Software display
FIGURE C.3: Display of the experimental software.
Figure C.3 shows the display of the experimental software during a retail period. The
individual parts will be explained in detail below.
Markets The upper part of the display represents the two markets A and B exemplar-
ily and repeats the key decision factors.
Decision and testing environment In the lower part of the display you can enter your
prices for the two markets. In addition, you can test the consequences of your pricing
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decision. In order to do so, you have to indicate your prices as well as what you expect
the prices of the other firm to be, by using the slider.
As soon as you release the slider, the values in the table beneath are being updated. The
table shows the effects of the respective price combination on the demand and on the
profit in one retail period.
For each market the demand and the profit of your firm and the other firm are being
shown. The table beneath shows the demand and the profit accumulated over both
markets for your firm and the other firm.
Please use the slider for your firm to set your prices. Note that the actual prices of the
other firm are set by the corresponding firm and not by you. The slider for the other
firm only serves as a means of decision support.
Please note: You cannot only use the testing environment in order to test the effects of
your own pricing decision, but also to estimate the possible reactions to your current
pricing decision of the other firm.
FIGURE C.4: Retail history.
Retail history Clicking the button “History” opens the retail history. The main pa-
rameters of the past retail periods are shown in this section:
◦ Your price for market A
◦ The price of the other firm for market A
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◦ Your price for market B
◦ The price of the other firm for market B
◦ Your profit in both markets
◦ The profit of the other firm in both markets
Another click on the button “History” closes the retail history again.
Course of the experiment
Overall, 3 rounds (0 to 2) are being played. Round 0 is a test run. Each round consists
of 10 retail periods. The firm pairings are being randomly determined all over again in
each round. However, it is excluded that you will ever play again with the same firm.
The information regarding the round and the course of the experiment are always being
shown at the top level of the screen.
At the end of each round, your accumulated profits of all 10 retail periods that represent
your payoff are being shown in euro. You do not have to memorize this value. At the
end of the experiment, the payment of exactly one round will be paid oud to you. It
will be chosen at random which of the rounds is being cashed out. To this end, you will
have to roll a dice. The test run, round 0, is not included.
Concluding remarks
Do not hesitate to ask questions. As long as they refer to these instructions and not to
possible strategies, we will answer your questions as far as possible. Please remember:
The better you have understood these instructions, the more money you can make.
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Before the experiment starts, you will be asked some questions on the screen with re-
gard to the understanding of the rules and the course of the experiment. Please enter
the respective answer into your computer. Afterwards, the experiment will start auto-
matically.
In case of any questions, please remain seated and give the person in charge of the
experiment a hand signal. Please wait until the person in charge of the experiment has
arrived at your seat. Talk as quietly as possible when asking the question. Please remain
seated after the end of the experiment as well and wait for further instructions from the
person in charge of the experiment. You can make notes on the pad that is laid out for
you on the table during the experiment. Please leave the experiment instructions, the
calculator as well as the note pad at the table after the experiment.
C.4 Multimarket contact
The following experimental instructions are for the MMC treatment.
Preliminary remarks
Welcome to the experiment and thank you very much for your participation. If you
read through these instructions carefully and consider them during the experiment,
you can earn an amount of money that depends on your decisions and the decisions
of the other participants. Please address the person in charge of the experiment in
case of any questions. Please do not talk to the other participants during the entire
experiment.
Throughout the experiment we will use the currencies monetary unit (short: MU) and
euro (short: EUR) (1 million MU =ˆ EUR 1). The euro that you will have earned by the
end of the experiment will be paid out to you in cash.
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During the experiment, you will represent a firm that sells a good to consumers. There
is exactly one other firm apart from you (which will be called “the other firm” in the
following). You will be competing against this other firm.
The experiment consists of at least 45 and at most 50 periods. The exact number of periods
will be determined at random and is identical for all participants of the experiment.
Any number between 45 and 50 periods is equally likely.
During the entire experiment, you play against the same firm. The other firm is also
represented by a participant of the experiment.
Setup of a period
In each period, you and the other firm offer a good in two markets. In each market
there are 10000 consumers.
The provision of the good will cost you 10 MU per consumer in market A and in market
B. You and the other firm produce equal goods. Therefore, the consumers will buy the
good from the firm that offers the good at a lower price. The consumers are willing to
pay a maximum of 50 MU for the good.
In each of the 45 to 50 periods, you offer your good to all consumers. Thereby, you
choose an individual price for market A and market B.
Demand
The demands in market A and market B will be determined separately and depend on
your prices and the prices of the other firm. All consumers will always demand the
good that is offered at the lower price. However, they are not willing to pay more than
50 MU per period.
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Thus, if you offer your good in a market at a higher price than the other firm, there
will be no demand for your good in this market. The same applies if one of the two
firms offers the good at a price higher than 50 MU. If both firms offer the same price in
a market, each firm will receive half of the demand in this market. If both prices of the
same market are above 50 MU, there will be no demand for both firms in this market.
Profit
Your profit in a retail period depends on your prices and your demand. Therefore, the
profit in one market is calculated as follows:
Pro f it = Demand · (Price− Cost o f Provision)
Your profit in a period is calculated by summing up your profit in market A and your
profit in market B. The profits in both markets are being accumulated over all periods
and constitute your overall profit.
Example Firms 1 and 2 offer the following prices:
Market A Market B
Firm 1 35 MU 40 MU
Firm 2 45 MU 40 MU
The profits of firm 1 in both markets are calculated as follows:
◦ Profit in market A: 10000 · (35 MU− 10 MU) = 250000 MU = EUR 0.25
◦ Profit in market B: 12 · 10000 · (40 MU− 10 MU) = 150000 MU = EUR 0.15
◦ Profit of the period: EUR 0.25 + EUR 0.15 = EUR 0.40
The profits of firm 2 in both markets are calculated as follows:
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◦ Profit in market A: 0 · (45 MU− 10 MU) = 0 MU = EUR 0.00
◦ Profit in market B: 12 · 10000 · (40 MU− 10 MU) = 150000 MU = EUR 0.15
◦ Profit of the period: EUR 0.00 + EUR 0.15 = EUR 0.15
Software display
FIGURE C.5: Display of the experimental software.
Figure C.5 shows the display of the experimental software during a period. To distin-
guish between both firms, the information for your firm is colored BLUE, whereas the
information for the other firm is colored RED. The individual parts of the display will
be explained in detail below.
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Progress of the experiment The progress of the experiment is always shown at the top
of the display. In the left part, the colors of your firm and the other firm are repeated.
The middle part shows the current period of the experiment. The key decision factors
are repeated in the right part.
Price trend The upper part of the display visualizes the trend of your prices and the
trend of the prices of the other firm in both markets. The graphs that depict your prices
are colored BLUE, whereas the graphs that depict the other firm’s prices are colored
RED. The graphs representing the prices in market A will be displayed as RECTAN-
GLES and the graphs representing the prices in market B will be displayed as CIR-
CLES. During the experiment, the graphs will be drawn continuously from one to the
next period.
Decision and testing environment In the lower part of the display you can enter your
prices for the two markets. In addition, you can test the consequences of your pricing
decision. In order to do so, you have to indicate your prices as well as your expectation
of the prices of the other firm by using the slider.
As soon as you release the slider, the values in the table beneath are being updated.
The table shows the effects of the respective price combination on the demand and on
the profit in one period. For each market the demand and the profit of your firm and
the other firm are being shown. The table beneath shows the demand and the profit
accumulated over both markets for your firm and the other firm.
Please use the sliders for your firm to set your prices for the current period. Note that
the actual prices of the other firm are set by the corresponding firm and not by you.
Hence, the sliders for the other firm only serve as a means of decision support.
Please note: You cannot only use the testing environment in order to test the effects of
your own pricing decision, but also to estimate the possible reactions to your current
pricing decision of the other firm.
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History By clicking the button “HISTORY” the following outcomes of the past peri-
ods are shown:
◦ Your price for market A in MU
◦ The price of the other firm for market A in MU
◦ Your price for market B in MU
◦ The price of the other firm for market B in MU
◦ Your profit in both markets in euro
◦ The profit of the other firm in both markets in euro
The history can be closed by clicking the button “HISTORY” again.
Concluding remarks
At the end of the experiment you will be shown your accumulated profits over all
periods, which represent your payoff, in euro. After answering a short questionnaire
you will be paid out your payoff by the person in charge of the experiment.
Do not hesitate to ask questions. As long as they refer to these instructions and not
to possible strategies, we will answer your questions as good as possible. Please re-
member: The better you have understood these instructions, the more money you can
earn.
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked some comprehension questions on the
screen with regard to the understanding of the rules and the course of the experiment.
Please enter the respective answers into your computer. Afterwards, the experiment
will start automatically.
300
C.5 Upstream and downstream competition
During the experiment you can take notes on the note pad that is laid out next to you on
the table. In case of any questions, please remain seated and give the person in charge of
the experiment a hand signal. Please wait until the person in charge of the experiment
has arrived at your seat. Talk as quietly as possible when asking your question. Please
remain seated after the end of the experiment as well and wait for further instructions
by the person in charge of the experiment.
C.5 Upstream and downstream competition
The following experimental instructions are for the WCPC-MSR treatment.
Preliminary remarks
Welcome to the experiment and thank you very much for your participation.In this ex-
periment you can earn an amount of money that depends on your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants. Please address the person in charge of the experi-
ment in case of questions. Please do not talk to the other participants during the entire
experiment. Throughout the experiment we will use the currency euro and its subunits
cent. At the beginning of the experiment your account balance is EUR 5.00. At the end
of the experiment, the final account balance will be paid to you in cash.
During the experiment you represent a firm which is selling a good to consumers. Next
to you, there are two other firms which are competing with you. All your decisions
are made in real time, thus, they are immediately effective and visible to all other
firms. Over the entire time horizon of the experiment, you play together with the same
firms.
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Experimental structure
There are three firms:
◦ Firm A
◦ Firm B
◦ Firm C
Firm A and Firm B are represented by participants of the experiment. Firm C acts
computerized. Which firm you represent is randomly chosen at the beginning of the
experiment and does not change over the entire experiment. Furthermore there are two
markets:
◦ Wholesale market
◦ Retail market
Figure C.6 visualizes the structure of the experiment. Each of the three firms offers
a retail product on the retail market and chooses its retail price. In order to produce
the retail product each firm needs a wholesale product. Only Firm A and Firm B offer
the wholesale product in the wholesale market and choose their respective wholesale
prices. Firm C has to buy the wholesale product from one of the two other firms in
order to be able to offer its retail product.
Wholesale Market
The wholesale products of Firm A and Firm B are equal. Thereby, the following holds:
◦ Firm C chooses automatically the cheaper wholesale product to satisfy its de-
mand.
302
C.5 Upstream and downstream competition
FIGURE C.6: Structure of the experiment.
Wholesale	
good	
Retail	good	
Wholesale	
good	
Retail	good	Retail	good	
Firm	C	
Firm	A	 Firm	B	
Wholesale	price	
Retail	price	
Consumers	
Wholesale	market	
Retail	market	
Wholesale	price	
Retail	price	 Retail	price	
◦ If Firm A and Firm B offer the identical wholesale price, Firm C chooses the
wholesale product from the firm which had previously offered the lower price.
◦ If Firm A and Firm B offer the identical wholesale price at the beginning, Firm C
chooses randomly from which firm it purchases the wholesale product.
There are no handling costs for the wholesale product. The prices of the wholesale
products range from 0 to 100.
Retail market
The retail products differ between firms. The demand of your retail product depends
on your retail price and the retail prices of the other firms. Thereby, the following holds
under the assumption that the other retail prices remain unchanged:
◦ If you increase your retail price, the demand of your retail product decreases.
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◦ If one of the other firms increases its retail price, the demand of your retail prod-
ucts increases.
◦ If all firms increase their retail price, the total demand of all retail products de-
creases.
If your retail price is located below the average of all three retail prices, the demand of
your retail product increases. If your retail price is located above the average of all three
retail prices, the demand of your retail product decreases. The extent of the deviation of
your retail price from the average of all three retail prices determines the magnitude of
this effect. If your retail price is above the average of all three retail prices, the demand
of your retail product may fall to zero. Firm C chooses its profit-maximizing retail price
in reaction to the effective wholesale price and the retail prices chosen by Firm A and
Firm B.
There are no handling costs for the retail product. The prices of the retail products
range from 0 to 100.
Profits
The profits of the three firms depend on the retail and wholesale prices. The calculations
for the profits of Firm A and Firm B depend on Firm C’s decision which firm to choose
as its wholesale provider.
If Firm C chooses to purchase its wholesale product from Firm A, the following holds
for the profits of each firm:
Pro f itA = Retail PriceA · DemandA +Wholesale PriceA · DemandC
Pro f itB = Retail PriceB · DemandB
Pro f itC = (Retail PriceC −Wholesale priceA) · DemandC
304
C.5 Upstream and downstream competition
If Firm C chooses to purchase its wholesale product from Firm B, the following holds
for the profits of each firm:
Pro f itA = Retail PriceA · DemandA
Pro f itB = Retail PriceB · DemandB +Wholesale PriceB · DemandC
Pro f itC = (Retail PriceC −Wholesale PriceB) · DemandC
Experimental procedure
The experiment is composed of two stages. At the first stage, as Firm A or Firm B, you
choose your initial retail price and your initial wholesale price. Before making your
final decision, you can test how a price combination affects the profits of all three firms.
This does not influence your account balance. After all firms have made their initial
price decision and have confirmed their decisions with a click on “apply initial prices”,
the second stage of the experiment starts.
The second stage lasts exactly 30 minutes. During this period of time, all decisions are
made in real time and without any interruptions. Your price decision remains effective
until you change your price. Note that subsequent to a change of your wholesale price,
the price cannot be changed again for the next 30 seconds. Furthermore, please be
aware that your wholesale price can not be located above your retail price.
Software display
Figure C.7 depicts the display of the exeriment software. In order to distinguish the
firms, their labels are colored as follows:
◦ Firm A: BLUE
◦ Firm B: GREEN
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FIGURE C.7: Display of the experimental software.
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◦ Firm C: ORANGE
In the following, the individual sections of the display will be explained from the bot-
tom up:
Experimental progress
On the left-hand side, it is denoted whether you represent Firm A or Firm B. The figure
illustrates this exemplarily for Firm A. On the right-hand side, your current account
balance as well as the remaining duration of the experiment is displayed. Your current
account balance consists of the initial balance of EUR 5.00 and the additionally earned
profits during the experiment.
Current profits and profit history
On the right-hand side, the current profits of all firms are displayed. Note that current
profits are scaled to the profit you would earn, if the current combination of all prices
would be held over the entire 30 minutes of the experiment. As soon as one of the
prices changes, the current profits are recalculated. On the left-hand side, the history of
the current profits is displayed.
Current prices and price history
On the right-hand side, the current prices of all three firms are displayed. The effective
wholesale price is always the lower wholesale price of both wholesale prices. On the
left-hand side, the history of your retail price, the average retail price of all three firms
and the effective wholesale price is displayed.
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Wholesale prices and current profits in the wholesale market
On the left-hand side, Firm A and Firm B choose their wholesale prices. Be aware that
Firm C offers no wholesale product and thus cannot choose a wholesale price. The
wholesale price can be set with the corresponding slider by using the mouse or the
arrow keys on the keyboard. Note that you can move all sliders at the first stage of the
experiment and only the slider of your firm at the second stage of the experiment. The
sliders of the other firms show their current wholesale prices. On the right-hand side
the current profits in the wholesale market are displayed. Furthermore it is displayed
which firms sells its wholesale product to Firm C. Note that subsequent to a change
of your wholesale price, the price cannot be changed again for the next 30 seconds.
Furthermore, please be aware that your wholesale price can not be located above your
retail price.
Retail prices and current profits in the retail market
On the left-hand side, all of the three firms choose their retail price. The retail price
can be set with the corresponding slider by using the mouse or the arrow keys on the
keyboard. Note that you can move all sliders at the first stage of the experiment and
only the slider of your firm at the second stage of the experiment. The sliders of the
other firms show their current retail prices. On the right-hand side, the current profits
in the retail market are displayed. Note that the displayed current profit of Firm C
already includes the costs for the wholesale product.
Concluding remarks
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked a set of comprehension questions, dis-
played on the computer screen, that cover the rules and the procedure of the experi-
ment. Please enter the respective answers. Thereupon, the experiment will start auto-
matically and it is displayed which firm you represent.
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In case of any questions during the experiment, please remain seated and inform the
person in charge of the experiment by the means of a hand gesture. Please wait until the
person in charge of the experiment has arrived at your seat. Talk as quietly as possible
when asking your question. Please remain seated after the end of the experiment and
wait for further instructions from the person in charge of the experiment.
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Statistical Analyses
D.1 Sequences of decision-making
TABLE D.1: Average degrees of tacit collusion over the entire time horizon across treatments.
Treatment Obs. ϕNashp/q ϕ
Nash
Π ϕ
Walras
p/q ϕ
Walras
Π
DB2 12 0.832 0.806 0.916 0.951
(0.249) (0.302) (0.124) (0.075)
DB3 12 0.605 0.611 0.737 0.827
(0.324) (0.301) (0.216) (0.134)
DC2 12 0.627 0.437 0.907 0.965
(0.550) (1.030) (0.138) (0.064)
DC3 12 0.397 0.249 0.759 0.880
(0.484) (0.702) (0.193) (0.112)
RB2 12 0.769 0.712 0.884 0.928
(0.343) (0.453) (0.172) (0.113)
RB3 11 0.539 0.491 0.693 0.774
(0.306) (0.324) (0.204) (0.144)
RC2 12 0.789 0.688 0.947 0.980
(0.259) (0.344) (0.065) (0.021)
RC3 13 0.386 0.186 0.754 0.870
(0.473) (0.745) (0.189) (0.119)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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D.2 Number of competitors
TABLE D.2: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on number of competi-
tors and competition model on the basis of all treatments.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariate ϕNashp ϕNashΠ ϕ
Walras
p ϕ
Walras
Π
Duopoly 0.208∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.075) (0.030) (0.044)
Quadropoly −0.041 −0.007 −0.009 0.031
(0.046) (0.093) (0.037) (0.055)
Cournot −0.249∗∗∗ −0.473∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.168) (0.047) (0.066)
Constant 0.077 0.003 0.138∗∗∗ 0.085
(0.056) (0.124) (0.047) (0.062)
Groups (s) 9 9 9 9
Groups (m) 10 10 10 10
Observations 23 23 23 23
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
TABLE D.3: Inter-study average degrees of tacit collusion and one-tailed matched-samples
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the basis of all treatments.
Studies ϕNashp ϕNashΠ ϕ
Walras
p ϕ
Walras
Π
2 vs. 3
Duopoly 7 0.110 −0.003 0.480 0.592
Triopoly 7 −0.079 −0.291 0.260 0.340
p-value 7 0.009 0.022 0.009 0.009
2 vs. 4
Duopoly 6 0.302 0.335 0.452 0.496
Quadropoly 6 0.025 −0.001 0.204 0.254
p-value 6 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
3 vs. 4
Triopoly 3 0.035 0.024 0.196 0.274
Quadropoly 3 0.049 0.051 0.174 0.249
p-value 3 0.946 0.946 0.500 0.500
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TABLE D.4: Mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on number of competitors and
competition model with an interaction effect for validation experiment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariate ϕNashp/q ϕ
Nash
Π ϕ
Walras
p/q ϕ
Walras
Π
Duopoly 0.204∗∗ 0.262∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.123) (0.045) (0.031)
Quadropoly −0.148 −0.128 −0.145∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.162) (0.060) (0.040)
Cournot −0.230∗∗ −0.251∗∗ −0.016 0.034
(0.094) (0.123) (0.045) (0.031)
Quadropoly x Cournot 0.016 0.096 0.029 0.091∗
(0.166) (0.216) (0.080) (0.054)
Period −0.002∗ −0.003 −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 0.673∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.106) (0.039) (0.026)
Groups 71 71 71 71
Observations 4,260 4,260 4,260 4,260
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
D.3 Price discrimination
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FIGURE D.1: Prices over time by groups and rounds for treatment UP.
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FIGURE D.2: Prices over time in market M1 by groups and rounds for treatment PD.
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FIGURE D.3: Prices over time in market M2 by groups and rounds for treatment PD.
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FIGURE D.4: Prices over time by cohorts for treatment SMC.
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FIGURE D.5: Prices over time in market M1 by cohorts for treatment MMC.
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FIGURE D.6: Prices over time in market M2 by cohorts for treatment MMC.
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FIGURE D.7: Prices over time in market M1 by cohorts for treatment PMC.
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FIGURE D.8: Prices over time in market M2 by cohorts for treatment PMC.
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TABLE D.5: Average market prices, profits, and consumer surplus across treatments.
Treatment N Tuples am ψm piAB piD C˜S
WM-NR 12 28,800 72.193 68.841 17.476 1.437 0.277
WM-MSR 11 26,400 72.368 74.253 18.808 1.366 0.230
WC-NR 9 21,600 76.960 78.092 19.611 1.441 0.197
WC-MSR 10 24,000 69.758 83.170 20.220 2.789 0.154
WCPC-NR 10 24,000 47.813 54.949 13.579 2.518 0.421
WCPC-MSR 12 28,800 52.429 67.187 16.277 3.165 0.306
Total 64 153,600 64.998 70.830 17.600 2.129 0.266
Averages are based on minutes [5,25] of the game phase.
TABLE D.6: OLS regressions of market variables on industry structures.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariate am ψm piAB piD C˜S
WC 4.768 9.251 2.135 0.004 −0.080
(9.504) (7.990) (2.075) (0.587) (0.074)
WCPC −24.380∗∗∗ −13.892∗ −3.897∗ 1.082∗∗∗ 0.144∗
(9.130) (7.645) (1.973) (0.406) (0.073)
MSR 0.175 5.412 1.333 −0.071 −0.047
(8.100) (6.624) (1.692) (0.383) (0.062)
WC x MSR −7.377 −0.334 −0.724 1.419∗ 0.004
(12.972) (10.884) (2.800) (0.755) (0.102)
WCPC x MSR 4.441 6.826 1.365 0.718 −0.067
(12.501) (10.339) (2.668) (0.573) (0.099)
Period 0.004∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ > −0.001 > −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 65.707∗∗∗ 62.550∗∗∗ 15.929∗∗∗ 1.539∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗
(5.886) (4.647) (1.175) (0.344) (0.043)
Observations 153,600 153,600 153,600 153,600 153,600
Clustered standard errors (by cohort) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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FIGURE D.9: Average wholesale (dashed) and retail (solid) market prices over time across treat-
ments. For purposes of illustration, every point in the graphs is a median over 50
subsequent ticks.
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TABLE D.7: Treatment comparisons of the wholesale market price am.
NR MSR
WM 73.573 ∼ 72.572
< ∗ ∼
WC 86.085 >∗ 83.082
> ∗∗∗ > ∗∗
WCPC 40.540 ∼ 49.049
< ∗∗∗ < ∗∗
WM 73.573 72.572
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
TABLE D.8: Treatment comparisons of the retail market price ψm.
NR MSR
WM 65.499 ∼ 83.124
< ∗∗ < ∗∗
WC 88.407 ∼ 92.281
> ∗∗∗ > ∗∗∗
WCPC 49.560 <∗ 67.415
< ∗∗ ∼
WM 65.499 83.124
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
TABLE D.9: Treatment comparisons of the integrated firms’ average profit piAB.
NR MSR
WM 16.383 ∼ 20.750
< ∗∗ ∼
WC 22.434 ∼ 22.802
> ∗∗∗ > ∗∗∗
WCPC 12.243 <∗ 15.866
< ∗∗∗ ∼
WM 16.383 20.750
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE D.10: Treatment comparisons of the reseller’s profit piD.
NR MSR
WM 0.899 ∼ 1.028
∼ < ∗∗
WC 0.258 <∗∗∗ 2.339
< ∗∗∗ ∼
WCPC 2.491 ∼ 2.322
∼ > ∗∗∗
WM 0.899 1.028
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
TABLE D.11: Treatment comparisons of the consumer surplus C˜S.
NR MSR
WM 0.292 ∼ 0.153
> ∗ > ∗∗
WC 0.097 ∼ 0.062
< ∗∗∗ < ∗∗∗
WCPC 0.461 >∗∗ 0.298
> ∗∗∗ > ∗
WM 0.292 0.153
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
TABLE D.12: Quantile regression of integrated firms’ profit on access provider role under
wholesale monopoly.
Covariate pii
Firm A 5.416∗∗∗
(1.805)
Period 0.001
(0.001)
Constant 18.604∗∗∗
(3.972)
Observations 57,600
Clustered standard errors (by cohort) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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